List of top Legal Studies Questions asked in Common Law Admission Test

Writ is a public law remedy. It refers to a formal. written order issued by a judicial authority directing an individual or authority to do or refrain from doing an act. The High Court. while exercising its power of judicial review, does not act as an appellate body. It is concerned with illegality. irrationality and procedural impropriety of an order passed by the State or a Statutory Authority. A High Court is empowered to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and for any other purpose. The writ jurisdiction of High Court is discretionary and equitable. Writ of mandamus is issued by a court commanding a public authority to perform a public duty belonging to its office. It can be issued only when a legal duty is imposed on the authority and the petitioner has right to compel the performance of such duty. Writ of mandamus is requested to be issued, inter alia. to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. A writ of mandamus may be issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself. It may be issued against a person who has a mandatory legal duty to perform. but has failed or has neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates by operation of law. The writ of mandamus is most extensive in regards to its remedial nature. The object of mandamus is to prevent disorder emanating from failure of justice and is required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy.
Harm suffered voluntarily does not constitute a legal injury and is not actionable. This principle is embodied in the maxim volenti non fit injuria. A person cannot complain of harm to the chances of which he has exposed himself with his free consent and free will. The maxim volenti non fit injuria is founded on good sense and justice. A person who has invited or assented to an act being done towards him cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong. The maxim presupposes a tortious act by the defendant. The maxim applies, in the first place, to intentional acts which would otherwise be tortious. There are certain limitations to the application of this maxim:
(i) It is no answer to a claim made by a workman against his employer for injury caused through a breach by the employer of a duty imposed upon him by a statute. But where the negligence or breach of statutory duty is on the part of an employee of the plaintiff who knowingly accepts the risk flowing from such breach and the employer-defendant is not guilty of negligence or breach of statutory duty, the defence of volenti non fit injuria is available to the defendant. 
(ii) Under an exigency caused by the defendant’s wrongful misconduct, consciously and deliberately faced a risk, even of death, whether the person endangered is one to whom he owes a duty of protection, as a member of his family, or is a mere stranger to whom he owes no such special duty. The rescuer will not be deprived of his remedy merely because the risk which he runs is not the same as that run by the person whom he rescues. But where there is no need to take any risk, the person suffering harm in doing so cannot recover. 
(iii) To cover a case of negligence the defence on the basis of the maxim must be based on implied agreement whether amounting to contract or not. The defence is available only when the plaintiff freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk impliedly agreed to incur it and to waive any claim for injury. But when the plaintiff has no choice or when the notice is given at a stage when it is beyond the ability of the plaintiff to make a choice there can be no implied agreement and the defence on the basis of the maxim must fail. 
(iv) The maxim will also not apply when the act relied upon is done because of the psychological condition which the defendant’s breach of duty had induced
It is essential to the creation of a contract that both parties should agree to the same thing in the same sense. Mutual consent, which should also be a free consent, is the sine qua non of a valid agreement and one of its essential elements is that a thing is understood in the same sense by a party as is understood by the other. Not only consent, but free consent is provided in Section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 to be necessary to the complete validity of a contract. Consent is free when it works without obstacles to impede its exercise. Where there is no consent or no real and certain object of consent, there can be no contract at all. Where there is consent, but not free consent, there is generally a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was not free. A general averment that consent was not freely obtained is not enough, and it is necessary to set up one of the vitiating elements such as fraud which includes, false assertion, active concealment, promise without intention of performing it, any other deceptive act, or any act declared as fraudulent. In order to constitute fraud, the act should have been done by the party to the contract, or by any other person with his connivance, or by his agent and with intent to deceive the other party thereto or his agent, or to induce him to enter into the contract. There is no duty upon parties to speak about facts likely to affect the other party’s consent to the contract and mere silence does not amount to fraud, unless the circumstances of the case show that there is duty to speak, or silence is, in itself equivalent to speech. On the other hand, misrepresentation falls into three categories: (i) a statement of fact, which if false, would be misrepresentation if the maker believes it to be true, but which is not justified by the information he possesses; (ii) any breach of duty which gains an advantage to the person committing it by misleading another to his prejudice, there being no intention to deceive; and (iii) causing a party to an agreement to make a mistake as to the substance of the thing which is the subject of the agreement, even though done innocently.
Section 4 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 reads as follows:
Communication when complete - The communication of a proposal is complete when it comes to the knowledge of the person to whom it is made. The communication of an acceptance is complete, - as against the proposer, when it is put in a course of transmission to him so as to be out of the power of the acceptor; as against the acceptor, when it comes to the knowledge of the proposer. 
Thus, the provision makes no difference in the position of the offeror. The offeror becomes bound when a properly addressed and adequately stamped letter of acceptance is posted. The acceptor does not become bound by merely posting his acceptance. He becomes bound only when his acceptance comes to the knowledge of the proposer. The contract is concluded at the place from where the proposal is accepted and communication of acceptance is dispatched, i.e., the address at which the proposal was sent. The court at that place would have jurisdiction to entertain a cause of action under the contract. This rule, that the communication of an acceptance is complete as against the proposer when the letter is posted, is probably intended to apply only when the parties are at a distance and they communicate by post. “Where, however, the parties are in each other’s presence or, though separated in space”, they are in direct communication, as, for example, by telephone, no contract will arise until the offeror receives the notification of acceptance
The doctrine of res judicata requires that a party should not be allowed to file same matter repeatedly against the other party either in the same court or in other competent court and that the decision given by one court should be accepted as final subject to any appeal, revision or review. The doctrine is founded on the principle that it is in the interest of the public at large that a finality should be attached to the binding decisions pronounced by courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. This apart, the object of the doctrine is to ensure that ultimately there should be an end to litigation. Doctrine of res judicata is embodied in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which governs the procedure to be followed in civil matters. Section 11 is inapplicable to writ jurisdictions. The Supreme Court has observed that though the rule is technical in nature yet the general doctrine of res judicata is based on public policy and therefore, it cannot be treated as irrelevant or inadmissible even in dealing with fundamental rights in petitions filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The court observed that if a writ petition filed by a party under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is considered on merits as a contested matter and is dismissed, the decision thus pronounced would continue to bind the parties unless it is otherwise modified or reversed in appeal or other appropriate proceedings permissible under the Constitution of India. It would not be open to a party to ignore the judgment of the High Court and move Supreme Court under Article 32 by an original petition made on the same facts and for obtaining the same or similar orders or writs. If the petition filed in the High Court under Article 226 is dismissed but not on the merits, then the dismissal of the writ petition would not constitute a bar to a subsequent petition under Article 32, however if the petition is dismissed without passing a speaking order, then such dismissal cannot be treated as creating a bar of res judicata.
Marriage is necessarily the basis of social organisation and the foundation of important legal rights and obligations. The importance and imperative character of the institution of marriage needs no comment. In Hindu law, marriage is treated as a Samskara or a sacrament. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 introduced monogamy as a law of marriage among Hindus by virtue of Section 5 clause (i) which is essentially the voluntary union for life of one man with one woman to the exclusion of all others. It enacts, “neither party must have a spouse living at the time of marriage”. The expression ‘spouse’ here used, means a lawfully married husband or wife. Before a valid marriage can be solemnised, both parties to such marriage must be either single or divorced or a widow or a widower and only then they are competent to enter into a valid marriage. If at the time of performance of the marriage rites and ceremonies, one or other of the parties had a spouse living and the earlier marriage had not already been set aside, the later marriage is no marriage at all. The Supreme Court in Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande v. State of Maharashtra, [AIR 1965 SC 1564] held, “Prima facie, the expression ‘whoever marries’ in Section 494 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (which defines the offence of bigamy) must mean ‘whoever marries validly’ or ‘whoever marries and whose marriage is a valid one’. If marriage is not valid according to the law applicable to the parties, no question arises of its being void by reason of its taking place during the life of the husband or wife of the person marrying. One of the conditions of a valid marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 is that it must be ‘solemnised’. Further, Section 13 (2) of the Act provides for grounds of divorce to wife and states, “A wife may also present a petition for the dissolution of her marriage by a decree of divorce on the ground that in the case of any marriage solemnized before the commencement of this Act, that the husband had married again before such commencement or that any other wife of the husband married before such commencement was alive at the time of the solemnization of the marriage of the petitioner: Provided that in either case the other wife is alive at the time of the presentation of the petition”.
The Indian Penal Code, 1860 does not define ‘consent’ in positive terms, but what cannot be regarded as ‘consent’ under the Code is explained by Section 90. Section 90 reads as follows: “90. Consent known to be given under fear or misconception - A consent is not such a consent as is intended by any section of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or under a misconception of fact, and if the person doing the act knows, or has reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or misconception;…” Consent given firstly under fear of injury and secondly under a misconception of fact is not ‘consent’ at all. That is what is enjoined by the first part of Section 90. These two grounds specified in Section 90 are analogous to coercion and mistake of fact which are the familiar grounds that can vitiate a transaction under the jurisprudence of our country as well as other countries. The factors set out in the first part of Section 90 are from the point of view of the victim. The second part of Section 90 enacts the corresponding provision from the point of view of the accused. It envisages that the accused too has knowledge or has reason to believe that the consent was given by the victim in consequence of fear of injury or misconception of fact. Thus, the second part lays emphasis on the knowledge or reasonable belief of the person who obtains the tainted consent. The requirements of both the parts should be cumulatively satisfied. In other words, the court has to see whether the person giving the consent had given it under fear of injury or misconception of fact and the court should also be satisfied that the person doing the act i.e. the alleged offender, is conscious of the fact or should have reason to think that but for the fear or misconception, the consent would not have been given. This is the scheme of Section 90 which is couched in negative terminology. Section 90 cannot, however, be construed as an exhaustive definition of consent for the purposes of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The normal connotation and concept of ‘consent’is not intended to be excluded. Various decisions of the High Court and of Supreme Court have not merely gone by the language of Section 90, but travelled a wider field, guided by the etymology of the word ‘consent’.
Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution prohibits Ex Post Facto laws. The expression Ex Post Facto Law means a law, which imposes penalties or convictions on the acts already done and increases the penalty for such acts. In other words, Ex Post Facto Law, imposes penalties retrospectively. For example, The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 came into force from 20.5.1961. A person guilty of accepting dowry is punishable under the Act after 20.5.1961 and not before 20.5.1961.
Ex post facto laws are of three kinds as follows:(a) A law which declared some act or omission as an offence for the first time after the completion of that act or omission. (b) A law which enhances the punishment or penalty for an offence subsequent to the commission of that offence. (c) A law which prescribes a new and different procedure for the prosecution of an offence subsequent to the commission of that offence.
Clause (1) of Art. 20 provides protection only in respect of the above first two categories of expost facto laws i.e. laws which declare acts as offences subsequent to the commission to those acts and laws which enhance the penalty subsequently.
Article 20(1) provides: No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. The first part of clause (1) provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence. The second part of clause (1) protects a person form a penalty greater than that which he might have been subjected to at the time of the commission of the offence.
Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act, which need not be a long gap. To bring common intention into effect a pre-concert is not necessarily be proved, but it may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons and could be inferred from facts and circumstances of each case. For example A and B caught hold of C where only B stabbed C with a knife but A is also liable for murder as there was a pre concerted action. In the case Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, Supreme court emphasized on this point that prior concert need not be something always very much prior to the incident, but could well be something that may develop on the spot, on the spur of the moment.
Common Intention and Similar Intention
Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them. In the case of Dukhmochan Pandey v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court, held that: “Common intention which developed at the spur of the moment is different from the similar intention actuated a number of person at the same time….the distinction between a common intention and similar intention may be fine, but is nonetheless a real one and if overlooked, may lead to miscarriage of justice….” The mere presence of accused together is not sufficient to hold that they shared the common intention to commit the offence in question. It is necessary that the intention of each one of 'several persons‘ be known to each other for constituting common intention.
Tension prevailed in the Jawahar area in Palghar district after three Mumbai residents, travelling in a Ford Ecosport to Silvassa, were allegedly lynched late on Thursday night. The Kasa police said the incident occurred near Gadakchinchale village under their jurisdiction. “Information received by us indicates that the three occupants of the SUV hailed form Kandivali in Mumbai and were going to attend a funeral in Silvassa,” Superintendent of Police Gaurav Singh, Palghar police said. A large mob of villagers surrounded the car within a matter of minutes and started attacking it with sticks, irons rods and their bare hands, leading to the death of all three occupants. “One of our patrolling vehicles later spotted the severely injured trio lying on the road and stopped to find out the matter. However, our team was also attacked by the mob and the vehicle pelted with stones. Our personnel had to flee and were unable to rescue to the victims,” an officer with the Kasa police said. A wireless alert was sent out later apprising all police stations and units of the incident following which reinforcements were sent to the village and a combing operation was undertaken. “Prima facie information indicates that the trio were mistaken for thieves and attacked. The villagers were on edge due to the ongoing lockdown and unavailability of essential supplies. For the past few days, several rumours have been doing the rounds on social media about thieves and dacoits targetting villages on the highway. As a result, villagers have been patrolling the highway and stopping late night travellers on suspicion,” the officer said
Source: Excerpt from The Hindu, written by Alok Deshpande (22/04/2020)
Principle of Natural Justice is derived from the word „Jus Natural‟ of the Roman law and it is closely related to Common law and moral principles but is not codified. It is a law of nature which is not derived from any statute or constitution. The principle of Natural Justice is adhered to by all the citizens of civilised State with Supreme importance. Natural justice simply means to make a sensible and reasonable decision making procedure on a particular issue. Sometimes, it doesn‘t matter what is the reasonable decision but in the end, what matters is the procedure and who all are engaged in taking the reasonable decision. It is not restricted within the concept of 'fairness‘ it has different colors and shades which vary from the context. Basically, natural justice consists of 3 rules.
The first one is “Hearing rule” which states that the person or party who is affected by the decision made by the Panel of expert members should be given a fair opportunity to express his point of view to defend himself. Secondly, “Bias rule" generally expresses that Panel of expert should be free from bias while taking the decision. The decision should be given in a free and fair manner which can fulfil the rule of natural justice. And thirdly, “Reasoned Decision” which states that order, decision or judgement of the Court given by the Presiding authorities with a valid and reasonable ground. The principles of Natural Justice have been adopted and followed by the judiciary to protect public rights against the arbitrary decision by the administrative authority. One can easily see that the rule of natural justice include the concept of fairness: they stay alive and support to safeguard the fair dealing.
Source: Excerpt taken from blog.ipleaders.in (Dated - 12th June, 2019)
On 7th May 2020, a major leakage of Styrene gas was reported from the plastics-manufacturing plant 'LG Polymers' located on the outskirts of the Visakhapatnam city. The accident took place when the cooling system of a polymers plant got clogged due to the mismanagement of factory workers and resulted in turning the city into a gas chamber. The gas which leaked was styrene gas, which is a 'hazardous chemical‘ under Rule 2(e) plus Entry 583 of Schedule I of the Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical Rules 1989.
Principle 1: Polluter Pays Principle
The 'Doctrine of Polluter Pays' is a well-established principle of environmental law, which places an obligation of compensating the damage to the people who ought to reimburse it and also have the capacity to disburse it. The principle explicitly affirms that the person who damages or destructs the environment has the absolute obligation to bear the cost of ameliorating the environment. In Enviro Legal Action v. Union of India case, the Apex Court of India held that the polluter is legally responsible to reimburse the individual sufferers as well as pay for the revitalization of the damaged environment.
Principle 2: Principle of Strict Liability
The principle of Strict Liability was established in the year 1868 in the case of Rylands v. Fletcher, where the Court held that any person who uses his/her land in an 'unnatural manner' and who keeps any 'hazardous substance' on such premises would be held liable under the principle of strict liability for any 'damage' occurred on the 'escape' of such perilous substance. However, the person is liable only when there is non-natural use of land; the principle also restricts liability when the escape is due to an act of strangers, Act of God, for example a natural calamity; due to the person injured or when it happens with the consent of the person injured or with statutory authority.
Principle 3: Principle of Absolute Liability
The absolute liability is a stringent form of Strict Liability as it is devoid of any exceptions that were mentioned under the earlier principle. for the first time in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India. This principle implies that whenever an enterprise is engaged in any dangerous or hazardous activity that threatens the people working in the enterprise and those living nearby, it owes an absolute and non-delegable duty to the community that no harm will be caused. If harm is indeed caused, the enterprise will have to compensate for damages, and can‘t use exceptions provided in the case of strict liability. The enterprise can‘t claim that the harm has not been caused due to negligence (absence of due care) or that it had taken all reasonable precautions.
The issue of Obscenity has vexed the Courts in India and abroad for a long time now. The intriguing question has always been the same, i.e., what should be the standards to qualify something as obscene in the eyes of law? In the United Kingdom, way back in 1868, the Court laid down the Hicklin test in Regina v. Hicklin (1868 L.R. 2 Q.B. 360), and held that: “The test of Obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as Obscenity is to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall.” Hicklin test postulated that a publication has to be judged for obscenity based on isolated passages of a work considered out of context and judged by their apparent influence on most susceptible readers, such as children or weak minded adults. However, this test was later rejected by most of the jurisdictions. There were many judgments where it was stipulated by the Indian Courts that, Obscenity has to be judged in the context of contemporary social mores, current socio-moral attitude of the community and the prevalent norms of acceptability/ susceptibility of the community, in relation to matters in issue. [For example, in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 881; Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodar v. State of Maharashtra 1969 (2) SCC 687 etc.] These judgements indicated that the concept of Obscenity would change with the passage of time and what might have been “obscene” at one point of time would not be considered as obscene at a later period. This came to be known as “Community Standards Test”. In Bobby Art International & Ors. v. Om Pal Singh Hoon (1996) 4 SCC 1, the Court, upholding the Community standards test held that, complete message and context of the objectionable scene/firm/picture etc., needs to be examined in order to find out whether the alleged material is obscene or not.
The COVID-19 pandemic has taken the entire world hostage in less than four months, and the global economy has been hit the hardest with governments across the globe implementing stringent policies including lockdown to control the coronavirus outbreak. The pandemic today presents unprecedented challenges and impediments to businesses in conducting their normal operations. The lockdown across the world has caused delays in the performance of contracts and transactions. Now, the question that arises is whether the current situation can enable parties to a contract to alter their obligations with non-compliance of terms neither being regarded as a "default committed by any party" nor a "breach of contract"? There are certain well-accepted practices for dealing with such extraordinary situations in commercial transactions by the inclusion of force majeure & material adverse effect (MAE) clauses. Determination of the types of circumstances so covered by the force majeure clause contained in a contract is essential. Provisions of force majeure often cover natural disasters like hurricanes, floods, and earthquakes as "acts of God." Other covered events may include war, terrorism, civil disorder, fire, disease medical epidemics or by reasons of applicable laws or regulations. Broadly, the Courts have interpreted the term "Force Majeure" as an event that can neither be anticipated nor controlled by either of the contracting parties. A force majeure clause applies in the context of ongoing contractual arrangements, whereas, an MAE or material adverse change (MAC) clause applies to the allocation of risk in transactions before their closure or completion. Pandemic and related consequences such as government action is a type of event covered by a force majeure clause, however, its impact on the affected party's ability to perform its contractual obligations may vary depending upon contractual terms. It is common for force majeure clauses to specify the impact that the event or circumstances in question must have, in order for the clause to be triggered. References may be made, for example, to the event or circumstances having "prevented", "hindered" or "delayed" performance. These terms require different levels of impact on performance before a party can claim recourse to these clauses. In other words, the force majeure and MAC clauses act as an exception to what would otherwise be treated as a breach of contract. Certain contracts may state that, if a force majeure clause is applied, the contract may automatically be terminated. On the other hand, some contracts may even state that the duty to fulfil the contractual obligation may be suspended for a certain period of time and if the force majeure event is not curbed or treated even after such time, then eventually the contract may be terminated. Though there cannot be a one-size-fits-all solution to this question, and it depends upon how the force majeure clause is worded in a specific contract; and in the absence of the same, applicable laws related to the same will be required to be taken into consideration.
Principle: Everyone has the right of private defense to defend his body and property by use of reasonable force unless that person had time to have recourse to protection of public authorities.
Facts: X receives information at 5.00 pm that Y along with few friends is planning to burn his crop at midnight which is ready to be harvested. He does not inform the village Police Station which was just one kilometer away. He gathers his family members and directs them to collect some weapons in the form of swords and lathis to protect his field/crop. At around 11.00 pm Y and his aides attack the crop and a severe fight ensues wherein Y is seriously injured.
This question consists of legal principle(s) (hereinafter referred to as ‘principle‘) and facts. Such proposition may or may not be true in the real and legal sense, yet you have to conclusively assume them to be true for the purposes of this section. Principles have to be applied to the given facts to arrive at the most reasonable conclusion. Only one of the alternatives, i.e., (A), (B), (C), or (D) is the most reasonable conclusion. In other words, in answering the following questions, you must not rely on any principle except the principles that are given herein below for every question. Further you must not assume any facts other than those stated in the question. The objective of this section is to test your ability in legal aptitude, study of law, research aptitude and problem solving ability even if the ’most reasonable conclusion‘ arrived at may be absurd or unacceptable for any other reason.
Principle : Where one of the parties to a contract was in position to dominate the decision of the other party, the contract is enforceable only at the option of the party who was in a position to dominate decision of the other party.
Facts : A doctor asked his patient to make a payment of Rs. 10,00,000/- (Ten Lac Only) for treatment of his fever. The patient paid an amount of Rs. 5,00,000/- (Five Lac Only) and promised to pay the remaining amount after the treatment. After treatment the patient recovered from fever. The doctor demanded the remaining amount from the patient. The patient refused to pay.
This question consists of legal principle(s) (hereinafter referred to as 'principle‘) and facts. Such proposition may or may not be true in the real and legal sense, yet you have to conclusively assume them to be true for the purposes of this section. Principles have to be applied to the given facts to arrive at the most reasonable conclusion. Only one of the alternatives, i.e., (A), (B), (C), or (D) is the most reasonable conclusion. In other words, in answering the following questions, you must not rely on any principle except the principles that are given herein below for every question. Further you must not assume any facts other than those stated in the question. The objective of this section is to test your ability in legal aptitude, study of law, research aptitude and problem solving ability even if the 'most reasonable conclusion‘ arrived at may be absurd or unacceptable for any other reason.