Step 1: Understanding the Concept:
This is an inference question based on the Spinozan hypothesis. We need to apply the principles of the hypothesis to a specific scenario: a person with limited mental energy.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The Spinozan hypothesis posits the following process:
1. Comprehension and Belief: This is the default, automatic, and passive process. It requires no effort.
2. Disbelief (Rejection): This is a secondary process that requires "effortful, deliberate assessment."
The scenario describes a person who is "too distracted or tired to exert much mental effort." This person has limited cognitive resources.
- Since comprehension is automatic and effortless, their tiredness should not affect their ability to understand the proposition (ruling out A and B).
- The crucial part is that they lack the mental effort required for the second step: assessment and potential disbelief.
- Because they cannot perform the effortful task of disbelief, they will remain in the default state, which is belief.
- Therefore, a tired or distracted person is more likely to simply accept propositions as true because they don't have the energy to question or reject them. This is especially true for "suspicious propositions" which an alert person would likely assess and reject.
Let's check the options:
(C) more likely to be uncertain and uncommitted: This describes the Cartesian intermediate state, not the Spinozan model. In the Spinozan model, the default is belief, not uncertainty.
(D) more likely to believe them than when he is alert and mentally fresh: This is correct. An alert person can exert the effort to disbelieve a suspicious proposition, while a tired person cannot and will be stuck with the initial, automatic belief.
(E) more likely to disbelieve them: This is the opposite of what the hypothesis implies, as disbelief requires effort which the person lacks.
Step 3: Final Answer:
A person with limited mental energy is less capable of the effortful process of disbelief, making them more likely to stick with the automatic initial belief.