List of practice Questions

The Supreme Court has observed that in international human rights law, equality is founded upon two complementary principles: non-discrimination and reasonable differentiation. The principle of non-discrimination seeks to ensure that all persons can equally enjoy and exercise all their rights and freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to arbitrary denial of opportunities for equal participation. Equality not only implies preventing discrimination (example, the protection of individuals against unfavourable treatment by introducing anti-discrimination laws), but goes beyond in remedying discrimination against groups suffering systematic discrimination in society. In concrete terms, it means embracing the notion of positive rights, affirmative action and reasonable accommodation. The move from the patronising and paternalistic approach to persons with disabilities represented by the medical model to viewing them as members of the community with equal rights has also been reflected in the evolution of international standards relating specifically to disabilities, as well as in moves to place the rights of persons with disabilities within the category of universal human rights. Disabled people no longer see their physical or mental limitations as a source of shame or as something to overcome in order to inspire others. What non-disabled people do not understand is that people with disabilities also have some rights, hopes and aspirations as everyone else. They do not want to depend on others. For this they want the proper environment to grow. It is the thinking of Disability Rights Movement, USA that it is not so much the disabled individual who needs to change, but the society
The Supreme Court judgment in B. Singh v. Union of India, [(2004) 3 SCC 363] held, when there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out. Public interest litigation (PIL) which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be ‘publicity interest litigation’ or ‘private interest litigation’ or ‘politics interest litigation’ or the latest trend ‘paise income litigation’. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it may become a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of a knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. The expression ‘PIL’ means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking
A question regarding the scope of Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 was considered in Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Rahul Modi, [2019 SCC OnLine SC 423]. The court observed that the Central Government is empowered under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 to order investigation into the affairs of a company in public interest by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO). Section 212(3) of the Companies Act provides that the investigation orders are required to be completed within the specified time. If it not so done, what should be the consequences and whether further proceedings or investigations shall be unlawful. The provision has to be seen in the context in which it occurs in the statute. Therefore, the stipulation of Section 212(3) regarding submission of the report ‘within such period as may be specified in the order’ is not to be taken as mandatory, but as purely directory. On the objective interpretation of the statutory provision, it cannot be said that on the expiry of that period the mandate in favour of SFIO must come to an end. If it was to come to an end, the legislation would have contemplated certain results thereof. In the absence of any clear stipulation, an interpretation that with the expiry of the period, the investigation must come to an end, will cause great violence to the scheme of legislation and with the expiry of mandate SFIO would also be powerless which would lead to an incongruous situation that serious frauds would remain beyond investigation.
It is well settled that while taking a decision regarding custody or other issues pertaining to a child, welfare of the child is of paramount consideration, not rights of the parents under a statute for the time being in force. In Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, [(1973) 1 SCC 840], the Court held that object and purpose of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 is not merely physical custody of the minor but due protection of the rights of ward’s health, maintenance and education. In considering the question of welfare of minor, due regard has to be given to the right of the father as natural guardian, but if the custody of the father cannot promote the welfare of the children, he may be refused such guardianship. The word “welfare” has to be construed literally and must be taken in its widest sense. The moral and ethical welfare of the child must also weigh with the court as well as its physical well-being. Though the provisions of the special statutes which govern the rights of the parents or guardians may be taken into consideration, there is nothing which can stand in the way of the court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases. Every child has right to proper health and education and it is the primary duty of the parents to ensure that child gets proper education. The courts in exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction have to decide such delicate questions. It has to consider the welfare of the child as of paramount importance taking into consideration other aspects of the matter including the rights of parents also
Conceptually, extradition is a rather complex jurisprudential zone as it has encompassed within itself various trajectories of apparently conflicting ideas. Generally, a State’s criminal jurisdiction extends over offences committed within its geographical boundaries but it is the common experience of all the countries that often a criminal committing an offence in one country flees to another country and thus seeks to avoid conviction and the consequential punishment. This poses a threat in all civilised countries to a fair adjudication of crime and sustaining the constitutional norms of rule of law. To remedy such anomalous and unjust situation, extradition has been evolved by way of international treaty obligation which ensures a mode of formal surrender of an accused by one country to another based on reciprocal arrangements. In India, extradition has not been defined under the Extradition Act, 1962. However, extradition has been defined as: ‘… the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offence outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender.’ But extradition is different from deportation by which competent State authorities order a person to leave a country and prevent him from returning to the same territory. Extradition is also different from exclusion, by which an individual is prohibited from staying in one part of a sovereign State. Both deportation and exclusion basically are nonconsensual exercise whereas extradition is based on a consensual treaty obligation between the requesting State and the requested State.
Judges can play a significant role in ridding the justice system of harmful stereotypes. They have an important responsibility to base their decisions on law and facts in evidence, and not engage in gender stereotyping. The Supreme Court of India observed that recently, the Courts across the country, have started imposing irrelevant conditions while granting bail. The conditions that can be imposed under the law are clearly laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and by the Supreme Court through its various decisions. Accordingly, it is clear that imposing conditions like rendering community service in COVID hospitals or in any other institution, plantation of trees, contributing to any particular charity relief fund, etc. is impermissible in law. While deciding a bail application, accused cannot assume the role of a social reformer or fund raiser for charities and imposed with conditions which have no nexus with the offence or relevance with the object of the bail provisions. During pendency of the trial accused is presumed innocent and his guilt is yet to be adjudicated by the Court. Imposing irrelevant conditions is violative of the right to equality and personal liberty, including procedure established by law. Such wide prevalence necessitates the urgent intervention of the court to declare that such remarks are unacceptable and have the potential to cause grave harm to the prosecutrix and the society at large; and to issue directions on gender sensitization of the bar and the bench, particularly with regard to judicial empathy for the prosecutrix…judicial stereotyping is a common and pernicious barrier to justice, particularly for women victims and survivors of violence. Such stereotyping causes judges to reach a view about cases based on preconceived beliefs, rather than relevant facts and actual enquiry. This requires judges to identify gender stereotyping, and identify how the application, enforcement or perpetuation of these stereotypes discriminates against women or denies them equal access to justice.
Courts must be open both in the physical and metaphorical sense. Save and except for in - camera proceedings in an exceptional category of cases, such as cases involving child sexual abuse or matrimonial proceedings bearing on matters of marital privacy, our legal system is founded on the principle that open access to courts is essential to safeguard valuable constitutional freedoms. The concept of an open court requires that information relating to a court proceeding must be available in the public domain. An open court proceeding ensures that the judicial process is subject to public scrutiny. Public scrutiny is crucial to maintaining transparency and accountability. However, there are certain exceptions to the rule of open courts in India. While emphasising the importance of public trial, it cannot be overlooked that the primary function of the judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a cause is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence subject to public gaze, is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully? If the primary function of the court is to do justice in causes brought before it, then on principle, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that there can be no exception to the rule that all causes must be tried in open court. The exceptions must be exercised with great caution and it is only if the court is satisfied beyond a doubt that the ends of justice themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in open court that it can pass an order to hold the trial in camera.