Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act indicates that when a fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon them. This section primarily applies to parties involved in the legal proceedings who would naturally have particular knowledge of certain facts that are central to the issues at hand. In legal terms, it is generally accepted that the term ‘any person’ in Section 106 refers to a party to the suit/proceeding.
According to legal interpretations, such as in the case of Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer, the section is applicable in situations where it is difficult for the prosecution to prove a fact that lies exclusively within the knowledge of the defendant or respondent. The court explained that the prosecution carries the burden of proof, but Section 106 facilitates specific situations where requiring the prosecution to establish a fact would be disproportionately challenging because the fact is solely known to the accused.
Thus, 'any person' refers specifically to the parties involved rather than to external witnesses or unrelated individuals. Hence, the correct application of Section 106 involves the party engaging directly with the legal matter.
The phrase “Presumptions are like bats, flitting in the twilight but disappearing in the sunshine of facts” suggests that a presumption in legal contexts operates to allocate the burden of proof initially to a party. However, this burden is not permanent and can shift back once credible evidence refuting the presumption is introduced. In simpler terms, a presumption serves to guide the initial phase of a legal argument, but it is the strength and presence of factual evidence that ultimately governs legal decisions. Once rebutting facts are presented, they 'shine light' on the presumption, nullifying its effect.
The correct interpretation based on the provided options is: "Presumption shifts the burden of proof to the party against whom the presumption operates, but the burden shifts back to the original party once rebutting facts are presented."
In the legal context, this is supported by the doctrine illustrated in Section 106 of the Evidence Act, which emphasizes that the burden of proof typically remains with the prosecution, except in exceptional cases where facts are particularly 'within the knowledge' of the accused. As stated in Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer (1956 SCR 199), the burden can temporarily shift when such a presumption is in play, requiring the defendant to present exculpatory evidence or explanation, especially in cases driven by circumstantial evidence.
From Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, we derive certain theories related to criminal law, specifically dealing with the burden of proof. Section 106 is concerned with situations where certain facts are especially within the knowledge of the accused, making it exceptionally onerous for the prosecution to prove those facts. Based on this:
1. Theory of reverse burden of proof: This emerges directly from Section 106, which implies that when a fact is exclusively within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proof lies on him to clarify those facts. Although, it doesn't mean that the accused must prove he did not commit the crime, it allows for situations where the accused must explain certain circumstances to complete the evidentiary gap.
2. Doctrine of last seen together: This is indirectly related, as it forms part of the circumstantial evidence where the last person seen with the deceased is reasonably expected to explain what happened at that time. The burden of explanation is heavily influenced by Section 106 when the accused claims exclusive knowledge about the circumstances.
Both these theories (2 and 3) are derived from the principles enshrined in Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
Thus, the correct option is: 2 and 3.
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473