List of practice Questions

"The main argument on behalf of the Respondents was that the Government was bound by its promise and could not have resiled from it. They had an indefeasible legitimate expectation of continued employment, stemming from the Government Order dated 20.02.2002 which could not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on behalf of the Respondents that they were not given an opportunity before the benefit that was promised, was taken away. To appreciate this contention of the Respondents, it is necessary to understand the concept of legitimate expectation. 14. The principle of legitimate expectation has been recognized by this Court in ―Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation & Ors.‖ If the promise made by an authority is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous, a person can claim that the authority in all fairness should not act contrary to the promise.
15. M. Jagannadha Rao, J. elaborately elucidated on legitimate expectation in ―Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India & Ors.‖ He referred to the judgment in 2 (1993) 3 SCC 499 ―Council of Civil Service Unions and Ors. v. Minister for the Civil Service‖ in which Lord Diplock had observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which, (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision- maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there has been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn. 
Rao, J. observed in this case, that the procedural part of legitimate expectation relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced. 
16. It has been held by R. V. Raveendran, J. in ―Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar‖ that legitimate expectation is not a legal right. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It may entitle an expectant: (a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or (b) to an explanation as to the cause of denial. In appropriate cases, the Courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice."
Source: Excerpt taken from the judgment delivered by the bench of L. Nageshwar Rao & Hemant Gupta, J.J. in Kerala State Beverages (M and M) v. P P Suresh & Ors.,(2019) 9 SCC 710.
Read the piece written by Prof. Upendra Baxi and answer the questions below:
No matter how the matters are for the time being resolved (and swiftly on all indications), the present crisis in the Supreme Court involves mainly a contention on how judicial business should be conducted. The extraordinary movement of four justices in making public a letter addressed to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) in November 2017, and assorted observations at the press conference last week are very unusual judicial happenings. At that conference, Justice Chelameswar said that “less than desirable things have happened” and the protesting Justices vainly “tried to collectively persuade” the CJI to take “remedial measures”. These happenings are now made even more unusual by Justice Ranjan Gogoi reportedly denying any “crisis|” and Justice Kurian Joseph saying the matter is now settled leaving little scope for “outside intervention”. However, the letter released at the press conference said otherwise; it spoke of the ways in which “the overall functioning of the justice delivery system”, the “independence of the high courts”, and the functioning of the office of the CJI have been “adversely affected”. A moving appeal to the Indian “Nation" was issued at the press conference and Justice Chelameswar justified speaking out, lest ”wise people" say later that they were complicit. A situation where four senior-most justices went public to express their discontent with the present CJI‘s exercise of authority to constitute Benches raises grave constitutional questions. Although only an in-house rectification can save matters, it is an anti-democratic error of grave proportions to think that co-citizens should have no interest, stake, or say in the matter. Undoubtedly, the Chief Justices, whether of the High courts or the Supreme Court, have the power to order the roster. The question is whether that power is coupled with a constitutional duty to follow certain conventions. Obviously, there are a few: Chief Justices have a primary duty of accountability to the Brother Justices, the Bar, and a general obligation through the Bar to the litigating public and people at large. But when a letter by four Senior Justices has been ignored for about two months, is going public with a copy of that letter and holding even a press conference unjudicial? On this question opinions are varied. Some have lauded this step as heroic while others regard this as "sheer trade union tactics‖ and some even say the step was extremely unfortunate but now some institutional solidarity should pave the path ahead. What are the other conventions? First, a part-heard matter may not be divested from the co-justices who are seized with it. Second, the CJI may not deny a request for recusal on grounds of conflict of interest. Third, the Chief Justice may not ignore the requests by co-justices to form a larger Bench. Fourth, a Chief Justice may not selectively assign sensitive or important cases to the same judges. However, fifth, it is doubtful whether there is, or ought to be, a convention requiring such matters to be heard only by the senior-most justices. No, because the decision to elevate a citizen to judgeship
must involve all relevant considerations; once elevated, a justice is co-equal to all other brethren. Sixth, it is true that co-equality occurs within a hierarchy: Not every justice becomes a Chief Justice, and the SC collegium must comprise the five senior-most justices. Outside this framework, the question about the rank-ordering may not arise; all Justices speak for the constitutional court. Any discussion about benches headed by “junior” justices is therefore injudicious. The second issue looming large is the finalisation of Memorandum of Procedure (MoP). In early July 2017 (in Justice Karnan‘s case), at least two Justices observed a need “to revisit the process of appointment of judges and establishment of a mechanism for corrective measures other than impeachment”. The letter also suggests that the issue of MoP "cannot linger on for indefinite period" and since the government has not responded to the MoP sent as far back as March 2017, the Court must now presume this long “silence” amounts to acceptance. Convening a full court and/or an agreement of the Chief Justices‘ conference stand was suggested. The highest court in the land cannot endlessly wait for the government. The remedies of impeachment and removal for judicial misconduct and review, and now curative jurisdiction, constitutionally exist. And further, the spectre of the call of conscience to go to the  “Nation” will now haunt all Chief Justices. Informed criticism has some impact on judicial dispositions. But the ultimate guarantee of fairness as justice lie with the Justices themselves. As Eugene Ehrlich, a founder of European sociology of law, said: “The best guarantee of justice lies in the personality of the judge.” Justices must be seen practising what they preach to the other holders of public power. It is only when they collectively fail to do so that a democracy is truly imperilled.
The Archimedean point of Habermas‘ philosophy of law is not the concept of natural law. His approach to positive law differs from both Han‘s and Hobbes‘. For him, positive laws are democratically established human artifacts. In the democratic procedure for legislatures to make laws, even if there may be arguments appealing to the concept of natural law, democratically established positive laws are not duplications of natural laws. Instead, they differ from natural laws both in content and form. The legitimacy and validity of positive laws come exclusively from the democratic process in which laws are established and published. By the same token, the rationality of positive laws comes exclusively from a democratic legislature based upon rational communication under the guidance of the communicative rationality. In social management, morality is complementary to positive law. But positive law is not subordinate to [1]. Instead, the two are parallel institutions. Habermas shares with Han and Hobbes the view that positive laws have two salient features. First, they are written and publically published. Second, they are backed by those who have a monopoly on force. The second feature of positive laws is dubbed by Habermas as the ―facticity‖ of law. The facticity or social reality of positive laws is that they are compulsory and backed by sanctions. As Habermas puts it, ―Such laws appear as the will of a lawgiver with the power to punish those who do not comply; to the extent that they are actually enforced and followed, they have an existence somewhat akin to social facts.‖. Also, for Habermas, as it is for Han and Hobbes, positive law differs from natural law in the sense that positive law is a social institution, a human artifact, not a natural institution. Positive law comes into existence by a historical and public action—that is, the democratically legislation of it and its being publically published.
Read the excerpts from an opinion piece entitled "Labour Law Suspension: Hit The Workers When They Are Down" by Pranab Bardhan, Professor of Graduate School at the Department of Economics at the University of California, Berkeley, published by Bloomberg Quint and answer the questions below:
It is interesting that while Indian states are trying to suspend labour protection and make it easier for employers to sack workers, many other countries are trying to minimise lay-offs in this period of crisis by giving wage subsidy to employers to induce them to keep the workers on the payroll. These programs are an effort to reduce displacement, distress, and loss of worker morale, and at the time of economic recovery less friction and de-skilling. The wage subsidies are quite substantial in Europe, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. It is also being attempted in some developing countries like Argentina, Bangladesh, Botswana, China, Malaysia, Philippines, South Africa, Thailand, and Turkey.
In the continuing sordid saga of callousness and brutality with the millions of suddenly unemployed migrant workers over the last six weeks since lockdown, an interesting fact to note is that employers who mostly had stopped paying them over this period, thus causing widespread hunger and homelessness, have lobbied with state governments to stop sending them back to their villages so that they remain available when the industries restart. I am actually in favour of a thorough overhaul. The current labour laws, tangled and outdated as they are, serve the long-term interests of neither the employers nor the workers. At the beginning of this century, the Second National Commission of Labour made a whole set of sensible recommendations for such an overhaul, but they remain largely unimplemented. I would support abolishing the firm size limit on labour retrenchment altogether, provided there is a provision for adequate unemployment benefits, both for regular and contract workers, and there is something like a state-provided universal basic income supplement as a fall-back option for everybody. "Allowing more flexibility in hiring and firing has to be combined, as part of a package deal, with a reasonable scheme of unemployment compensation from an earmarked fund, to which employers and employees should both regularly contribute." For far too long businesses in India, with some notable exceptions, have considered labour as a necessary but troublesome cog in the production machine, and the focus is to squeeze the maximum out of it with minimum pay and benefits while brandishing the threat of job insecurity. Organised labour, often under politicised partisan leadership from outside, has played that adversarial game. It is in the long-term interests of both sides to see at the ground level that labour-friendly practices can actually enhance long- term productivity and profitability. If cooperation can replace mutual suspicion and labour representatives can be trusted to participate in corporate governance as is the practice, say, in Germany and a few other European countries labour organisations can play a responsible role in achieving mutually beneficial goals. Taking the cover of the pandemic to unilaterally whittle down labour protections is going the opposite way, to distrust, and labour unrest.
Read the following passage carefully and then answer the accompanying questions employing the concepts provided in the passage:
According to Hohfeld, legal relationships can exist only between two legal persons and one thing. One of the two persons always has a legal advantage (that's the right) over the other. The other person has the corresponding legal disadvantage. ... For example employer employee. The basic building block of legal rights is liberty. It allows one person to do exactly as she pleases with no duty to do otherwise. ... But ... the important thing about a liberty: No one is required to respect it. It is merely a “permission without a protection”. For example, I can enjoy the view of my neighbour's garden but he is not under a duty to protect my view and can screen it off.
A “claim” entitles one person to limit the liberty of another, who then has a duty either to act or not to act in certain ways toward the claimant. For example, a child's claim to maintenance from parents places a duty on parents to provide maintenance. In personam claims can be made against a definite number of persons whilst in rem claims are available against every person in the world. ...An immunity disables one person from interfering with the liberty of another...Claims tell us what we should not do. Immunities tell us what we cannot do. ... For example, a public official cannot be prosecuted without special permission. A “power” is an ability that the law gives a person to (realise) her own legal rights or the rights of someone else (for example the power to sue). Its correlate, the liability carries the sense of exposure to having one's legal status changed. For example, only a person with locus in a case can file a litigation to press his claims.
[Adapted from Steven Wise, Rattling the Cage Towards Legal Rights of Animals) (2000)]
Read the extracts of leading judicial pronouncement and answer the questions below:
1. What is bad in theology was once good in law but after Shariat has been declared as the personal law, whether what is Quranically wrong can be legally right is the issue to be considered in this case. Therefore, the simple question that needs to be answered in this case is only whether triple talaq has any legal sanctity. That is no more res integra. This Court in [1] has held, though not in so many words, that triple talaq lacks legal sanctity. Therefore, in terms of Article 141 [1] is the law that is applicable in India.
2. Having said that, I shall also make an independent endeavour to explain the legal position in [1] and lay down the law explicitly.
3. [2] was enacted to put an end to the unholy, oppressive and discriminatory customs and usages in the Muslim community. Section 2 is most relevant in the face of the present controversy.
Application of Personal law to Muslims. - Notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in all questions (save questions relating to agricultural land) regarding intestate succession, special property of females, including personal property inherited or obtained under contract or gift or any other provision of Personal Law, marriage, dissolution of marriage, including talaq, ila, zihar, lian, khula and mubaraat, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and trust properties, and wakfs (other than charities and charitable institutions and charitable and religious endowments) the rule of decision in cases where the parties are Muslims shall be Muslim Personal Law (Shariat).
The Principles of state responsibility dictate that states are accountable for breaches of International Law. Such breaches of treaty or customary international law enable the injured state to maintain a claim against the violating state, whether by way of diplomatic action or by way of recourse to international mechanisms where such are in place with regard to subject matter in issue. Recourse to International Arbitration or to the International Court of Justice is also possible provided the necessary jurisdictional basis has been established. Customary International Law imposes several important fundamental obligations upon the States in the area of environmental protection. The view that the International law supports an approach predicated upon absolute territorial sovereignty, so that a state could do as it liked irrespective of the consequences upon other states has long been discredited. The basic duty upon states is not so to act as to injure the rights of other states. This duty has evolved partly out of the regime concerned with international waterways. In the [1] case, the Permanent Court of International Justice noted that 'this community of interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of common legal right, the essential features of which are the perfect equality of all riparian states in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of any preferential privileges of any riparian state in relation to others.'. But the principle is of far wide application. It was held in [2] case that the concept of territorial sovereignty incorporated an obligation to protect within the territory the rights of other states. It has now been established that it was an obligation of every state to not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states. This judicial approach has now been widely reaffirmed in international instruments. Article [3] of the Law of Sea Convention, 1982 provides that 'states shall take all measures necessary to ensure that activities under their jurisdiction and control are so conducted as not to cause damage by pollution to other states and their environment.' It is sometimes argued that the appropriate standard for the conduct of states in this field is that of strict liability. In other words, states are under an absolute obligation to prevent pollution and are thus liable for its effects irrespective of fault.
One of the biggest casualties of the Covid-19 pandemic and the resultant lockdown has been institutionalized education. Schools have been shut to prevent the spread of the virus and this has given way to online classrooms, a very new concept in India even for the most sophisticated schools. It is commendable how easily some educational institutions have moved to virtual classrooms, all thanks to tools such as Zoom, Google Hangouts and Microsoft Teams. But there are some still struggling to get online. The online classes, whatever the enabling technology, is only as good as the teachers and the ability of the students to grasp the new teaching technique. One of the teachers felt students are actually more responsive and active in online classrooms, compared to when they are in physical ones. “This could be because this is a new concept and they are excited to explore it with the teachers. They also don't get distracted by their classmates, which frequently happens in a regular class." Teachers do find the absence of a blackboard a disadvantage and network connectivity a constant problem. “We miss the clarity that a blackboard gives us, we are kind of making do with the virtual whiteboard on Zoom.” Shweta Kawatra, a parent who teaches in a New Delhi school, highlights that many students have not been able to take advantage of the virtual platform because they do not have a suitable device at home or lack a good internet connection. “It has its own share of disadvantages too. Too much screen time can be perilous for health. Prolonged online sessions can be overwhelming and may lead to problems related to vision, body posture and sleep disorder,” Kawatra adds.
[Excerpt from an Article by Sneha Saha, The Indian Express, dated April 18, 2020]
If anything, the novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has taught us to rethink our lifestyles and question our need to travel to work every day. After all, in the age of internet, zoom meetings and webinars can be virtually conducted and physical distancing is possible. A large nature of work in cities is of tertiary nature, a major part of which can be done from home. This can affect the way offices function and reduce the need for all employees to be physically present every day. Information Technology companies are already contemplating a move of making many of its employees work from home and make this a ‗new normal‘. If more firms follow suit, the need for huge office buildings and central business districts would change. Apartments cannot get bigger at the same rate, and people may not have the space or atmosphere to work from home. This would mean that more people would opt for co-working spaces close to their homes. This could be a game changer, for it would provide the cities to better distribute their activities throughout the spaces and rid themselves of the idea of zoning. Only a handful of professionals are allowed to function from residential zones, including doctors, lawyers, architects, etc. This needs serious rethinking. Many more professions of similar nature that do not disturb surrounding residence and have no requirements of special services should be added to the list. This new work culture would bring associated demand for food joints, cafés, stationary shops, etc.
[Excerpt from „Down to Earth‟ Magazine, Blog authored by Sugeet Grover, August 17, 2020]
Don‘t miss the cloud behind the silver lining. The Class XII CBSE pass result has soared to an all-time high of 88.8%. The number of students scoring 95% and above has more than doubled. If only these higher marks were a reflection of students getting more skilled and more competitive. Instead, the odds are they simply mirror an assessment scheme relaxed to compensate students for the many disruptions originating in the pandemic. The goal of reducing student stress levels during this turbulent time is excellent and laudable. But it is a fallacy that high marks can accomplish this by themselves. The real stressor, after all, is shortage of opportunities. When every bout of grade inflation raises cut-offs for higher education even higher, it is no succour. That India‘s Gross Enrolment Ratio is only 27% compared to Indonesia‘s 36%, Thailand‘s 49% and the US‘s 88% is just one measure of the toll taken by our failure to build adequate colleges and universities. License raj continues to suppress autonomy and expansion in this sector. For example, a new national education policy is reportedly mulling at least 20% of students being able to attend private higher educational institutions through freeships and another 30% through scholarships, besides fee caps. On top of the stasis already wreaked by reservations, this would be disastrous. Browbeating the private sector to make up for public sector deficiencies is counterproductive. As the pandemic has underlined the key role of good government services in healthcare, so too is raising the standard of publicly funded schools and universities essential. What the students need is an ecosystem where government institutions deliver quality education and private options are plentiful. It is better prospects alone that will best alleviate students‘ stress. Meanwhile, crudely chopping syllabi will only worsen their disorientation and should be reconsidered.
[TOI Edit, Times of India Editorials, Dated July 15, 2020].
In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, launched an ill-fated anti-alcohol campaign in the then Soviet Union. The anti-alcohol campaign had some beneficial public health consequences: Crime fell and life expectancy rose. But the campaign was a political and economic disaster. Gorbachev forgot that the addiction of the state to alcohol revenue was even more incurable than the addiction of some citizens to alcohol itself. The budgetary losses created an economic crisis. Historians suspect that more than the loss of the Soviet Empire, it was this campaign that delegitimized Gorbachev. An old Soviet joke went like this: A disaffected and angry citizen, fed up of standing in lines for vodka, decided to go assassinate Gorbachev. He soon came back and ruefully reported that the lines to assassinate Gorbachev were even longer than the lines for Vodka. As the lockdown eased in India, and social distancing went for a toss at alcohol outlets, we were reminded of how difficult an issue alcohol is to rationally discuss in India. The stampede was caused by the ineptness with which the opening was handled in most cities. Alcohol has also migrated from being a question of personal freedom and choice to an issue in broader cultural wars, an odd site on which we measure progressivism in India. It is also a window on how liberalism has been misunderstood. Liberals should, rightly, be suspicious of prohibition on moral and practical grounds. Government grossly exceeds its legitimate power when it interferes with the rights of individuals to lead their lives as they please, and fashion their selves after their own ideals, interests and preferences. And certainly, moralism or puritanism on alcohol cannot be the basis of state policy. That moralism has no basis, and it violates the dignity and freedom of individuals.
[Excerpt from an Opinion by Bhanu Pratap Mehta, The Indian Express, May 7, 2020]
Some readers wondered whether my reading of the crisis in the news media is about journalism or about the news industry. Though the fortunes of the news industry have a bearing on journalism, there is, indeed, a difference between looking at issues that govern journalism and the factors that contribute to the financial stress of the media industry. Over the last few years, I have been discussing the impact of digitalisation on journalism. The pandemic has accelerated the process of digital transformation of the news media. Therefore, these issues need close scrutiny. One of the defining elements of analog journalism was the way two crucial functions of journalism — bearing witness and making sense — complemented each other and helped people make informed choices. When I talk about the strength of analog, I am neither romanticising the past nor am I a Luddite. Most importantly, I do not believe in nostalgia. Many scholars have established “how rose-coloured glasses always leads to an unfair distortion — looking back on the best of the past while comparing it to the worst of the present.” Hence, when I talk about the digital information news environment, I am talking about how there needs to be a conducive atmosphere for credible information to resonate with the people. Literature on misinformation, disinformation and malinformation reveals a new distinction in the minds of the citizens. Editors and journalists have to contend with a new breed of sceptics. These are the people who trust social media forwards more than evidence-based, data-driven journalism. Their confirmation bias flows from encrypted social media platforms that are full of conspiracy theories.
[Excerpt from an Article by A.S. Panneerselvan, The Hindu, dated August 10, 2020]
Article 20(1) of the Indian Constitution prohibits Ex Post Facto laws. The expression Ex Post Facto Law means a law, which imposes penalties or convictions on the acts already done and increases the penalty for such acts. In other words, Ex Post Facto Law, imposes penalties retrospectively. For example, The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 came into force from 20.5.1961. A person guilty of accepting dowry is punishable under the Act after 20.5.1961 and not before 20.5.1961.
Ex post facto laws are of three kinds as follows:(a) A law which declared some act or omission as an offence for the first time after the completion of that act or omission. (b) A law which enhances the punishment or penalty for an offence subsequent to the commission of that offence. (c) A law which prescribes a new and different procedure for the prosecution of an offence subsequent to the commission of that offence.
Clause (1) of Art. 20 provides protection only in respect of the above first two categories of expost facto laws i.e. laws which declare acts as offences subsequent to the commission to those acts and laws which enhance the penalty subsequently.
Article 20(1) provides: No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. The first part of clause (1) provides that no person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence. The second part of clause (1) protects a person form a penalty greater than that which he might have been subjected to at the time of the commission of the offence.
Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act, which need not be a long gap. To bring common intention into effect a pre-concert is not necessarily be proved, but it may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons and could be inferred from facts and circumstances of each case. For example A and B caught hold of C where only B stabbed C with a knife but A is also liable for murder as there was a pre concerted action. In the case Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, Supreme court emphasized on this point that prior concert need not be something always very much prior to the incident, but could well be something that may develop on the spot, on the spur of the moment.
Common Intention and Similar Intention
Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them. In the case of Dukhmochan Pandey v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court, held that: “Common intention which developed at the spur of the moment is different from the similar intention actuated a number of person at the same time….the distinction between a common intention and similar intention may be fine, but is nonetheless a real one and if overlooked, may lead to miscarriage of justice….” The mere presence of accused together is not sufficient to hold that they shared the common intention to commit the offence in question. It is necessary that the intention of each one of 'several persons‘ be known to each other for constituting common intention.
Tension prevailed in the Jawahar area in Palghar district after three Mumbai residents, travelling in a Ford Ecosport to Silvassa, were allegedly lynched late on Thursday night. The Kasa police said the incident occurred near Gadakchinchale village under their jurisdiction. “Information received by us indicates that the three occupants of the SUV hailed form Kandivali in Mumbai and were going to attend a funeral in Silvassa,” Superintendent of Police Gaurav Singh, Palghar police said. A large mob of villagers surrounded the car within a matter of minutes and started attacking it with sticks, irons rods and their bare hands, leading to the death of all three occupants. “One of our patrolling vehicles later spotted the severely injured trio lying on the road and stopped to find out the matter. However, our team was also attacked by the mob and the vehicle pelted with stones. Our personnel had to flee and were unable to rescue to the victims,” an officer with the Kasa police said. A wireless alert was sent out later apprising all police stations and units of the incident following which reinforcements were sent to the village and a combing operation was undertaken. “Prima facie information indicates that the trio were mistaken for thieves and attacked. The villagers were on edge due to the ongoing lockdown and unavailability of essential supplies. For the past few days, several rumours have been doing the rounds on social media about thieves and dacoits targetting villages on the highway. As a result, villagers have been patrolling the highway and stopping late night travellers on suspicion,” the officer said
Source: Excerpt from The Hindu, written by Alok Deshpande (22/04/2020)
Principle of Natural Justice is derived from the word „Jus Natural‟ of the Roman law and it is closely related to Common law and moral principles but is not codified. It is a law of nature which is not derived from any statute or constitution. The principle of Natural Justice is adhered to by all the citizens of civilised State with Supreme importance. Natural justice simply means to make a sensible and reasonable decision making procedure on a particular issue. Sometimes, it doesn‘t matter what is the reasonable decision but in the end, what matters is the procedure and who all are engaged in taking the reasonable decision. It is not restricted within the concept of 'fairness‘ it has different colors and shades which vary from the context. Basically, natural justice consists of 3 rules.
The first one is “Hearing rule” which states that the person or party who is affected by the decision made by the Panel of expert members should be given a fair opportunity to express his point of view to defend himself. Secondly, “Bias rule" generally expresses that Panel of expert should be free from bias while taking the decision. The decision should be given in a free and fair manner which can fulfil the rule of natural justice. And thirdly, “Reasoned Decision” which states that order, decision or judgement of the Court given by the Presiding authorities with a valid and reasonable ground. The principles of Natural Justice have been adopted and followed by the judiciary to protect public rights against the arbitrary decision by the administrative authority. One can easily see that the rule of natural justice include the concept of fairness: they stay alive and support to safeguard the fair dealing.
Source: Excerpt taken from blog.ipleaders.in (Dated - 12th June, 2019)