The statement regarding the presumption as to dowry death under Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, being a 'shall' presumption is True.
To understand why this is true, let's analyze the legal provisions involved:
Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC): This section defines 'dowry death' and outlines its critical elements:
The Role of Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act: Once the above ingredients are proven, Section 113B creates a 'shall' presumption against the accused. This means:
The wording of Section 113B suggests the presumption it provides is obligatory, not discretionary, making the statement 'True.' The language aims to reinforce stringent measures against the social evil of dowry-related deaths.
To determine whether the demand for dowry was 'soon before' the death of an alleged victim of dowry death under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, the court considers the following:
The phrase 'soon before' in the context of Section 304-B of IPC cannot be interpreted strictly as 'immediately before.' Instead, it must be assessed based on the 'proximate and live link' between the demand for dowry and the cruelty or harassment faced by the victim leading to her death. This requires a comprehensive evaluation of the case's circumstances.
The Supreme Court of India has emphasized that there isn't a strict formula for determining 'soon before,' and each case must be judged on its totality of circumstances. Therefore, the correct option is: "The totality of circumstances of each case, without relying on any straight jacket formula."
The court also considers legislative intent, which seeks to curb social evils like bride burning and dowry demand, ensuring the due process of establishing the offence under Section 304-B. Once the necessary ingredients are proven, the presumption of causality under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, is activated, placing the onus on the accused to rebut the presumption.
The question pertains to the interpretation of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, which deals with 'dowry death.' To establish an offence under this section, the prosecution must prove that the death of the victim occurred 'otherwise than under normal circumstances.' This phrase is crucial in understanding the scope of deaths covered under this section. The law does not restrict the type of unnatural death to a specific cause such as homicidal, suicidal, or accidental. Instead, it encompasses all these possibilities.
Based on the comprehension provided, we can understand the following points:
Thus, the correct answer is that the unnatural death under Section 304-B can be homicidal, suicidal, or accidental as all fall under the scope of deaths 'otherwise than under normal circumstances.'
The phrase ‘soon before’ in Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, should not be interpreted as ‘immediately before’ because the legislative intent of this section is to address the serious social problems of bride burning and dowry demands. The intention is not to strictly narrow down the time frame between the cruelty experienced by the victim and her death, but rather to ensure that a significant link is established between the two events. The Supreme Court of India has provided clarity on this matter to ensure that justice is not hindered by overly restrictive interpretations that could otherwise fail to address the root issues.
According to Section 304-B(1) of IPC, a 'dowry death' happens when an unnatural death occurs within seven years of marriage under circumstances of cruelty or harassment related to dowry demands by the husband or his relatives. The court requires a 'proximate and live link' between the cruelty or harassment and the resultant death to uphold the legislative intent, which is to curb such social evils effectively.
Therefore, the correct understanding of the law and answer to why 'soon before' is not taken to mean 'immediately before’ is that the legislation aims to provide broader protection and to uphold its purpose of curbing socially harmful practices such as bride burning and dowry demands.
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473