List of practice Questions

To every State whose land territory is at any place washed by the sea, international law attaches a corresponding portion of maritime territory... International law does not say to a State: “You are entitled to claim territorial waters if you want them”. No maritime State can refuse them. International law imposes upon a maritime State, certain obligations and confers upon it certain rights arising out of the sovereignty which it exercises over its maritime territory. The possession of this territory is not optional, not dependent upon the will of the State, but compulsory. In the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, the nationality of ships in the high seas has been referred to in paragraph 287, wherein it has been observed that the legal order on the high seas is based primarily on the rule of International Law which requires every vessel sailing the high seas to possess the nationality of, and to fly the flag of, one State, whereby a vessel and persons on board the vessel are subjected to the law of the State of the flag and in general subject to its exclusive jurisdiction. In paragraph 291 of the aforesaid discourse, the learned author has defined the scope of flag jurisdiction to mean that jurisdiction in the high seas is dependent upon the Maritime Flag under which vessels sail, because no State can extend its territorial jurisdiction to the high seas. Of course, the aforesaid principle is subject to the right of ‘hot pursuit’, which is an exception to the exclusiveness of the flag jurisdiction over ships on the high seas in certain special cases.
In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court analysed the ambit of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and also the scope of the expression ‘arrest’ contained therein and also under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). ‘Arrest’ may be classified into two categories, namely, the arrest under a warrant issued by a court and arrest without warrant. Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly directs that the investigation should be completed in the first instance within 24 hours; if not the arrested person should be brought before a Magistrate as provided under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Turning now to Article 22(1) and (2), we must ascertain whether its protection extends to both categories of arrests mentioned above, and, if not, then which one of them comes within its protection. There can be no matter of doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than do arrests under such warrants. The provision that the arrested person should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him. In the case of arrest under a warrant issued by a court, the judicial mind had already been applied to the case when the warrant was issued and, therefore, there is less reason for making such production in that case a matter of a substantive fundamental right. The matter of ‘House Arrest’ was deliberated by the court as: “There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a court cannot remand a person unless the court is authorised to do so by law. We are of the view, that in the facts of this case, the house arrest was not ordered purporting to be under Section 167. We observe that under Section 167 in appropriate cases it will be open to courts to order house arrest.”
The constitutional validity of the West Bengal Housing Industry Regulation Act, 2017 (WB-HIRA) was challenged on the basis that both WB-HIRA and a Parliamentary enactment, namely, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) are relatable to the legislative subjects contained in Entries 6 and 7 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. WB-HIRA has neither been reserved for nor has it received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, which was necessary since it was going to occupy the same field as the RERA, a law which had been enacted by the Parliament. The State enactment contains certain provisions which are either: directly inconsistent with the corresponding provisions of the Central enactment; or a virtual replica of the Central enactment; and Parliament having legislated on a field covered by the Concurrent List, it is constitutionally impermissible for the State Legislature to enact a law over the same subject matter by setting up a parallel legislation. The analysis indicates repugnancy between WB-HIRA and RERA. Undoubtedly, as Article 254(1) postulates, the legislation enacted by the State legislature is void ‘to the extent of the repugnancy’. There is, not only a direct conflict of certain provisions between the RERA and WB-HIRA, but there is also a failure of the State legislature to incorporate statutory safeguards in WB-HIRA, which have been introduced in the RERA for protecting the interest of the purchasers of real estate. For repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, there is a twin requirement to be fulfilled: firstly, there has to be a ‘repugnancy’ between a Central and State Act; and secondly, the Presidential assent has to be held as being non-existent. The test for determining such repugnancy is indeed to find out the dominant intention of both the legislations and whether such dominant intentions of both the legislations are alike or different. A provision in one legislation in order to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation, but such partial or incidental coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not attract the doctrine of repugnancy. In order to attract the doctrine of repugnancy, both the legislations must be substantially on the same subject. Hence, WB-HIRA is repugnant to the RERA, and is hence unconstitutional.
The present system of appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and as elucidated in the Collegium system makes it clear that the first step is a recommendation from Collegium of four senior-most judges and presided over by the Chief Justice. This process in turn requires wide consultation by the Chief Justice of the High Court to identify the requisite talent, so as to make the recommendations. Contrary to some portrayed beliefs as if this is an extremely subjective system, every Chief Justice is actually required to solicit names from different sources whether it be sitting judges, retired judges, or prominent members of the Bar. It is from this pool of talent that he selects, after a discussion in the collegium, the most suitable candidates. It is thus of utmost importance that the flow of recommendations continues for the appointment process to work successfully. The current situation of vacancies, especially in some of the larger courts with very few recommendations in the pipeline seems to be the genesis of this problem. The data placed before us, as drawn from the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) shows that five (5) High Courts alone are responsible for 54% of the pendency of over 57,51,312 cases i.e., the High Courts of Allahabad, Punjab & Haryana, Madras, Bombay, and Rajasthan. The Madras High Court has among the highest arrears in the country of 5.8 lakh cases despite having fewer vacancies than most other High Courts (i.e., 7%). This does not take away from the requirement of appointing ad hoc Judges but supports the view that even if the existing vacancies are few, a situation may arise requiring the expertise of experienced Judges to be appointed as ad hoc Judges.
A thought-provoking book titled ‘The Morality of Law’ by Lon L. Fuller on moral philosophy insists on a distinction between ‘morality of aspiration’ and ‘morality of duty’. From the view of the morality of aspiration, the human conduct does not bear on mandatory rules but on conceptions of the ‘Good Life’, of ‘what beseems a human being functioning at his best to human capacities’. Because no law can compel a man to live up to the excellence of which he is capable. But for workable standards of judgment, the morality of duty lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society directed towards certain specific goals must fail of its mark. Because the duty ties it very closely to what is ‘rationally discoverable’ and ‘objective’, as contrasted with the morality of aspiration based on subjectivism. However, moralists may differ as to what range of conduct should fall within the respective spheres of duty and the morality of aspirations. “When we are passing a judgment of moral duty, it seems absurd to say that such a duty can in some way flow directly from knowledge of a situation of fact.” As due to the fact that before we conclude ‘that a duty ought to exist’, however well we may understand the facts, by the close connection between understanding a person’s ideals, approval and disapproval. Does this mean that duties are rationally discoverable, and a matter of choice, even if not of ‘ineffable preference’? Presumably not, since when we pass a moral judgment of duty ‘ought’ to exist. It is necessary to distinguish between the accepted morality of a social group and the personal morality of individuals. ‘Duty’ may appear in all of these, but the satisfaction is very often a matter of degree varying from situation to situation. The rule of a morality of duty is necessary for social living. The morality of aspiration provides a general idea of the perfection we ought to acquire it. If we consider the whole range of moral issues, we may imagine a yardstick which begins at the bottom with the most obvious demands of social living and extends upward to the highest reaches of human aspirations. Somewhere along this scale an invisible pointer marks the dividing line where the pressure of duty leaves off and the challenge of excellence begins. The whole field of moral argument is an undeclared war over the location of this pointer. Whom we regard as being moralistic are always trying to inch the pointer upward so as to expand the area of duty and they bludgeon us into a belief that we are duty bound to embrace this pattern of human conduct, instead of making us realize a pattern of life they consider worthy of human nature
Both lawmen and laymen often ask, ‘What is the law applicable to a given set of facts?’ The answers to this question differ depending upon the specific jurisdiction to which the given set of facts is linked. Contrary to this, scholars and students of jurisprudence are likely to ask the general question, viz ‘What is Law?’. This question on the philosophy and nature of law supposes that law is a distinctive social-political phenomenon with universal characteristics that can be perceived through philosophical analysis. In such a study, the assumption is that law possesses some universal characteristics.
An analysis of the philosophy of law can be done for different reasons. Apart from a purely intellectual interest in understanding this complex phenomenon known as law, scholars also study the same as a normative social practice that purports to guide human behaviour, giving rise to reasons for action. The primary challenge of the branch of scholarship known as jurisprudence is based on this ‘normative, reason-giving aspect of law’. At the same time, we must understand that law is not the only normative realm in any given society. It is one of the many normative standards such as morality, religion, customs and usages, etiquette, self-regulatory standards within a family or corporation etc. So, it is also essential that we study law on the differences and similarities of the same with these normative standards.
While discerning these connections and contradictions, legal theories often study the content of the norm apart from giving importance to the source. Generally, theoretical studies on the content such as natural lawyers emphasize values such as fairness, justice, liberty etc., as qualifications for the norms to be called laws. They have argued that laws must be in tune with certain principles of inner morality, such as that laws be general, public, prospective, coherent, clear, stable, and practicable are indispensable to law-making. Whereas theories that give prominence to the sources of the norm, such as enactment/command by political institution/authority, do not always emphasize on the content.
Such philosophical analysis of law comprises both explanatory and justificatory aspects. While the explanatory aspect consists of explaining how laws can give rise to reasons and what kinds of reasons are involved. One example of this would be Dworkin’s classification of law as concepts, principles and rules. The aspect of justification concerns whether people ought to comply with the law’s demands. In other words, it is the attempt to explain the moral legitimacy of law and the subjects’ reasons for complying with it.
Two recent developments have brought India's reliance on fossil fuel into sharp focus. The Russia-Ukraine conflict and the consequent surge in crude oil prices roiled the economy. Separately, the most recent IPCC report on climate highlighted the energy sector's large contribution to global warming. Both these developments need to be located in the context of India's pledge to get to net zero carbon emissions by 2070. Meeting this pledge requires an overhaul of both the logistics and electricity sectors to reduce reliance on fossil fuels. Transitioning to renewables in energy is an important part of the solution. Within renewables, solar energy has been lavished with policy support. However, it won't be enough to meet the targets. Anil Kakodkar, former chairman of Atomic Energy Commission, had written that India can't meet its net-zero commitment without nuclear power. He's right. It's an area where India was off to an early start, developed relatively high indigenous capabilities in relation to other sectors, but subsequently let the ball drop. Today, nuclear power contributes a mere 3% of the total electricity generated, and has a capacity of 6780 MW. After the early euphoria of the India-United States civil nuclear deal, progress has been disappointing. The deal did open the pathway to a stable supply of uranium ore from Kazakhstan and Canada. However, the design of the subsequent bill on civil liability for nuclear damage killed the prospect of participation of Western firms. India's main partner today is Russia. which side stepped the bill through inter-government agreements.
A Madras High Court Judge's suggestion to amend the Constitution of India mandating that every citizen also has a duty to laugh comes as a whiff of fresh air - something the country has been gasping for, of late. Justice GR Swaminathan of the Madurai Bench has a remarkably refined sense of humour, but in quashing an FIR against a man arrested for an innocuous social media post, his insightful observations only highlight the idiocy and absurdity that surround the growth and normalisation of the offence-taking tribe. Written from the perspective of cartoonists and satirists, the judgment draws attention to how what ought to be a reasonable understanding of a situation is increasingly being influenced by impulses that border on the irrational and amount to an abuse of the legal process. The petitioner tried tongue-in-cheek wordplay while captioning photographs after a sight-seeing trip with family : 'Trip to Sirumalai for shooting practice'. For the police. it appeared as a threat to wage war, though the Judicial Magistrate refused remand. 'Laugh at what?' is a serious question. the Judge said. using the 'holy cow' as a metaphor, which varies from person to person. region to region. Being funny is one thing. the Judge righty states, and poking fun at another is different altogether. Those who have been at the receiving end for their attempt at humour can draw strength from the ruling, but then. a creative process facing combative opposition because of its very nature is anything but funny.
Students decide to attend college for several reasons. These reasons include career opportunities and financial stability, intellectual growth, a time for self-discovery, norms. obligations, and social opportunities. Outside demands in society. such as technology changes, and increased educational demands also drive the need for more students to attend college. The students then spend the next few years trying to discover a path and find their way so they can become successful. The transition to college presents students with many new challenges. including increased academic demands. less time with family members, interpersonal problems with roommates and romantic interests, and financial stress. Competitive academic work and uncertainty about future employment and professional career were also noted as sources of stress. The transition to college represents a process characterized by change, ambiguity. and adjustment across all of life's domains. The transition towards independence and self-sufficiency has been characterized as 'stress-arousing' and 'anxiety-provoking' by many college students. Failure to accomplish and develop these characteristics of development and maintain independence may result in life dissatisfaction. Emerging adulthood has also been noted to augment college students' vulnerability to stress. Many students experience their first symptoms of depression and anxiety during this time, but a growing problem is that college campuses do not have enough resources to help all of these students. It has been noted that 75% to 80% of college students are moderately stressed and 10% to 12% are severely stressed.
The United Nations Commission on Environment and Development defines 'sustainable development' as follows: "Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Sustainable development clearly postulates an anthropocentric bias, least concerned with the rights of other species which live on this earth. Anthropocentrism is always human-interest focused thinking that considers non-humans as having only instrumental value to humans, in other words, humans take precedence and human responsibilities towards non-human are based on benefits to humans. Eco-centrism is nature-centred, where humans are part of nature and non-humans have intrinsic value. In other words, human interest does not take automatic precedence and humans have obligations towards non-humans independently of human interest. Eco-centrism is, therefore, life-centred, nature-centred where nature includes both humans and non-humans. The Constitution of India protects not only human rights but also casts an obligation on human beings to protect and preserve a specie from becoming extinct. Conservation and protection of environment is an inseparable part of the fundamental right to life. According to the doctrine of 'public trust' recognized under the Constitution of India, certain common properties such as rivers, seashores, forests and the air are held by the Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. The resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole, that it would be totally unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The State, as a custodian of the natural resources, has a duty to maintain them not merely for the benefit of the public, but for the best interest of flora and fauna, wildlife and so on.