Step 1: Recall the post–44th Amendment text of Article 352.
The Forty-fourth Amendment Act, 1978 replaced “internal disturbance” with “armed rebellion”. Hence, after 1978, the three grounds are: war, external aggression, or armed rebellion.
Step 2: Eliminate options using the current text.
(A) includes “internal disturbance” ⇒ incorrect post-44th.
(B) introduces “financial instability” (not a ground) ⇒ incorrect.
(C) exactly matches the amended Article 352 ⇒ correct.
(D) mixes “armed rebellion” with the obsolete “internal disturbance” ⇒ incorrect.
Step 3: Conclude.
Therefore, \(\boxed{\text{(C)}}\) is the only option aligned with Article 352 as amended.
Step 1: What changed in 1978?
The 44th Amendment added a safeguard: the President can issue a Proclamation of Emergency only on the basis of the written advice of the Cabinet (i.e., Council of Ministers with the Prime Minister at the head, of Cabinet rank). The requirement is about who advises and that it be in writing.
Step 2: Test each option.
(A) Only the Prime Minister ⇒ fails the Cabinet-in-writing requirement ⇒ wrong.
(B) Prior approval by both Houses is not a pre-condition to issuance (Parliamentary approval comes after issuance within the prescribed period) ⇒ wrong.
(C) Mirrors the Amendment’s safeguard — Cabinet decision & written communication to the President ⇒ correct.
(D) Approval by half the State Legislatures relates to constitutional amendments under Article 368, not emergency proclamations ⇒ wrong. Step 3: Conclusion.
The only option that reflects the 44th Amendment safeguard is \(\boxed{\text{(C)}}\).
Step 1: Understanding “internal disturbance.”
The Commission used “internal disturbance” in a broad, factual sense (short of external aggression), covering serious breakdowns of public order/peace and similar disorders that may require Union assistance under Article 355.
Step 2: Option-wise analysis.
(A) Financial exigency is a separate constitutional concept (e.g., Article 360 — Financial Emergency) and not cited as an instance of “internal disturbance” in this context ⇒ incorrect.
(B) Breaches of public peace fall squarely within internal disturbance/public order problems ⇒ correct.
(C) Inefficient administration (mere maladministration) does not, by itself, equal internal disturbance ⇒ incorrect.
(D) Since (B) is correct, “None of the above” is incorrect.
Step 3: Final selection.
Therefore, \(\boxed{\text{(B)}}\) best matches the Sarkaria Commission’s illustrations.
Step 1: Scope of “external aggression” in Article 355.
In Sarbananda Sonowal, the Court interpreted “external aggression” broadly to include non-military threats if they undermine the security and integrity of the nation — such as large-scale illegal immigration from another country.
Step 2: Applying to options.
(A) Matches the judgment — illegal migrants from other countries can amount to external aggression ⇒ correct.
(B) Migration from within India is an internal movement of citizens and not “external aggression” ⇒ incorrect.
(C) Restricts “external aggression” only to war-like military acts — the judgment broadened beyond that ⇒ incorrect.
(D) Incorrect because (A) is correct.
Step 3: Conclusion.
\(\boxed{\text{(A)}}\) reflects the Supreme Court’s expanded interpretation.
Step 1: Definition in Section 5.
A “public emergency” under Section 5 means a grave emergency threatening the security of India or part thereof, whether by war, external aggression or internal disturbance. The threat must be to security, not just economic well-being.
Step 2: Court’s findings in GMS.
The Court held that economic slowdown — even if severe — does not meet the security threat standard in the definition. The pandemic did not amount to war, external aggression, or internal disturbance threatening security. Hence: (i) Incorrect — slowdown alone is not “public emergency”.
(ii) Incorrect — it was not similar to national emergency situations.
(iii) Incorrect — economic slowdown is not “internal disturbance” under Section 5.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Since all three statements are incorrect, \(\boxed{\text{(D)}}\) is the correct choice.
Step 1: Distinguishing “law and order” from “public order.”
The Court held that “law and order” is a broader term, but “public order” focuses on the disturbance’s impact on the community. The nature of the act alone is insufficient; the effect on public tranquillity and the even tempo of life is crucial.
Step 2: Applying to the given options.
(A) Correct — nature of act alone is not decisive; context matters.
(B) Correct — disturbance of public tranquillity is a key factor.
(C) Correct — whether the community’s normal life continues undisturbed is part of the test.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Since all three are correct, \(\boxed{\text{(D)}}\) is the answer.
The Supreme Court has indicated that matters that affect public order are to be determined:
i. By looking at the nature of the act, how violent it is irrespective of its context.
ii. The degree and effect any action has on the life of the community.
iii. By consideration of factors related to the maintenance of law and order.
Step 1: Understanding the “public order” test.
The Court considers multiple factors: the nature of the act (how violent or disruptive), the degree of effect on the community, and relation to maintenance of law and order.
Step 2: Option-wise analysis.
(i) Correct — violence level is relevant even before considering broader context.
(ii) Correct — assessing the degree/effect on community life is essential.
(iii) Correct — factors tied to law and order maintenance are part of the evaluation.
Step 3: Conclusion.
All statements are valid tests, so \(\boxed{\text{(D)}}\) is correct.
Step 1: Court’s ruling in GMS.
The Court found that Section 5’s emergency exemption could not be invoked without meeting the “public emergency” threshold. The CoVID-19 economic slowdown was insufficient to trigger such emergency powers.
Step 2: Applying to statements.
(i) Incorrect — the pandemic was not considered a “grave emergency” under Section 5.
(ii) Correct — issuing the exemption without satisfying statutory conditions violated the rule of law.
(iii) Correct — denying overtime pay for extended hours breached the principle of just and humane working conditions under labour laws and constitutional directives.
Step 3: Conclusion.
Only (ii) and (iii) are correct ⇒ \(\boxed{\text{(C)}}\).
Step 1: Purpose of double wage rate for overtime.
The overtime provision is both a compensatory and a protective measure. It recognises that extended work hours impose additional strain, which requires fair monetary compensation (i).
Step 2: Health and stamina aspect.
Continuous long hours can degrade workers’ health; the provision helps them maintain proper health and stamina by discouraging excessive overtime unless fairly rewarded (ii).
Step 3: Anti-exploitation safeguard.
By mandating double wages, the law deters employers from overusing labour purely for cost-saving purposes, thus protecting workers from exploitation (iii).
Step 4: Conclusion.
All three rationales are correct ⇒ \(\boxed{\text{(A)}}\).
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473