List of top Legal Studies Questions

To every State whose land territory is at any place washed by the sea, international law attaches a corresponding portion of maritime territory... International law does not say to a State: “You are entitled to claim territorial waters if you want them”. No maritime State can refuse them. International law imposes upon a maritime State, certain obligations and confers upon it certain rights arising out of the sovereignty which it exercises over its maritime territory. The possession of this territory is not optional, not dependent upon the will of the State, but compulsory. In the ninth edition of Oppenheim’s International Law, the nationality of ships in the high seas has been referred to in paragraph 287, wherein it has been observed that the legal order on the high seas is based primarily on the rule of International Law which requires every vessel sailing the high seas to possess the nationality of, and to fly the flag of, one State, whereby a vessel and persons on board the vessel are subjected to the law of the State of the flag and in general subject to its exclusive jurisdiction. In paragraph 291 of the aforesaid discourse, the learned author has defined the scope of flag jurisdiction to mean that jurisdiction in the high seas is dependent upon the Maritime Flag under which vessels sail, because no State can extend its territorial jurisdiction to the high seas. Of course, the aforesaid principle is subject to the right of ‘hot pursuit’, which is an exception to the exclusiveness of the flag jurisdiction over ships on the high seas in certain special cases.

Section 304-B (1) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) defines ‘dowry death’ of a woman. It provides that ‘dowry death’ is where death of a woman is caused by burning or bodily injuries or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances, within seven years of marriage, and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, in connection with demand for dowry. Further, Section 304-B (2) of IPC provides punishment for the aforesaid offence. The Supreme Court of India summarized the law under Section 304-B of IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (IEA) as under:
(i) Section 304-B of IPC must be interpreted keeping in mind the legislative intent to curb the social evil of bride burning and dowry demand;
(ii) The prosecution must at first establish the existence of the necessary ingredients for constituting an offence under Section 304-B of IPC. Once these ingredients are satisfied, the rebuttable presumption of causality, provided under Section 113-B of IEA operates against the accused;
(iii) The phrase ‘soon before’ as appearing in Section 304-B of IPC cannot be construed to mean ‘immediately before’. The prosecution must establish existence of ‘proximate and live link’ between the cruelty or harassment for dowry demand by the husband or his relatives and the consequential death of the victim

In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court analysed the ambit of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and also the scope of the expression ‘arrest’ contained therein and also under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). ‘Arrest’ may be classified into two categories, namely, the arrest under a warrant issued by a court and arrest without warrant. Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly directs that the investigation should be completed in the first instance within 24 hours; if not the arrested person should be brought before a Magistrate as provided under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Turning now to Article 22(1) and (2), we must ascertain whether its protection extends to both categories of arrests mentioned above, and, if not, then which one of them comes within its protection. There can be no matter of doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than do arrests under such warrants. The provision that the arrested person should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him. In the case of arrest under a warrant issued by a court, the judicial mind had already been applied to the case when the warrant was issued and, therefore, there is less reason for making such production in that case a matter of a substantive fundamental right. The matter of ‘House Arrest’ was deliberated by the court as: “There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a court cannot remand a person unless the court is authorised to do so by law. We are of the view, that in the facts of this case, the house arrest was not ordered purporting to be under Section 167. We observe that under Section 167 in appropriate cases it will be open to courts to order house arrest.”

The constitutional validity of the West Bengal Housing Industry Regulation Act, 2017 (WB-HIRA) was challenged on the basis that both WB-HIRA and a Parliamentary enactment, namely, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) are relatable to the legislative subjects contained in Entries 6 and 7 of List III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India. WB-HIRA has neither been reserved for nor has it received Presidential assent under Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India, which was necessary since it was going to occupy the same field as the RERA, a law which had been enacted by the Parliament. The State enactment contains certain provisions which are either: directly inconsistent with the corresponding provisions of the Central enactment; or a virtual replica of the Central enactment; and Parliament having legislated on a field covered by the Concurrent List, it is constitutionally impermissible for the State Legislature to enact a law over the same subject matter by setting up a parallel legislation. The analysis indicates repugnancy between WB-HIRA and RERA. Undoubtedly, as Article 254(1) postulates, the legislation enacted by the State legislature is void ‘to the extent of the repugnancy’. There is, not only a direct conflict of certain provisions between the RERA and WB-HIRA, but there is also a failure of the State legislature to incorporate statutory safeguards in WB-HIRA, which have been introduced in the RERA for protecting the interest of the purchasers of real estate. For repugnancy under Article 254 of the Constitution, there is a twin requirement to be fulfilled: firstly, there has to be a ‘repugnancy’ between a Central and State Act; and secondly, the Presidential assent has to be held as being non-existent. The test for determining such repugnancy is indeed to find out the dominant intention of both the legislations and whether such dominant intentions of both the legislations are alike or different. A provision in one legislation in order to give effect to its dominant purpose may incidentally be on the same subject as covered by the provision of the other legislation, but such partial or incidental coverage of the same area in a different context and to achieve a different purpose does not attract the doctrine of repugnancy. In order to attract the doctrine of repugnancy, both the legislations must be substantially on the same subject. Hence, WB-HIRA is repugnant to the RERA, and is hence unconstitutional.

The Supreme Court of India, in South East Asia Marine Engineering & Constructions Ltd. (SEAMEC LTD.) v. Oil India Ltd.,(2020) 5 SCC 164, noted that, under the Indian contract law, the consequences of a force majeure event are provided for under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 which deals with a contract to do an Act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible, or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the Act becomes impossible or unlawful. When the parties have not provided for what would take place when an event which renders the performance of the contract impossible, then Section 56 applies. When the Act contracted for becomes impossible, then under Section 56, the parties are exempted from further performance and the contract becomes void. The Court has further held that in Section 56, the word ‘impossible’ is to be taken in its practical and not literal sense. It must be borne in mind, however, that Section 56 lays down a rule of positive law and does not leave the matter to be determined according to the intention of the parties. However, there is no doubt that the parties may instead choose the consequences that would flow on the happening of an uncertain future event, under Section 32 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

The Supreme Court of India has held that the nature of inquiry before the Family Court is, indeed, adjudicatory. It is obliged to resolve the rival claims of the parties and while doing so, it must adhere to the norms prescribed by the statute in that regard and also the foundational principle of fairness of procedure and natural justice. These provisions plainly reveal that the Family Court is expected to follow procedure known to law, which means insist for a formal pleading to be filed by both sides, then frame the issues for determination, record the evidence of the parties to prove the facts asserted by the concerned party and only thereafter, to enter upon determination and render decision thereon by recording the reasons for such decision. For doing this, the Family Court is expected to give notice to the respective parties and provide them sufficient time and opportunity to present their claim in the form of pleadings and evidence before determination of the dispute.

The Supreme Court of India has held that the rationale of granting maintenance from the date of application finds its roots in the object of enacting maintenance legislations, so as to enable the wife to overcome the financial crunch which occurs on separation from the husband. Financial constraints of a dependant spouse hamper their capacity to be effectively represented before the Court. Enforcement of the order of maintenance is the most challenging issue, which is encountered by the applicants. If maintenance is not paid in a timely manner, it defeats the very object of the social welfare legislation. Execution petitions usually remain pending for months, if not years, which completely nullifies the object of the law.

The Supreme Court of India observed that, while appreciating the existence of the right to peaceful protest against a legislation ……., we have to make it unequivocally clear that public ways and public spaces cannot be occupied in such a manner and that too indefinitely. Democracy and dissent go hand in hand, but then the demonstrations expressing dissent must be in designated places alone. The present case was not even one of protests taking place in an undesignated area but was a blockage of a public way which caused grave inconvenience to commuters. We cannot accept the plea of the applicants that an indeterminable number of people can assemble whenever they choose to protest.

The present system of appointments as envisaged by the Constitution and as elucidated in the Collegium system makes it clear that the first step is a recommendation from Collegium of four senior-most judges and presided over by the Chief Justice. This process in turn requires wide consultation by the Chief Justice of the High Court to identify the requisite talent, so as to make the recommendations. Contrary to some portrayed beliefs as if this is an extremely subjective system, every Chief Justice is actually required to solicit names from different sources whether it be sitting judges, retired judges, or prominent members of the Bar. It is from this pool of talent that he selects, after a discussion in the collegium, the most suitable candidates. It is thus of utmost importance that the flow of recommendations continues for the appointment process to work successfully. The current situation of vacancies, especially in some of the larger courts with very few recommendations in the pipeline seems to be the genesis of this problem. The data placed before us, as drawn from the National Judicial Data Grid (NJDG) shows that five (5) High Courts alone are responsible for 54% of the pendency of over 57,51,312 cases i.e., the High Courts of Allahabad, Punjab & Haryana, Madras, Bombay, and Rajasthan. The Madras High Court has among the highest arrears in the country of 5.8 lakh cases despite having fewer vacancies than most other High Courts (i.e., 7%). This does not take away from the requirement of appointing ad hoc Judges but supports the view that even if the existing vacancies are few, a situation may arise requiring the expertise of experienced Judges to be appointed as ad hoc Judges.

A thought-provoking book titled ‘The Morality of Law’ by Lon L. Fuller on moral philosophy insists on a distinction between ‘morality of aspiration’ and ‘morality of duty’. From the view of the morality of aspiration, the human conduct does not bear on mandatory rules but on conceptions of the ‘Good Life’, of ‘what beseems a human being functioning at his best to human capacities’. Because no law can compel a man to live up to the excellence of which he is capable. But for workable standards of judgment, the morality of duty lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society directed towards certain specific goals must fail of its mark. Because the duty ties it very closely to what is ‘rationally discoverable’ and ‘objective’, as contrasted with the morality of aspiration based on subjectivism. However, moralists may differ as to what range of conduct should fall within the respective spheres of duty and the morality of aspirations. “When we are passing a judgment of moral duty, it seems absurd to say that such a duty can in some way flow directly from knowledge of a situation of fact.” As due to the fact that before we conclude ‘that a duty ought to exist’, however well we may understand the facts, by the close connection between understanding a person’s ideals, approval and disapproval. Does this mean that duties are rationally discoverable, and a matter of choice, even if not of ‘ineffable preference’? Presumably not, since when we pass a moral judgment of duty ‘ought’ to exist. It is necessary to distinguish between the accepted morality of a social group and the personal morality of individuals. ‘Duty’ may appear in all of these, but the satisfaction is very often a matter of degree varying from situation to situation. The rule of a morality of duty is necessary for social living. The morality of aspiration provides a general idea of the perfection we ought to acquire it. If we consider the whole range of moral issues, we may imagine a yardstick which begins at the bottom with the most obvious demands of social living and extends upward to the highest reaches of human aspirations. Somewhere along this scale an invisible pointer marks the dividing line where the pressure of duty leaves off and the challenge of excellence begins. The whole field of moral argument is an undeclared war over the location of this pointer. Whom we regard as being moralistic are always trying to inch the pointer upward so as to expand the area of duty and they bludgeon us into a belief that we are duty bound to embrace this pattern of human conduct, instead of making us realize a pattern of life they consider worthy of human nature

Both lawmen and laymen often ask, ‘What is the law applicable to a given set of facts?’ The answers to this question differ depending upon the specific jurisdiction to which the given set of facts is linked. Contrary to this, scholars and students of jurisprudence are likely to ask the general question, viz ‘What is Law?’. This question on the philosophy and nature of law supposes that law is a distinctive social-political phenomenon with universal characteristics that can be perceived through philosophical analysis. In such a study, the assumption is that law possesses some universal characteristics.
An analysis of the philosophy of law can be done for different reasons. Apart from a purely intellectual interest in understanding this complex phenomenon known as law, scholars also study the same as a normative social practice that purports to guide human behaviour, giving rise to reasons for action. The primary challenge of the branch of scholarship known as jurisprudence is based on this ‘normative, reason-giving aspect of law’. At the same time, we must understand that law is not the only normative realm in any given society. It is one of the many normative standards such as morality, religion, customs and usages, etiquette, self-regulatory standards within a family or corporation etc. So, it is also essential that we study law on the differences and similarities of the same with these normative standards.
While discerning these connections and contradictions, legal theories often study the content of the norm apart from giving importance to the source. Generally, theoretical studies on the content such as natural lawyers emphasize values such as fairness, justice, liberty etc., as qualifications for the norms to be called laws. They have argued that laws must be in tune with certain principles of inner morality, such as that laws be general, public, prospective, coherent, clear, stable, and practicable are indispensable to law-making. Whereas theories that give prominence to the sources of the norm, such as enactment/command by political institution/authority, do not always emphasize on the content.
Such philosophical analysis of law comprises both explanatory and justificatory aspects. While the explanatory aspect consists of explaining how laws can give rise to reasons and what kinds of reasons are involved. One example of this would be Dworkin’s classification of law as concepts, principles and rules. The aspect of justification concerns whether people ought to comply with the law’s demands. In other words, it is the attempt to explain the moral legitimacy of law and the subjects’ reasons for complying with it.

When parties to a contract are under a 'mistake' regarding an important fact related to such contract, it may affect the contract in two ways. It may, firstly, defeat the consent altogether that the parties are supposed to have given, that is to say, the consent is unreal. Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the same sense. Secondly, the mistake may mislead the parties as to the purpose which they had contemplated. Where the mistake does not defeat consent, but only misleads the parties, i.e., where both parties to an agreement are under a mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void. However, if the mistake is concerning an erroneous opinion regarding value of the subject-matter of the agreement, it is not a mistake as to a matter of fact. Thus, agreement is void when: (1) both the parties to an agreement are mistaken, (2) their mistake is as to a matter of fact, and (3) the fact about which they are mistaken is essential to the agreement. Further, it is pertinent to note that a mistake, in order to invalidate a contract, should be a mistake of fact and not a mistake of law. Furthermore, where only one party to the contract is under mistake of fact, and the other party is not, the contract is not voidable merely for such reason.

The United Nations Commission on Environment and Development defines 'sustainable development' as follows: "Sustainable development is the development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Sustainable development clearly postulates an anthropocentric bias, least concerned with the rights of other species which live on this earth. Anthropocentrism is always human-interest focused thinking that considers non-humans as having only instrumental value to humans, in other words, humans take precedence and human responsibilities towards non-human are based on benefits to humans. Eco-centrism is nature-centred, where humans are part of nature and non-humans have intrinsic value. In other words, human interest does not take automatic precedence and humans have obligations towards non-humans independently of human interest. Eco-centrism is, therefore, life-centred, nature-centred where nature includes both humans and non-humans. The Constitution of India protects not only human rights but also casts an obligation on human beings to protect and preserve a specie from becoming extinct. Conservation and protection of environment is an inseparable part of the fundamental right to life. According to the doctrine of 'public trust' recognized under the Constitution of India, certain common properties such as rivers, seashores, forests and the air are held by the Government in trusteeship for the free and unimpeded use of the general public. The resources like air, sea, waters and the forests have such a great importance to the people as a whole, that it would be totally unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The State, as a custodian of the natural resources, has a duty to maintain them not merely for the benefit of the public, but for the best interest of flora and fauna, wildlife and so on.

There are two principal theories on the relationship between international law and domestic law-Monism and Dualism. The monistic theory maintains that the subjects of two systems of law, i.e., international law and municipal law are essentially one. The monistic theory asserts that international law and municipal law are fundamentally the same in nature, and arise from the same science of law, and are manifestations of a single conception of law. The followers of this theory view international law and municipal law as part of a universal body of legal rules binding all human beings, collectively or singly. In a monist system, international law does not need to be incorporated into domestic law because international law immediately becomes incorporated in domestic legal system upon ratification of an international treaty. According to this theory, domestic law is subordinate to international law. The Statute of the International Criminal Court, therefore, can be directly applied and adjudicated in national courts according to the monistic theory. According to dualism theory, international law and municipal law represent two entirely distinct legal systems, i.e., international has an intrinsically different character from that of municipal law. International law is not directly applicable in the domestic system under dualism. First, international law must be translated into State legislation before the domestic courts can apply it. For example, under dualism, ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court is not enough-it must be implemented through State legislation into the domestic system. Most states and courts presumptively view national and international legal systems as discrete entities and routinely discuss in dualist fashion incorporation of rules from one system to the other.

A special marriage, i.e., a marriage between persons from two different religious affiliations can be legally contracted in India under the provisions of the law relating to special marriages. The law relating to special marriages provides for the registration of such marriages and for divorce in such cases. One of the modes in which a special marriage can be legally terminated is through divorce by mutual consent of parties to the marriage. In order to obtain a divorce by mutual consent, both the parties to the special marriage are required to jointly present a petition for divorce to the district court on the ground that they have been living separately for one year or more, that they have not been able to live together and that they have mutually agreed that the marriage should be dissolved. At least six months after the presentation of such petition, but not later than eighteen months after the presentation of such petition, the district court, after hearing the parties and after making the necessary inquiry, and being satisfied that the marriage is a 'special marriage', and that the claims made in the petition are true, shall declare the marriage to be dissolved. Further, the personal presence of the parties before the district court at the time of presenting the joint petition for divorce is not mandatory, as the parties can satisfy the court even by affidavit that the requirements for granting divorce on mutual consent are fulfilled.

Where a spouse contracts a second marriage while the first marriage is still subsisting, the spouse would be guilty of the offence of bigamy under the penal law in India, if it is proved that the first as well as the second marriages were legally valid, i.e., all the necessary ceremonies required by law or by custom have been performed at the time of contracting the marriages. According to the penal law in India, if a person, who has a living husband or wife, marries again, then such person is liable to be punished with imprisonment up to seven years along with a fine for committing the offence of bigamy. Although the penal law of India is applicable to all citizens irrespective of their religious affiliations, an exception to the offence of bigamy may be created by the law relating to marriage applicable to followers of a particular religion. Under the Hindu law relating to marriage, bigamy is not permitted. If a Hindu wife files a criminal complaint against her husband on the ground that during the subsistence of her marriage, her husband had married a second wife by converting into another religion which legally permits having more than one wife, then her husband is liable to be punished for the offence of bigamy. Further, the Hindu law relating to marriage also provides that the punishment for offence of bigamy as provided in the penal law of India would be applicable to marriage between two Hindus.

The Constitution of India guarantees to all its citizens certain fundamental freedoms, which are recognized as their fundamental rights. However, these fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of India are not absolute as no right can be. Each of these fundamental rights is liable to be controlled, curtailed and regulated to some extent by laws made by the Parliament or the State Legislatures. Accordingly, the Constitution of India lays down the grounds and the purposes for which a legislature can impose 'reasonable restrictions' on the rights guaranteed to citizens. The State cannot travel beyond the contours of these reasonable restrictions in curbing the fundamental rights guaranteed to citizens. While determining the constitutional validity of a restriction imposed on a fundamental right by a legislation, the Court is not concerned with the necessity of the restriction or the wisdom of the policy underlying it, but only whether the restriction is in excess of the requirement, and whether the legislature has overstepped the Constitutional limitations. Two of the fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen of India are- the right to move freely throughout the territory of India and the right to reside and settle in any part of India. However, the State may impose reasonable restrictions on these rights by law, in the interests of the general public or for the protection of the interests of any Scheduled Tribes.

To maintain the secular character of the Indian polity, not only does the Constitution of India guarantee freedom of religion to individuals and groups, but it is also against the general policy of the Constitution of India that any money be paid out of the public funds for promoting or maintaining any particular religion. Accordingly, it is provided in the Constitution of India that no person shall be compelled to pay any taxes, the proceeds of which are specifically appropriated in payment of expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination. This does not prohibit the State from enacting a law to incur expenses for the promotion or maintenance of any particular religion or religious denomination, but by such law, no person can be compelled to pay any tax, the proceeds of which are to be so utilized. This, however, does not invalidate levy of a fee to provide some service. Thus, a fee can be levied on pilgrims to a religious fair to meet the expenses of the measures taken to safeguard the health, safety and welfare of the pilgrims. Such fee levied by a State will be valid because the object of such contribution is not to foster or preserve religion, but to control secular administration of religious institutions.

Writ is a public law remedy. It refers to a formal. written order issued by a judicial authority directing an individual or authority to do or refrain from doing an act. The High Court. while exercising its power of judicial review, does not act as an appellate body. It is concerned with illegality. irrationality and procedural impropriety of an order passed by the State or a Statutory Authority. A High Court is empowered to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of Fundamental Rights and for any other purpose. The writ jurisdiction of High Court is discretionary and equitable. Writ of mandamus is issued by a court commanding a public authority to perform a public duty belonging to its office. It can be issued only when a legal duty is imposed on the authority and the petitioner has right to compel the performance of such duty. Writ of mandamus is requested to be issued, inter alia. to compel performance of public duties which may be administrative, ministerial or statutory in nature. A writ of mandamus may be issued in favour of a person who establishes a legal right in himself. It may be issued against a person who has a mandatory legal duty to perform. but has failed or has neglected to do so. Such a legal duty emanates by operation of law. The writ of mandamus is most extensive in regards to its remedial nature. The object of mandamus is to prevent disorder emanating from failure of justice and is required to be granted in all cases where law has established no specific remedy.

‘A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z, unless Z gives him money.’ The following is true about this statement

Which of the following is correct ?

Following is true about a warrant

‘A is accused of murdering B’. The following facts may not be in issue in his trial

Pick the incorrect statement.

In which of the following case, the Supreme Court has held that the daughter being a coparcener has a right in the coparcenary property by birth irrespective of whether the father was alive or not at the time of 2005 amendment ?