List of practice Questions

Jurisprudence progresses as well as regresses. The late nineteenth-century analysis of rights which Hohfeld brought to completion makes a notable advance in clarity. But rights of each of the four Hohfeldian types are spoken of by Aquinas, as well as by the civilian lawyers of his age (and indeed of earlier ages). The word ‘right’ translates the Latin ius or jus, the root of the word’s ‘justice’, ‘jurist’, ‘juridical’, and ‘jurisprudence’. Though Aquinas does not use the plural forms of the word ius as often as we use the plural ‘rights’, it is a sheer mistake to claim, as some have, that he lacked or repudiated the concept of rights in the modern sense, in which a right is ‘subjective’ in the sense of belonging to someone (the
subject of the right). When he defines justice as the steady willingness to give to others what is theirs, Aquinas immediately goes on to treat that phrase as synonymous with their right (ius suum); hence he treats a right/rights (ius/iura) as subjective. He also uses the word to speak of ‘objective’ right, that is, what interpersonal action or relationship is right-morally or legally, depending upon the context. Hobbes, who got inspired much in Benthamite and Austinian positivism, spurned the classical juristic tradition and defined ‘right’ as liberty in the sense of sheer absence of duty. So, people have most rights in the state of nature where they have no duties. This move exemplifies regression in legal and,
more generally, in political and moral philosophy. Fortunately, the mistake is quite obvious. If no one has any duties to or in respect of others, it will be more accurate to say that no one has any rights at all. For everyone, in such a state of affairs, is subject to being destroyed or abused by everyone and anyone else, and everyone’s actions can be impeded as much as any person or group cares, and is able, to arrange. The truth is that the concept of a right makes little sense save as (the Hohfeldian claim-right) a correlative of someone else’s duty, or (the Hohfeldian liberty) as protected by someone else’s duty of non-interference, or (the Hohfeldian power) as promoted by the duty of officials and others to recognize and
effectuate one’s acts-in-the-law (or their ethical counterparts), or (the Hohfeldian immunity) as protected by a similar duty of officials and others not to recognize another’s juridical acts as it purportedly bears on my position.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Edited by Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma, and Scott J. Shapiro)

The Supreme Court affirmed that it is a well-established principle of administrative law that an adjudicatory body cannot base its decision on any material unless the person against whom it is sought to be utilized has been apprised of it and given an opportunity to respond to it. The court noted from MP Jain & SN Jain’s treatise on Principles of Administrative Law that if the adjudicatory body is going to rely on any material, evidence or document for its decision against a party, then the same must be brought to his notice and he be given an opportunity to rebut it or comment thereon. It is regarded as a fundamental principle of natural justice that no material ought to be relied on against a party without giving him an opportunity to respond to the same... The right to know the material on which the authority is going to base its decision is an element of the right to defend oneself. If without disclosing any evidence to the party, the authority takes it into its consideration, and decides the matter against the party, then the decision is vitiated for it amounts to denial of a real and effective opportunity to the party to meet the case against him.
On the issue of the impact of such non-disclosure the Court referred to its earlier pronouncements and summarised the principles thus – A quasi-judicial authority has a duty to disclose the material that has been relied upon at the stage of adjudication. The actual test is whether the material that is required to be disclosed is relevant for purpose of adjudication. If it is, then the principles of natural justice require its due disclosure. The aggrieved person must be able to prove that prejudice has been caused to him due to non-disclosure. To prove prejudice, he must prove that had the material been disclosed to him the outcome or the punishment would have been different.
(Extract with Edits taken from in Deepak Ananda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 11 SCC 130)

International Organisations have had a significant impact on the development of international law, effectively contributing to the establishment of a global constitutional system. According to Henkin, international organisations “represent new laws at its birth, for it is itself a child of law”. For instance, the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and its specialised agencies and other international organisations have played a crucial role in shaping international law. The World Health Organisation (WHO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) are among the organisations that have contributed to the significant transformation of international law sources, actors and processes over the past century. Since its establishment with an initial membership of fifty-one states, UN has undergone significant development, becoming a diverse and multidimensional global institution with a current membership of 193 nations. The UN has positioned itself as a global constitutional organisation, striving to safeguard and uphold a minimal world order. Numerous experts in International Law recognise the UN as a crucial international organisation for the maintenance of peace and security.
(Rawa Almakky,“The Role of International Organisations in the Development of International Law: An Analytical Assessment of the United Nations”, International Scientific Journal on LAW and WORLD, Vol. 9 No. 28, 2023)

As new situations arise; the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. It should keep pace with changing socio-economic norms. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialized economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for that matter in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build up our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because the new law does not recognize the rule of strict and absolute liability, we cannot have it too. Court should not feel inhibited by this rule merely because the new law does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety. The court discussed the scope of the Epistolary jurisdiction and reiterated that procedure being merely a handmaid of justice should not stand in the way to access to justice.
(Extracted with edits from M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395)

The jurisdiction of this court has been invoked for protecting the Great Indian Bustard and the Lesser Florican, both of whom are on the verge of extinction. India faces a number of pressing near term challenges that directly impact the right to a healthy environment, particularly for vulnerable and indigenous communities including forest dwellers. The lack of reliable electricity supply for many citizens not only hinders economic development but also disproportionately affects communities, including women and low-income households, further perpetuating inequalities. Therefore, the right to a healthy environment encapsulates the principle that every individual has the entitlement to live in an environment that is clean, safe, and conducive to their well-being. The promotion of renewable energy sources plays a crucial role in promoting social equity by ensuring access to clean and affordable energy of all segments of society, especially in rural and undeserved areas. This contributes to poverty alleviation, enhances quality of life, and fosters inclusive growth and development across the nation. Therefore, transitioning to renewable energy is not just an environmental imperative but also a strategic investment in India’s future prosperity, resilience and sustainability. The right to equality under Art. 14 and the right to life under Art. 21 must be appreciated in the context of the decisions of this court, the actions and commitments of the state on national and international level, and scientific consensus on climate change and its adverse effects. By recognising the right to a healthy
environment, states are compelled to prioritise environmental protection and sustainable development, thereby addressing the root cause of climate change and safeguarding the well-being of present and future generations.
(Extract taken from MK Ranjitsinh and Ors v. Union of India, 2024 SC)

The Supreme Court recently examined the interplay between Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 47 of the Registration Act titled “time from which registered document operates” states that registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration has been required or made. On the other hand, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that the transfer of immovable property of value above Rs. 100 can be made only by a registered document. It is a trite law that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be made by a deed of conveyance and in the absence of such deed that is duly stamped and registered as required by law, no right, title or interest in the immovable property can be transferred. The Court referred to an earlier decision in Ram Saran Lall v. Domini Kuer where a harmonious balance was maintained between the peremptory language of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and the deeming fiction under Section 47 of the registration act. It also implicitly recognised that Section 54 draws a clear distinction between transfer of tangible immovable property of value more Rs. 100 and less than Rs. 100. In the former case, such transfer can only be made through a registered instrument, whereas in the latter case the transfer may be either by registered instrument or by delivery of property.
(Extract from Kanwar Raj Singh v. Gejo, 2024 SC)

Article 21 of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. Conversely, we think that a person is entitled to the protection of his liberty only in accordance with law. When a person’s liberty cannot be violated in breach of a law, can a person’s liberty be protected even in the face of a breach or violation of law? In other words, should rule of law prevail over personal liberty of a person or vice-versa? Further, should this Court weigh in favour of a person’s freedom and liberty even when it has been established that the same was granted in violation of law? Should the scales of justice tilt against rule of law? We wish to make it clear that only when rule of law prevails will liberty and all other fundamental rights would prevail under our Constitution including the right to equality and equal protection of law as enshrined in Article 14 thereof. Justice Nagarathna, who authored the judgement, began her pronouncement by invoking classical Greek Philosopher Plato. “Punishment is to be inflicted not for the sake of vengeance but for the sake of prevention and reformation. In his treatise, Plato reasons that the lawgiver, as far as he can, ought to imitate the doctor who does not apply his drug with a view to pain only, but to do the patient good. This curative theory of punishment likens penalty to medicine administered for the sake of the one being
chastised. Thus, if a criminal is curable, he ought to be improved by education and other suitable arts and the set free as a better citizen and less of a burden to the state. This postulate lies at the heart of the policy of remission.” Having said that, she also pointed out the competing interests involved, of the rights of the victim’s family to justice and the right of the convicts to a second chance by remission or reduction of their sentence. She added, “A woman deserves respect howsoever high or low she may otherwise be considered in the society or whatever faith she may follow or whatever creed she may belong to. Can heinous crime against women permit remission of the convicts by a reduction in their sentence and
by granting them liberty?”
(This extract has been taken from Bilkis Yakoob Rasul v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 481)

The Indian Contract Act is a classical model of contract law that covers various codes that govern general contracts as well as specific contracts. Contract of Bailment, one such type of contract under the Indian law of contract, talks about the delivery of goods from one person to another for a purpose. Under this contract, the bailee is given a right to lien. Right to lien is defined under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which talks about the general right to lien of bankers, wharfingers, factors, attorneys of high courts and policy brokers.
Generally, two parties are involved. The banker who lends money to the borrower or the customer, who then provides a security in exchange for the loan. Both parties are entitled to some of the rights that are associated with the securities that were provided. It is a possessory right which allows the bank to have temporary possession of the goods until 17 * PG the customer’s outstanding debt is paid. The banker the right to act as the trustee of the property as long as they are acting within their powers as the custodian and do not sell the property without giving notice to the customer. The landmark judgment of Syndicate Bank v. Vijay Kumar and Others dealt with the issue of whether or not a banker’s right to lien and set off was a general and customary right guaranteed to them. In furtherance of Halsbury’s laws of England, this judgment recognised the banker’s right to general lien was a right guaranteed by the law and not the contract.
(Extracted with edits from “Critical Analysis of Bankers Right of General Lien” by Alisha Khalid Bhendwade, IJLRA, Vol. II, 2024)

“The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status. It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsels appearing for the Petitioner that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Art. 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice......”
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Art. 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. This is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
It is apparent that the power under Art. 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is
entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court. In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 SC, this court stated that the same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate
or relevant reasons for passing the order.
[Extract from the judgment of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1]

Whether an agreement is a mortgage by conditional sale or sale with an option to repurchase is a vexed question to be considered in the facts of each case. The essentials of an agreement, to qualify as a mortgage by conditional sale, can succinctly be summarized. An ostensible sale with transfer of possession and ownership, but containing a clause for reconveyance in accordance with Section 58(c) of the Act, will clothe the agreement as a mortgage by conditional sale. Referring to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act the observed, “A deeming fiction was added in the negative that a transaction shall not be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition for reconveyance is contained in the document which purports to effect the sale.” The issue under adjudication was whether the transaction between the parties was an absolute sale of the property or it was a mortgage. The court relied upon the case Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Prasad and Anr, 2006 SC and held that A bare perusal of the said provision clearly shows that a mortgage by conditional sale must be evidenced by one document whereas a sale with condition of retransfer may be evidenced by more than one document. A sale with a condition of retransfer is not a mortgage. It is not a partial transfer. By reason of such a transfer all rights have been transferred reserving only a personal right to the purchaser and such a personal right would be lost unless the same is exercised within the stipulated time. The execution of separate agreement for reconveyance, either contemporaneously or subsequently, shall militate against the agreement being mortgaged by conditional sale. There must exist a debtor and creditor relationship. The valuation of the property, and the transaction value, along with the duration of time for reconveyance, are important considerations to decide the nature of the agreement. There will have to be a cumulative consideration of these factors, along with the recitals in the agreement, intention of the parties, coupled with other attendant circumstances, considered in a holistic manner. The language used in the agreement may not always be conclusive. (Extract from Prakash (Dead) By LR. V. G. Aradhya & Ors, 2023 SC)

In the present case, the levy of IGST on the supply of ocean freight services under the reverse charge mechanism on the importer, when the value of such service is already included in the transaction value of imported goods, amounts to double taxation. The concept of double taxation implies that the same subject matter is taxed twice when it should be taxed only once. The GST law, as framed, does not envisage taxation of a transaction twice, and the fundamental principles of GST do not support such an imposition. Further, the importer, who is not the recipient of the service but is treated as a deemed recipient under the reverse charge mechanism, cannot be made liable to pay tax on a service that they have not directly availed. This stretches the scope of reverse charge mechanism beyond its intended purpose, which is to simplify tax collection by shifting the liability to pay tax from the service provider to the service recipient, particularly in cases where the service provider is located outside India and does not have a presence within the taxable territory. Moreover, the constitutional framework requires that a tax should be levied with legislative competence and should not contravene any fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The imposition of IGST on ocean freight under the reverse charge mechanism without proper legislative backing undermines the very essence of taxation principles enshrined in the Constitution of India.
(This extract is taken from Mohit Minerals v. Union of India CA No. 1390/2022)

In Kapilaben v. Ashok Kumar Jayantilal Sheth, (2020) 20 SCC 648, the Supreme Court has considered that the assignment of a contract might result in a transfer of either rights or obligations thereunder. The transfer of obligations is not possible without the consent of the other party. However, the transfer of rights is permissible, except in cases where the contract is of a personal nature. “It is well-settled that the term ‘representative-in-interest’ includes the assignee of a contractual interest. Though the provisions of the Contract Act do not particularly deal with the assignability of contracts, the court has opined time and again that a party to a contract cannot assign their obligations or liabilities without the consent of the other party. A Constitution Bench in Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) (P) Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 1810], has laid out this principle as follows: “An assignment of a contract might result by transfer either of the rights or of the obligations thereunder. However, there is a well-recognised distinction between these two classes of assignments. As a rule, obligations under a contract cannot be assigned except with the consent of the promisee, and when such consent is given, it is really a novation resulting in substitution of liabilities. On the other hand, rights under a contract are assignable unless the contract is personal in its nature or the rights are incapable of assignment either under the law or under an agreement between the parties.”
[Extracted with edits from Indira Devi v. Veena Gupta, (2023) 8 SCC 124]

Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer (1956 SCR 199) the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: “This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word ‘especially’ underscores facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. It added, if the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than him whether he did or did not.” It is evident that it cannot be the intention and Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on the accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. the King. 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R, 1936-3 All ER 36 at p.49 (B). In case resting on circumstantial evidence, an accused person’s failure to provide a reasonable explanation as required by S. 106 could serve as an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
(Based on facts from State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors, AIR 2000SUPREME COURT 2988)

SEBI was established as India’s principal capital markets regulator with the aim to protect the interest of investors in securities and promote the development and regulation of the securities market in India. SEBI is empowered to regulate the securities market in India by the SEBI Act 1992, the SCRA and the Depositories Act 1996. SEBI’s powers to regulate the securities market are wide and include delegated legislative, administrative, and adjudicatory powers to enforce SEBI’s regulations. SEBI exercises its delegated legislative power by inter alia framing regulations and appropriately amending them to keep up with the dynamic nature of the securities’ market. SEBI has issued a number of regulations on various areas of security regulation which form the backbone of the framework governing the securities market in India.
Section 11 of the SEBI Act lays down the functions of SEBI and expressly states that it “shall be the duty of the Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market, by such measures as it thinks fit”. Further, Section 30 of the SEBI Act empowers SEBI to make regulations consistent with the Act. Significantly, while framing these regulations, SEBI consults its advisory committees consisting of domain experts, including market experts, leading market players, legal experts, technology experts, retired Judges of this Court or the High Courts, academicians, representatives of industry associations and investor associations. During the consultative process, SEBI also invites and duly considers comments from the public on their proposed regulations. SEBI follows similar consultative processes while reviewing and amending its regulations.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 171)

For a principle to be acceptable as a law, Lon Fuller states that it must be measured in terms of the following eight standards: (1) The principle must be expounded in a manner so that it can be generally applied. A pattern less ad hoc system of law lacks the desired “internal morality” which legal principles should possess. This proposition is comparable to the often-read statement that our government is a government of laws rather than men. (2) The mandates of the law must be communicated to the people to whom they are directed. (3) Newly announced principles of law, except on rare occasions, should be applied only in a prospective manner. Retroactive application of changes in prescribed norms, subject to the presence of compelling extenuating circumstances, should be avoided. (4) Standards of action and inaction should be clearly stated. Fuller concedes that the lawmaker cannot specify with absolute clarity exactly what is demanded of each individual in every instance when the law may affect him. He does, however, assert that the duty to clarify the law should be delegated to the enforcement bodies only to the extent that such action is required by the environment in which the law must operate. (5) Arguing that respect for the law calls for consistency, Fuller maintains that the originators of laws should take great pains to see that the body of law is as free as possible from contradictory mandates, (6) Emphasizing that law is tied to the capabilities of human beings, Fuller insists that those who prescribe the norms required of individuals must refrain from imposing impossible standards of action or inaction. A stated norm which demands an absurd course of action would violate Fuller’s idea of the “internal morality of law.” (7) While stare decisis, of recent date, has been viewed by some, if not many people, as a barrier on the pathways to needed change, Fuller is of the opinion that abiding by previously announced norms is desirable in and of itself. He finds that frequency of change, by its very nature, tends to have a deleterious impact upon the persons who are subjected to an abrupt alteration of the requirements which the law imposes upon them. (8) The student of American history is familiar with Andrew Jackson’s assertion to the effect that while the Supreme Court might render a judgment, it lacked the means by which it might be implemented.
[Extracted from Tucker, Edwin W. (1965) “The Morality of Law, by Lon L. Fuller,” Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 40: Iss. 2, Article5.]

The landmark judgment of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa & Others, delivered by the Supreme Court of India in 1978, significantly influenced the interpretation of the term ‘industry’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case cantered on whether the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, a statutory body, could be classified as an industry under the Act, thereby making its employees eligible for certain protections and benefits. Prior to this case, the definition of ‘industry’ had been subject to varied interpretations, leading to confusion and inconsistency in its application. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, broadly defined ‘industry’ to include any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture, or calling of employers and any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. However, this expansive definition left room for ambiguity, especially concerning statutory bodies and non-profit organizations. In this case, the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board argued that it was not an industry, emphasizing its statutory duties and public welfare objectives. The Board contended that its primary purpose was to provide essential services, not to engage in profit-making activities typical of private enterprises. On the other hand, the respondents, including A. Rajappa, argued that the Board’s activities fell within the scope of an industry as defined by the Act, and thus, its employees should be entitled to the benefits and protections accorded to workers in industries. The Supreme Court, in its judgment, undertook a comprehensive analysis of the term ‘industry.’ The bench, led by Chief Justice M. Hameedullah Beg, laid down a broad and inclusive definition of ‘industry.’ The Court asserted that what mattered was the nature of the activity and the relationship between the employer and the employees. This interpretation aimed to ensure that a wide range of workers, including those employed in public utility services, statutory bodies, and even some non-profit organizations, would be covered under the protective umbrella of the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others had far-reaching implications. It extended the scope of labour protections to a broader spectrum of workers, ensuring that more employees could benefit from the dispute resolution mechanisms and other safeguards provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. This judgment underscored the judiciary’s role in interpreting labour laws to promote social justice and protect workers’ rights in a rapidly industrializing nation.
(Extract from Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others, 1978 2 SCC)

Dominic Ongwen, a former commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, was convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in February 2021. The case marked a significant milestone in international criminal law, focusing on issues of child soldiering, forced marriage, and sexual and gender-based violence. Ongwen was found guilty of 61 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, enslavement, forced marriage, rape, and conscription of children under the age of 15 into armed groups. The ICC’s judgment emphasized the importance of accountability for leaders who exploit children in conflicts and commit sexual and gender-based crimes.
A critical aspect of the judgment was the consideration of Ongwen’s own history as a child soldier. Ongwen was abducted by the LRA at around the age of nine and was forced to commit atrocities as he rose through the ranks. The court balanced this background against the gravity of his crimes, ultimately ruling that his personal history did not absolve him of responsibility for his actions as an adult commander. The judgment is also notable for its comprehensive approach to reparations for victims. The ICC ordered collective reparations, including symbolic measures like memorials, physical and psychological rehabilitation, and financial compensation to support the victims and their communities. This case reinforces the ICC’s commitment to addressing serious international crimes, particularly those involving vulnerable populations such as children and women and underscores the principles of justice and reparation in international criminal law.
(This extract is taken from Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (ICC, 2021))

The right kind of education consists in understanding the child as he is without imposing upon him an ideal of what we think he should be. To enclose him in the framework of an ideal is to encourage him to conform, which breeds fear and produces in him a constant conflict between what he is and what he should be: and all inward conflicts have their outward manifestations in society. If the parent loves the child, he observes him, he studies his tendencies, his moods, and peculiarities. It is only when one feels no love for the child that one imposes upon him an ideal, for then one's ambitions are trying to fulfill themselves in him, wanting him to become this or that. If one loves, not the ideal but the child, then there is a possibility of helping him to understand himself as he is.
Ideals are a convenient escape, and the teacher who follows them is incapable of understanding his students and dealing with them intelligently; for him, the future ideal, the what should be, is far more important than the present child. The pursuit of an ideal excludes love, and without love no human problem can be solved. If the teacher is of the right kind, he will not depend on a method, but will study each individual pupil. In our relationship with children and young people, we are not dealing with mechanical devices that can be quickly repaired, but with living beings who are impressionable, volatile, sensitive, afraid, affectionate: and to deal with them, we have to have great understanding, the strength of patience and love. When we lack these, we look to quick and easy remedies and hope for marvellous and automatic results. If we are unaware, mechanical in our attitudes and actions, we fight shy of any demand upon us that is disturbing and that cannot be met by an automatic response, and this is one of our major difficulties in education.
(Extract with edits from "The right kind of Education" by J. Krishna Murti)

Education is not the amount of information that is put into your brain and runs riot there, undigested, all your life. We must have life-building, man-making, character-making assimilation of ideas.... If education were identical with information, the libraries are the sages in the world and encyclopaedias are the rishis. Getting by heart the thoughts of others in a foreign language and stuffing your brain with them and taking some University degree, you consider yourself educated. Is this education? What is the goal of your education? Open your eyes and see what a piteous cry for food is rising in the land of Bharata, proverbial for its food. Will your education fulfill this want?
We want that education by which character is formed, strength of mind is increased, the intellect is expanded and by which one can stand on one's own feet. What we need to study independent of foreign control, different branches of the knowledge that is our own, and with it the English language and Western science; we need technical education and all else that will develop industries so that men instead of seeking for service may earn enough to provide for themselves and save against a rainy day. The end of all education, all training, should be man-making. The end and aim of all training are to make the man grow. The training by which the current expression of will are brought under control and become fruitful, is called education. What our country now wants are muscles of iron and nerves of steel, gigantic wills, which nothing can resist, which can penetrate into the mysteries and secrets of the universe and will accomplish their purpose in any fashion, even if it meant going down to the bottom of the ocean, meeting death face to face.
There is only one method of attaining knowledge. It is by concentration. The very essence of education is concentration of mind. From the lowest to the highest man, all have to use the same method to attain knowledge. The chemist who works in the laboratory concentrates on elements to analyze them. Knowledge is acquired by concentration.
[Extracted with edits from "Education" by Swami Vivekananda]

Punctually at midday, he opened his bag and spread out his professional equipment, which consisted of a dozen cowrie shells, a square piece of cloth with obscure mystic charts on it, a notebook, and a bundle of palmyra writing. His forehead was dazzling with sacred ash and vermilion, and his eyes sparkled with a sharp, abnormal gleam which was really an outcome of a continual searching look for customers, but which his simple clients took to be a prophetic light and felt comforted. The power of his eyes was considerably enhanced by their position placed as they were between the painted forehead and the dark whiskers which streamed down his cheeks: even a half-wit's eyes would sparkle in such a setting. People were attracted to him as bees are attracted to cosmos or dahlia stalks, He sat under the boughs of a spreading tamarind tree which flanked a path running through the town hall park, It was a remarkable place in many ways: a surging crowd was always moving up and down this narrow road morning till night. A variety of trades and occupations was represented all along its way: medicine sellers, sellers of stolen hardware and junk, magicians, and, above all, an auctioneer of cheap cloth, who created enough din all day to attract the whole town. Next to him in vociferousness came a vendor of fried groundnut, who gave his ware a fancy name each day, calling it "Bombay Ice Cream" one day, and on the next "Delhi Almond," and on the third "Raja's Delicacy," and so on and so forth, and people flocked to him. A considerable portion of this crowd dallied before the astrologer too. The astrologer transacted his business by the light of a flare which crackled and smoked up above the groundnut heap nearby.
(Extracted with edits from "An Astrologer's Day" by R.K. Narayan)

The "Nari Shakti Vandan Adhiniyam", 2023 Act received near-unanimous support in both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. The legislation mandates the reservation of one-third of all seats in the Lok Sabha, state legislative assemblies, and Delhi (as a union territory with an elected assembly) for women. This linking of the implementation of the Act to the implementing of two long-term exercises of census and delimitation, makes little sense to many, and sounds quite like empowerment delayed for now.
In a 2012 article 'Holding Up Half the Sky: Reservations for Women in India', Rudolf C Heredia breaks down the common misconceptions that cloud our understanding of women's political participation- "When women do attain a national leadership role it is often because they have inherited the mantle from their fathers ophusbands, rather than as persons in their own right and are then projected as matriarchs, part of the joint family, complementary to the patriarchy rather than a challenge to it."
In 'Equality versus Empowerment: Women in Indian Legislature', 2023, Soumya Bhowmick makes the case for going a step beyond quotas, and to turn our attention to the complexities that shape women's agency in the country. This, he argues, would require a bottoms-up approach, rather than merely handing out reservations in a top-down manner. "In a country like India with a considerably large heterogeneous population, the dissemination of legislative power would be insufficient to protect the interests of minority groups such as women, Scheduled Castes, and Scheduled Tribes." He concludes that "implementing the idea of reservation for women would bring about descriptive representation, but its transformation into substantive representation would depend on the change in the attitudes of the people."
While the reservation of one-third of seats for women belonging to the scheduled castes and tribes under the amendment to article 330a and 332 of the constitution is a welcome step, it remains to be seen whether it fully acknowledges the complex interplay of hierarchies, socio-political relationships which also affect the extent and nature of complications that surround effective realisation of women's politics for Indian politics to emerge as a truly emancipatory space.

In keeping with the slogan for this year's Olympics, "Games Wide Open," the opening ceremony took place outside a stadium setting by the river, for the first time. In many respects, the Paris Games turned out to be one of the most elaborate cultural rituals since Covid swept across the world beginning in late 2019. Health restrictions forced the organizers of Tokyo 2020 and Beijing 2022 to sharply limit the scale of the festivities, with events largely closed to the public. Paris 2024, powered in part by pent-up demand for communal experiences, symbolized an international post-pandemic vibe shift.
The International Olympic Committee and French officials managed strict security measures in place. Yet the recent history of violence in France - including the 2015 terror attack in Paris that left 138 people dead and at least 416 injured - stalked public consciousness prior to the games. The geopolitical backdrop for the Paris Games was no less troubling. The war between Israel and Hamas which had crossed the six-month mark, raised fears of a protracted conflict and wider regional instability. The devastation in the Gaza Strip has provoked international outrage, isolating Israel on the global stage. Meanwhile, Russia continues to gain ground in its military offensive against Ukraine as some Western nations worry about the rise of authoritarianism. These international crises raised serious concerns that could come into play during the Games in the form of protests and other political demonstrations.
Nevertheless, Olympics organizers put up a show that stunned the throngs assembled on the boulevards of Paris, not to mention the millions of people who watched the Games unfold on their televisions and mobile devices. At the Paris 2024 Olympics, India secured a total of six medals; one silver and five bronze which was one down from the highest haul of medals from the previous Olympics. Neeraj Chopra earned a silver in men's javelin with an 89.45 throw, narrowly missing gold to Pakistan's Arshad Nadeem. Shooter Manu Bhaker made history by clinching bronze in the women's 10'm air pistol, becoming the first Indian woman to win a medal in Olympic shooting. The men's hockey team achieved a second consecutive bronze, defeating Spain 2-1, with captain Harmanpreet Singh scoring both goals.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from "The Olympics are nearly here. For a weary world, they can't come soon enough", NBCNEWS)

During the First World War, Indian merchants and industrialists wanted protection against imports of foreign goods, and a rupee-sterling foreign exchange ratio that would discourage imports. To organise business interests, they formed the Indian Industrial and Commercial Congress in 1920 and the Federation of the Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industries (FICCI) in 1927. The industrialists attacked colonial control over the Indian economy and supported the Civil Disobedience Movement when it was first launched. They gave financial assistance and refused to buy or sell imported goods. After the failure of the Round Table Conference, business groups were no longer uniformly enthusiastic. They were apprehensive of the spread of militant activities, and worried about prolonged disruption of business, as well as of the growing influence of socialism amongst the younger members of the Congress.
The industrial working classes did not participate in the Civil Disobedience Movement in large numbers, except in the Nagpur region. As the industrialists came closer to the Congress, workers stayed aloof. But inspite of that, some workers did participate in the Civil Disobedience Movement, selectively adopting some of the ideas of the Gandhian programme, like boycott of foreign goods, as part of their own movements against low wages and poor working conditions. There were strikes by railway workers in 1930 and dockworkers in 1932. In 1930, thousands of workers in Chotanagpur tin mines wore Gandhi caps and participated in protest rallies and boycott campaigns. But the Congress was reluctant to include workers' demands as part of its programme of struggle. It felt that this would alienate industrialists and divide the anti-imperial forces.
Another important feature of the Civil Disobedience Movement was the large-scale participation of women. During Gandhiji's salt march, thousands of women came out of their homes to listen to him. They participated in protest marches, manufactured salt, and picketed foreign cloth and liquor shops. Many went to jail.
[Excerpt from Chapter II - Nationalism in India, India and the Contemporary World, NCERT]

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi used a BRICS summit in Russia recently to showcase ambitions for a more harmonious relationship between the world's two most populous countries after years of animosity.
The meeting between Xi and Modi, who have not held formal talks for five years, was one highlight of a summit. BRICS also gave an opportunity to the Russian President Vladimir Putin for showcasing that the West had failed to isolate Russia over the Ukraine war.
A final communique listed a number of projects aimed at facilitating trade between BRICS nations including an alternative payment system to the dollar but did not include details or timelines.
Just two days after New Delhi announced that it had reached a deal with Beijing to resolve a four-year military stand-off on their disputed Himalayan frontier, Xi told Modi that they should enhance communication and cooperation and effectively manage differences.
BRICS - an idea thought up inside Goldman Sachs two decades ago to describe the growing economic clout of China and other major emerging markets - is now a group that accounts for 45% of the world's population and 35% of the global economy.
Former Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neill, who coined the BRIC term in 2001, told Reuters that he had little optimism for the BRICS club as long as China and India remained so divided.
"It seems to me basically to be a symbolie annual gathering where important emerging countries, particularly noisy ones like Russia, but also China, can basically get together and highlight how good it is to be part of something that doesn't involve the U.S. and that global governance isn't good enough,"
The 43-page final communique from the summit ranged from geopolitics and narcoties to artificial intelligence and even the preservation of Big Cats, but lacked detail on some major issues. It mentioned Ukraine just once.
(Excerpts from "Putin scores a BRICS win with rare Xi and Modi show of harmony" By Vladimir Soldatkin and Guy Faulconbridge, Reuters, October 23, 2024)