Comprehension
The Supreme Court of India observed that, while appreciating the existence of the right to peaceful protest against a legislation ……., we have to make it unequivocally clear that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied in such a manner and that too indefinitely. Democracy and dissent go hand in hand, but then the demonstrations expressing dissent must be in designated places alone. The present case was not even one of protests taking place in an undesignated area but was a blockage of a public way which caused grave inconvenience to commuters. We cannot accept the plea of the applicants that an indeterminable number of people can assemble whenever they choose to protest.
Question: 1
Which of the following judgments relating to right to peaceful protest has the above excerpt been taken from?
Which of the following judgments relating to right to peaceful protest has the above excerpt been taken from?
Updated On: Aug 14, 2025
- M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 648.
- Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 266.
- Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, (2020) 3 SCC 637.
- Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 439.
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The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The excerpt provided discusses the balance between the right to peaceful protest and the usage of public spaces. The Supreme Court of India clarified that while individuals have the right to protest against legislation, such protests must occur in designated areas and should not obstruct public ways. The case stressed the importance of maintaining public order alongside allowing democratic dissent.
From the options available, this legal judgment pertains to the case of Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police, (2020) 10 SCC 439. In this case, the Supreme Court dealt with protests resulting in the blockade of public spaces, emphasizing the need to ensure that public areas remain accessible and not indefinitely occupied for demonstrations.
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Question: 2
Which of the following judgments is not related to right to assemble as enshrined under the Constitution of India?
Which of the following judgments is not related to right to assemble as enshrined under the Constitution of India?
Updated On: Aug 14, 2025
- Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324.
- Sampurna Behura v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 433.
- Bimal Gurung v. Union of India, (2018) 15 SCC 480.
- Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2016) 15 SCC 525.
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
To determine which judgment is not related to the right to assemble as enshrined under the Constitution of India, we must understand the context of each case cited in the options. The Constitution of India guarantees the right to assemble peacefully under Article 19(1)(b). Relevant judgments often discuss the balance between this right and reasonable restrictions, such as maintaining public order and safety.
Let's analyze each option:
- Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 324: This case involved the right to protest and assembly, dealing with legal restrictions on public gatherings.
- Sampurna Behura v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 433: This judgment primarily addressed child rights and the enforcement of policies related to child welfare, not directly related to the right to assemble.
- Bimal Gurung v. Union of India, (2018) 15 SCC 480: This case pertained to the right to peaceful protest concerning political dissent and assembly.
- Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (2016) 15 SCC 525: This judgment involved the rights of individuals protesting against government actions, discussing the extent of police responses to such gatherings.
From this analysis, Sampurna Behura v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 433 is the case that does not relate to the right to assemble since it focuses on child welfare rather than assembly rights.
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Question: 3
As per the judgment of In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1, which of the following statement is not correct?
As per the judgment of In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1, which of the following statement is not correct?
Updated On: Aug 14, 2025
- Right to sleep is not a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
- An individual is entitled to sleep as comfortably and as freely as he breathes.
- Sleep, is a fundamental and basic requirement without which the existence of life would be in peril.
- State’s compelling interest in regulation of subject was discussed in this case.
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The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
In the case of In Re Ramlila Maidan Incident, (2012) 5 SCC 1, the Supreme Court of India dealt with issues related to the use of public spaces for protests. The court emphasized the importance of democracy and dissent but also highlighted that such expressions should not cause inconvenience to the public or occur in undesignated areas. Among the statements provided:
- An individual's entitlement to sleep comfortably and freely was recognized.
- The necessity of sleep as a fundamental requirement for life was acknowledged.
- The state's compelling interest in regulation of subject matter was discussed.
- However, stating that the "right to sleep is not a part of Article 21 of the Constitution of India" is incorrect. Article 21 does protect the right to life and personal liberty, which encompasses the right to sleep.
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Question: 4
Which of the following statement is not correct in relation to right to assemble under the Constitution of India?
Which of the following statement is not correct in relation to right to assemble under the Constitution of India?
Updated On: Aug 14, 2025
- The assembly should be peaceful.
- Reasonable restrictions stated under Article 19 for right to assemble are sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, morality.
- The assembly should be without arms.
- Reasonable restrictions on right to assemble are provided in Article 19(3) of the Constitution of India.
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Article 19 of the Constitution of India provides certain fundamental rights to citizens, including the right to assemble peacefully and without arms. The restrictions on this right are specified within the same constitutional framework.
Explanation of Options:
- The assembly should be peaceful.
This is a correct statement. The right to assemble is subject to the condition that the assembly must be peaceful. Any assembly that turns violent or disrupts public peace loses constitutional protection. - Reasonable restrictions stated under Article 19 for right to assemble are sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, morality.
This statement is not correct. Article 19(3) specifically allows the state to impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right to assemble in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, and morality. However, morality is not explicitly mentioned for the right to assemble, rather it pertains to freedom of speech and expression. - The assembly should be without arms.
This is a correct statement. The constitutional provision clearly states that the assembly must be without arms, implying that gathering with weapons is not protected. - Reasonable restrictions on right to assemble are provided in Article 19(3) of the Constitution of India.
This statement is correct, although it overlooks the precise wording and scope as described in other parts of the article. It generally identifies the provision that imposes restrictions on the right to assemble.
Therefore, the incorrect statement concerning the right to assemble under the Constitution of India is: Reasonable restrictions stated under Article 19 for right to assemble are sovereignty and integrity of India or public order, morality.
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Question: 5
The rule prohibiting demonstrations by government servants was discussed in which of the following judgments?
The rule prohibiting demonstrations by government servants was discussed in which of the following judgments?
Updated On: Aug 14, 2025
- Union of India v. Naveen Jindal, (2004) 2 SCC 510.
- Ram Bahadur Rai v. State of Bihar, AIR 1975 SC 223.
- Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166
- Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
In the case of Kameshwar Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 1166, the Supreme Court of India dealt with the rule prohibiting demonstrations by government servants. The Court examined the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution and assessed its reasonable restrictions as outlined in Article 19(2). The Court acknowledged the right to peaceful protest but emphasized that demonstrations by government employees should not disrupt public ways or spaces, reflecting the balance between public order and democratic expression. This judgment clarified the limits for government servants regarding participation in demonstrations, highlighting the need for such activities to occur in designated areas to prevent public inconvenience, as discussed in the comprehension excerpt. Thus, the case sets a precedent for understanding the balance between individual rights and public order in the context of demonstrations by government employees.
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Question: 6
Which of the following judges of the Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in the judgment as given in the excerpt?
Which of the following judges of the Supreme Court of India were part of the Bench in the judgment as given in the excerpt?
Updated On: Aug 14, 2025
- Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Indira Banerjee, JJ.
- Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.
- Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.
- Sanjay Kishan Kaul and Krishna Murari, JJ.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The question asks which judges were part of the Supreme Court Bench for a specific judgment. Analyzing the given options and the correct answer, we identify that the following judges were included in the Bench:
Sanjay Kishan Kaul | Aniruddha Bose | Krishna Murari |
Based on the comprehension, the Supreme Court observed principles regarding protests, emphasizing that public ways should not be occupied indefinitely. This judgment involves the examination of peaceful protests and the necessity to keep public areas unobstructed. The correct choice, representing this Bench, is:
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Aniruddha Bose and Krishna Murari, JJ.
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Top Questions on Judgments
- An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’] - Until 2017, India did not have a codified law to order internet shut downs. A general power was vested in District Magistrates in this regard. The Magistrate could issue an order ordering a shut down if a ‘speedy remedy’ (extending to internet shut down) is desirable for ‘immediate prevention’ of an event. The Magistrate had to be satisfied that the order is ‘likely to prevent or tends to prevent obstruction, annoyance or injury to human life, health or safety, or a disturbance of public tranquillity’. The Magistrate’s order cannot be for longer than two months.
In 2017, new rules to order internet shut downs were introduced taking the power away from the Magistrate. These rules — the Temporary Suspension Rules — state that internet shut downs can now only be ordered by the Home Secretary of the Union or State Governments. Only in “unavoidable circumstances” can the passing of orders be delegated to someone lower than the rank of a Joint Secretary to the Government of India. And even in this case, the official must be authorised by the Centre or State Home Secretary. Shut downs can be ordered where ‘necessary’ or ‘unavoidable’ during a ‘public emergency’ or in the ‘interest of public safety’. Shut down orders must necessarily detail the reasons to shut down the internet. The orders must also be sent to a review committee under the state or central government within 24 hours. The committee must then review them within five working days. The rules state that apart from the Chief Secretary and Legal Secretary, the committee can comprise a secretary other than the home secretary.
In January 2020 the Supreme Court passed its judgement in the case of Anuradha Bhasin. The judgement in this case explicitly recognised two things: that the freedom to access information is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India (which protects the freedom of speech and expression); and that the freedom to conduct your trade, profession or business over the internet is also a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India (which protects the freedom to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business). Every time the internet is suspended, it is quite obvious that it is a violation of these rights. These rights can only be curtailed in the interest of the ‘sovereignty and security of the state, integrity of the nation, friendly relations with foreign states, or public order or for preventing incitement to the commission of an offence’. The Supreme Court’s judgement in Anuradha Bhasin’s case had also underlined that shut down orders must clearly provide reasons for the shut down and they must be publicly available.
[Extracted with edits and revisions from “In India, are internet shut downs in accordance with law? Not always”, by Diksha Munjal, News Laundry] - Twitter’s lawyer on October 27, said before the Karnataka High Court that Union government orders to block certain Twitter handles and posts must contain reasons for the same that can be communicated to users of the microblogging site. He said this applies to all blocking orders sent to social media platforms. The lawyer representing Twitter said that reasons for the blocking order must be provided to users so they can determine whether or not they want to challenge the orders.
Challenging the blocking orders, Twitter’s July 5 petition contended that several blocking orders “demonstrate excessive use of powers and are disproportionate”. Such orders can only be issued by the Union government and not the state governments, he said, which increases the danger of such abuse. Twitter also claimed that the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology had sent it a letter threatening consequences for failing to comply with the blocking orders, such as criminal proceedings against the company’s chief compliance officer and the stripping away of Twitter’s safe harbour immunity, otherwise available to social media platforms under Section 79(1) of the Information Technology Act (the “IT Act”). Note that the Government has the power to strip away such safe harbour immunity under the IT Act. Further, in a previous hearing, Twitter’s lawyer said that the company was asked to block entire accounts, although Section 69A of the IT Act does not permit blocking of the whole account. It only permits the blocking of information, or a particular tweet or post. It argued that the Union government’s direction to block whole accounts will affect its business, adding that several prominent persons have their accounts on the platform.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “ ‘Government Must Provide Reasons for Blocking User Accounts,’ Twitter Tells Karnataka HC”, The Wire] - Assume that the statements in the passages are the applicable law.
Quashing a case of cruelty that was filed against a man by his wife, the Bombay High Court said that if a married lady is asked to do household work for the family, it cannot be said that she is treated “like a maid servant”. The Court was hearing an application by the husband and his parents seeking that proceedings against them are quashed. A First Information Report (“FIR”) was filed against the trio in September 2020, around nine months after the marriage, alleging that they hounded the woman for money to purchase a car, harassed her mentally and physically and treated her like a maid servant. Examining the evidence, the Court found that there was no merit to the woman’s allegations. The Court said that though the FIR says that she was treated properly for about a month and then “like a maid servant”, there are no details of what this meant. The Court added: “If a married lady is asked to do household work for the purpose of the family, it cannot be said that it is like a maid servant.” The Court held that the mere use of the word harassment “mentally and physically” in the FIR is not sufficient to constitute an offence Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”), which punishes the husband, or a relative of the husband of a woman who subjects her to cruelty in any way. It is interesting to note that Section 498A of the IPC also provides that if a married woman is actually treated like a ‘maid servant’, it would be an offence under that Section.
[Extracted, with edits and revisions, from “If Wife Is Asked To Do Household Work, Does Not Mean She Is Treated Like Maid: Bombay HC”, The Wire] - Common intention implies a pre-arranged plan and acting in concert pursuant to the plan. Common intention comes into being prior to the commission of the act, which need not be a long gap. To bring common intention into effect a pre-concert is not necessarily be proved, but it may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons and could be inferred from facts and circumstances of each case. For example A and B caught hold of C where only B stabbed C with a knife but A is also liable for murder as there was a pre concerted action. In the case Pandurang v. State of Hyderabad, Supreme court emphasized on this point that prior concert need not be something always very much prior to the incident, but could well be something that may develop on the spot, on the spur of the moment.
Common Intention and Similar Intention
Common intention does not mean similar intention of several persons. To constitute common intention it is necessary that the intention of each one of them be known to the rest of them and shared by them. In the case of Dukhmochan Pandey v. State of Bihar, the Supreme Court, held that: “Common intention which developed at the spur of the moment is different from the similar intention actuated a number of person at the same time….the distinction between a common intention and similar intention may be fine, but is nonetheless a real one and if overlooked, may lead to miscarriage of justice….” The mere presence of accused together is not sufficient to hold that they shared the common intention to commit the offence in question. It is necessary that the intention of each one of 'several persons‘ be known to each other for constituting common intention.
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Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam
- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Nil Ratan Kundu and another v. Abhijit Kundu’ 2008(3) Apex Court Judgements 232 (SC), while granting the custody to the maternal grandparents observed: In our judgement, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well settled and it is this. In deciding a difficult and complex question as to custody of minor, a Court of law should keep in mind relevant statutes and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a humane problem in live in relationship and is required to be solved with human touch. A Court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the Court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, may bound, to give due weight to a child’s ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favorable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable consideration. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgement, the Court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the Court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Gaurav Nagpal v. Semedha Nagpal’-(2009)1 SCC 42, while giving paramount importance to the welfare of the child, which should include moral and ethical values, besides ethical well-being, observed as under:
When the court is confronted with conflicting demands made by the parents, each time it has to justify the demands. The Court has not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis, in such matters human angles are relevant for deciding those issues. The Court then does not give emphasis on what the parties say, it has to exercise a jurisdiction which is aimed at the welfare of the minor. As observed recently in Mausami Moitra Ganguli case, the Court has to give due weightage to the child’s ordinary contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favorable surroundings, but over and above physical comforts, the moral and ethical values have also to be noted. They are equal if not more important than the others.
(Extracts from Jaswinder Singh and Another vs Surjit Singh, AIR 2010 (NOC) 425 (P. & H.))- CLAT PG - 2025
- Family Laws
- The Companies Act, 2013 does not deal with insolvency and bankruptcy when the companies are unable to pay their debts or the aspects relating to the revival and rehabilitation of the companies and their winding up if revival and rehabilitation is not possible. In principle, it cannot be doubted that the cases of revival or winding up of the company on the ground of insolvency and inability to pay debts are different from cases where companies are wound up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013. The two situations are not identical. Under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013, even a running and financially sound company can also be wound up for the reasons in clauses (a) to (e). The reasons and grounds for winding up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013 are vastly different from the reasons and grounds for the revival and rehabilitation scheme as envisaged under the IBC. The two enactments deal with two distinct situations and in our opinion, they cannot be equated when we examine whether there is discrimination or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For the revival and rehabilitation of the companies, certain sacrifices are required from all quarters, including the workmen. In case of insolvent companies, for the sake of survival and regeneration, everyone, including the secured creditors and the Central and State Government, are required to make sacrifices. The workmen also have a stake and benefit from the revival of the company, and therefore unless it is found that the sacrifices envisaged for the workmen, which certainly form a separate class, are onerous and burdensome so as to be manifestly unjust and arbitrary, we will not set aside the legislation,solely on the ground that some or marginal sacrifice is to be made by the workers. We would also reject the argument that to find out whether there was a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or whether the right to life under Article 21 Constitution of India was infringed, we must word by word examine the waterfall mechanism envisaged under the Companies Act, 2013, where the company is wound up in terms of grounds (a) to (e) of Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013; and the rights of the workmen when the insolvent company is sought to be revived, rehabilitated or wound up under the Code. The grounds and situations in the context of the objective and purpose of the two enactments are entirely different.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Moser Baer Karamchari Union Thr. President Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Union of India and Ors, 2023 SCC Online SC 547)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Company Law
- Ahmadi, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Punchhi, J., endorsed the recommendations in the following words-The time is ripe for taking stock of the working of the various Tribunals set up in the country after the insertion of Articles 323-A and 323-B in the Constitution. After the incorporation of these two articles, Acts have been enacted where-under tribunals have been constituted for dispensation of justice. Sufficient time has passed, and experience gained in these last few years for taking stock of the situation with a view to finding out if they have served the purpose and objectives for which they were constituted. Complaints have been heard in regard to the functioning of other tribunals as well and it is time that a body like the Law Commission of India has a comprehensive look-in with a view to suggesting measures for their improved functioning. That body can also suggest changes in the different statutes and evolve a model on the basis whereof tribunals may be constituted or reconstituted with a view to ensuring greater independence. An intensive and extensive study needs to be undertaken by the Law Commission in regard to the Constitution of tribunals under various statutes with a view to ensuring their independence so that the public confidence in such tribunals may increase and the quality of their performance may improve.
Before parting with the case, it is necessary to express our anguish over the ineffectiveness of the alternative mechanism devised for judicial review. The judicial review and remedy are the fundamental rights of the citizens. The dispensation of justice by the tribunal is much to be desired.
(Extracted with Edits from R.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 119)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Constitutional Laws
- The elements of tort of negligence consist in – (a) duty of care; (b) duty is owed to the plaintiff; (c) the duty has been carelessly breached. Negligence does not entail liability unless the exacts a duty in the given circumstances to observe care. Duty is an obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct fraught with unreasonable risk of damage to others. The question whether duty exists in a particular situation involves determination of law. Hence, three ingredients are necessary for the existence of a duty of care: (i) foreseeability of the damage, (ii) proximity of relationship between the parties; and (iii) whether it is “just, fair and reasonable” that the law should impose a duty of care. In Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman, 1990 2AC 605, the court held that breach of duty is concerned with the standard of care that ought to have been adopted in the circumstances and whether the defendant’s conduct fell below that standard i.e., whether he was careless.
The court while quoting Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, 1997 stated that as a tort, negligence consists of legal duty to take care and breach of that duty. Duty determines whether the type of loss suffered by the plaintiff in the particular way in which to occurred can ever be actionable. The division of negligence into duty, breach and consequent damage is convenient for the purpose of exposition but it can be confusing because the issues will often overlap. The process of determining a breach of duty involves three steps: First, it is necessary to ascertain the qualities of the reasonable person, given the qualities attributed to him, would have taken in the circumstances. The factors that are permissible to take into account in this regard are prescribed by law, but the amount of care that the reasonable person would have taken is a question of fact. Thirdly, it must be determined whether the defendant took less care than the reasonable person would have taken.
(Extracts from Managing Director, Kerala Tourism Development Corporation Limited v. Deepti Singh and Ors., 2019 SC)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Law of Torts
- Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) states that the State should not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) stipulates that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Clause (2) stipulates that no citizen shall be discriminated in or be ineligible for any employment or office under the State on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Clause (4) of the provision states that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The purpose of the equal opportunity principle in Article 16(1) and the reservation provision in Article 16(4) has emerged as a focal point of the jurisprudence on reservations in this Court. A discussion of the journey of the competing models of equality that the Court has espoused and their evolution over the course of the years is necessary to understand the constitutional vision on equality.
The impugned constitutional amendments by which Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) have been inserted, flow from Article 16 (4). They do not alter the structure of Article 16 (4). They retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons which enables the State to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the state administration under article 335. Sub-categorization within a class is a constitutional requirement to secure substantive equality in the event that there is a distinction between two sections of a class; Sub-classification must not lead to the exclusion of one of the categories in the class. A model that provides sufficient opportunities to all categories of the class must be adopted; and Sub-classification among a class must be on a reasonable basis.
Justice Bela Trivedi opined, in dissent, that presidential list of scheduled castes notified under Article 341 cannot be altered by the States. Any change to this list can only be made by a law enacted by Parliament. Sub-classification, according to her would amount to tampering with the Presidential List and undermine the object Article 341, which aims to eliminate political influence in the SC-ST List. Further, she emphasised the importance of adhering to the rule of plain and literal interpretation. She mentions that any preferential treatment for a sub-class within the presidential list would deprive other classes within the same category of their benefits. In the absence of executive or legislative power, state lack the competence to sub-classify castes and the benefit reserved for all SCs. Allowing states to do so would constitute a colourable exercise of power, which is impermissible under law. Justice Trivedi concluded by affirming that affirmative action by States must remain within constitutional boundaries and held that the law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah case was correct and should be upheld.
(Extract from The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 2024 SC)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Constitutional Laws
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