List of top Legal Studies Questions

The Indian Contract Act is a classical model of contract law that covers various codes that govern general contracts as well as specific contracts. Contract of Bailment, one such type of contract under the Indian law of contract, talks about the delivery of goods from one person to another for a purpose. Under this contract, the bailee is given a right to lien. Right to lien is defined under Section 171 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which talks about the general right to lien of bankers, wharfingers, factors, attorneys of high courts and policy brokers.
Generally, two parties are involved. The banker who lends money to the borrower or the customer, who then provides a security in exchange for the loan. Both parties are entitled to some of the rights that are associated with the securities that were provided. It is a possessory right which allows the bank to have temporary possession of the goods until 17 * PG the customer’s outstanding debt is paid. The banker the right to act as the trustee of the property as long as they are acting within their powers as the custodian and do not sell the property without giving notice to the customer. The landmark judgment of Syndicate Bank v. Vijay Kumar and Others dealt with the issue of whether or not a banker’s right to lien and set off was a general and customary right guaranteed to them. In furtherance of Halsbury’s laws of England, this judgment recognised the banker’s right to general lien was a right guaranteed by the law and not the contract.
(Extracted with edits from “Critical Analysis of Bankers Right of General Lien” by Alisha Khalid Bhendwade, IJLRA, Vol. II, 2024)

“The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status. It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsels appearing for the Petitioner that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Art. 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice......”
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Art. 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. This is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
It is apparent that the power under Art. 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is
entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court. In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 SC, this court stated that the same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate
or relevant reasons for passing the order.
[Extract from the judgment of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1]

Whether an agreement is a mortgage by conditional sale or sale with an option to repurchase is a vexed question to be considered in the facts of each case. The essentials of an agreement, to qualify as a mortgage by conditional sale, can succinctly be summarized. An ostensible sale with transfer of possession and ownership, but containing a clause for reconveyance in accordance with Section 58(c) of the Act, will clothe the agreement as a mortgage by conditional sale. Referring to Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act the observed, “A deeming fiction was added in the negative that a transaction shall not be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition for reconveyance is contained in the document which purports to effect the sale.” The issue under adjudication was whether the transaction between the parties was an absolute sale of the property or it was a mortgage. The court relied upon the case Bishwanath Prasad Singh v. Rajendra Prasad and Anr, 2006 SC and held that A bare perusal of the said provision clearly shows that a mortgage by conditional sale must be evidenced by one document whereas a sale with condition of retransfer may be evidenced by more than one document. A sale with a condition of retransfer is not a mortgage. It is not a partial transfer. By reason of such a transfer all rights have been transferred reserving only a personal right to the purchaser and such a personal right would be lost unless the same is exercised within the stipulated time. The execution of separate agreement for reconveyance, either contemporaneously or subsequently, shall militate against the agreement being mortgaged by conditional sale. There must exist a debtor and creditor relationship. The valuation of the property, and the transaction value, along with the duration of time for reconveyance, are important considerations to decide the nature of the agreement. There will have to be a cumulative consideration of these factors, along with the recitals in the agreement, intention of the parties, coupled with other attendant circumstances, considered in a holistic manner. The language used in the agreement may not always be conclusive. (Extract from Prakash (Dead) By LR. V. G. Aradhya & Ors, 2023 SC)

In the present case, the levy of IGST on the supply of ocean freight services under the reverse charge mechanism on the importer, when the value of such service is already included in the transaction value of imported goods, amounts to double taxation. The concept of double taxation implies that the same subject matter is taxed twice when it should be taxed only once. The GST law, as framed, does not envisage taxation of a transaction twice, and the fundamental principles of GST do not support such an imposition. Further, the importer, who is not the recipient of the service but is treated as a deemed recipient under the reverse charge mechanism, cannot be made liable to pay tax on a service that they have not directly availed. This stretches the scope of reverse charge mechanism beyond its intended purpose, which is to simplify tax collection by shifting the liability to pay tax from the service provider to the service recipient, particularly in cases where the service provider is located outside India and does not have a presence within the taxable territory. Moreover, the constitutional framework requires that a tax should be levied with legislative competence and should not contravene any fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The imposition of IGST on ocean freight under the reverse charge mechanism without proper legislative backing undermines the very essence of taxation principles enshrined in the Constitution of India.
(This extract is taken from Mohit Minerals v. Union of India CA No. 1390/2022)

In Kapilaben v. Ashok Kumar Jayantilal Sheth, (2020) 20 SCC 648, the Supreme Court has considered that the assignment of a contract might result in a transfer of either rights or obligations thereunder. The transfer of obligations is not possible without the consent of the other party. However, the transfer of rights is permissible, except in cases where the contract is of a personal nature. “It is well-settled that the term ‘representative-in-interest’ includes the assignee of a contractual interest. Though the provisions of the Contract Act do not particularly deal with the assignability of contracts, the court has opined time and again that a party to a contract cannot assign their obligations or liabilities without the consent of the other party. A Constitution Bench in Khardah Co. Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) (P) Ltd. [AIR 1962 SC 1810], has laid out this principle as follows: “An assignment of a contract might result by transfer either of the rights or of the obligations thereunder. However, there is a well-recognised distinction between these two classes of assignments. As a rule, obligations under a contract cannot be assigned except with the consent of the promisee, and when such consent is given, it is really a novation resulting in substitution of liabilities. On the other hand, rights under a contract are assignable unless the contract is personal in its nature or the rights are incapable of assignment either under the law or under an agreement between the parties.”
[Extracted with edits from Indira Devi v. Veena Gupta, (2023) 8 SCC 124]

Vivian Bose, J., had observed that Section 106 of the Evidence Act is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible for the prosecution to establish certain facts which are particularly within the knowledge of the accused. In Shambu Nath Mehra vs. The State of Ajmer (1956 SCR 199) the learned Judge has stated the legal principle thus: “This lays down the general rule that in a criminal case the burden of proof is on the prosecution and section 106 is designed to meet certain exceptional cases in which it would be impossible, or at any rate disproportionately difficult for the prosecution to establish facts which are ‘especially’ within the knowledge of the accused and which he could prove without difficulty or inconvenience. The word ‘especially’ underscores facts that are pre-eminently or exceptionally within the knowledge of the accused. It added, if the section were to be interpreted otherwise, it would lead to the very startling conclusion that in a murder case the burden lies on the accused to prove that he did not commit the murder because who could know better than him whether he did or did not.” It is evident that it cannot be the intention and Privy Council has twice refused to construe this section, as reproduced in certain other Acts outside India, to mean that the burden lies on the accused person to show that he did not commit the crime for which he is tried. These cases are Attygalle v. the King. 1936 PC 169 (AIR V 23) (A) and Seneviratne v. R, 1936-3 All ER 36 at p.49 (B). In case resting on circumstantial evidence, an accused person’s failure to provide a reasonable explanation as required by S. 106 could serve as an additional link in the chain of circumstances.
(Based on facts from State of West Bengal vs. Mir Mohammad Omar & Ors, AIR 2000SUPREME COURT 2988)

SEBI was established as India’s principal capital markets regulator with the aim to protect the interest of investors in securities and promote the development and regulation of the securities market in India. SEBI is empowered to regulate the securities market in India by the SEBI Act 1992, the SCRA and the Depositories Act 1996. SEBI’s powers to regulate the securities market are wide and include delegated legislative, administrative, and adjudicatory powers to enforce SEBI’s regulations. SEBI exercises its delegated legislative power by inter alia framing regulations and appropriately amending them to keep up with the dynamic nature of the securities’ market. SEBI has issued a number of regulations on various areas of security regulation which form the backbone of the framework governing the securities market in India.
Section 11 of the SEBI Act lays down the functions of SEBI and expressly states that it “shall be the duty of the Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market, by such measures as it thinks fit”. Further, Section 30 of the SEBI Act empowers SEBI to make regulations consistent with the Act. Significantly, while framing these regulations, SEBI consults its advisory committees consisting of domain experts, including market experts, leading market players, legal experts, technology experts, retired Judges of this Court or the High Courts, academicians, representatives of industry associations and investor associations. During the consultative process, SEBI also invites and duly considers comments from the public on their proposed regulations. SEBI follows similar consultative processes while reviewing and amending its regulations.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Vishal Tiwari v. Union of India, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 171)

For a principle to be acceptable as a law, Lon Fuller states that it must be measured in terms of the following eight standards: (1) The principle must be expounded in a manner so that it can be generally applied. A pattern less ad hoc system of law lacks the desired “internal morality” which legal principles should possess. This proposition is comparable to the often-read statement that our government is a government of laws rather than men. (2) The mandates of the law must be communicated to the people to whom they are directed. (3) Newly announced principles of law, except on rare occasions, should be applied only in a prospective manner. Retroactive application of changes in prescribed norms, subject to the presence of compelling extenuating circumstances, should be avoided. (4) Standards of action and inaction should be clearly stated. Fuller concedes that the lawmaker cannot specify with absolute clarity exactly what is demanded of each individual in every instance when the law may affect him. He does, however, assert that the duty to clarify the law should be delegated to the enforcement bodies only to the extent that such action is required by the environment in which the law must operate. (5) Arguing that respect for the law calls for consistency, Fuller maintains that the originators of laws should take great pains to see that the body of law is as free as possible from contradictory mandates, (6) Emphasizing that law is tied to the capabilities of human beings, Fuller insists that those who prescribe the norms required of individuals must refrain from imposing impossible standards of action or inaction. A stated norm which demands an absurd course of action would violate Fuller’s idea of the “internal morality of law.” (7) While stare decisis, of recent date, has been viewed by some, if not many people, as a barrier on the pathways to needed change, Fuller is of the opinion that abiding by previously announced norms is desirable in and of itself. He finds that frequency of change, by its very nature, tends to have a deleterious impact upon the persons who are subjected to an abrupt alteration of the requirements which the law imposes upon them. (8) The student of American history is familiar with Andrew Jackson’s assertion to the effect that while the Supreme Court might render a judgment, it lacked the means by which it might be implemented.
[Extracted from Tucker, Edwin W. (1965) “The Morality of Law, by Lon L. Fuller,” Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 40: Iss. 2, Article5.]

The landmark judgment of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa & Others, delivered by the Supreme Court of India in 1978, significantly influenced the interpretation of the term ‘industry’ under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case cantered on whether the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, a statutory body, could be classified as an industry under the Act, thereby making its employees eligible for certain protections and benefits. Prior to this case, the definition of ‘industry’ had been subject to varied interpretations, leading to confusion and inconsistency in its application. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, broadly defined ‘industry’ to include any business, trade, undertaking, manufacture, or calling of employers and any calling, service, employment, handicraft, or industrial occupation or avocation of workmen. However, this expansive definition left room for ambiguity, especially concerning statutory bodies and non-profit organizations. In this case, the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board argued that it was not an industry, emphasizing its statutory duties and public welfare objectives. The Board contended that its primary purpose was to provide essential services, not to engage in profit-making activities typical of private enterprises. On the other hand, the respondents, including A. Rajappa, argued that the Board’s activities fell within the scope of an industry as defined by the Act, and thus, its employees should be entitled to the benefits and protections accorded to workers in industries. The Supreme Court, in its judgment, undertook a comprehensive analysis of the term ‘industry.’ The bench, led by Chief Justice M. Hameedullah Beg, laid down a broad and inclusive definition of ‘industry.’ The Court asserted that what mattered was the nature of the activity and the relationship between the employer and the employees. This interpretation aimed to ensure that a wide range of workers, including those employed in public utility services, statutory bodies, and even some non-profit organizations, would be covered under the protective umbrella of the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision in Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others had far-reaching implications. It extended the scope of labour protections to a broader spectrum of workers, ensuring that more employees could benefit from the dispute resolution mechanisms and other safeguards provided under the Industrial Disputes Act. This judgment underscored the judiciary’s role in interpreting labour laws to promote social justice and protect workers’ rights in a rapidly industrializing nation.
(Extract from Bangalore Water Supply v. A. Rajappa & Others, 1978 2 SCC)

Dominic Ongwen, a former commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, was convicted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in February 2021. The case marked a significant milestone in international criminal law, focusing on issues of child soldiering, forced marriage, and sexual and gender-based violence. Ongwen was found guilty of 61 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, enslavement, forced marriage, rape, and conscription of children under the age of 15 into armed groups. The ICC’s judgment emphasized the importance of accountability for leaders who exploit children in conflicts and commit sexual and gender-based crimes.
A critical aspect of the judgment was the consideration of Ongwen’s own history as a child soldier. Ongwen was abducted by the LRA at around the age of nine and was forced to commit atrocities as he rose through the ranks. The court balanced this background against the gravity of his crimes, ultimately ruling that his personal history did not absolve him of responsibility for his actions as an adult commander. The judgment is also notable for its comprehensive approach to reparations for victims. The ICC ordered collective reparations, including symbolic measures like memorials, physical and psychological rehabilitation, and financial compensation to support the victims and their communities. This case reinforces the ICC’s commitment to addressing serious international crimes, particularly those involving vulnerable populations such as children and women and underscores the principles of justice and reparation in international criminal law.
(This extract is taken from Prosecutor v. Dominic Ongwen (ICC, 2021))

In which of the following cases did the Supreme Court of India hold that the rule of nemo judex in causa sua is subject to the doctrine of necessity?

According to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, what is the fixed amount of compensation payable in the event of death caused by a motor vehicle accident under no-fault liability?

The grounds for decree for dissolution of marriage under Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 are:
I. whereabouts of the husband have not been known for two years.
II. husband has been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of five years.
III. husband has failed to perform marital obligations for two years without reasonable cause.
IV. husband has neglected or failed to maintain his wife for one year.
Select the correct answer.

What is the meaning of the legal term ``Res ipsa loquitur''?

A mortgaged his property to B for Rupees 50 lakhs. Later, A sold the same property to C for Rupees 60 lakhs and allowed C to retain Rupees 50 lakhs to redeem the mortgage. B then sued C for recovery of the mortgage amount. What is the correct legal position?

A was heading towards his office and while he was parking his car in the parking lot, A mistakenly hit another car which was already parked. Even after taking all necessary precautions, the accident occurred. Which concept of law covers this incident?

Statement: Environmental Law is prescribed by the Bar Council of India for the LLB course. (a) The Bar Council of India mandates the Environmental Law subject for study.
(b) Environmental study is necessary for law students.
(c) The Bar Council of India has the right to consider any subject mandatory.
(d) Environmental Law is not necessary for law students.
Which statement/statements is/are correct?

Statement 1: Under the Indian Penal Code, if a person harbours an offender who has escaped custody for an offence punishable with imprisonment up to 3 years, he shall be punished with imprisonment up to 7 years.
Statement 2: The law provides an exception for harbouring or concealing by the husband or wife of the offender.

The Trade Union cannot spend its common fund on:

A Statement is followed by two Conclusions, I and II.
Statement: According to the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, the Government credits ₹15,000 to the Rehabilitation Fund for each child or adolescent for whom fine has been recovered from the employer. This amount may be deposited or invested, and the interest is also payable to the child or adolescent.
Conclusions:
I. The child or adolescent is entitled not only to the credited amount but also to the interest accrued on it.
II. The Government is not required to deposit any money other than what is collected as fines from the employer.
Which one is correct?

Consider the following statements about Article 32 of the Constitution and select the correct answer:
I. The Article is silent about the locus standi regarding who may approach the Court.
II. The Article is silent about the opposite party against whom relief may be granted.
III. The Article creates scope for even a sixth type of writ.

If a bailiff executes an eviction based on a civil court order later declared void for lack of jurisdiction, what protection does Section 78 of the Indian Penal Code provide?

Under Section 290(1) of Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, within how many days from the date of framing of charge can an accused file an application for plea bargaining?

What is a dying declaration?

As per Section 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, if a Magistrate sentenced a person to two years’ imprisonment and a fine, what is the maximum imprisonment he may impose in default of payment of the fine?