List of practice Questions

Which of the following is not a fundamental (primary) factor considered for selection of a location for the construction of pharmaceutical or chemical plant?

In the process of Extraction, ethanol is used as a solvent for:

The version of GMP in India that describe requirement of factory premises for manufacture of cosmetics:

Which one of the following is not the property of osmotic diuretics?

A fixed oil when added to an equal volume of ethanol; clear liquid is obtained; on cooling at 0°C and on storage for three hours, the liquid remains clear such fixed oil is identified as

In shikimic acid pathway, chorismate mutase converts chorismic acid to

In yam, the presence of, irregular arrangement of the fibres, the ends of which often project from the surface is because of

Plants which are not differentiated into root, stem and leaves are

The fundamental principle "Law of similia" falls under which therapy?

Kraft temperature is the temperature

Two monomers in maltose are :

Let $S$ be the set of all complex numbers $z$ satisfying $\left|z^{2}+z+1\right|=1$. Then which of the following statements is/are TRUE?

For a complex number $z$, let $Re(z)$ denote the real part of $z$. Let $S$ be the set of all complex numbers $z$ satisfying $z^{4}-|z|^{4}=4 i z^{2}$, where $i=\sqrt{-1}$. Then the minimum possible value of $\left|z_{1}-z_{2}\right|^{2}$, where $z_{1}, z_{2} \in S$ with $Re\left( z _{1}\right)$$>$0 and $Re\left( z _{2}\right)$ $<$ 0, is ______

An amplitude modulated wave is represented by the expression $v _{ m }=5(1+0.6 \cos 6280 t )$ $\sin \left(211 \times 10^{4} t \right)$ volts. The minimum and maximum amplitudes of the amplitude modulated wave are, respectively :

Consider two solid spheres of radii $R, = 1m, \,R_2 = 2m$ and masses $M_1$ and $M_2$, respectively. The gravitational field due to sphere (1) and (2) are shown. The value of $\frac{m_{1}}{m_{2}}$ is :

A bead of mass $m$ stays at point $P(a, b)$ on a wire bent in the shape of a parabola $y=4 c x^{2}$ and rotating with angular speed $\omega$ (see figure).

The value of $\omega$ is (neglect friction) :

A rod of length $L$ has non-uniform linear mass density given by $\rho\left(x\right)=a+b\left(\frac{x}{L}\right)^{2},$ where a and b are constants and $0 \le x \le L.$ The value of $x$ for the centre of mass of the rod is a t :

A particle is moving unidirectionally on a horizontal plane under the action of a constant power supplying energy source. The displacement (s) - time (t) graph that describes the motion of the particle is (graphs are drawn schematically and are not to scale) :

The requirement of balancing various considerations brings us to the principle of proportionality. In the case of K. S. Puttaswamy (Privacy-9J.) (supra), this Court observed: “310…Proportionality is an essential facet of the guarantee against arbitrary State action because it ensures that the nature and quality of the encroachment on the right is not disproportionate to the purpose of the law...” Further, in the case of CPIO v. Subhash Chandra Aggarwal, [(2019) SCC OnLine SC 1459], the meaning of proportionality was explained as: "225. It is also crucial for the standard of proportionality to be applied to ensure that neither right is restricted to a greater extent than necessary to fulfil the legitimate interest of the countervailing interest in question…”
The proportionality principle can be easily summarized by Lord Diplock‘s aphorism ‗you must not use a steam hammer to crack a nut, if a nutcracker would do?‘ [Refer to R v. Goldsmith, [1983] 1 WLR 151, 155 (Diplock J)]. In other words, proportionality is all about means and ends. The suitability of proportionality analysis under Part III, needs to be observed herein. The nature of fundamental rights has been extensively commented upon. One view is that the fundamental rights apply as ‗rules‘, wherein they apply in an ‗all¬ or ¬nothing fashion‘. This view is furthered by Ronald Dworkin, who argued in his theory that concept of a right implies its ability to trump over a public good. Dworkin‘s view necessarily means that the rights themselves are the end, which cannot be derogated as they represent the highest norm under the Constitution. This would imply that if the legislature or executive act in a particular manner, in derogation of the right, with an object of achieving public good, they shall be prohibited from doing so if the aforesaid action requires restriction of a right. However, while such an approach is often taken by American Courts, the same may not be completely suitable in the Indian context, having regard to the structure of Part III which comes with inbuilt restrictions. Source: Excerpt taken from a judgment delivered by the bench of N. V. Ramanna, R. Subhash Reddy, B.R. Gavai, J.J. on 10th January, 2020.

In taking this view, Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar, speaking for a majority of five judges, relied upon the judgment of Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the US Supreme Court in Wolf v Colorado, which held:
“The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police … is basic to a free society… We have no hesitation in saying that were a State affirmatively to sanction such police incursion into privacy it would run counter to the guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
While the Court observed that the Indian Constitution does not contain a guarantee similar to the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution, it proceeded to hold that:
“Nevertheless, these extracts would show that an unauthorised intrusion into a person‘s home and the disturbance caused to him thereby, is as it were the violation of a common law right of a man an ultimate essential of ordered liberty, if not of the very concept of civilisation. An English Common Law maxim asserts that ―every man‘s house is his castle‖ and in Semayne case [5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] where this was applied, it was stated that ―the house of everyone is to him as his castle and fortress as well as for his defence against injury and violence as for his repose‖. We are not unmindful of the fact that Semayne case [(1604) 5 Coke 91: 1 Sm LC (13th Edn) 104 at p. 105] was concerned with the law relating to executions in England, but the passage extracted has a validity quite apart from the context of the particular decision. It embodies an abiding principle which transcends mere protection of property rights and expounds a concept of ―personal liberty‖ which does not rest on any element of feudalism or on any theory of freedom which has ceased to be of value.”
Source: Excerpt taken from the Judgment delivered by a 9 Judge bench of the Supreme Court in 2017 and authored by Dr. D. Y. Chandrachud. J.

It will be relevant to refer to the statement made by the contemnor which was made and read out before this Court by the contemnor on 20.08.2020, which reads as under:
“I have gone through the judgment of this Hon‟ble Court. I am pained that I have been held guilty of committing contempt of the Court whose majesty I have tried to uphold - not as a courtier or cheerleader but as a humble guard - for over three decades, at some personal and professional cost. I am pained, not because I may be punished, but because I have been grossly misunderstood. I am shocked that the court holds me guilty of “malicious, scurrilous, calculated attack” on the institution of administration of justice. I am dismayed that the Court has arrived at this conclusion without providing any evidence of my motives to launch such an attack. I must confess that I am disappointed that the court did not find it necessary to serve me with a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo-motu notice was issued, nor found it necessary to respond to the specific averments made by me in my reply affidavit or the many submissions of my counsel. I find it hard to believe that the Court finds my tweet “has the effect of destabilizing the very foundation of this important pillar of Indian democracy”. I can only reiterate that these two tweets represented my bona-fide beliefs, the expression of which must be permissible in any democracy. Indeed, public scrutiny is desirable for healthy functioning of judiciary itself. I believe that open criticism of any institution is necessary in a democracy, to safeguard the constitutional order. We are living through that moment in our history when higher principles must trump routine obligations, when saving the constitutional order must come before personal and professional niceties, when considerations of the present must not come in the way of discharging our responsibility towards the future. Failing to speak up would have been a dereliction of duty, especially for an officer of the court like myself. My tweets were nothing but a small attempt to discharge what I considered to be my highest duty at this juncture in the history of our republic. I did not tweet in a fit of absence mindedness. It would be insincere and contemptuous on my part to offer an apology for the tweets that expressed what was and continues to be my bona-fide belief. Therefore, I can only humbly paraphrase what the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi had said in his trial: I do not ask for mercy. I do not appeal to magnanimity. I am here, therefore, to cheerfully submit to any penalty that can lawfully be inflicted upon me for what the Court has determined to be an offence, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen.”
Source: Excerpt taken from the Judgment delivered by Arun Mishra, B. R. Gavai & Krishna Murari, J.J.

"9. We now come to the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported as Rajeev Kumar Gupta & Others v. Union of India & Others – (2016) 13 SCC 153. In this judgment, the posts in Prasar Bharati were classified into four Groups–A to D. The precise question that arose before the Court is set out in para 5 thereof in which it is stated that the statutory benefit of 3 per cent reservation in favour of those who are disabled is denied insofar as identified posts in Groups A and B are concerned, since these posts are to be filled through direct recruitment. After noticing the arguments based on the nine-Judge bench in Indra Sawhney vs. Union of India, 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217, this Court held:
14. We now examine the applicability of the prohibition on reservation in promotions as propounded by Indra Sawhney. Prior to Indra Sawhney, reservation in promotions were permitted under law as interpreted by this Court in Southern Railway v. Rangachari, AIR 1962 SC 36. Indra Sawhney specifically overruled Rangachari to the extent that reservations in promotions were held in Rangachari to be permitted under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. Indra Sawhney specifically addressed the question whether reservations could be permitted in matters of promotion under Article 16(4). The majority held that reservations in promotion are not permitted under our constitutional scheme.
15. The respondent argued that the answer to Question 7 in Indra Sawhney squarely covers the situation on hand and the reasons outlined by the majority opinion in Indra Sawhney at… must also apply to bar reservation in promotions to identified posts of Group A and Group B.
16. We do not agree with the respondent‟s submission. Indra Sawhney ruling arose in the context of reservations in favour of backward classes of citizens falling within the sweep of Article 16(4).
21. The principle laid down in Indra Sawhney is applicable only when the State seeks to give preferential treatment in the matter of employment under the State to certain classes of citizens identified to be a backward class. Article 16(4) does not disable the State from providing differential treatment (reservations) to other classes of citizens under Article 16(1) if they otherwise deserve such treatment. However, for creating such preferential treatment under law, consistent with the mandate of Article 16(1), the State cannot choose any one of the factors such as caste, religion, etc. mentioned in Article 16(1) as the basis. The basis for providing reservation for PWD is physical disability and not any of the criteria forbidden under Article 16(1). Therefore, the rule of no reservation in promotions as laid down in Indra Sawhney has clearly and normatively no application to PWD."
Source: Excerpt taken from a Judgment of three judge bench comprising of R.F. Nariman, Aniruddha Bose & V. Ramasubramaniyam., JJ.