Comprehension
Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 475: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 478] it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc. We have few other legislations also where reliefs have been provided to woman placed in certain vulnerable situations. Section 125 Cr.P.C. of course, provides for maintenance of a destitute wife and Section 498-A IPC is related to mental cruelty inflicted on women by her husband and in-laws. Section 304-B IPC deals with the cases relating to dowry death. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was enacted to deal with the cases of dowry demands by the husband and family members. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides for grant of maintenance to a legally wedded Hindu wife, and also deals with rules for adoption. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 refers to the provisions dealing with solemnisation of marriage also deals with the provisions for divorce. For the first time, though, the DV Act, Parliament has recognised a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simpliciter. We have already stated, when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f ) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship invariably, it may be a question of fact and degree, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the tests judicially evolved.
(This extract is taken from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755)
(This extract is taken from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755)
Question: 1
What is the scope of analysis required to determine if a relationship falls within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act?
What is the scope of analysis required to determine if a relationship falls within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act?
Updated On: Sep 10, 2025
- Considering the number of children born in a live in relationship
- Considering only the cohabitation period of the relationship and there emotional connectivity
- Conducting a close analysis of the entire interpersonal relationship, taking into account all facets
- Evaluating only the financial aspects and mutual agreements of the relationship, and if there is any written agreement between the partner
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The scope of analysis required to determine if a relationship is categorized as a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under Section 2(f) of the DV Act involves conducting a comprehensive examination of the entire interpersonal relationship, considering all relevant aspects. This determination requires going beyond just the cohabitation period or financial elements and extends to a thorough evaluation of various facets of the relationship. Factors such as emotional depth, mutual care, social recognition, shared responsibilities, and the intention of permanence typically inform this analysis. It is a nuanced question of fact and degree, often necessitating judicial review to ensure the relationship aligns with the judicially evolved tests for such a classification.
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Question: 2
In which of the following case, the Supreme Court read down the word “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
In which of the following case, the Supreme Court read down the word “adult male” in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
Updated On: Sep 10, 2025
- Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma
- Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora
- Uma Narayan v. Priya Krishna Prasad
- All of the above
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
The correct answer to the question "In which of the following case, the Supreme Court read down the word 'adult male' in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?" is Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora.
The explanation for this decision relies on understanding the context in which the law was evaluated and interpreted. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 was enacted to provide a remedy for women as victims of domestic violence, promoting civil protection and addressing vulnerable situations for women.
Initially, the Act used the term "adult male" as part of the description of who could be the respondent. However, the Supreme Court, in the Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora case, found that limiting the term to "adult male" was unconstitutional as it discriminated based on gender and was not reflective of the full scope of domestic situations where violence may occur. This reading down allows the inclusion of any person in a domestic relationship, regardless of gender, as a potential respondent, enhancing the Act's protective measures for women.
This decision represents a significant shift in interpreting women's protective laws in India, aligning the legal framework with modern notions of equality and gender-neutral application.
Initially, the Act used the term "adult male" as part of the description of who could be the respondent. However, the Supreme Court, in the Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Harsora case, found that limiting the term to "adult male" was unconstitutional as it discriminated based on gender and was not reflective of the full scope of domestic situations where violence may occur. This reading down allows the inclusion of any person in a domestic relationship, regardless of gender, as a potential respondent, enhancing the Act's protective measures for women.
This decision represents a significant shift in interpreting women's protective laws in India, aligning the legal framework with modern notions of equality and gender-neutral application.
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Question: 3
As per Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, while disposing of an application under Section 12(1), the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person so that the aggrieved person can:
As per Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, while disposing of an application under Section 12(1), the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person so that the aggrieved person can:
Updated On: Sep 10, 2025
- Live a life that meets at least the bare minimum needs for survival and basic well-being
- Live a life that is consistent with her standard of living which she is accustomed
- Live a life that is consistent with her parent’s standard of living
- Live a life which can cover her medical expenses and expenses incurred due to litigation of domestic violence
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
To solve the question regarding Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, it's essential to understand the context of the Act and its specific section:
- Section 20 of the Act allows the Magistrate to provide monetary relief to an aggrieved person.
- The purpose of the monetary relief is to enable the aggrieved person to maintain a standard of living that she was accustomed to before the domestic violence incident.
Among the options given, the correct option is:
- Live a life that is consistent with her standard of living which she is accustomed
This aligns with the intention of the Act to ensure that the aggrieved person can continue to live with dignity and security, resembling her prior lifestyle before the disruption caused by domestic violence.
The other options primarily reference basic survival needs or external standards of living, which do not fully satisfy the statute's aim of restoring the aggrieved person to her accustomed standard.
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Question: 4
In which case, the three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently interpreted the term “shared household” and has held that “...lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship...” have to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household?
In which case, the three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently interpreted the term “shared household” and has held that “...lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship...” have to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household?
Updated On: Sep 10, 2025
- Rupa Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja
- Satish Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra
- S.R. Batra v. Tarin Batra
- B.R. Mehta v. Atma Devi
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The recent interpretation of the term "shared household" by a three-judge bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court was decided in the case of Rupa Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja. This case emphasizes that the phrase “lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship” should be understood in the context of permanency. The court clarified that mere transient or casual living experiences in different places do not constitute a "shared household."
The concept of a "shared household" is crucial to understanding the provisions under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. This act introduces protections for women from domestic violence and includes relationships in the nature of marriage which were not traditionally recognized as matrimonial. As highlighted in the comprehensive analysis provided in the case of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, the Act covers arrangements like live-in relationships as long as they resemble marriage to some degree of permanency.
Several other legal provisions provide relief to women in vulnerable situations. These include:
- Section 125 Cr.P.C.: Maintenance for a destitute wife.
- Section 498-A IPC: Addresses mental cruelty by a husband and his family.
- Section 304-B IPC: Deals with dowry-related deaths.
- The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: Addresses dowry demands.
- The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956: Provides maintenance for legally wedded Hindu wives.
- The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955: Covers marriage solemnization and divorce.
Through these legal frameworks, the Indian judiciary and legislature aim to provide necessary safeguards and rights to women in domestic relationships.
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Question: 5
Under Indian Law, can a woman in a live in relationship claim maintenance under S. 125, Cr.P.C. despite not being a legally wedded wife?
Under Indian Law, can a woman in a live in relationship claim maintenance under S. 125, Cr.P.C. despite not being a legally wedded wife?
Updated On: Sep 10, 2025
- No, as per the interpretation of statute “wife” means legally wedded wife and includes who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband
- Yes, a woman in a live in relationship can claim maintenance u/s 125, Cr.P.C. as strict proof of marriage is not necessary and maintenance cannot be denied if evidence suggests cohabitation
- A woman in live in relationship can only claim maintenance if she has been cohabiting for more than five years and dependent children from the relationship
- A woman in live in relationship can claim maintenance only through a civil suit as the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA) does not apply to live in relationships
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Under Indian Law, the question of whether a woman in a live-in relationship can claim maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C. despite not being a legally wedded wife requires a nuanced understanding of recent legal developments and judicial interpretations. Let's break down the relevant aspects:
- Section 125, Cr.P.C. is a provision aimed at providing maintenance to neglected wives, children, and parents who are unable to maintain themselves. The term "wife" has traditionally been interpreted to mean a legally wedded wife. However, recent legal precedents have evolved to include women in vulnerable situations who may not have been formally married.
- The concept of live-in relationships in India, while not yet widely accepted socially, has gained legal recognition for purposes of protection under certain laws. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDVA), for example, covers couples that have a "relationship in the nature of marriage."
- In the landmark case of Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), the Supreme Court of India acknowledged that live-in relationships resembling marriage could warrant protection against domestic violence, thereby providing scope for such women to claim maintenance, even in the absence of a formal marriage.
- The core argument is that if evidence suggests a stable, monogamous, and long-term cohabitation akin to marriage, denying maintenance solely on the grounds of legal marriage formality could lead to injustice. The judiciary has, therefore, interpreted the law in a manner that seeks to prevent exploitation and provide necessary financial support to women in such relationships.
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Top Questions on Family Laws
- In which case, the Supreme Court has upheld the rights of senior citizens to reclaim property under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007?
- TS PGLCET - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Family Laws
- Fill in the blanks based on the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as to the relation by blood. Two persons are said to be related to each other by __________ when they are descended from a common ancestor by the same wife, and by __________ when they are descended from a common ancestor, but by different wives; two persons are said to be related to each other by __________ when they are descended from a common ancestress but by different husbands.
- TS PGLCET - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Family Laws
- In which case the Supreme Court observed that “She cannot be treated as a chattel at the age of 14 years to hand over her custody to her biological father where she has not lived ever since her birth. The stability of the child is also of paramount consideration”?
- TS PGLCET - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Family Laws
- In which case, the Supeme Court held that an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father until she is unable to maintain herself, by an application under Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956?
- TS PGLCET - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Family Laws
- Under Christian Law, non-compliance of decree of Restitution of Conjugal Rights shall act as one of the grounds for divorce after how many years of passing of decree?
- TS PGLCET - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Family Laws
View More Questions
Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam
- The Companies Act, 2013 does not deal with insolvency and bankruptcy when the companies are unable to pay their debts or the aspects relating to the revival and rehabilitation of the companies and their winding up if revival and rehabilitation is not possible. In principle, it cannot be doubted that the cases of revival or winding up of the company on the ground of insolvency and inability to pay debts are different from cases where companies are wound up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013. The two situations are not identical. Under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013, even a running and financially sound company can also be wound up for the reasons in clauses (a) to (e). The reasons and grounds for winding up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013 are vastly different from the reasons and grounds for the revival and rehabilitation scheme as envisaged under the IBC. The two enactments deal with two distinct situations and in our opinion, they cannot be equated when we examine whether there is discrimination or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For the revival and rehabilitation of the companies, certain sacrifices are required from all quarters, including the workmen. In case of insolvent companies, for the sake of survival and regeneration, everyone, including the secured creditors and the Central and State Government, are required to make sacrifices. The workmen also have a stake and benefit from the revival of the company, and therefore unless it is found that the sacrifices envisaged for the workmen, which certainly form a separate class, are onerous and burdensome so as to be manifestly unjust and arbitrary, we will not set aside the legislation,solely on the ground that some or marginal sacrifice is to be made by the workers. We would also reject the argument that to find out whether there was a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or whether the right to life under Article 21 Constitution of India was infringed, we must word by word examine the waterfall mechanism envisaged under the Companies Act, 2013, where the company is wound up in terms of grounds (a) to (e) of Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013; and the rights of the workmen when the insolvent company is sought to be revived, rehabilitated or wound up under the Code. The grounds and situations in the context of the objective and purpose of the two enactments are entirely different.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Moser Baer Karamchari Union Thr. President Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Union of India and Ors, 2023 SCC Online SC 547)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Company Law
- Ahmadi, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Punchhi, J., endorsed the recommendations in the following words-The time is ripe for taking stock of the working of the various Tribunals set up in the country after the insertion of Articles 323-A and 323-B in the Constitution. After the incorporation of these two articles, Acts have been enacted where-under tribunals have been constituted for dispensation of justice. Sufficient time has passed, and experience gained in these last few years for taking stock of the situation with a view to finding out if they have served the purpose and objectives for which they were constituted. Complaints have been heard in regard to the functioning of other tribunals as well and it is time that a body like the Law Commission of India has a comprehensive look-in with a view to suggesting measures for their improved functioning. That body can also suggest changes in the different statutes and evolve a model on the basis whereof tribunals may be constituted or reconstituted with a view to ensuring greater independence. An intensive and extensive study needs to be undertaken by the Law Commission in regard to the Constitution of tribunals under various statutes with a view to ensuring their independence so that the public confidence in such tribunals may increase and the quality of their performance may improve.
Before parting with the case, it is necessary to express our anguish over the ineffectiveness of the alternative mechanism devised for judicial review. The judicial review and remedy are the fundamental rights of the citizens. The dispensation of justice by the tribunal is much to be desired.
(Extracted with Edits from R.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 119)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Constitutional Laws
- The elements of tort of negligence consist in – (a) duty of care; (b) duty is owed to the plaintiff; (c) the duty has been carelessly breached. Negligence does not entail liability unless the exacts a duty in the given circumstances to observe care. Duty is an obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct fraught with unreasonable risk of damage to others. The question whether duty exists in a particular situation involves determination of law. Hence, three ingredients are necessary for the existence of a duty of care: (i) foreseeability of the damage, (ii) proximity of relationship between the parties; and (iii) whether it is “just, fair and reasonable” that the law should impose a duty of care. In Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman, 1990 2AC 605, the court held that breach of duty is concerned with the standard of care that ought to have been adopted in the circumstances and whether the defendant’s conduct fell below that standard i.e., whether he was careless.
The court while quoting Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, 1997 stated that as a tort, negligence consists of legal duty to take care and breach of that duty. Duty determines whether the type of loss suffered by the plaintiff in the particular way in which to occurred can ever be actionable. The division of negligence into duty, breach and consequent damage is convenient for the purpose of exposition but it can be confusing because the issues will often overlap. The process of determining a breach of duty involves three steps: First, it is necessary to ascertain the qualities of the reasonable person, given the qualities attributed to him, would have taken in the circumstances. The factors that are permissible to take into account in this regard are prescribed by law, but the amount of care that the reasonable person would have taken is a question of fact. Thirdly, it must be determined whether the defendant took less care than the reasonable person would have taken.
(Extracts from Managing Director, Kerala Tourism Development Corporation Limited v. Deepti Singh and Ors., 2019 SC)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Law of Torts
- Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) states that the State should not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) stipulates that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Clause (2) stipulates that no citizen shall be discriminated in or be ineligible for any employment or office under the State on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Clause (4) of the provision states that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The purpose of the equal opportunity principle in Article 16(1) and the reservation provision in Article 16(4) has emerged as a focal point of the jurisprudence on reservations in this Court. A discussion of the journey of the competing models of equality that the Court has espoused and their evolution over the course of the years is necessary to understand the constitutional vision on equality.
The impugned constitutional amendments by which Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) have been inserted, flow from Article 16 (4). They do not alter the structure of Article 16 (4). They retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons which enables the State to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the state administration under article 335. Sub-categorization within a class is a constitutional requirement to secure substantive equality in the event that there is a distinction between two sections of a class; Sub-classification must not lead to the exclusion of one of the categories in the class. A model that provides sufficient opportunities to all categories of the class must be adopted; and Sub-classification among a class must be on a reasonable basis.
Justice Bela Trivedi opined, in dissent, that presidential list of scheduled castes notified under Article 341 cannot be altered by the States. Any change to this list can only be made by a law enacted by Parliament. Sub-classification, according to her would amount to tampering with the Presidential List and undermine the object Article 341, which aims to eliminate political influence in the SC-ST List. Further, she emphasised the importance of adhering to the rule of plain and literal interpretation. She mentions that any preferential treatment for a sub-class within the presidential list would deprive other classes within the same category of their benefits. In the absence of executive or legislative power, state lack the competence to sub-classify castes and the benefit reserved for all SCs. Allowing states to do so would constitute a colourable exercise of power, which is impermissible under law. Justice Trivedi concluded by affirming that affirmative action by States must remain within constitutional boundaries and held that the law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah case was correct and should be upheld.
(Extract from The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 2024 SC)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Constitutional Laws
- The environmental rule of law, at a certain level, is a facet of the concept of the rule of law. But it includes specific features that are unique to environmental governance, features which are sui generis. The environmental rule of law seeks to create essential tools such as conceptual, procedural and institutional, to bring structure to the discourse on environmental protection. It does so to enhance our understanding of environmental challenges of how they have been shaped by humanity’s interface with nature in the past, how they continue to be affected by its engagement with nature in the present and the prospects for the future, if we were not to radically alter the course of destruction which humanity’s actions have charted.
The environmental rule of law seeks to facilitate a multi-disciplinary analysis of the nature and consequences of carbon footprints and in doing so it brings a shared understanding between science, regulatory decisions and policy perspectives in the field of environmental protection. It recognises that the “law” element in the environmental rule of law does not make the concept peculiarly the preserve of Lawyers and Judges. On the contrary, it seeks to draw within the fold all stakeholders in formulating strategies to deal with current challenges posed by environmental degradation, climate change and the destruction of habitats. The environmental rule of law seeks a unified understanding of these concepts. There are significant linkages between concepts such as sustainable development, the polluter pays principle etc. The universe of nature is indivisible and integrated. The state of the environment in one part of the earth affects and is fundamentally affected by what occurs in another part. Every element of the environment shares a symbiotic relationship with the others. It is this inseparable bond and connect which the environmental rule of law seeks to explore and understand in order to find solutions to the pressing problems which threaten the existence of humanity. The environmental rule of law is founded on the need to understand the consequences of our actions going beyond local, State and national boundaries. The rise in the oceans threatens not just maritime communities. The rise in temperatures, dilution of glaciers and growing desertification have consequences which go beyond the communities and creatures whose habitats are threatened. They affect the future survival of the entire eco-system. The environmental rule of law attempts to weave an understanding of the connections in the natural environment which make the issue of survival a unified challenge which confronts human societies everywhere.
(Extract from Pragnesh Shah v. Arunkumar Sharma (2022) 11 SCC 493 )- CLAT PG - 2025
- Environmental Law
View More Questions