Theories of statutory interpretation form the bedrock of judicial hermeneutics, particularly in common law systems where judicial exposition coexists with legislative supremacy. At the foundational level, the literal rule posits that when statutory language is clear and unambiguous, the court is bound to give effect to the text, even if it leads to inconvenient consequences. This approach is based on the maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum. However, the golden rule permits departure from the literal meaning to avert absurdity. This rule acknowledges the imperfection of legislative drafting and underscores the principle noscitur a sociis, which means a word is known by the company it keeps.
More dynamic is the mischief rule, originating from Heydon’s Case, which directs the court to examine the defect or mischief in prior law that legislation intended to cure. It empowers courts to consider extrinsic aids, including Law Commission reports and legislative debates. In the constitutional domain, the purposive approach was employed in landmark cases such as Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, and Justice K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India. This interpretation approach prioritizes the spirit over the letter of the law and affirms transformative constitutionalism. Amidst this interpretive elasticity, the judiciary remains constrained by the maxim judicis est jus dicere non dare, which stipulates that the judge’s role is to declare law, but not legislate.
The maxim noscitur a sociis is most relevant for
The maxim noscitur a sociis is a principle used in statutory interpretation, which asserts that the meaning of a word can be determined by the words surrounding it. This means that a word is understood by the company it keeps. It helps in interpreting ambiguous or vague terms by considering the context in which they appear. This maxim is primarily used in contextual interpretation of words (Option 3). It guides courts to interpret a word in a manner that is consistent with the surrounding words and the overall context of the statute, rather than interpreting it in isolation.
For example, if a statute refers to “vehicles, such as cars, trucks, and motorcycles,” the term “vehicles” should be interpreted in the context of the other items listed, implying that it refers to road-going transportation methods and not, for example, trains or airplanes. This is a classic example of contextual interpretation. Thus, the maxim noscitur a sociis} helps clarify the meaning of a term by looking at how it relates to other words in the statute.
Other options are less relevant in this context:
Option (1) Extrinsic aids to help interpretation refers to materials outside the text of the statute, such as legislative history or external documents, which are not the focus of the maxim noscitur a sociis.
Option (2) Historical context for interpretation involves interpreting laws based on the historical circumstances or the situation when the law was passed, which differs from the principle of interpreting words by their surrounding context.
Option (4) Judicial precedent-based interpretation involves interpreting laws based on previous court decisions, which is a different approach from the contextual interpretation based on the surrounding words.
Therefore, the correct answer is Option (3): Contextual interpretation of words.
The legal maxim expressum facit cessare tacitum} refers to the rule that what is expressly stated in a legal document excludes what is implied or not explicitly mentioned. It essentially means that if something is explicitly stated, any implied provisions that could contradict it are excluded. This principle helps in preventing ambiguity by ensuring that what is clearly stated overrides what is not said.
For example, if a statute specifically grants a right or permission, anything impliedly suggesting the contrary is disregarded.
Thus, Option (1), which states "What is expressed excludes what is implied," is the correct interpretation of this maxim.
To further clarify:
Option (2) "What is implied excludes what is expressed" would be incorrect because implied provisions are generally excluded when the statute explicitly addresses a matter.
Option (3) "What is implied includes what is expressed" is also incorrect because it goes against the maxim's purpose of emphasizing explicit language over implied meaning.
Option (4) "What is expressed includes what is implied" is similarly incorrect, as it suggests that implied meanings should be included even when contradicted by explicit statements in the statute.
Thus, the correct answer is Option (1): What is expressed excludes what is implied.