Step 1: Reference to Lalita Kumari guidelines.
In Lalita Kumari v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014), the Supreme Court listed situations where preliminary inquiry is permissible before registering an FIR. These include matrimonial disputes, corruption allegations, and cases with abnormal delay in reporting.
Step 2: Option-wise analysis.
(A) Correct — matrimonial disputes often require preliminary verification.
(B) Correct — corruption allegations also fall in permissible preliminary inquiry category.
(C) Correct — substantial delay in complaint justifies limited preliminary inquiry.
Step 3: Conclusion.
All three match the Court’s permissible categories ⇒ \(\boxed{\text{(D)}}\).
Step 1: Legal principle on FIR validity.
The Court clarified that the essential element of an FIR is that it must ex facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. A cryptic or incomplete message does not fulfill this requirement.
Step 2: Eliminating other options.
(B) Incorrect — non-reading-over is not the principle reiterated in this case.
(C) Incorrect — FIRs are not substantive evidence except for limited purposes.
(D) Incorrect — FIRs are not inherently hearsay; they have evidentiary value under certain provisions.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Only (A) matches the principle reiterated ⇒ \(\boxed{\text{(A)}}\).
Step 1: FIR registration requirement.
As per Lalita Kumari, once information discloses a cognizable offence, FIR must be registered forthwith. Recording it in a Station House Diary without FIR registration is improper.
Step 2: Legal consequence.
If the first recorded version is in the Station House Diary, it is treated as the FIR. Any subsequent formal FIR becomes a statement during investigation under Section 161 CrPC.
Step 3: Conclusion.
This is exactly what option (C) states ⇒ \(\boxed{\text{(C)}}\).
Step 1: Self-incriminatory FIR.
Section 25 of the Evidence Act bars the use of confessions made to a police officer as proof against the accused. An FIR lodged by the accused containing a confession is covered by this bar.
Step 2: Why Article 20(3) not applicable here.
Article 20(3) protects against compelled self-incrimination. Here, the statement was voluntary; the bar arises from Section 25, not constitutional compulsion.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Thus, the FIR cannot be used to prove the confession ⇒ \(\boxed{\text{(B)}}\).
Step 1: Meaning of ex facie.
The term means “on the face of it” — something apparent without detailed investigation or inference. |
Step 2: Matching with the legal context.
In legal terms, ex facie refers to what is immediately obvious from a document or act upon straightforward reading, without the need for deeper analysis.
Step 3: Option elimination.
(A) Incorrect — while close, “stated terms” may still require interpretation.
(B) Correct — “simple perusal” captures the immediate-obviousness aspect.
(C) Incorrect — this involves inference, contrary to ex facie meaning.
(D) Incorrect — unrelated to burden of proof considerations.
Step 4: Conclusion.
Thus, \(\boxed{\text{(B)}}\) is correct.
Step 1: Court’s directive in Lalita Kumari.
The Court set a strict timeline — preliminary inquiries, where permissible, must be completed within seven days to avoid undue delay in FIR registration.
Step 2: Eliminate wrong options.
(A) Incorrect — 15 days was not prescribed in the judgment.
(C) Incorrect — Court did specify a limit (seven days).
(D) Incorrect — Magistrate’s permission is not the standard for inquiry duration.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Therefore, \(\boxed{\text{(B)}}\) is correct.
Step 1: Principle on mixed information.
When the facts disclosed include at least one cognizable offence, the entire set of facts is treated as cognizable for FIR purposes — splitting them is not required at the registration stage.
Step 2: Eliminate wrong options.
(B) Incorrect — severance is not done at registration stage.
(C) Incorrect — referral to Magistrate is for purely non-cognizable cases.
(D) Incorrect — Sections 156 and 157 CrPC govern investigation procedure, not FIR confirmation.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Thus, \(\boxed{\text{(A)}}\) is correct.
Step 1: Section 154 vs Section 157 threshold.
Section 154 mandates FIR registration when information discloses a cognizable offence. Section 157, however, deals with launching an investigation and uses “reason to suspect” — a slightly higher threshold requiring some preliminary satisfaction of suspicion.
Step 2: Court’s interpretation in Lalita Kumari.
The Court recognised this difference, holding that while FIR registration is mandatory upon disclosure, investigation requires the officer to form a reasonable suspicion based on the information.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Option (B) correctly reflects this higher threshold under Section 157 ⇒ \(\boxed{\text{(B)}}\).
Step 1: Principle from Lalita Kumari.
At FIR registration stage, the only test is whether the information ex facie discloses a cognizable offence. The genuineness, credibility, or falsity of the information is irrelevant at this stage. |
Step 2: Implications for police.
(A) True — informant’s version must be accepted at face value for registration purposes.
(B) True — the statement is taken as true at the registration stage.
(C) True — police cannot refuse to register on grounds of suspected falsity.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Since all three are correct, \(\boxed{\text{(D)}}\) is correct.
Having heard the learned Counsels for the parties, and on perusal of the ma terial on record, the primary issue which arises for consideration of this Court is ”whether a review or recall of an order passed in a criminal proceeding initiated under section 340 of CrPC is permissible or not?” [...] A careful consideration of the statutory provisions and the aforesaid decisions of this Court clarify the now-well settled position of jurisprudence of Section 362 of CrPC which when summarized would be that the criminal courts, as envisaged under the CrPC, are barred from altering or reviewing in their own judgments except for the exceptions which are explicitly provided by the statute, namely, correction of a clerical or an arithmetical error that might have been committed or the said power is provided under any other law for the time being in force. As the courts become functus officio the very moment a judgment or an order is signed, the bar of Section 362 CrPC becomes applicable. Despite the powers provided under Section 482 CrPC which, this veil cannot allow the courts to step beyond or circumvent an explicit bar. It also stands clarified that it is only in situations wherein an application for recall of an order or judgment seeking a procedural review that the bar would not apply and not a substantive review where the bar as contained in Section 362 CrPC is attracted. Numerous decisions of this Court have also elaborated that the bar under said provision is to be applied stricto sensu.
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Vikram Bakshi v. RP Khosla 2025 INSC 1020)
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473