List of top Legal Studies Questions

Which of the following case is not related to offence of ‘Rape’?

Right of private defence against the act of Public Servant is available if

The Supreme Court in which of the following case held that “though the right to pursue higher education has not been spelt out as a fundamental right under Part III of the Constitution, it bears emphasis that access to professional education is not a governmental largesse, and that the State has an affirmative obligation to facilitate access to education at all levels.”

In which case, it was held by the Supreme Court that an anticipatory bail cannot be limited or restricted to a fixed period ?

Offence of ‘Waging of War’ and offence of ‘Sedition’ require

When a person is accused of committing more than one offence of the same kind, either against the same person or not, he may be charged with and tried at one trial if the said offences were committed within the space of

‘Z’ attempts to horsewhip ‘A’, not in such a manner as to cause grievous hurt to ‘A’. ‘A’ draws out a pistol but ‘Z’ continues the assault. ‘A’ believing in good faith that he can not save himself by any other means, shoots ‘Z’ dead. ‘A’ is liable for

‘Morals are more dynamic, more revolutionary, more mobile, more directed towards the future ... than is the law. The latter is more attached to traditional practices than to acts of innovation, more dependent on intellectual representations and the balance of forces than is morality. Yet, ..., there have been cases where “an advanced law” has overcome current morality so that law has become a factor in moral change.’ This exception happens in which of the following circumstance ?

Assertion (A) : The rule making power of the Supreme Court is not subject to any law made by the Parliament of India.
Reason (R) : Only an impartial and independent judiciary can protect the right of the individual without fear or favour.

“The High Court may confer on any Magistrate invested with the powers of a Magistrate of the second-class, power to try summarily any offence.” Which of the following is not correct regarding the powers of such Magistrate to try summarily an offence ?

Roscoe Pound’s theory identifies the proper goal of a legal system as the satisfaction of demands, desires, and claims. The demands, desires, and claims are called as

Which of the following condition must be satisfied for invoking Section 210 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, in a case?

Which of the following is not correct regarding a person arrested with or without warrant by a police officer or under a warrant by a private person?

“What cannot be done directly, cannot be done indirectly”– this statement epitomises the doctrine of

The questions are to be answered on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage. Choose the most appropriate response that accurately and completely answer the question.
The literal meaning of the term immovable is incapable of being moved, motionless, steadfast, or firmly fixed. s.3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, makes it clear that immovable property does not include standing timber, growing crops or grass. s. 3 (26) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 explains that immovable property shall include land, benefits to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, as permanently fastened to anything attached to the earth. Under s. 2(6) of the Registration Act, 1908, Immovable property includes land, buildings, hereditary allowances, right to ways, lights, ferries, fisheries or any other benefit to arise out of land, and things attached to the earth, or permanently fastened to anything which is attached to the earth, but not standing timber, growing crops, or grass. Standing timber must be a timber tree that is in a state fit for construction or building purposes or ready to be used as timber, and further, a tree that is meant to be converted into timber so shortly that it can already be looked upon as timber for all practical purposes even though it is still rooted in earth. In order to be regarded as movable property, it is intended to be cut reasonably early. The expression ‘things attached to earth’ has again been explained in s.3 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 as things which are rooted in earth, such as trees and shrubs, things that are embedded in earth such as walls and buildings and things that are permanently attached to what is embedded in the earth for the permanent beneficial enjoyment of to which it is attached.

The questions are to be answered on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage. Choose the most appropriate response that accurately and completely answer the question.
Along with the evolution of the family unit, society has willingly accepted the premise that parents have absolute power over their un-emancipated children. In ancient times, parental authority was unconditional and parents were granted the power of life and death over their minor children. As late as the eighteenth century, Americans recognized a parent’s right to unquestioned authority and by the late nineteenth century, the American courts developed the doctrine of parent-child tort immunity. The doctrine was designed to exempt parents from personal liability for tortious acts they committed against their minor child. A parent is immune from a tort suit brought by his child if the suit is for negligence and the minor child is not self-supporting. Also it is to be noted that parents are not immune from suits for intentional torts.

The questions are to be answered on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.Choose the most appropriate response that accurately and completely answer the question.
The term mergers and acquisitions (M&A) refers to the consolidation of companies or their major business assets through financial transactions between companies.A company may purchase and absorb another company outright,merge with it to create a new company,acquire some or all of its major assets, make a tender offer for its stock,or stage a hostile takeover.Mergers can be structured in a number of different ways, based on the relationship between the two companies involved in the deal. For instance conglomerate mergers involve firms of unrelated business activities. Congeneric merger involve two businesses that serve the same consumer base in different ways.Horizontal merger is a business consolidation that occurs between firms who operate in the same space, often as competitors offering the same good or service.A market extension merger takes place between two companies that deal in the same products but in separate markets.A product extension merger takes place between two business organizations that deal in products that are related to each other and operate in the same market.A vertical merger occurs when two or more firms, operating at different levels within an industry’s supply chain, merge operations.

The questions are to be answered on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.Choose the most appropriate response that accurately and completely answer the question.
A contract of guarantee is a contract to perform the promise, of discharge the liability,of a third person in case of his default. Anything done,or any promise made,for the benefit of the principal debtor may be a sufficient consideration to the surety for giving the guarantee.In every contract of guarantee there is an implied promise by the principal debtor to indemnify the surety, and the surety is entitled to recover from the principal debtor whatever sum he has rightfully paid under the guarantee,but no sums, which he has paid wrongfully. Any guarantee,which has been obtained by means of misrepresentation made by the creditor, or with his knowledge and assent, concerning a material part of the transaction,is invalid.Any guarantee,which the creditor has obtained by means of keeping silence as to material circumstance, is also invalid.

The questions are to be answered on the basis of what is stated or implied in the passage.Choose the most appropriate response that accurately and completely answer the question.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services (the “GATS”),negotiated and concluded as a result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations,when it came into effect in 1995 was the first multilateral agreement covering this important and growing area of trade in services.Article I: 2 of the GATS defines the concept of “trade in services” as “the supply of a service” within one of four defined “modes of supply”:(a) from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member (Mode 1-Cross-border Supply);(b) in the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member (Mode 2-Consumption Abroad);(c) by a service supplier of one Member,through commercial presence in the territory of any other Member (Mode 3-Commercial Presence);(d) by a service supplier of one Member,through presence of natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member (Mode 4-Movement of Natural Persons).

Which of the following case is bible on the delegated legislation.

Match List I with List II

List I		List II
A.	Fundamental Rights	I.	Part XX
B.	Directive principles of state policy	II.	Part IV (A)
C.	Amendment procedure	III.	Part III
D.	Fundamental duties	IV.	Part IV

Choose the correct answer from the options given below :

Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity. Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner. But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1 (hereafter IYLA)]

An Ordinance which is promulgated by the Governor has (as clause 2 of Article 213 provides) the same force and effect as an Act of the legislature of the State assented to by the Governor. However - and this is a matter of crucial importance – clause 2 goes on to stipulate in the same vein significant constitutional conditions. These conditions have to be fulfilled before the ‘force and effect’ fiction comes into being. These conditions are prefaced by the expression “but every such Ordinance” which means that the constitutional fiction is subject to what is stipulated in sub-clauses (a) and (b). Sub-clause (a) provides that the Ordinance “shall be laid before the legislative assembly of the state” or before both the Houses in the case of a bi-cameral legislature. Is the requirement of laying an Ordinance before the state legislature mandatory? There can be no manner of doubt that it is. The expression “shall be laid” is a positive mandate which brooks no exceptions. That the word ‘shall’ in sub-clause (a) of clause 2 of Article 213 is mandatory, emerges from reading the provision in its entirety. As we have noted earlier, an Ordinance can be promulgated only when the legislature is not in session. Upon the completion of six weeks of the reassembling of the legislature, an Ordinance “shall cease to operate”.
Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’]

The other material which prompted the High Court to reach the conclusion that the subsoil/minerals vest in the State is … recitals of a patta which ….. states that if minerals are found in the property covered by the patta and if the pattadar exploits those minerals, the pattadar is liable for a separate tax in addition to the tax shown in the patta and …. certain standing orders of the Collector of Malabar which provided for collection of seigniorage fee in the event of the mining operation being carried on. We are of the clear opinion that the recitals in the patta or the Collector’s standing order that the exploitation of mineral wealth in the patta land would attract additional tax, in our opinion, cannot in any way indicate the ownership of the State in the minerals. The power to tax is a necessary incident of sovereign authority (imperium) but not an incident of proprietary rights (dominium). Proprietary right is a compendium of rights consisting of various constituent, rights. If a person has only a share in the produce of some property, it can never be said that such property vests in such a person. In the instant case, the State asserted its ‘right’ to demand a share in the ‘produce of the minerals worked’ though the expression employed is right – it is in fact the Sovereign authority which is asserted. From the language of the BSO No.10 it is clear that such right to demand the share could be exercised only when the pattadar or somebody claiming through the pattadar, extracts/works the minerals – the authority of the State to collect money on the happening of an event – such a demand is more in the nature of an excise duty/a tax. The assertion of authority to collect a duty or tax is in the realm of the sovereign authority, but not a proprietary right….
The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil…
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’)

A nationwide lockdown was declared by the Central Government from 24 March 2020 to prevent the spread of the CoVID-19 pandemic. Economic activity came to a grinding halt. The lockdown was extended on several occasions, among them for the second time on 14 April 2020. On 17 April 2020, the Labour and Employment Department of the State of Gujarat issued a notification under Section 5 of the Factories Act to exempt all factories registered under the Act “from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. for adult workers” under Sections 51, 54, 55 and 56. The stated aim of the notification was to provide “certain relaxations for industrial and commercial activities” from 20 April 2020 till 19 July 2020.
Section 5 of the Factories Act provides that in a public emergency, the State Government can exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of the Act, except Section 67. Section 5 is extracted below: “5. Power to exempt during public emergency. — In any case of public emergency the State Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, exempt any factory or class or description of factories from all or any of the provisions of this Act except section 67 for such period and subject to such conditions as it may think fit: Provided that no such notification shall be made for a period exceeding three months at a time. Explanation.— For the purposes of this section ‘public emergency’ means a grave emergency whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened, whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance.” (emphasis supplied) The notification in its relevant part is extracted below:
“... NOW, THEREFORE, in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Factories Act, 1948, the ‘Factories Act’ PART B Government of Gujarat hereby directs that all the factories registered under the Factories Act, 1948 shall be exempted from various provisions relating to weekly hours, daily hours, intervals for rest etc. of adult workers under section 51, section 54, and section 55 and section 56 with the following conditions from 20th April till 19th July 2020, –
(1) No adult worker shall be allowed or required to work in a factory for more than twelve hours in any day and Seventy Two hours in any week.
(2) The Periods of work of adult workers in a factory each day shall be so fixed that no period shall exceed six hours and that no worker shall work for more than six hours before he has had an interval of rest of at least half an hour.
(3) No Female workers shall be allowed or required to work in a factory between 7:00 PM to 6:00 AM.
(4) Wages shall be in a proportion of the existing wages (e.g. If wages for eight hours are 80 Rupees, then proportionate wages for twelve hours will be 120 Rupees).”
[Extract from judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Mazdoor Sabha v. The State of Gujarat decided on 1 October, 2020, (hereafter ‘GMS’)]