List of top Legal Studies Questions asked in Common Law Admission Test

The Contract Act 1872 deals with contract law in India, its rights, duties, and exceptions arising out of it. Section 2(h) of the Act gives us the definition of a contract, which is simply an agreement enforceable by law. To understand the difference between void agreements and voidable contracts it is important to talk about sections 2(h), 2(a). 20), 2(d), 14, 16 (3) and 15,24-28 of the Indian Contact Act. Void agreements are fundamentally invalid making them unenforceable by default. These agreements cannot be fulfilled as they consist of illegal elements, and they cannot be enforced even after subjecting it to both parties. However, in the case of voidable contract, the agreement is initially enforceable, but it is later on denied at the option of either of the parties due to various reasons.
Unless rejected by a party, this contract will remain valid and enforceable. The party who is at the disadvantage due to any circumstance applicable to the contract has the ability to render the agreement void. A void agreement is void ab initio making it impossible to rectify any defects in it while voidable contracts can be rectified. In case of a void agreement, neither of the parties is subject to any compensation for any losses but voidable contracts have some remedies. 
A valid agreement forms a contract that may again be either valid or voidable. The primary difference between a void agreement and voidable contract is that a void agreement cannot be converted into a contract. 
(Extracted with edits from A Comparative Study of Voidable Contracts and Void Agreements)

The 42nd Constitutional Amendment Act 1976 introduced the concept of environmental protection in an explicit manner into the Constitution through introduction of Article 48-A and Article 51-A (g). In many judgments, the Supreme Court ruled that both the state and its residents have a fundamental duty to preserve and protect their natural resources. The recent judgment obliquely makes way for an enforceable right, and a potential obligation on the state unless the same is overturned by an Act of Parliament.
India is signatory of various international environmental conservation treaties under which India has the binding commitment to reduce carbon emission. During the COP 21. India signed Paris Agreement along with 196 countries, under which universally binding agreement was made to limit greenhouse gas emission to levels that would prevent global temperatures from increasing to more than 1.5 degree Celsius before the industrial revolution. India has committed to generating 50% of its energy through renewable resources and will generate 500 GW of energy from non-fossil fuels by 2030, reducing the carbon emission by 1 billion ton. Additionally, India has committed to achieve net zero carbon emission target by 2070.
Supreme Court's March 21, 2024 verdict builds on the bulwark of jurisprudence in place since 1986, and, through various other judgments, the Supreme Court has recognised the right to clean environment along with right to clean air, water and soil free from pollution which is absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of life. Any disturbance with these basic elements of environment would amount to violation of Article 21. It also establishes duty of the state to maintain ecological balance and hygienic environment. Although right to clean environment has existed; by recognizing the right against climate change it shall compel the states to prioritize environmental protection and sustainable development.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from "Supreme Court of India bolts Right to Life with climate justice", The Economic Times, 06-05-2024)

The Supreme Court of India declared that the right to privacy is a fundamental right and that the right to informational privacy is part of this right. Subsequently, the Parliament of India enacted a new law relating to digital personal data protection. The law applies to Indian residents and businesses collecting the data of Indian residents. It also applies to non-citizens living in India whose data processing is "in connection with any activity related to the offering of goods or services" that happens outside India. The law allows personal data to be processed for any lawful purpose. If the personal data is sensitive, then additional safeguards are to be observed. The entity processing data can do so either by taking the concerned individual's consent or for "legitimate uses". which include situations where an individual has voluntarily provided personal data for a specified purpose. The law requires that an individual's consent must be "free, specific, informed, unconditional and unambiguous with a clear affirmative action" and for a specific purpose. The data collected has to be limited to that necessary for the specified purpose. A clear notice containing these details has to be provided to consumers, including the rights of the concerned individual and the grievance redressal mechanism. Individuals have the right to withdraw consent if consent is the ground on which data is being processed. The law also creates rights and obligations for individuals. These include the right to get a summary of all the collected data and to know the identities of all other entities/organisations with whom the personal data has been shared, along with a description of the data shared. Individuals also have the right to correction. completion, updating, and erasure of their data. Besides, they have a right to obtain redressal for their grievances and a right to nominate persons who will receive their data. [Excerpts from Anirudh Burman, "Understanding India's New Data Protection Law", CARNEGIE INDIA, October 03, 2023]

Geographical Indications (GIs) are a form of intellectual property that designates a product as originating from a specific geographic location, where a given quality. reputation, or other characteristic is essentially attributable to its geographic origin. GIs protect names that are used to identify products with specific qualities or characteristics due to their geographic origin. For example, 'Champagne' refers to sparkling wine produced in the Champagne region of France, and 'Darjeeling Tea' refers to tea grown in the Darjeeling region of India. The protection of GIs ensures that only products genuinely originating from a specific region are allowed to use the geographical name. This helps maintain the product's reputation and quality, prevents misuse or imitation, and supports local economies by promoting regional products. International agreements such as the TRIPS Agreement under the World Trade Organization (WTO) provide a framework for the protection of GIs globally.

Children come in contact with the criminal justice system either as victims or witnesses to a crime or as children in conflict with law (CICL). As CICL, they could be alleged of, accused or recognised as having broken the law by committing a crime. According to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) Report 2021, India recorded a total number of 1,49,404 instances of crimes against children in 2021 a rise of over 16 per cent from the previous year. In terms of percentage, the top categories under crime against children were kidnapping and abduction, followed by cases registered under the POCSO Act. Further, the NCRB report revealed that of the total cases, 53,874 were registered under POCSO Sections. Sexual offences against children shows a steady ascent, with 47,221 such cases being recorded in 2020, and 47,335 cases in 2019. In 2019, as many as 32,269 cases were registered across the country, while the 2021 report registered a decline of 3.5 per cent recording 31,170 cases.
The Criminal Justice system of any country broadly refers to agencies of the government charged with enforcing law, adjudicating crime, and correcting criminal conduct. The main objective of the criminal justice system is 'deterrence', ie., to punish the 'transgressors and the criminals' and to maintain law and order in the society. Globally, children and young people are routinely exposed to various forms of violence if they are before the criminal justice system. They are at risk of physical and psychological abuse, sexual assault, and other harms, including inadequate educational opportunities, poor and outdated vocational training. They face several challenges including mental, emotional, and behavioural disorders. Children, who are victims of violence or exposed to violence during childhood, are more likely to have difficulty in school, abuse drugs or alcohol, act aggressively, suffer from depression or other mental health problems and engage in criminal behaviour as adults. 
[Extracted, with edits and revisions from "Child Rights in the Criminal Justice System: Need for Law Reform" written by Dr. Asha Bajpai published in the Journal of the National Human Rights Commission, India].

The Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 that has provision for up to five years' imprisonment and a fine of up to 1 crore for malpractices and organized cheating in government recruitment exams was notified by the Union government and came into effect from June 21, 2024. The Bill had received assent from the President of India on the 13th February 2024. The Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024 mentions punishments for "leakage of question paper or answer key", "directly or indirectly assisting the candidate in any manner unauthorisedly in the public examination" and "tampering with the computer network or a computer resource or a computer system" as offences done by a person, group of persons or institutions. Besides these, "creation of fake website to cheat or for monetary gain", "conduct of fake examination, issuance of fake admit cards or offer letters to cheat or for monetary gain" and "manipulation in seating arrangements, allocation of dates and shifts for the candidates to facilitate adopting unfair means in examinations" are also among the offences punishable under the law.
"Any person or persons resorting to unfair means and offences under this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for a term not less than three years but which may extend to five years and with fine up to 10 lakh," said the Act. A service provider, engaged by the public examination authority for conduct of examinations, shall also be liable to be punished with imposition of a fine up to 1 crore "and proportionate cost of examination shall also be recovered" from it, according to the Act. Such service providers shall also be barred from being assigned with any responsibility for the conduct of any public examination for a period of four years.
 [Extracted, with edits and revisions from "Act that Punishes Organized Cheating in Government Exams Comes into Effect" published in The Hindu dated 22-06-2024]

The Supreme Court on September 1 held that a child born of a void or voidable marriage can inherit the parent’s share in a joint Hindu family property. A three-judge Bench headed by Chief Justice of India D.Y. Chandrachud however clarified that such a child would not be entitled to rights in or to the property of any other person in the family. A voidable marriage is one that is made invalid by the husband or wife through a decree. A void marriage is invalid at its very inception.
Chief Justice Chandrachud said the first step to the inheritance of a child from a void or voidable marriage would be to ascertain the exact share of his parent in the ancestral property. This could be done by means of conducting a “notional partition” of the ancestral property and calculating how much of the property the parent would have got immediately before his death. Once the share of the deceased parent in the property is ascertained through such a notional partition, his heirs, including his children by means of void or voidable marriage, would be entitled to their portions in the share.
The Chief Justice said that Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act has statutorily conferred legitimacy to children born out of void or voidable marriages. In fact, Chief Justice Chandrachud pointed out that Section 16(3) stipulates that children from void and voidable marriages would have a right to their parents’ property. The court said the intent of granting legitimacy to such children in the Hindu Marriage Act should also be reflected in the Hindu Succession Act, which governs inheritance. Children from void or voidable marriages come within the ambit of “legitimate kinship” and cannot be regarded as illegitimate by the Hindu Succession Act when it comes to inheritance.
The case before the three-judge Bench was focused on an amended provision in the Hindu Marriage Act, Section 16(3). The case was referred to a larger Bench in 2011 after a Division Bench of the apex court refused to follow past precedents and championed the cause of children born out of illegitimate marriages.
“With changing social norms of legitimacy in every society, including ours, what was illegitimate in the past may be legitimate today. The concept of legitimacy stems from social consensus, in the shaping of which various social groups play a vital role,” Justice Ganguly, who authored the 2011 judgment, had observed.
During the hearings on the reference, Chief Justice Chandrachud had agreed with the Division Bench’s findings that children from void and voidable marriages had rights over the property, whether self-acquired or ancestral, of their parents
[Extracted with edits and revisions from “Children from void, voidable marriages entitled to parents’ share in ancestral property: Supreme Court”, by Krishnadas Rajagopal, The Hindu, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/children-from-void-voidable-marriages-arelegitimate-can-claim-rights-in-parents-properties-sc/article67259229.ece ]

There are some advantages of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act (DPDPA), 2023. For instance, for the first time, personal data belonging to or identifying children will have to be classified separately, with such data carrying a greater degree of security and privacy. The law also seeks to reduce the rate and impact of data breaches targeting Indian businesses. The Digital Personal Data Protection law, however, goes a step beyond by imposing penalties for cases where data is breached as a result of a lack of implementation of adequate security controls. However, it could be said that the law isn’t balanced, because it provides wide exemptions to the processing of personal data to the government. For instance, data can be processed “in the interest of prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of any offence … in India.” These kinds of exemptions are dangerous as they stand to legitimise widespread and unwarranted collection of data under the guise that such collection and processing may ultimately be useful for preventing or deterring a crime.
Security agencies will have significant authority to collect and retain any data whatsoever, as is typically the case with exemptions relating to the maintenance of sovereignty, integrity, security of the state, preservation of public order, prevention of offences, and incitement to commit offences. The law also exempts processing of personal data held outside of India. The government is also exempt from being required to delete any data that it possesses, regardless of the purpose it may have been collected for, on the request of an individual, or by way of a prescribed data retention period.
The government is not bound by purpose limitations, allowing data collected for one specified purpose be used for a new, incompatible purpose, which stands in contrast to the regulations imposed on businesses.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions from “Digital Personal Data Protection Law Raises Questions About Consistency with Right to Privacy Ruling” published in The Wire dated 22-08-2023]

The Editors Guild of India has expressed concern over the “draconian provisions” of the Press and Registration of Periodicals (PRP) Bill, 2023, that can have an adverse impact on freedom of the press.
The Guild added: “Editors Guild of India would like the proposed bill to ensure that publishing of news in India remains free of encumbrances and intrusive checks on publishers by the Registrar, and that the primary emphasis of the Registrar and the PRP remains ‘registration’ and not ‘regulation’, as the latter has the potential of restricting freedom of the press.”
“In the definitions section, the term ‘specified authority’ gives power to government agencies beyond the Press Registrar, to conduct the functions of the Registrar, which could even include police and other law enforcement agencies. Given the intrusive, expansive, and vague nature of powers that the bill in any case allows to the Press Registrar, the power to further delegate this power to other government agencies including law enforcement agencies is deeply distressing,” the Guild said.
The statement says sections 4(1) and 11(4) allow the Registrar to deny the right to bring out a periodical and cancel the certificate of registration of a periodical to persons convicted of “terrorist act or unlawful activity” or “for having done anything against the security of the State”.
“Interestingly, the PRB Act, 1867, had no such provisions. Given the liberal and arbitrary use of UAPA (which is the basis for defining ‘terrorist act’ and ‘unlawful activity’), as well as other criminal laws, including sedition, against journalists and media organisations to suppress freedom of speech, the Guild is deeply concerned by the introduction of these new provisions, and the way they can be misused to deny the right to bring out news publications to persons who are critical of governments,” it said.
Among the other worrisome provisions listed by the Guild is Section 6(b), which gives power to the Press Registrar (as well as any other “specified authority”) to enter the premises of a periodical to “inspect or take copies of the relevant records or documents or ask any questions necessary for obtaining any information required to be furnished”
[Extracted, with edits and revisions from “Editors Guild of India expresses concern over draconian provisions of the Press and Registration of Periodicals Bills, 2023” published in The Telegraph dated 07-08-2023]

In India, the legal landscape surrounding online defamation is a subject of significant interest and debate. With the rise of social media, and online platforms, cases of online defamation have become increasingly common. Defamation refers to making false statements about someone that harm their reputation. Online defamation includes defamatory statements made on the internet, including social media, blogs, forums, and other online platforms.
One critical aspect of online defamation is determining the liability of intermediaries, such as social media platforms or websites, for defamatory content posted by users. Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000, provides a safe harbor for intermediaries, stating that they are not liable for third-party content if they act as intermediaries and follow due diligence in removing or disabling access to the content once notified.
However, determining whether an intermediary has fulfilled its due diligence obligations can be complex. The Indian judiciary has been actively interpreting this provision. One significant case is the Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, in which the Supreme Court clarified that intermediaries are required to act upon a valid court order or government directive for content removal, not upon private complaints.
The court also emphasized that the intermediaries should not take a proactive role in monitoring content, as this could potentially infringe on free speech. While the law provides a safe harbor, it does not absolve intermediaries from their responsibilities.
Online defamation cases often involve a balancing act between the right to freedom of expression and the right to reputation. The Indian legal system requires a careful examination of the content, context, and intent of the statements to determine whether they qualify as defamatory. Additionally, the plaintiff in an online defamation case must prove that the statement was false, damaging to their reputation, and made with a degree of fault, such as negligence or actual malice.

The Indian legal system places a significant emphasis on protecting the rights and welfare of children. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, is a vital piece of legislation in this regard. It is designed to ensure that children in conflict with the law receive special care, protection, and treatment, with the ultimate goal of their rehabilitation and reintegration into society.
One of the key provisions of the Act is the establishment of Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs) at the district level. These boards consist of a Metropolitan Magistrate or Judicial Magistrate of the first class and two social workers, at least one of whom should be a woman. The primary function of the JJB is to determine the age of the juvenile, the circumstances in which the offense was committed, and whether the juvenile should be sent to a special home or released on probation.
The Act makes a clear distinction between a “child in conflict with the law” and a “child in need of care and protection.” A child in conflict with the law is one who has committed an offense, while a child in need of care and protection is a child who is vulnerable or at risk and requires special care and support.
The Act introduces a unique approach to dealing with children who are in conflict with the law. For children between the ages of 16 and 18, who have committed heinous offenses, they can be tried as adults, subject to a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board. This assessment considers the child’s mental and physical capacity to commit such an offense. If the board determines that the child should be tried as an adult, the case is transferred to the regular criminal courts.
The Act also places restrictions on the publication of information that could lead to the identification of a juvenile offender. This is done to protect the privacy and future prospects of the child.

Consumers are people who buy and use goods or services. Consumers have a right to file a complaint for any of the services or goods used by them under Consumer Protection Law. Under Consumer Protection Law, a ‘consumer’ means:
Person buying and using goods and services: A consumer includes any person who buys goods and services, as well as anyone who uses them. For instance, a person who watches a movie after buying a movie ticket is a consumer and similarly, a person who uses a gift voucher gifted from someone else is also a consumer.
Person using goods for self-employment, and not for commercial purposes: The consumer protection law does not apply to people who use goods and services for commercial purposes. However, there are some exceptions to this. For example, people who use goods for self-employment are considered as consumers. For example, artists who buy art supplies for their work or beauticians who buy beauty products are consumers.
Person using online facilities: A consumer also includes any person who buys or hires goods or services online. For example, if you order from an online clothes website, you are a consumer.
People facing issues related to food: Consumers also include people who may be facing issues related to food items, such as adulteration, poor quality, lack of service, etc. For instance, issues related to food can cover problems across a wide range of products, starting from water that goes into the production of items like juices as well as the sale of animals like chicken, mutton etc. that are expressly intended for human consumption.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “Who is a Consumer?”, Nyaaya India]

Until 2017, India did not have a codified law to order internet shut downs. A general power was vested in District Magistrates in this regard. The Magistrate could issue an order ordering a shut down if a ‘speedy remedy’ (extending to internet shut down) is desirable for ‘immediate prevention’ of an event. The Magistrate had to be satisfied that the order is ‘likely to prevent or tends to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of public tranquillity’. The Magistrate’s order cannot be for longer than two months.
In 2017, new rules to order internet shut downs were introduced taking the power away from the Magistrate. These rules — the Temporary Suspension Rules — state that internet shut downs can now only be ordered by the Home Secretary of the Union or State Governments. Only in “unavoidable circumstances” can the passing of orders be delegated to someone lower than the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India. And even in this case, the official must be authorised by the Centre or State Home Secretary. Shut downs can be ordered where ‘necessary’ or ‘unavoidable’ during a ‘public emergency’ or in the ‘interest of public safety’. Shut down orders must necessarily detail the reasons to shut down the internet. The orders must also be sent to a review committee under the state or central government within 24 hours. The committee must then review them within five working days. The rules state that apart from the Chief Secretary and Legal Secretary, the committee can comprise a secretary other than the home secretary.
In January 2020 the Supreme Court passed its judgement in the case of Anuradha Bhasin. The judgement in this case explicitly recognised two things: that the freedom to access information is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (which protects the freedom of speech and expression); and that the freedom to conduct your trade, profession or business over the internet is also a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India (which protects the freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business). Every time the internet is suspended, it is quite obvious that it is a violation of these rights. These rights can only be curtailed in the interest of the ‘sovereignty and security of the state, integrity of the nation, friendly relations with foreign states, or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence’. The Supreme Court’s judgement in Anuradha Bhasin’s case had also underlined that shut down orders must clearly provide reasons for the shut down and they must be publicly available.
[Extracted with edits and revisions from “In India, are internet shut downs in accordance with law? Not always”, by Diksha Munjal, News Laundry]

Surrogacy is defined by law as “a practice whereby one woman bears and gives birth to a child for an intending couple” and intends to hand over the child to them after the birth, as per the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 (the “SRA”). The SRA restricts altruistic surrogacy to legally wedded infertile Indian couples. The couple is deemed eligible for surrogacy only if they have been married for five years. The SRA sets an age limitation for the couple. A husband must be between 26 and 55 years of age and a wife between 23 and 50 years. Further, Indian couples with biological or adopted children are prohibited from undertaking surrogacy, save for some exceptions such as mentally or physically challenged children, or those suffering from a life-threatening disorder or fatal illness. The SRA provides that the surrogate mother has to be a close relative of the couple (such as a sibling of one of the members of the couple), a married woman with a child of her own, aged between 25 and 35 years, who has been a surrogate only once in her life. Even within this category of people, commercial surrogacy is banned in India and that includes the “commercialisation of surrogacy services or procedures or its component services or component procedures”. The surrogate woman cannot be given payments, rewards, benefits or fees, “except the medical expenses and such other prescribed expenses incurred on the surrogate mother and the insurance coverage for the surrogate mother”.
A legal commentator points out some criticisms of the law. “Permitting limited conditional surrogacy to married Indian couples and disqualifying other persons on basis of nationality, marital status, sexual orientation or age does not pass the test of equality,” he writes. He adds that reproductive autonomy, inclusive of the right to procreation and parenthood is protected under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty. The intending parents typically sign a contract with the surrogate. The Indian Contract Act, 1972 (the “ICA”) provides that a valid contract has to be in writing, and signed in the presence of two witnesses. The ICA also provides that a contract that is prohibited by any other law will not be valid under the ICA.
[Extracted with edits and revisions from “What laws regulate surrogacy in India”, The Indian Express]

Free legal aid is the provision of free legal services in civil and criminal matters for those poor and marginalised people who cannot afford the services of a lawyer for the conduct of a case or a legal proceeding in any Court, Tribunal or Authority. These services are governed by the Legal Services Authority Act, 1987 (the “Act”) and provided by the National Legal Services Authority (“NALSA”).
Provision of free legal aid includes:
• Representation by an advocate in legal proceedings;
• Payment of process fees, expenses of witnesses and all other charges payable or incurred in connection with any legal proceedings in appropriate cases;
• Preparation of pleadings, memo of appeal, paper book including printing and translation of documents in legal proceedings;
• Drafting of legal documents, special leave petition etc.; and
• Supply of certified copies of judgments, orders, notes of evidence and other documents in legal proceedings.
Free legal aid also includes provision of aid and advice to the beneficiaries to access benefits under welfare statutes and schemes framed by the Central Government or the state governments and to ensure access to justice in any other manner. Free legal aid is not confined to cases before the subordinate courts.
Free legal aid must be provided to the needy from the lowest court to the Supreme Court of India. 
According to Section 13(1) of the Act, any individual who satisfies any criteria under Section 12 is entitled to receive free legal aid, provided that NALSA is satisfied that such person has a genuine case to prosecute or defend the matter. There is hence no bar as to which kind of cases one can apply and not apply for. Section 12 of the Act includesthe following:
• a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe;
• a woman or a child;
• a person with a disability;
• an industrial workman; or
• a person in police custody.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “FAQs”, National Legal Services Authority]

Twitter’s lawyer on October 27, said before the Karnataka High Court that Union government orders to block certain Twitter handles and posts must contain reasons for the same that can be communicated to users of the microblogging site. He said this applies to all blocking orders sent to social media platforms. The lawyer representing Twitter said that reasons for the blocking order must be provided to users so they can determine whether or not they want to challenge the orders.
Challenging the blocking orders, Twitter’s July 5 petition contended that several blocking orders “demonstrate excessive use of powers and are disproportionate”. Such orders can only be issued by the Union government and not the state governments, he said, which increases the danger of such abuse. Twitter also claimed that the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology had sent it a letter threatening consequences for failing to comply with the blocking orders, such as criminal proceedings against the company’s chief compliance officer and the stripping away of Twitter’s safe harbour immunity, otherwise available to social media platforms under Section 79(1) of the Information Technology Act (the “IT Act”). Note that the Government has the power to strip away such safe harbour immunity under the IT Act. Further, in a previous hearing, Twitter’s lawyer said that the company was asked to block entire accounts, although Section 69A of the IT Act does not permit blocking of the whole account. It only permits the blocking of information, or a particular tweet or post. It argued that the Union government’s direction to block whole accounts will affect its business, adding that several prominent persons have their accounts on the platform. 
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “ ‘Government Must Provide Reasons for Blocking User Accounts,’ Twitter Tells Karnataka HC”, The Wire]

The government has amended the Electoral Bond Scheme, 2018. The Ministry of Finance on November 7, 2022, issued a notification for amending the scheme to provide “an additional period of 15 days” for their sale “in the year of general elections to the Legislative Assembly of any States or Union Territories with Legislature”. The bonds under this scheme are usually made available for purchase by any person for a period of ten days each in the months of January, April, July, and October, when specified by the Union Government. The original scheme had provided for an additional period of thirty days, as specified by the Government, in the year when Lok Sabha elections are held, while the amendment adds another 15 days.
Since Assembly elections to various States and Union Territories are held every year, the amendment effectively means that there will be 15 additional dates annually during which the bonds can be sold. Immediately after issuing the notification, the Union Government also announced the sale of electoral bonds under the 23rd tranche from the authorised branches of the State Bank of India. The notification said the sale of bonds would take place through the 29 authorised branches of the said bank from November 9 to November 15, 2022. Like in previous rounds of sale, the electoral bonds shall be valid for 15 calendar days from the date of issue and no payment shall be made to any payee political party if the bond is deposited after expiry of the validity period. The Electoral Bond deposited by an eligible political party in its account shall be credited on the same day.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “Electoral Bonds Scheme Amended To Allow Sale for Additional 15 Days in Assembly Election Years”, by Gaurav Vivek Bhatnagar, The Wire]

Parliament passed the Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act, 2022 (the “Act”) in March 2022. The legislation enables police and central investigating agencies to collect, store and analyse the measurements of arrested persons. Until rules are notified, an Act cannot be implemented or come into force. On September 19, 2022, the Ministry of Home Affairs (the “MHA”) notified the rules (the “Rules”) under the Act.
The Act empowers a Magistrate to direct any person to give measurements to the police, which till now was reserved for convicts and those involved in heinous crimes. It also enables police personnel of the rank of Head Constable or above to take measurements of any person who resists or refuses to give measurements when ordered to do so by a Magistrate. As per the Rules, “measurements” mean finger-impressions, palm-print, footprint, photographs, iris and retina scan, physical, biological samples and their analysis, behavioural attributes including signatures, and handwriting. Though it has not been specified, analysis of biological samples could also include DNA profiling.
However, the Rules state that measurements of those detained under preventive Sections of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“CrPC”) shall not be taken unless such person is at that time charged or under arrest in connection with any other offence punishable under any other law. Measurements can also be taken under the Rules if a person has been ordered to give security for his good behaviour for maintaining peace under Section 117 of the CrPC for a proceeding under that Section. [Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “Explained | Rules for identifying criminals”, by Vijaita Singh, The Hindu]

Assume that the statements in the passages are the applicable law.
Quashing a case of cruelty that was filed against a man by his wife, the Bombay High Court said that if a married lady is asked to do household work for the family, it cannot be said that she is treated “like a maid servant”. The Court was hearing an application by the husband and his parents seeking that proceedings against them are quashed. A First Information Report (“FIR”) was filed against the trio in September 2020, around nine months after the marriage, alleging that they hounded the woman for money to purchase a car, harassed her mentally and physically and treated her like a maid servant. Examining the evidence, the Court found that there was no merit to the woman’s allegations. The Court said that though the FIR says that she was treated properly for about a month and then “like a maid servant”, there are no details of what this meant. The Court added: “If a married lady is asked to do household work for the purpose of the family, it cannot be said that it is like a maid servant.” The Court held that the mere use of the word harassment “mentally and physically” in the FIR is not sufficient to constitute an offence Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”), which punishes the husband, or a relative of the husband of a woman who subjects her to cruelty in any way. It is interesting to note that Section 498A of the IPC also provides that if a married woman is actually treated like a ‘maid servant’, it would be an offence under that Section.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “If Wife Is Asked To Do Household Work, Does Not Mean She Is Treated Like Maid: Bombay HC”, The Wire]

When parties to a contract are under a 'mistake' regarding an important fact related to such contract, it may affect the contract in two ways. It may, firstly, defeat the consent altogether that the parties are supposed to have given, that is to say, the consent is unreal. Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. Secondly, the mistake may mislead the parties as to the purpose which they had contemplated. Where the mistake does not defeat consent, but only misleads the parties, i.e., where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void. However, if the mistake is concerning an erroneous opinion regarding value of the subject-matter of the agreement, it is not a mistake as to a matter of fact. Thus, agreement is void when: (1) both the parties to an agreement are mistaken, (2) their mistake is as to a matter of fact, and (3) the fact about which they are mistaken is essential to the agreement. Further, it is pertinent to note that a mistake, in order to invalidate a contract, should be a mistake of fact and not a mistake of law. Furthermore, where only one party to the contract is under mistake of fact, and the other party is not, the contract is not voidable merely for such reason.

The United Nations Commission on Environment and Development defines 'sustainable development' as follows: "Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Sustainable development clearly postulates an anthropocentric bias, least concerned with the rights of other species which live on this earth. Anthropocentrism is always human-interest focused thinking that considers non-humans as having only instrumental value to humans, in other words, humans take precedence and human responsibilities towards non-human are based on benefits to humans. Eco-centrism is nature-centred, where humans are part of nature and non-humans have intrinsic value. In other words, human interest does not take automatic precedence and humans have obligations towards non-humans independently of human interest. Eco-centrism is, therefore, life-centred, nature-centred where nature includes both humans and non-humans. The Constitution of India protects not only human rights but also casts an obligation on human beings to protect and preserve a specie from becoming extinct. Conservation and protection of environment is an inseparable part of the fundamental right to life. According to the doctrine of 'public trust' recognized under the Constitution of India, certain common properties such as rivers, seashores, forests and the air are held by the Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. The resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole, that it would be totally unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The State, as a custodian of the natural resources, has a duty to maintain them not merely for the benefit of the public, but for the best interest of flora and fauna, wildlife and so on.

There are two principal theories on the relationship between international law and domestic law-Monism and Dualism. The monistic theory maintains that the subjects of two systems of law, i.e., international law and municipal law are essentially one. The monistic theory asserts that international law and municipal law are fundamentally the same in nature, and arise from the same science of law, and are manifestations of a single conception of law. The followers of this theory view international law and municipal law as part of a universal body of legal rules binding all human beings, collectively or singly. In a monist system, international law does not need to be incorporated into domestic law because international law immediately becomes incorporated in domestic legal system upon ratification of an international treaty. According to this theory, domestic law is subordinate to international law. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, therefore, can be directly applied and adjudicated in national courts according to the monistic theory. According to dualism theory, international law and municipal law represent two entirely distinct legal systems, i.e., international has an intrinsically different character from that of municipal law. International law is not directly applicable in the domestic system under dualism. First, international law must be translated into State legislation before the domestic courts can apply it. For example, under dualism, ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court is not enough-it must be implemented through State legislation into the domestic system. Most states and courts presumptively view national and international legal systems as discrete entities and routinely discuss in dualist fashion incorporation of rules from one system to the other.

A special marriage, i.e., a marriage between persons from two different religious affiliations can be legally contracted in India under the provisions of the law relating to special marriages. The law relating to special marriages provides for the registration of such marriages and for divorce in such cases. One of the modes in which a special marriage can be legally terminated is through divorce by mutual consent of parties to the marriage. In order to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, both the parties to the special marriage are required to jointly present a petition for divorce to the district court on the ground that they have been living separately for one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. At least six months after the presentation of such petition, but not later than eighteen months after the presentation of such petition, the district court, after hearing the parties and after making the necessary inquiry, and being satisfied that the marriage is a 'special marriage', and that the claims made in the petition are true, shall declare the marriage to be dissolved. Further, the personal presence of the parties before the district court at the time of presenting the joint petition for divorce is not mandatory, as the parties can satisfy the court even by affidavit that the requirements for granting divorce on mutual consent are fulfilled.

Where a spouse contracts a second marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting, the spouse would be guilty of the offence of bigamy under the penal law in India, if it is proved that the first as well as the second marriages were legally valid, i.e., all the necessary ceremonies required by law or by custom have been performed at the time of contracting the marriages. According to the penal law in India, if a person, who has a living husband or wife, marries again, then such person is liable to be punished with imprisonment up to seven years along with a fine for committing the offence of bigamy. Although the penal law of India is applicable to all citizens irrespective of their religious affiliations, an exception to the offence of bigamy may be created by the law relating to marriage applicable to followers of a particular religion. Under the Hindu law relating to marriage, bigamy is not permitted. If a Hindu wife files a criminal complaint against her husband on the ground that during the subsistence of her marriage, her husband had married a second wife by converting into another religion which legally permits having more than one wife, then her husband is liable to be punished for the offence of bigamy. Further, the Hindu law relating to marriage also provides that the punishment for offence of bigamy as provided in the penal law of India would be applicable to marriage between two Hindus.

The Constitution of India guarantees to all its citizens certain fundamental freedoms, which are recognized as their fundamental rights. However, these fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of India are not absolute as no right can be. Each of these fundamental rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by the Parliament or the State Legislatures. Accordingly, the Constitution of India lays down the grounds and the purposes for which a legislature can impose 'reasonable restrictions' on the rights guaranteed to citizens. The State cannot travel beyond the contours of these reasonable restrictions in curbing the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens. While determining the constitutional validity of a restriction imposed on a fundamental right by a legislation, the Court is not concerned with the necessity of the restriction or the wisdom of the policy underlying it, but only whether the restriction is in excess of the requirement, and whether the legislature has overstepped the Constitutional limitations. Two of the fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen of India are- the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the right to reside and settle in any part of India. However, the State may impose reasonable restrictions on these rights by law, in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribes.