List of top Questions asked in Common Law Admission Test - PG

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Nil Ratan Kundu and another v. Abhijit Kundu’ 2008(3) Apex Court Judgements 232 (SC), while granting the custody to the maternal grandparents observed: In our judgement, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well settled and it is this. In deciding a difficult and complex question as to custody of minor, a Court of law should keep in mind relevant statutes and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a humane problem in live in relationship and is required to be solved with human touch. A Court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the Court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, may bound, to give due weight to a child’s ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favorable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable consideration. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgement, the Court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the Court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Gaurav Nagpal v. Semedha Nagpal’-(2009)1 SCC 42, while giving paramount importance to the welfare of the child, which should include moral and ethical values, besides ethical well-being, observed as under: 
When the court is confronted with conflicting demands made by the parents, each time it has to justify the demands. The Court has not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis, in such matters human angles are relevant for deciding those issues. The Court then does not give emphasis on what the parties say, it has to exercise a jurisdiction which is aimed at the welfare of the minor. As observed recently in Mausami Moitra Ganguli case, the Court has to give due weightage to the child’s ordinary contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favorable surroundings, but over and above physical comforts, the moral and ethical values have also to be noted. They are equal if not more important than the others. 
(Extracts from Jaswinder Singh and Another vs Surjit Singh, AIR 2010 (NOC) 425 (P. & H.))

The Companies Act, 2013 does not deal with insolvency and bankruptcy when the companies are unable to pay their debts or the aspects relating to the revival and rehabilitation of the companies and their winding up if revival and rehabilitation is not possible. In principle, it cannot be doubted that the cases of revival or winding up of the company on the ground of insolvency and inability to pay debts are different from cases where companies are wound up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013. The two situations are not identical. Under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013, even a running and financially sound company can also be wound up for the reasons in clauses (a) to (e). The reasons and grounds for winding up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013 are vastly different from the reasons and grounds for the revival and rehabilitation scheme as envisaged under the IBC. The two enactments deal with two distinct situations and in our opinion, they cannot be equated when we examine whether there is discrimination or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For the revival and rehabilitation of the companies, certain sacrifices are required from all quarters, including the workmen. In case of insolvent companies, for the sake of survival and regeneration, everyone, including the secured creditors and the Central and State Government, are required to make sacrifices. The workmen also have a stake and benefit from the revival of the company, and therefore unless it is found that the sacrifices envisaged for the workmen, which certainly form a separate class, are onerous and burdensome so as to be manifestly unjust and arbitrary, we will not set aside the legislation,solely on the ground that some or marginal sacrifice is to be made by the workers. We would also reject the argument that to find out whether there was a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or whether the right to life under Article 21 Constitution of India was infringed, we must word by word examine the waterfall mechanism envisaged under the Companies Act, 2013, where the company is wound up in terms of grounds (a) to (e) of Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013; and the rights of the workmen when the insolvent company is sought to be revived, rehabilitated or wound up under the Code. The grounds and situations in the context of the objective and purpose of the two enactments are entirely different.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Moser Baer Karamchari Union Thr. President Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Union of India and Ors, 2023 SCC Online SC 547)

Ahmadi, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Punchhi, J., endorsed the recommendations in the following words-The time is ripe for taking stock of the working of the various Tribunals set up in the country after the insertion of Articles 323-A and 323-B in the Constitution. After the incorporation of these two articles, Acts have been enacted where-under tribunals have been constituted for dispensation of justice. Sufficient time has passed, and experience gained in these last few years for taking stock of the situation with a view to finding out if they have served the purpose and objectives for which they were constituted. Complaints have been heard in regard to the functioning of other tribunals as well and it is time that a body like the Law Commission of India has a comprehensive look-in with a view to suggesting measures for their improved functioning. That body can also suggest changes in the different statutes and evolve a model on the basis whereof tribunals may be constituted or reconstituted with a view to ensuring greater independence. An intensive and extensive study needs to be undertaken by the Law Commission in regard to the Constitution of tribunals under various statutes with a view to ensuring their independence so that the public confidence in such tribunals may increase and the quality of their performance may improve.
Before parting with the case, it is necessary to express our anguish over the ineffectiveness of the alternative mechanism devised for judicial review. The judicial review and remedy are the fundamental rights of the citizens. The dispensation of justice by the tribunal is much to be desired.
(Extracted with Edits from R.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 119)

The elements of tort of negligence consist in – (a) duty of care; (b) duty is owed to the plaintiff; (c) the duty has been carelessly breached. Negligence does not entail liability unless the exacts a duty in the given circumstances to observe care. Duty is an obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct fraught with unreasonable risk of damage to others. The question whether duty exists in a particular situation involves determination of law. Hence, three ingredients are necessary for the existence of a duty of care: (i) foreseeability of the damage, (ii) proximity of relationship between the parties; and (iii) whether it is “just, fair and reasonable” that the law should impose a duty of care. In Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman, 1990 2AC 605, the court held that breach of duty is concerned with the standard of care that ought to have been adopted in the circumstances and whether the defendant’s conduct fell below that standard i.e., whether he was careless.
The court while quoting Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, 1997 stated that as a tort, negligence consists of legal duty to take care and breach of that duty. Duty determines whether the type of loss suffered by the plaintiff in the particular way in which to occurred can ever be actionable. The division of negligence into duty, breach and consequent damage is convenient for the purpose of exposition but it can be confusing because the issues will often overlap. The process of determining a breach of duty involves three steps: First, it is necessary to ascertain the qualities of the reasonable person, given the qualities attributed to him, would have taken in the circumstances. The factors that are permissible to take into account in this regard are prescribed by law, but the amount of care that the reasonable person would have taken is a question of fact. Thirdly, it must be determined whether the defendant took less care than the reasonable person would have taken.
 (Extracts from Managing Director, Kerala Tourism Development Corporation Limited v. Deepti Singh and Ors., 2019 SC)

Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) states that the State should not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) stipulates that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Clause (2) stipulates that no citizen shall be discriminated in or be ineligible for any employment or office under the State on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Clause (4) of the provision states that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The purpose of the equal opportunity principle in Article 16(1) and the reservation provision in Article 16(4) has emerged as a focal point of the jurisprudence on reservations in this Court. A discussion of the journey of the competing models of equality that the Court has espoused and their evolution over the course of the years is necessary to understand the constitutional vision on equality.
The impugned constitutional amendments by which Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) have been inserted, flow from Article 16 (4). They do not alter the structure of Article 16 (4). They retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons which enables the State to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the state administration under article 335. Sub-categorization within a class is a constitutional requirement to secure substantive equality in the event that there is a distinction between two sections of a class; Sub-classification must not lead to the exclusion of one of the categories in the class. A model that provides sufficient opportunities to all categories of the class must be adopted; and Sub-classification among a class must be on a reasonable basis.
Justice Bela Trivedi opined, in dissent, that presidential list of scheduled castes notified under Article 341 cannot be altered by the States. Any change to this list can only be made by a law enacted by Parliament. Sub-classification, according to her would amount to tampering with the Presidential List and undermine the object Article 341, which aims to eliminate political influence in the SC-ST List. Further, she emphasised the importance of adhering to the rule of plain and literal interpretation. She mentions that any preferential treatment for a sub-class within the presidential list would deprive other classes within the same category of their benefits. In the absence of executive or legislative power, state lack the competence to sub-classify castes and the benefit reserved for all SCs. Allowing states to do so would constitute a colourable exercise of power, which is impermissible under law. Justice Trivedi concluded by affirming that affirmative action by States must remain within constitutional boundaries and held that the law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah case was correct and should be upheld.
(Extract from The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 2024 SC)

Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 475: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 478] it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc. We have few other legislations also where reliefs have been provided to woman placed in certain vulnerable situations. Section 125 Cr.P.C. of course, provides for maintenance of a destitute wife and Section 498-A IPC is related to mental cruelty inflicted on women by her husband and in-laws. Section 304-B IPC deals with the cases relating to dowry death. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was enacted to deal with the cases of dowry demands by the husband and family members. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides for grant of maintenance to a legally wedded Hindu wife, and also deals with rules for adoption. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 refers to the provisions dealing with solemnisation of marriage also deals with the provisions for divorce. For the first time, though, the DV Act, Parliament has recognised a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simpliciter. We have already stated, when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f ) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship invariably, it may be a question of fact and degree, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the tests judicially evolved.
(This extract is taken from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755)

The environmental rule of law, at a certain level, is a facet of the concept of the rule of law. But it includes specific features that are unique to environmental governance, features which are sui generis. The environmental rule of law seeks to create essential tools such as conceptual, procedural and institutional, to bring structure to the discourse on environmental protection. It does so to enhance our understanding of environmental challenges of how they have been shaped by humanity’s interface with nature in the past, how they continue to be affected by its engagement with nature in the present and the prospects for the future, if we were not to radically alter the course of destruction which humanity’s actions have charted.
The environmental rule of law seeks to facilitate a multi-disciplinary analysis of the nature and consequences of carbon footprints and in doing so it brings a shared understanding between science, regulatory decisions and policy perspectives in the field of environmental protection. It recognises that the “law” element in the environmental rule of law does not make the concept peculiarly the preserve of Lawyers and Judges. On the contrary, it seeks to draw within the fold all stakeholders in formulating strategies to deal with current challenges posed by environmental degradation, climate change and the destruction of habitats. The environmental rule of law seeks a unified understanding of these concepts. There are significant linkages between concepts such as sustainable development, the polluter pays principle etc. The universe of nature is indivisible and integrated. The state of the environment in one part of the earth affects and is fundamentally affected by what occurs in another part. Every element of the environment shares a symbiotic relationship with the others. It is this inseparable bond and connect which the environmental rule of law seeks to explore and understand in order to find solutions to the pressing problems which threaten the existence of humanity. The environmental rule of law is founded on the need to understand the consequences of our actions going beyond local, State and national boundaries. The rise in the oceans threatens not just maritime communities. The rise in temperatures, dilution of glaciers and growing desertification have consequences which go beyond the communities and creatures whose habitats are threatened. They affect the future survival of the entire eco-system. The environmental rule of law attempts to weave an understanding of the connections in the natural environment which make the issue of survival a unified challenge which confronts human societies everywhere. 
(Extract from Pragnesh Shah v. Arunkumar Sharma (2022) 11 SCC 493 )

Jurisprudence progresses as well as regresses. The late nineteenth-century analysis of rights which Hohfeld brought to completion makes a notable advance in clarity. But rights of each of the four Hohfeldian types are spoken of by Aquinas, as well as by the civilian lawyers of his age (and indeed of earlier ages). The word ‘right’ translates the Latin ius or jus, the root of the word’s ‘justice’, ‘jurist’, ‘juridical’, and ‘jurisprudence’. Though Aquinas does not use the plural forms of the word ius as often as we use the plural ‘rights’, it is a sheer mistake to claim, as some have, that he lacked or repudiated the concept of rights in the modern sense, in which a right is ‘subjective’ in the sense of belonging to someone (the
subject of the right). When he defines justice as the steady willingness to give to others what is theirs, Aquinas immediately goes on to treat that phrase as synonymous with their right (ius suum); hence he treats a right/rights (ius/iura) as subjective. He also uses the word to speak of ‘objective’ right, that is, what interpersonal action or relationship is right-morally or legally, depending upon the context. Hobbes, who got inspired much in Benthamite and Austinian positivism, spurned the classical juristic tradition and defined ‘right’ as liberty in the sense of sheer absence of duty. So, people have most rights in the state of nature where they have no duties. This move exemplifies regression in legal and,
more generally, in political and moral philosophy. Fortunately, the mistake is quite obvious. If no one has any duties to or in respect of others, it will be more accurate to say that no one has any rights at all. For everyone, in such a state of affairs, is subject to being destroyed or abused by everyone and anyone else, and everyone’s actions can be impeded as much as any person or group cares, and is able, to arrange. The truth is that the concept of a right makes little sense save as (the Hohfeldian claim-right) a correlative of someone else’s duty, or (the Hohfeldian liberty) as protected by someone else’s duty of non-interference, or (the Hohfeldian power) as promoted by the duty of officials and others to recognize and
effectuate one’s acts-in-the-law (or their ethical counterparts), or (the Hohfeldian immunity) as protected by a similar duty of officials and others not to recognize another’s juridical acts as it purportedly bears on my position.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law, Edited by Jules L. Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma, and Scott J. Shapiro)

The Supreme Court affirmed that it is a well-established principle of administrative law that an adjudicatory body cannot base its decision on any material unless the person against whom it is sought to be utilized has been apprised of it and given an opportunity to respond to it. The court noted from MP Jain & SN Jain’s treatise on Principles of Administrative Law that if the adjudicatory body is going to rely on any material, evidence or document for its decision against a party, then the same must be brought to his notice and he be given an opportunity to rebut it or comment thereon. It is regarded as a fundamental principle of natural justice that no material ought to be relied on against a party without giving him an opportunity to respond to the same... The right to know the material on which the authority is going to base its decision is an element of the right to defend oneself. If without disclosing any evidence to the party, the authority takes it into its consideration, and decides the matter against the party, then the decision is vitiated for it amounts to denial of a real and effective opportunity to the party to meet the case against him.
On the issue of the impact of such non-disclosure the Court referred to its earlier pronouncements and summarised the principles thus – A quasi-judicial authority has a duty to disclose the material that has been relied upon at the stage of adjudication. The actual test is whether the material that is required to be disclosed is relevant for purpose of adjudication. If it is, then the principles of natural justice require its due disclosure. The aggrieved person must be able to prove that prejudice has been caused to him due to non-disclosure. To prove prejudice, he must prove that had the material been disclosed to him the outcome or the punishment would have been different.
(Extract with Edits taken from in Deepak Ananda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2023) 11 SCC 130)

International Organisations have had a significant impact on the development of international law, effectively contributing to the establishment of a global constitutional system. According to Henkin, international organisations “represent new laws at its birth, for it is itself a child of law”. For instance, the Charter of the United Nations (UN) and its specialised agencies and other international organisations have played a crucial role in shaping international law. The World Health Organisation (WHO), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) are among the organisations that have contributed to the significant transformation of international law sources, actors and processes over the past century. Since its establishment with an initial membership of fifty-one states, UN has undergone significant development, becoming a diverse and multidimensional global institution with a current membership of 193 nations. The UN has positioned itself as a global constitutional organisation, striving to safeguard and uphold a minimal world order. Numerous experts in International Law recognise the UN as a crucial international organisation for the maintenance of peace and security.
(Rawa Almakky,“The Role of International Organisations in the Development of International Law: An Analytical Assessment of the United Nations”, International Scientific Journal on LAW and WORLD, Vol. 9 No. 28, 2023)

As new situations arise; the law has to be evolved in order to meet the challenge of such new situations. Law cannot afford to remain static. It should keep pace with changing socio-economic norms. We have to evolve new principles and lay down new norms which would adequately deal with the new problems which arise in a highly industrialized economy. We cannot allow our judicial thinking to be constricted by reference to the law as it prevails in England or for that matter in any other foreign country. We no longer need the crutches of a foreign legal order. We are certainly prepared to receive light from whatever source it comes but we have to build up our own jurisprudence and we cannot countenance an argument that merely because the new law does not recognize the rule of strict and absolute liability, we cannot have it too. Court should not feel inhibited by this rule merely because the new law does not recognise the rule of strict and absolute liability. The enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of safety. The court discussed the scope of the Epistolary jurisdiction and reiterated that procedure being merely a handmaid of justice should not stand in the way to access to justice.
(Extracted with edits from M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (1987) 1 SCC 395)

The jurisdiction of this court has been invoked for protecting the Great Indian Bustard and the Lesser Florican, both of whom are on the verge of extinction. India faces a number of pressing near term challenges that directly impact the right to a healthy environment, particularly for vulnerable and indigenous communities including forest dwellers. The lack of reliable electricity supply for many citizens not only hinders economic development but also disproportionately affects communities, including women and low-income households, further perpetuating inequalities. Therefore, the right to a healthy environment encapsulates the principle that every individual has the entitlement to live in an environment that is clean, safe, and conducive to their well-being. The promotion of renewable energy sources plays a crucial role in promoting social equity by ensuring access to clean and affordable energy of all segments of society, especially in rural and undeserved areas. This contributes to poverty alleviation, enhances quality of life, and fosters inclusive growth and development across the nation. Therefore, transitioning to renewable energy is not just an environmental imperative but also a strategic investment in India’s future prosperity, resilience and sustainability. The right to equality under Art. 14 and the right to life under Art. 21 must be appreciated in the context of the decisions of this court, the actions and commitments of the state on national and international level, and scientific consensus on climate change and its adverse effects. By recognising the right to a healthy
environment, states are compelled to prioritise environmental protection and sustainable development, thereby addressing the root cause of climate change and safeguarding the well-being of present and future generations.
(Extract taken from MK Ranjitsinh and Ors v. Union of India, 2024 SC)

The Supreme Court recently examined the interplay between Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908 and Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Section 47 of the Registration Act titled “time from which registered document operates” states that registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration has been required or made. On the other hand, Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act provides that the transfer of immovable property of value above Rs. 100 can be made only by a registered document. It is a trite law that a transfer of immovable property by way of sale can only be made by a deed of conveyance and in the absence of such deed that is duly stamped and registered as required by law, no right, title or interest in the immovable property can be transferred. The Court referred to an earlier decision in Ram Saran Lall v. Domini Kuer where a harmonious balance was maintained between the peremptory language of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and the deeming fiction under Section 47 of the registration act. It also implicitly recognised that Section 54 draws a clear distinction between transfer of tangible immovable property of value more Rs. 100 and less than Rs. 100. In the former case, such transfer can only be made through a registered instrument, whereas in the latter case the transfer may be either by registered instrument or by delivery of property.
(Extract from Kanwar Raj Singh v. Gejo, 2024 SC)

Article 21 of the Constitution states that no person shall be deprived of his liberty except in accordance with procedure established by law. Conversely, we think that a person is entitled to the protection of his liberty only in accordance with law. When a person’s liberty cannot be violated in breach of a law, can a person’s liberty be protected even in the face of a breach or violation of law? In other words, should rule of law prevail over personal liberty of a person or vice-versa? Further, should this Court weigh in favour of a person’s freedom and liberty even when it has been established that the same was granted in violation of law? Should the scales of justice tilt against rule of law? We wish to make it clear that only when rule of law prevails will liberty and all other fundamental rights would prevail under our Constitution including the right to equality and equal protection of law as enshrined in Article 14 thereof. Justice Nagarathna, who authored the judgement, began her pronouncement by invoking classical Greek Philosopher Plato. “Punishment is to be inflicted not for the sake of vengeance but for the sake of prevention and reformation. In his treatise, Plato reasons that the lawgiver, as far as he can, ought to imitate the doctor who does not apply his drug with a view to pain only, but to do the patient good. This curative theory of punishment likens penalty to medicine administered for the sake of the one being
chastised. Thus, if a criminal is curable, he ought to be improved by education and other suitable arts and the set free as a better citizen and less of a burden to the state. This postulate lies at the heart of the policy of remission.” Having said that, she also pointed out the competing interests involved, of the rights of the victim’s family to justice and the right of the convicts to a second chance by remission or reduction of their sentence. She added, “A woman deserves respect howsoever high or low she may otherwise be considered in the society or whatever faith she may follow or whatever creed she may belong to. Can heinous crime against women permit remission of the convicts by a reduction in their sentence and
by granting them liberty?”
(This extract has been taken from Bilkis Yakoob Rasul v. Union of India (2024) 5 SCC 481)

The Indian Contract Act is a classical model of contract law that covers various codes that govern general contracts as well as specific contracts. Contract of Bailment, one such type of contract under the Indian law of contract, talks about the delivery of goods from one person to another for a purpose. Under this contract, the bailee is given a right to lien. Right to lien is defined under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which talks about the general right to lien of bankers, wharfingers, factors, attorneys of high courts and policy brokers.
Generally, two parties are involved. The banker who lends money to the borrower or the customer, who then provides a security in exchange for the loan. Both parties are entitled to some of the rights that are associated with the securities that were provided. It is a possessory right which allows the bank to have temporary possession of the goods until 17 * PG the customer’s outstanding debt is paid. The banker the right to act as the trustee of the property as long as they are acting within their powers as the custodian and do not sell the property without giving notice to the customer. The landmark judgment of Syndicate Bank v. Vijay Kumar and Others dealt with the issue of whether or not a banker’s right to lien and set off was a general and customary right guaranteed to them. In furtherance of Halsbury’s laws of England, this judgment recognised the banker’s right to general lien was a right guaranteed by the law and not the contract.
(Extracted with edits from “Critical Analysis of Bankers Right of General Lien” by Alisha Khalid Bhendwade, IJLRA, Vol. II, 2024)

“The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status. It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsels appearing for the Petitioner that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Art. 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice......”
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Art. 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. This is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
It is apparent that the power under Art. 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is
entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court. In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 SC, this court stated that the same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate
or relevant reasons for passing the order.
[Extract from the judgment of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1]

Whether an agreement is a mortgage by conditional sale or sale with an option to repurchase is a vexed question to be considered in the facts of each case. The essentials of an agreement, to qualify as a mortgage by conditional sale, can succinctly be summarized. An ostensible sale with transfer of possession and ownership, but containing a clause for reconveyance in accordance with Section 58(c) of the Act, will clothe the agreement as a mortgage by conditional sale. Referring to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act the observed, “A deeming fiction was added in the negative that a transaction shall not be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition for reconveyance is contained in the document which purports to effect the sale.” The issue under adjudication was whether the transaction between the parties was an absolute sale of the property or it was a mortgage. The court relied upon the case Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Prasad and Anr, 2006 SC and held that A bare perusal of the said provision clearly shows that a mortgage by conditional sale must be evidenced by one document whereas a sale with condition of retransfer may be evidenced by more than one document. A sale with a condition of retransfer is not a mortgage. It is not a partial transfer. By reason of such a transfer all rights have been transferred reserving only a personal right to the purchaser and such a personal right would be lost unless the same is exercised within the stipulated time. The execution of separate agreement for reconveyance, either contemporaneously or subsequently, shall militate against the agreement being mortgaged by conditional sale. There must exist a debtor and creditor relationship. The valuation of the property, and the transaction value, along with the duration of time for reconveyance, are important considerations to decide the nature of the agreement. There will have to be a cumulative consideration of these factors, along with the recitals in the agreement, intention of the parties, coupled with other attendant circumstances, considered in a holistic manner. The language used in the agreement may not always be conclusive. (Extract from Prakash (Dead) By LR. V. G. Aradhya & Ors, 2023 SC)

In the present case, the levy of IGST on the supply of ocean freight services under the reverse charge mechanism on the importer, when the value of such service is already included in the transaction value of imported goods, amounts to double taxation. The concept of double taxation implies that the same subject matter is taxed twice when it should be taxed only once. The GST law, as framed, does not envisage taxation of a transaction twice, and the fundamental principles of GST do not support such an imposition. Further, the importer, who is not the recipient of the service but is treated as a deemed recipient under the reverse charge mechanism, cannot be made liable to pay tax on a service that they have not directly availed. This stretches the scope of reverse charge mechanism beyond its intended purpose, which is to simplify tax collection by shifting the liability to pay tax from the service provider to the service recipient, particularly in cases where the service provider is located outside India and does not have a presence within the taxable territory. Moreover, the constitutional framework requires that a tax should be levied with legislative competence and should not contravene any fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The imposition of IGST on ocean freight under the reverse charge mechanism without proper legislative backing undermines the very essence of taxation principles enshrined in the Constitution of India.
(This extract is taken from Mohit Minerals v. Union of India CA No. 1390/2022)

In Kapilaben v. Ashok Kumar Jayantilal Sheth, (2020) 20 SCC 648, the Supreme Court has considered that the assignment of a contract might result in a transfer of either rights or obligations thereunder. The transfer of obligations is not possible without the consent of the other party. However, the transfer of rights is permissible, except in cases where the contract is of a personal nature. “It is well-settled that the term ‘representative-in-interest’ includes the assignee of a contractual interest. Though the provisions of the Contract Act do not particularly deal with the assignability of contracts, the court has opined time and again that a party to a contract cannot assign their obligations or liabilities without the consent of the other party. A Constitution Bench in Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) (P) Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 1810], has laid out this principle as follows: “An assignment of a contract might result by transfer either of the rights or of the obligations thereunder. However, there is a well-recognised distinction between these two classes of assignments. As a rule, obligations under a contract cannot be assigned except with the consent of the promisee, and when such consent is given, it is really a novation resulting in substitution of liabilities. On the other hand, rights under a contract are assignable unless the contract is personal in its nature or the rights are incapable of assignment either under the law or under an agreement between the parties.”
[Extracted with edits from Indira Devi v. Veena Gupta, (2023) 8 SCC 124]

Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer (1956 SCR 199) the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: “This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word ‘especially’ underscores facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. It added, if the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than him whether he did or did not.” It is evident that it cannot be the intention and Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on the accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. the King. 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R, 1936-3 All ER 36 at p.49 (B). In case resting on circumstantial evidence, an accused person’s failure to provide a reasonable explanation as required by S. 106 could serve as an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
(Based on facts from State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors, AIR 2000SUPREME COURT 2988)

SEBI was established as India’s principal capital markets regulator with the aim to protect the interest of investors in securities and promote the development and regulation of the securities market in India. SEBI is empowered to regulate the securities market in India by the SEBI Act 1992, the SCRA and the Depositories Act 1996. SEBI’s powers to regulate the securities market are wide and include delegated legislative, administrative, and adjudicatory powers to enforce SEBI’s regulations. SEBI exercises its delegated legislative power by inter alia framing regulations and appropriately amending them to keep up with the dynamic nature of the securities’ market. SEBI has issued a number of regulations on various areas of security regulation which form the backbone of the framework governing the securities market in India.
Section 11 of the SEBI Act lays down the functions of SEBI and expressly states that it “shall be the duty of the Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market, by such measures as it thinks fit”. Further, Section 30 of the SEBI Act empowers SEBI to make regulations consistent with the Act. Significantly, while framing these regulations, SEBI consults its advisory committees consisting of domain experts, including market experts, leading market players, legal experts, technology experts, retired Judges of this Court or the High Courts, academicians, representatives of industry associations and investor associations. During the consultative process, SEBI also invites and duly considers comments from the public on their proposed regulations. SEBI follows similar consultative processes while reviewing and amending its regulations.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 171)

For a principle to be acceptable as a law, Lon Fuller states that it must be measured in terms of the following eight standards: (1) The principle must be expounded in a manner so that it can be generally applied. A pattern less ad hoc system of law lacks the desired “internal morality” which legal principles should possess. This proposition is comparable to the often-read statement that our government is a government of laws rather than men. (2) The mandates of the law must be communicated to the people to whom they are directed. (3) Newly announced principles of law, except on rare occasions, should be applied only in a prospective manner. Retroactive application of changes in prescribed norms, subject to the presence of compelling extenuating circumstances, should be avoided. (4) Standards of action and inaction should be clearly stated. Fuller concedes that the lawmaker cannot specify with absolute clarity exactly what is demanded of each individual in every instance when the law may affect him. He does, however, assert that the duty to clarify the law should be delegated to the enforcement bodies only to the extent that such action is required by the environment in which the law must operate. (5) Arguing that respect for the law calls for consistency, Fuller maintains that the originators of laws should take great pains to see that the body of law is as free as possible from contradictory mandates, (6) Emphasizing that law is tied to the capabilities of human beings, Fuller insists that those who prescribe the norms required of individuals must refrain from imposing impossible standards of action or inaction. A stated norm which demands an absurd course of action would violate Fuller’s idea of the “internal morality of law.” (7) While stare decisis, of recent date, has been viewed by some, if not many people, as a barrier on the pathways to needed change, Fuller is of the opinion that abiding by previously announced norms is desirable in and of itself. He finds that frequency of change, by its very nature, tends to have a deleterious impact upon the persons who are subjected to an abrupt alteration of the requirements which the law imposes upon them. (8) The student of American history is familiar with Andrew Jackson’s assertion to the effect that while the Supreme Court might render a judgment, it lacked the means by which it might be implemented.
[Extracted from Tucker, Edwin W. (1965) “The Morality of Law, by Lon L. Fuller,” Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 40: Iss. 2, Article5.]

The landmark judgment of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa & Others, delivered by the Supreme Court of India in 1978, significantly influenced the interpretation of the term ‘industry’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case cantered on whether the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, a statutory body, could be classified as an industry under the Act, thereby making its employees eligible for certain protections and benefits. Prior to this case, the definition of ‘industry’ had been subject to varied interpretations, leading to confusion and inconsistency in its application. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, broadly defined ‘industry’ to include any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture, or calling of employers and any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. However, this expansive definition left room for ambiguity, especially concerning statutory bodies and non-profit organizations. In this case, the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board argued that it was not an industry, emphasizing its statutory duties and public welfare objectives. The Board contended that its primary purpose was to provide essential services, not to engage in profit-making activities typical of private enterprises. On the other hand, the respondents, including A. Rajappa, argued that the Board’s activities fell within the scope of an industry as defined by the Act, and thus, its employees should be entitled to the benefits and protections accorded to workers in industries. The Supreme Court, in its judgment, undertook a comprehensive analysis of the term ‘industry.’ The bench, led by Chief Justice M. Hameedullah Beg, laid down a broad and inclusive definition of ‘industry.’ The Court asserted that what mattered was the nature of the activity and the relationship between the employer and the employees. This interpretation aimed to ensure that a wide range of workers, including those employed in public utility services, statutory bodies, and even some non-profit organizations, would be covered under the protective umbrella of the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others had far-reaching implications. It extended the scope of labour protections to a broader spectrum of workers, ensuring that more employees could benefit from the dispute resolution mechanisms and other safeguards provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. This judgment underscored the judiciary’s role in interpreting labour laws to promote social justice and protect workers’ rights in a rapidly industrializing nation.
(Extract from Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others, 1978 2 SCC)

Dominic Ongwen, a former commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, was convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in February 2021. The case marked a significant milestone in international criminal law, focusing on issues of child soldiering, forced marriage, and sexual and gender-based violence. Ongwen was found guilty of 61 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, enslavement, forced marriage, rape, and conscription of children under the age of 15 into armed groups. The ICC’s judgment emphasized the importance of accountability for leaders who exploit children in conflicts and commit sexual and gender-based crimes.
A critical aspect of the judgment was the consideration of Ongwen’s own history as a child soldier. Ongwen was abducted by the LRA at around the age of nine and was forced to commit atrocities as he rose through the ranks. The court balanced this background against the gravity of his crimes, ultimately ruling that his personal history did not absolve him of responsibility for his actions as an adult commander. The judgment is also notable for its comprehensive approach to reparations for victims. The ICC ordered collective reparations, including symbolic measures like memorials, physical and psychological rehabilitation, and financial compensation to support the victims and their communities. This case reinforces the ICC’s commitment to addressing serious international crimes, particularly those involving vulnerable populations such as children and women and underscores the principles of justice and reparation in international criminal law.
(This extract is taken from Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (ICC, 2021))

An unpleasant tussle ensured between the TATA Sons and Cyrus Pallonji Mistry (“CPM”) in October 2016, when Mistry, who was the sixth chairman of Tata Sons, was ousted from the position of Executive Chairman of Tata Sons Limited. CPM took over as the chairman in 2012 after Ratan Tata announced his retirement. Tata Group patriarch Ratan Tata had personally asked Cyrus Mistry to resign as chairman of Tata Sons as the board had lost faith in him, but his refusal led to the removal via majority vote. Cyrus Investments Private limited and Sterling Investment Corporation Private Limited belonged to the Shapoorji Palloni Group in which CPM held a controlling interest (about 2% of the issued share capital of Tata Sons). Seven out of the nine directors of Tata Sons voted for CPM’s replacement after Farida Khambata abstained and Mistry was declared ineligible to vote as he was an interested director. Mistry challenged his removal, accusing the board of mismanagement and of oppressing minority shareholders. however, the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) rejected his petition. After this Mistry challenged his removal in National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). In 2018, NCLAT order restored Mistry as the group’s executive chairman. Tata Sons challenged that NCLAT order in Supreme Court. CPM also challenged the order for few more relief. Supreme Court stayed NCLAT’s order reinstating Cyrus Mistry as the executive chairman of Tata Sons and restoring his directorships in the holding company as well as three group companies, with a preliminary observation that the first impression of the order was “not good” and that the tribunal ‘could’ not have given consequential relief that had not been sought in the first place. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decided the case in favour of Tata Sons. One of the issues decided by Supreme Court was that “whether the case was fit to be qualified as a situation of ‘Oppression and Mismanagement’ under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013?”. On this issue, the Supreme Court observed that “unless the removal of a person as a chairman of a company is oppressive or mismanaged or done in a prejudicial manner damaging the interests of the company, its members or the public at large, the NCLT cannot interfere with the removal of a person as a Chairman of a Company in a petition under Section 241 of the Companies Act, 2013.” This case highlighted the point that “an executive chairman does not have sovereign authority over the company. In corporate democracy, decision making always remains with the Board as long as they enjoy the pleasure of the shareholders. Likewise, an executive chairman will continue as long as he/she enjoys the pleasure of the Board. An assumption by the executive chairman that he/she would have a free hand in running the affairs of the company is incongruous to corporate governance and corporate democracy. The Tribunal held that the concept of ‘free hand rule’ is antithesis to collective responsibility and collective decision making”.
[Based on Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. v. Cyrus Investment Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC 122].