In the Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India case, the issue of double taxation under GST on ocean freight services was addressed. When the value of the ocean freight service is already included in the transaction value of imported goods, imposing Integrated Goods and Services Tax (IGST) under the reverse charge mechanism (RCM) on the importer represents double taxation. The GST framework is designed to avoid taxing the same subject matter more than once. In this context, the answer to what constitutes double taxation in the issue at hand is: Tax not payable on ocean freight under the RCM for CIF imports. The reverse charge mechanism was primarily intended to simplify the tax process, transferring tax payment liability from the service provider to the service recipient, especially when the service provider is outside Indian territory. However, in this case, the importer is not the actual recipient of the service but is treated as a deemed recipient under the RCM, leading to an undue tax liability without direct service provision. This falls outside the norms and principles of GST and lacks sufficient legislative backing as per the constitutional tax provisions in India.
In the context of legal and constitutional requirements for levying a tax, it is essential that the tax must have legislative competence and must not contravene fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. This principle ensures that all taxes imposed are backed by appropriate legislative authority, meaning that the government body enacting the tax has the power to do so as defined by the law. Furthermore, the imposition of a tax should respect the fundamental rights of individuals, ensuring that such rights are not violated in the collection and administration of taxes.
This criterion was highlighted in the case summary of Mohit Minerals v. Union of India. It involved the levy of IGST (Integrated Goods and Services Tax) on ocean freight services under the reverse charge mechanism. The judgment found that this imposition amounted to double taxation because the value of the ocean freight service was already included in the transaction value of imported goods. Under GST principles, double taxation is not anticipated, and the Indian Constitution requires that taxes adhere to established legislative authority without infringing on constitutional rights. The imposition of the tax in this scenario was deemed inconsistent with these legal and constitutional guidelines, as it lacked proper legislative backing and extended beyond the intended scope of reverse charge mechanisms.
The correct choice regarding the constitutional requirement for levying a tax, as discussed in this case, is that the tax should have legislative competence and not contravene fundamental rights.
| Options | Explanation |
|---|---|
| The tax should be easy to administer | Convenience in administration is practical but not a constitutional requirement. |
| The tax should have legislative competence and not contravene fundamental rights | Constitutional requirement ensuring legal backing and respect for fundamental rights. |
| The tax should be progressive in nature | Progressivity is related to equity and fairness but not a constitutional requirement. |
| The tax should only apply to domestic transactions | Application to domestic transactions is jurisdictional, not a constitutional mandate. |
Section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, which is an inclusive definition, inter alia, provides that relinquishment of an asset or extinguishment of any right therein amounts to a transfer of a capital asset. While the taxpayer continues to remain a shareholder of the company even with the reduction of share capital, it could not be accepted that there was no extinguishment of any part of his right as a shareholder qua the company. A company under Section 66 of the Companies Act, 2013 has a right to reduce the share capital and one of the modes which could be adopted is to reduce the face value of the preference share. When as a result of reducing the face value of the share, the share capital is reduced, the right of the preference shareholder to the dividend or his share capital and the right to share in the distribution of the net assets upon liquidation is extinguished proportion ately to the extent of reduction in the capital. Such a reduction of the right of the capital asset clearly amounts to a transfer within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Principal Commissioner of Income Tax v. Jupiter Capital Pvt Ltd., (2025 INSC 38)
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473