Theories of statutory interpretation form the bedrock of judicial hermeneutics, particularly in common law systems where judicial exposition coexists with legislative supremacy. At the foundational level, the literal rule posits that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court is bound to give effect to the text, even if it leads to inconvenient consequences. This approach is based on the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum. However, the golden rule permits departure from the literal meaning to avert absurdity. This rule acknowledges the imperfection of legislative drafting and underscores the principle noscitur a sociis, which means a word is known by the company it keeps.
More dynamic is the mischief rule, originating from Heydon’s Case, which directs the court to examine the defect or mischief in prior law that legislation intended to cure. It empowers courts to consider extrinsic aids, including Law Commission reports and legislative debates. In the constitutional domain, the purposive approach was employed in landmark cases such as Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. This interpretation approach prioritizes the spirit over the letter of the law and affirms transformative constitutionalism. Amidst this interpretive elasticity, the judiciary remains constrained by the maxim judicis est jus dicere non dare, which stipulates that the judge’s role is to declare law, but not legislate.
