Comprehension
In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the Court analysed the ambit of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and also the scope of the expression “arrest” contained therein and under the relevant provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Arrest may be classified into two categories, namely, arrest under a warrant issued by a court and arrest without warrant. Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly directs that the investigation should be completed in the first instance within 24 hours; if not, the arrested person should be brought before a Magistrate as provided under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Turning now to Article 22(1) and (2), we must ascertain whether its protection extends to both categories of arrests mentioned above, and, if not, then which one of them comes within its protection. There can be no doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than arrests under such warrants. The provision that the arrested person should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him.
In the case of arrest under a warrant issued by a court, the judicial mind had already been applied to the case when the warrant was issued and, therefore, there is less reason for making such production in that case a matter of a substantive fundamental right. The matter of “House Arrest” was deliberated by the Court as:
Turning now to Article 22(1) and (2), we must ascertain whether its protection extends to both categories of arrests mentioned above, and, if not, then which one of them comes within its protection. There can be no doubt that arrests without warrants issued by a court call for greater protection than arrests under such warrants. The provision that the arrested person should within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate is particularly desirable in the case of arrest otherwise than under a warrant issued by the court, for it ensures the immediate application of a judicial mind to the legal authority of the person making the arrest and the regularity of the procedure adopted by him.
In the case of arrest under a warrant issued by a court, the judicial mind had already been applied to the case when the warrant was issued and, therefore, there is less reason for making such production in that case a matter of a substantive fundamental right. The matter of “House Arrest” was deliberated by the Court as:
“There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a court cannot remand a person unless the court is authorised to do so by law. We are of the view that, in the facts of this case, the house arrest was not ordered purporting to be under Section 167. We observe that under Section 167 in appropriate cases it will be open to courts to order house arrest.”
Question: 1
Consider the following statements:
(I) The application of judicial mind is not necessary to issue a warrant by the court.
(II) The constitutional notion demands the application of judicial mind immediately after the arrest of person without a warrant.
Choose the correct answer from the code given below.
Consider the following statements:
(I) The application of judicial mind is not necessary to issue a warrant by the court.
(II) The constitutional notion demands the application of judicial mind immediately after the arrest of person without a warrant.
Choose the correct answer from the code given below.
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Judicial oversight is crucial both before issuing warrants and immediately after warrantless arrests to safeguard personal liberty.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Both (I) and (II) are true.
- Both (I) and (II) are untrue.
- (I) is true and (II) is untrue.
- (II) is true and (I) is untrue.
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The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Judicial mind in issuing warrants.
Issuing a warrant is a judicial act — it necessarily requires the application of judicial mind to the facts and circumstances before depriving a person of liberty. Thus, statement (I) is incorrect.
Step 2: Judicial mind after arrest without warrant.
As per Gautam Navlakha v. NIA, when arrest occurs without a warrant, Article 22(2) of the Constitution requires the arrested person to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours. This ensures immediate application of judicial mind to validate the arrest. Hence, statement (II) is correct.
Step 3: Conclusion.
The correct combination is that (II) is true and (I) is untrue. \[ \boxed{\text{D}} \]
Issuing a warrant is a judicial act — it necessarily requires the application of judicial mind to the facts and circumstances before depriving a person of liberty. Thus, statement (I) is incorrect.
Step 2: Judicial mind after arrest without warrant.
As per Gautam Navlakha v. NIA, when arrest occurs without a warrant, Article 22(2) of the Constitution requires the arrested person to be produced before the nearest Magistrate within 24 hours. This ensures immediate application of judicial mind to validate the arrest. Hence, statement (II) is correct.
Step 3: Conclusion.
The correct combination is that (II) is true and (I) is untrue. \[ \boxed{\text{D}} \]
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Question: 2
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies to arrest __________.
Section 57 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 applies to arrest __________.
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Section 57 CrPC is a safeguard against unlawful detention after warrantless arrests by ensuring prompt production before a Magistrate.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- With
- Without
- With or without
- On execution of
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Understanding Section 57 CrPC.
Section 57 mandates that a person arrested without a warrant shall not be detained for more than 24 hours without being produced before a Magistrate.
Step 2: Reason for restriction.
This provision ensures quick judicial scrutiny of warrantless arrests, which inherently lack prior judicial approval.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Thus, Section 57 applies specifically to arrests without a warrant.
\[ \boxed{\text{B}} \]
Section 57 mandates that a person arrested without a warrant shall not be detained for more than 24 hours without being produced before a Magistrate.
Step 2: Reason for restriction.
This provision ensures quick judicial scrutiny of warrantless arrests, which inherently lack prior judicial approval.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Thus, Section 57 applies specifically to arrests without a warrant.
\[ \boxed{\text{B}} \]
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Question: 3
The fundamental right under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India regarding the duty of police to produce arrested person before the nearest Magistrate applies to:
The fundamental right under Article 22(2) of the Constitution of India regarding the duty of police to produce arrested person before the nearest Magistrate applies to:
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Article 22(2) is designed to check police power in warrantless arrests, ensuring early judicial review of detention.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Detenu who at the time of arrest is an enemy alien.
- Arrest under any law providing for preventive detention.
- Arrest under Section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- Arrest in execution of warrant issued by the court.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Scope of Article 22(2).
Article 22(2) requires that a person arrested without a warrant be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours. Section 41 CrPC empowers police to arrest without a warrant in certain cases.
Step 2: Exclusions.
Enemy aliens (A) and preventive detention (B) are governed by special rules under Article 22(3). Arrests in execution of warrants (D) already have judicial mind applied before arrest, so Article 22(2)’s safeguard is less relevant.
Step 3: Conclusion.
The requirement under Article 22(2) applies to arrests under Section 41 CrPC. \[ \boxed{\text{C}} \]
Article 22(2) requires that a person arrested without a warrant be produced before a Magistrate within 24 hours. Section 41 CrPC empowers police to arrest without a warrant in certain cases.
Step 2: Exclusions.
Enemy aliens (A) and preventive detention (B) are governed by special rules under Article 22(3). Arrests in execution of warrants (D) already have judicial mind applied before arrest, so Article 22(2)’s safeguard is less relevant.
Step 3: Conclusion.
The requirement under Article 22(2) applies to arrests under Section 41 CrPC. \[ \boxed{\text{C}} \]
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Question: 4
Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 empowers a Judicial Magistrate to authorise the detention of an accused in:
Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 empowers a Judicial Magistrate to authorise the detention of an accused in:
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Section 167 CrPC is a procedural safeguard ensuring judicial oversight over extended detention during investigation.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Police Custody.
- Judicial Custody.
- Both Police Custody and Judicial Custody.
- Other than Police and Judicial Custody.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Understanding Section 167 CrPC.
Section 167 CrPC deals with situations where investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. It empowers the Magistrate to authorise detention beyond the initial period.
Step 2: Types of custody.
The law recognises two types of custody during investigation — Police Custody (detention in the custody of the investigating agency) and Judicial Custody (detention in jail under the orders of the court).
Step 3: Magistrate’s power.
A Judicial Magistrate may authorise either police custody or judicial custody, subject to statutory time limits under Section 167(2).
Step 4: Conclusion.
Thus, the Magistrate is empowered to authorise both types of custody.
\[ \boxed{\text{C}} \]
Section 167 CrPC deals with situations where investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours. It empowers the Magistrate to authorise detention beyond the initial period.
Step 2: Types of custody.
The law recognises two types of custody during investigation — Police Custody (detention in the custody of the investigating agency) and Judicial Custody (detention in jail under the orders of the court).
Step 3: Magistrate’s power.
A Judicial Magistrate may authorise either police custody or judicial custody, subject to statutory time limits under Section 167(2).
Step 4: Conclusion.
Thus, the Magistrate is empowered to authorise both types of custody.
\[ \boxed{\text{C}} \]
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Question: 5
In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court did not consider the period of house arrest in calculating the period of custody for the purpose of filing the application for default bail because:
In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court did not consider the period of house arrest in calculating the period of custody for the purpose of filing the application for default bail because:
Show Hint
Only custody authorised under Section 167 CrPC counts towards the statutory period for default bail.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- The order of house arrest was not purported to be under Section 167 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- The court is not authorized to order house arrest under Section 167 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- The order of house arrest was illegal.
- The term ‘house arrest’ was not given anywhere under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
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The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Context from case law.
In Gautam Navlakha, the Supreme Court examined whether house arrest time could be counted towards custody under Section 167 CrPC for default bail calculation.
Step 2: Reasoning of the Court.
The Court noted that the house arrest in this case had not been ordered under Section 167 CrPC. Since Section 167 governs authorised detention during investigation, custody under its ambit is required to count towards default bail.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Because the house arrest order was not under Section 167, that period was excluded from custody calculation. \[ \boxed{\text{A}} \]
In Gautam Navlakha, the Supreme Court examined whether house arrest time could be counted towards custody under Section 167 CrPC for default bail calculation.
Step 2: Reasoning of the Court.
The Court noted that the house arrest in this case had not been ordered under Section 167 CrPC. Since Section 167 governs authorised detention during investigation, custody under its ambit is required to count towards default bail.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Because the house arrest order was not under Section 167, that period was excluded from custody calculation. \[ \boxed{\text{A}} \]
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Question: 6
In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court has established that the order of the court to direct house arrest of the arrested person shall be:
In Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 382, the court has established that the order of the court to direct house arrest of the arrested person shall be:
Show Hint
House arrest can qualify as “custody” under Section 167 CrPC if judicially authorised and procedurally valid.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Unconstitutional.
- Within the competence of the court under Section 167 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- Beyond the competence of the court under Section 167 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
- Discretionary.
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Legal position clarified by the Court.
The Supreme Court in Gautam Navlakha held that in appropriate cases, courts may order house arrest under Section 167 CrPC.
Step 2: Rationale.
The Court interpreted the term “custody” in Section 167 broadly to include house arrest, provided it meets the conditions of detention and judicial authorisation.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Thus, such an order is within the competence of the court under Section 167 CrPC. \[ \boxed{\text{B}} \]
The Supreme Court in Gautam Navlakha held that in appropriate cases, courts may order house arrest under Section 167 CrPC.
Step 2: Rationale.
The Court interpreted the term “custody” in Section 167 broadly to include house arrest, provided it meets the conditions of detention and judicial authorisation.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Thus, such an order is within the competence of the court under Section 167 CrPC. \[ \boxed{\text{B}} \]
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