Comprehension
It will be relevant to refer to the statement made by the contemnor which was made and read out before this Court by the contemnor on 20.08.2020, which reads as under:
“I have gone through the judgment of this Hon‟ble Court. I am pained that I have been held guilty of committing contempt of the Court whose majesty I have tried to uphold - not as a courtier or cheerleader but as a humble guard - for over three decades, at some personal and professional cost. I am pained, not because I may be punished, but because I have been grossly misunderstood. I am shocked that the court holds me guilty of “malicious, scurrilous, calculated attack” on the institution of administration of justice. I am dismayed that the Court has arrived at this conclusion without providing any evidence of my motives to launch such an attack. I must confess that I am disappointed that the court did not find it necessary to serve me with a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo-motu notice was issued, nor found it necessary to respond to the specific averments made by me in my reply affidavit or the many submissions of my counsel. I find it hard to believe that the Court finds my tweet “has the effect of destabilizing the very foundation of this important pillar of Indian democracy”. I can only reiterate that these two tweets represented my bona-fide beliefs, the expression of which must be permissible in any democracy. Indeed, public scrutiny is desirable for healthy functioning of judiciary itself. I believe that open criticism of any institution is necessary in a democracy, to safeguard the constitutional order. We are living through that moment in our history when higher principles must trump routine obligations, when saving the constitutional order must come before personal and professional niceties, when considerations of the present must not come in the way of discharging our responsibility towards the future. Failing to speak up would have been a dereliction of duty, especially for an officer of the court like myself. My tweets were nothing but a small attempt to discharge what I considered to be my highest duty at this juncture in the history of our republic. I did not tweet in a fit of absence mindedness. It would be insincere and contemptuous on my part to offer an apology for the tweets that expressed what was and continues to be my bona-fide belief. Therefore, I can only humbly paraphrase what the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi had said in his trial: I do not ask for mercy. I do not appeal to magnanimity. I am here, therefore, to cheerfully submit to any penalty that can lawfully be inflicted upon me for what the Court has determined to be an offence, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen.”
Source: Excerpt taken from the Judgment delivered by Arun Mishra, B. R. Gavai & Krishna Murari, J.J.
“I have gone through the judgment of this Hon‟ble Court. I am pained that I have been held guilty of committing contempt of the Court whose majesty I have tried to uphold - not as a courtier or cheerleader but as a humble guard - for over three decades, at some personal and professional cost. I am pained, not because I may be punished, but because I have been grossly misunderstood. I am shocked that the court holds me guilty of “malicious, scurrilous, calculated attack” on the institution of administration of justice. I am dismayed that the Court has arrived at this conclusion without providing any evidence of my motives to launch such an attack. I must confess that I am disappointed that the court did not find it necessary to serve me with a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo-motu notice was issued, nor found it necessary to respond to the specific averments made by me in my reply affidavit or the many submissions of my counsel. I find it hard to believe that the Court finds my tweet “has the effect of destabilizing the very foundation of this important pillar of Indian democracy”. I can only reiterate that these two tweets represented my bona-fide beliefs, the expression of which must be permissible in any democracy. Indeed, public scrutiny is desirable for healthy functioning of judiciary itself. I believe that open criticism of any institution is necessary in a democracy, to safeguard the constitutional order. We are living through that moment in our history when higher principles must trump routine obligations, when saving the constitutional order must come before personal and professional niceties, when considerations of the present must not come in the way of discharging our responsibility towards the future. Failing to speak up would have been a dereliction of duty, especially for an officer of the court like myself. My tweets were nothing but a small attempt to discharge what I considered to be my highest duty at this juncture in the history of our republic. I did not tweet in a fit of absence mindedness. It would be insincere and contemptuous on my part to offer an apology for the tweets that expressed what was and continues to be my bona-fide belief. Therefore, I can only humbly paraphrase what the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi had said in his trial: I do not ask for mercy. I do not appeal to magnanimity. I am here, therefore, to cheerfully submit to any penalty that can lawfully be inflicted upon me for what the Court has determined to be an offence, and what appears to me to be the highest duty of a citizen.”
Source: Excerpt taken from the Judgment delivered by Arun Mishra, B. R. Gavai & Krishna Murari, J.J.
Question: 1
The above passage has been taken from which of the following recent cases relating to the Criminal Contempt of Court?
The above passage has been taken from which of the following recent cases relating to the Criminal Contempt of Court?
Updated On: Jul 17, 2024
- In Re: Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
- The Registrar General, Supreme Court of India v. Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
- Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan
- Union of India v. Prashant Bhushan & Anr.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The correct Option is (C):Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan
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Question: 2
The Source of power of the Supreme Court to take suo-motu cognizance of Contempt of the Court has been provided under which of the following?
The Source of power of the Supreme Court to take suo-motu cognizance of Contempt of the Court has been provided under which of the following?
Updated On: Jul 17, 2024
- Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Article 129 r/w Section 13 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
- Article 129
- Article 129 r/w Article 141.
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The Correct Option is C
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The correct Option is (C):Article 129
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Question: 3
Which of the following could be a valid defence for the contemnor in a contempt proceeding against him?
Which of the following could be a valid defence for the contemnor in a contempt proceeding against him?
Updated On: Jul 17, 2024
- Statements are bona-fide fair criticism without attributing motives to the judges.
- Statements are the personal opinion of the person and do not have the capacity to influence the thinking of public at large
- Statements are based on the quotes from retired judges of the Supreme Court.
- Statements are mere opinions which does not fall under the category of the term "scandalising the court."
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The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The correct Option is (A):
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Question: 4
In which of the following cases, the apex court held that, "Contempt jurisdiction should not be used by judges to uphold their own dignity. In the free market-place of ideas, criticism about the judicial system or the judges should be welcomed, so long as criticisms do not impair or hamper the „administration of justice‘."?
In which of the following cases, the apex court held that, "Contempt jurisdiction should not be used by judges to uphold their own dignity. In the free market-place of ideas, criticism about the judicial system or the judges should be welcomed, so long as criticisms do not impair or hamper the „administration of justice‘."?
Updated On: Jul 17, 2024
- Amicus Curiae v. Prashant Bhushan
- P.N. Duda v. V. P. Shivshankar
- A.K. Gopalan v. Noordeen
- Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal
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The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The correct Option is (D):Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal
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Question: 5
Which of the following can be stated as not true about the intent of the contemnor as mentioned in the passage above?
Which of the following can be stated as not true about the intent of the contemnor as mentioned in the passage above?
Updated On: Jul 17, 2024
- He believes in the dignity and independence of judiciary and his act, further strengthens his belief.
- His statements hold the sanctity of the institution to be of utmost importance and his actions will uphold the same.
- He compares himself with the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi and puts himself at the same pedestal.
- His statements are criticism of an individual and not the institution itself and such criticism is quintessential for a healthy democracy.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The correct Option is (C):He compares himself with the father of the nation Mahatma Gandhi and puts himself at the same pedestal.
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Question: 6
A comparison of the Freedom of Speech and Expression between the text of Constitution of India and the U.S. Constitution may lead to many conclusions. Which of the following is not a conclusion of such a comparison?
A comparison of the Freedom of Speech and Expression between the text of Constitution of India and the U.S. Constitution may lead to many conclusions. Which of the following is not a conclusion of such a comparison?
Updated On: Jul 17, 2024
- The U.S. Constitution expressly mentions about the Freedom of Press but does not mention about the Freedom of Expression.
- The Freedom of Press though not expressly mentioned under Article 19 (1) (a), it is implicit under the Freedom of Speech
- The idea of Freedom of Speech and Expression is much broader in India as compared to that in the U.S. Constitution
- The Freedom of Speech and Expression under both the constitutions is identical in terms of its extent.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The correct Option is (C):The idea of Freedom of Speech and Expression is much broader in India as compared to that in the U.S. Constitution
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Question: 7
Which of the following case is not related to the Contempt of Court as a restriction to the Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article 19 (1) (a)?
Which of the following case is not related to the Contempt of Court as a restriction to the Freedom of Speech and Expression enshrined under Article 19 (1) (a)?
Updated On: Aug 22, 2024
- In Re Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343
- Hari Singh Nagra v. Kapil Sibal, AIR 2010 SC 55.
- In Re Harijai Singh, (1996) 6 SCC 466.
- Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, (2016) 7 SCC 221.
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The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The correct Option is (D):Subramaniam Swamy v. UOI, (2016) 7 SCC 221
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Question: 8
In which of the following cases it was held that holding Dharna in front of Supreme Court in which lawyers too, take part is not by itself Contempt of Court if the access to the Court is not hindered?
In which of the following cases it was held that holding Dharna in front of Supreme Court in which lawyers too, take part is not by itself Contempt of Court if the access to the Court is not hindered?
Updated On: Jul 17, 2024
- Hiralal Dixit v. Union of India
- J.R. Parashar v. Prashant Bhushan
- Tarun Bharat Singh v. Union of India
- P. N. Duda v. V. P. Shivshankar
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct Option is (A):Hiralal Dixit v. Union of India
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Question: 9
Justice Krishna Iyer in (1) observed that normative guideline for Judges to observe in contempt jurisdiction is not to be (2) even where distortions and criticism oversteps thelimitation.
Justice Krishna Iyer in (1) observed that normative guideline for Judges to observe in contempt jurisdiction is not to be (2) even where distortions and criticism oversteps thelimitation.
Updated On: Aug 22, 2024
- (1) S. Mulgaokar, (2) hypersensitive
- (1) Shamsher Singh, (2) provocative
- (1) Hira Lal, (2) emotional
- (1) Ediga Annama, (2) sensitive
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The Correct Option is A
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The correct Option is (A):(1) S. Mulgaokar, (2) hypersensitive
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Question: 10
Late Arun Jaitely, in Parliament had said that the Supreme Court is destroying the edifice of Parliament brick by brick. Another member responded by saying transparency in judicial appointments is required as half the judges in the country lack integrity. Are these statements Contempt of Court after the Prashant Bhushan 2020 judgment?
Late Arun Jaitely, in Parliament had said that the Supreme Court is destroying the edifice of Parliament brick by brick. Another member responded by saying transparency in judicial appointments is required as half the judges in the country lack integrity. Are these statements Contempt of Court after the Prashant Bhushan 2020 judgment?
Updated On: Jul 17, 2024
- Yes, because MPs are also bound by Contempt law
- No, because MPs are exempted from Contempt law.
- Jaitely can‘t be punished as he is no more but the other member can be held liable.
- No, because the statements made in Parliament are protected.
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The Correct Option is D
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The correct Option is (D):No, because the statements made in Parliament are protected.
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