List of top Legal Studies Questions

Apply the given legal principles to the facts provided in the following of the question and select the most appropriate answer.
Principle : Whoever, intending to dishonestly take any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person’s consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft.
Facts : R owns an antique watch but is unsure of its value. She took it to a jeweller Y for a free valuation that was offered by Y. Y took the watch home instead of valuing it and does not provide any explanation. R enters Y’s home, pushes Y to one side, and retrieves her watch by force. Has R committed theft ?

Apply the given legal principles to the facts provided in the following of the question and select the most appropriate answer.
Principle : Whoever, takes any movable property out of the possession of any person without that person’s consent, moves that property in order to such taking, is said to commit theft.
Facts : W visits her friend B’s house for a party. She noticed that B possessed a rare gold ornament. Fearing search and detection if she took the ornament, W hid it in an air duct in the ceiling, where it was unlikely to be discovered by B. W intended on returning to B’s house at a future date to take the ornament. Has W committed theft ?

Apply the given legal principles to the facts provided in the following of the question and select the most appropriate answer.
Principle : No confession made to a Police Officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of any offence.
Facts : Ritu was accused of having murdered Akash over a property dispute. After arrest, Ritu made a confession to the Inspector that she had in fact murdered Akash. The confessional statement of Ritu was written on a paper and Ritu signed the same. The police carried on further investigation but were not able to find any other evidence to produce before the court. Can the confessional statement signed by Ritu be proved in court ?

Apply the given legal principles to the facts provided in the following of the question and select the most appropriate answer.
Principle 1 : A misrepresentation arises when a person makes a false statement of fact to another which induces the other party to enter into a contract, resulting in loss to that other party.
Principle 2 : When consent to an agreement is caused by misrepresentation, the agreement is a contract voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.
Facts : It was Kritika’s mother’s 50^th birthday on 9th February 2021. Kritika decided to organise a lavish celebration to celebrate the event. Kritika’s mother used to play the piano before her marriage. However, after Kritika was born, she was unable to take out any time to pursue her interest in playing the instrument. Kritika learnt about this from her maternal grandmother a few days before her mother’s birthday. She decided to give her mother a piano on her 50^th birthday.
She visited Himanshu’s piano store for this purpose. Himanshu showed Kritika all the pianos available at his store and explained the features of each model. Kritika had no prior knowledge of pianos and hence relied upon Himanshu’s opinion. She saw a vintage piano and was immediately drawn to it. Being a shrewd businessman, Himanshu saw an opportunity to sell the piano and said “They don’t make them like this anymore. It’s got a fine tone and it’s really cheap at ` 50,000”.
Kritika purchased the piano and gifted the same to her mother. However, when her mother started playing it, she immediately realized that the piano was of an inferior quality and that the tone was not proper. Kritika and her mother approached Himanshu and asked him to either replace the piano or refund the money. Himanshu refused to do either. What would be the strongest argument that Himanshu could make ?

Humans as well as the wildlife are completely dependent upon environment for their survival. Humans are completely dependent on the environment. Like humans, the wildlife is also dependent on the environment for its survival and also gets affected by the environment. The relationship between humans and animals can be understood by the food-chain and food-web. The wildlife is affected by several reasons such as population, deforestation, urbanisation, high number of industries, chemical effluents, unplanned land-use policies, and reckless use of natural resources, etc.
The Directive Principles of State Policy provide that protection and improvement of environment, safeguarding forest and wildlife have been duly enjoined upon the Government. Those principles have found statutory expression in various enactments i.e., the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 and the Environment Protection Act, 1986 etc. which have been enforced by the court in various decisions. The inaction of the State to constitutional and statutory duties cannot be permitted. The Court has to issue appropriate directions to fulfil the mandate. Article 51-A of the Constitution of India provides fundamental duty to protect and preserve environment, wildlife, etc.

It is a cardinal principle of the law of contract that acceptance of an offer must be absolute and it can give no room for doubt. The offer and acceptance must be founded on three components, viz., ‘certainty’, ‘commitment’ and ‘communication’. However, when the acceptor puts any new condition while accepting the proposal already signed by the proposer, the contract is not complete until the proposer accepts that condition, as held by the Court in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui,[(1973) 3 SCC 889]. An acceptance with a variation is no acceptance. It is, in effect and substance, simply a counter-proposal which must be accepted fully by the original proposer, before a contract is made.

There is a difference between grant of bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in case of pre-trial arrest and suspension of sentence under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and grant of bail, post-conviction. In the earlier case, there may be presumption of innocence, which is a fundamental postulate of criminal jurisprudence, and the courts may be liberal, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, on the principle that bail is the rule and jail is an exception, as held by the Court in Dataram Singh v. State of UP, [(2018) 3 SCC 22]. However, in case of post-conviction bail, by suspension of operation of the sentence, there is a finding of guilt and the question of presumption of innocence does not arise. Nor is the principle of bail being the rule and jail an exception attracted, once there is conviction upon trial. Rather, the court considering an application for suspension of sentence and grant of bail, is to consider the prima facie merits of the appeal, coupled with other factors. There should be strong compelling reasons for grant of bail, notwithstanding an order of conviction, by suspension of sentence, and this strong and compelling reason must be recorded in the order granting bail, as mandated in Section 389(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Supreme Court has observed that in international human rights law, equality is founded upon two complementary principles: non-discrimination and reasonable differentiation. The principle of non-discrimination seeks to ensure that all persons can equally enjoy and exercise all their rights and freedoms. Discrimination occurs due to arbitrary denial of opportunities for equal participation. Equality not only implies preventing discrimination (example, the protection of individuals against unfavourable treatment by introducing anti-discrimination laws), but goes beyond in remedying discrimination against groups suffering systematic discrimination in society. In concrete terms, it means embracing the notion of positive rights, affirmative action and reasonable accommodation. The move from the patronising and paternalistic approach to persons with disabilities represented by the medical model to viewing them as members of the community with equal rights has also been reflected in the evolution of international standards relating specifically to disabilities, as well as in moves to place the rights of persons with disabilities within the category of universal human rights. Disabled people no longer see their physical or mental limitations as a source of shame or as something to overcome in order to inspire others. What non-disabled people do not understand is that people with disabilities also have some rights, hopes and aspirations as everyone else. They do not want to depend on others. For this they want the proper environment to grow. It is the thinking of Disability Rights Movement, USA that it is not so much the disabled individual who needs to change, but the society

The Supreme Court judgment in B. Singh v. Union of India, [(2004) 3 SCC 363] held, when there is material to show that a petition styled as a public interest litigation is nothing but a camouflage to foster personal disputes, the said petition is to be thrown out. Public interest litigation (PIL) which has now come to occupy an important field in the administration of law should not be ‘publicity interest litigation’ or ‘private interest litigation’ or ‘politics interest litigation’ or the latest trend ‘paise income litigation’. If not properly regulated and abuse averted, it may become a tool in unscrupulous hands to release vendetta and wreak vengeance, as well. There must be real and genuine public interest involved in the litigation and not merely an adventure of a knight errant borne out of wishful thinking. It cannot be invoked by a person or a body of persons to further his or their personal causes or satisfy his or their personal grudge and enmity. A person acting bona fide and having sufficient interest in the proceeding of public interest litigation will alone have a locus standi and can approach the court to wipe out violation of fundamental rights and genuine infraction of statutory provisions, but not for personal gain or private profit or political motive or any oblique consideration. The expression ‘PIL’ means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or general interest in which the public or a class of the community have pecuniary interest or some interest by which their legal rights or liabilities are affected. Public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of public interest an ugly private malice, vested interest and/or publicity-seeking is not lurking

A question regarding the scope of Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 was considered in Serious Fraud Investigation Office v. Rahul Modi, [2019 SCC OnLine SC 423]. The court observed that the Central Government is empowered under Section 212(1)(c) of the Companies Act, 2013 to order investigation into the affairs of a company in public interest by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO). Section 212(3) of the Companies Act provides that the investigation orders are required to be completed within the specified time. If it not so done, what should be the consequences and whether further proceedings or investigations shall be unlawful. The provision has to be seen in the context in which it occurs in the statute. Therefore, the stipulation of Section 212(3) regarding submission of the report ‘within such period as may be specified in the order’ is not to be taken as mandatory, but as purely directory. On the objective interpretation of the statutory provision, it cannot be said that on the expiry of that period the mandate in favour of SFIO must come to an end. If it was to come to an end, the legislation would have contemplated certain results thereof. In the absence of any clear stipulation, an interpretation that with the expiry of the period, the investigation must come to an end, will cause great violence to the scheme of legislation and with the expiry of mandate SFIO would also be powerless which would lead to an incongruous situation that serious frauds would remain beyond investigation.

It is well settled that while taking a decision regarding custody or other issues pertaining to a child, welfare of the child is of paramount consideration, not rights of the parents under a statute for the time being in force. In Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A. Chakramakkal, [(1973) 1 SCC 840], the Court held that object and purpose of the Guardians and Wards Act 1890 is not merely physical custody of the minor but due protection of the rights of ward’s health, maintenance and education. In considering the question of welfare of minor, due regard has to be given to the right of the father as natural guardian, but if the custody of the father cannot promote the welfare of the children, he may be refused such guardianship. The word “welfare” has to be construed literally and must be taken in its widest sense. The moral and ethical welfare of the child must also weigh with the court as well as its physical well-being. Though the provisions of the special statutes which govern the rights of the parents or guardians may be taken into consideration, there is nothing which can stand in the way of the court exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction arising in such cases. Every child has right to proper health and education and it is the primary duty of the parents to ensure that child gets proper education. The courts in exercise of parens patriae jurisdiction have to decide such delicate questions. It has to consider the welfare of the child as of paramount importance taking into consideration other aspects of the matter including the rights of parents also

Conceptually, extradition is a rather complex jurisprudential zone as it has encompassed within itself various trajectories of apparently conflicting ideas. Generally, a State’s criminal jurisdiction extends over offences committed within its geographical boundaries but it is the common experience of all the countries that often a criminal committing an offence in one country flees to another country and thus seeks to avoid conviction and the consequential punishment. This poses a threat in all civilised countries to a fair adjudication of crime and sustaining the constitutional norms of rule of law. To remedy such anomalous and unjust situation, extradition has been evolved by way of international treaty obligation which ensures a mode of formal surrender of an accused by one country to another based on reciprocal arrangements. In India, extradition has not been defined under the Extradition Act, 1962. However, extradition has been defined as: ‘… the surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offence outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which, being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender.’ But extradition is different from deportation by which competent State authorities order a person to leave a country and prevent him from returning to the same territory. Extradition is also different from exclusion, by which an individual is prohibited from staying in one part of a sovereign State. Both deportation and exclusion basically are nonconsensual exercise whereas extradition is based on a consensual treaty obligation between the requesting State and the requested State.

Torture is a form of crudity and a barbarity which appals modern civilisation. The right to freedom from torture is enshrined in number of human rights instruments which provide for protection of all individuals from being intentionally subjected to severe physical or psychological distress by, or with the approval or acquiescence of government agents acting for a specific purpose, such as to obtain information. The issues of fake encounters; illegal, unjustified and unwarranted arrests without any valid ground; eliciting confession from innocent persons for offences which they have never committed, by way of custodial violence; etc., have always been subject-matters of consideration by the Indian courts. Police atrocities in India had always been a subject-matter of controversy and debate. In view of the provisions of Article 21 of the Constitution of India, any form of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is inhibited. Torture is not permissible whether it occurs during investigation, interrogation or otherwise. The State must protect victims of torture and ill-treatment. Therefore, the State must ensure prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment to any person, particularly at the hands of any State agency/police force. Tolerance of police atrocities amounts to acceptance of systematic subversion and erosion of the rule of law

Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) provides that any Court may, at any stage of any inquiry, trial or other proceedings under the CrPC, summon any person as a witness, or examine any person in attendance, though not summoned as a witness, or recall and re-examine any person already examined and the Court shall summon and examine or recall and re-examine any such person ‘if his evidence appears to it to be essential to the just decision of the case’. The true test, therefore, is whether it appears to the Court that the evidence of such person who is sought to be recalled is essential to the just decision of the case. The scope and object of the provision is to enable the court to determine the truth and to render a just decision after discovering all relevant facts and obtaining proper proof of such facts, to arrive at a just decision of the case. Power must be exercised judiciously and not capriciously or arbitrarily, as any improper or capricious exercise of such power may lead to undesirable results. The power conferred under Section 311 of the CrPC must therefore, be invoked by the court only in order to meet the ends of justice, for strong and valid reasons, and the same must be exercised with great caution and circumspection.

Judges can play a significant role in ridding the justice system of harmful stereotypes. They have an important responsibility to base their decisions on law and facts in evidence, and not engage in gender stereotyping. The Supreme Court of India observed that recently, the Courts across the country, have started imposing irrelevant conditions while granting bail. The conditions that can be imposed under the law are clearly laid down in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and by the Supreme Court through its various decisions. Accordingly, it is clear that imposing conditions like rendering community service in COVID hospitals or in any other institution, plantation of trees, contributing to any particular charity relief fund, etc. is impermissible in law. While deciding a bail application, accused cannot assume the role of a social reformer or fund raiser for charities and imposed with conditions which have no nexus with the offence or relevance with the object of the bail provisions. During pendency of the trial accused is presumed innocent and his guilt is yet to be adjudicated by the Court. Imposing irrelevant conditions is violative of the right to equality and personal liberty, including procedure established by law. Such wide prevalence necessitates the urgent intervention of the court to declare that such remarks are unacceptable and have the potential to cause grave harm to the prosecutrix and the society at large; and to issue directions on gender sensitization of the bar and the bench, particularly with regard to judicial empathy for the prosecutrix…judicial stereotyping is a common and pernicious barrier to justice, particularly for women victims and survivors of violence. Such stereotyping causes judges to reach a view about cases based on preconceived beliefs, rather than relevant facts and actual enquiry. This requires judges to identify gender stereotyping, and identify how the application, enforcement or perpetuation of these stereotypes discriminates against women or denies them equal access to justice.

Courts must be open both in the physical and metaphorical sense. Save and except for in - camera proceedings in an exceptional category of cases, such as cases involving child sexual abuse or matrimonial proceedings bearing on matters of marital privacy, our legal system is founded on the principle that open access to courts is essential to safeguard valuable constitutional freedoms. The concept of an open court requires that information relating to a court proceeding must be available in the public domain. An open court proceeding ensures that the judicial process is subject to public scrutiny. Public scrutiny is crucial to maintaining transparency and accountability. However, there are certain exceptions to the rule of open courts in India. While emphasising the importance of public trial, it cannot be overlooked that the primary function of the judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a cause is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence subject to public gaze, is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully? If the primary function of the court is to do justice in causes brought before it, then on principle, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that there can be no exception to the rule that all causes must be tried in open court. The exceptions must be exercised with great caution and it is only if the court is satisfied beyond a doubt that the ends of justice themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in open court that it can pass an order to hold the trial in camera.

The right to self-determination and bodily integrity has been recognised by the Supreme Court of India. The right to execute an Advance Medical Directive is nothing but a step towards protection of the aforesaid right by an individual, in event he becomes incompetent to take an informed decision, in particular stage of life. It has to be recognised by all including the States that a person has right to execute an Advance Medical Directive to be utilised to know his decision regarding manner and extent of medical treatment given to his body, in case he is incapacitated to take an informed decision. Such right by an individual does not depend on any recognition or legislation by a State and we are of the considered opinion that such rights can be exercised by an individual in recognition and in affirmation of his right of bodily integrity and self-determination which are duly protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. The procedure and manner of such expression of such right is a question which needs to be addressed to protect the vulnerable, infirm and old from any misuse. It is the duty of the State to protect its subjects specially those who are infirm, old and need medical care. The duty of doctor to extend medical care to the patients, who come to them in no manner diminishes in any manner by recognition of concept that an individual is entitled to execute an Advance Medical Directive. The physicians and medical practitioners treating a person, who is incompetent to express an informed decision have to act in a manner so as to give effect to the express wishes of an individual.

The Supreme Court of India has held that it is a cardinal principle of the law of contract that the offer and acceptance of an offer must be absolute. It can give no room for doubt. The offer and acceptance must be based or founded on three components, that is, certainty, commitment and communication. However, when the acceptor puts in a new condition while accepting the contract already signed by the proposer, the contract is not complete until the proposer accepts that condition, as held by the Court in Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui, [AIR 1972 SC 1242]. An acceptance with a variation is no acceptance. It is, in effect and substance, simply a counter proposal which must be accepted fully by the original proposer, before a contract is made.

There is a general presumption that every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved. It is open even if one coparcener has separated, to the non -separating members to remain joint and to enjoy as members of a joint family. The protection of rights of daughters as coparcener is envisaged in the substituted Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 recognises the partition brought about by a decree of a court or effected by a registered instrument. A special definition of partition has been carved out in the Explanation. The intendment of the provisions is not to jeopardise the interest of the daughter and to take care of sham or frivolous transaction set up in defence unjustly to deprive the daughter of her right as coparcener and prevent nullifying the benefit flowing from the provisions as substituted. The intendment of Section 6 of the Act is only to accept the genuine partitions that might have taken place under the prevailing law, and are not set up as a false defence and only oral ipse dixit is to be rejected outrightly. It has to be remembered that the courts cannot defeat the object of the beneficial provisions made by the Amendment Act. The exception is carved out by us as earlier execution of a registered document for partition was not necessary, and the court was rarely approached for the sake of family prestige. The statutory fiction of partition created by the proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 as originally enacted did not bring about the actual partition or disruption of coparcenary. The fiction was only for the purpose of ascertaining share of deceased coparcener when he was survived by a female heir, of Class I as specified in the Schedule to the 1956 Act or male relative of such female. The provisions of the substituted Section 6 are required to be given full effect.

The Supreme Court of India, in Sangitaben Shaileshbhai Datanta v. State of Gujarat, [2018 SCC OnLine SC 2300] was examining a question where a court, after grant of bail to an accused, ordered the accused and their relatives to undergo scientific test viz. lie detector, brain mapping and narco-analysis. This Court held that direction of the court to carry out such tests is not only in contravention to the first principles of criminal law jurisprudence but also violates statutory requirements. The Court held: “While adjudicating a bail application, Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is the guiding principle wherein Court takes into consideration, inter alia, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual matrix, and therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. However, the court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police, or rather order specific tests as done in the present case. In the instant case, by ordering the abovementioned tests, the High Court has converted the adjudication of a bail matter to that of a mini-trial indeed.”

We may note that even though rights in land are no more a fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, and the provisions of any Act seeking to divest any person from the rights in property have to be strictly followed. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right; however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred in that Article. The State in exercise of its power of eminent domain may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid. The right to property is recognised as a basic human right. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured; else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed, the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.

The Supreme Court of India noted that it is a prevalent gender stereotype that women officers find it challenging to meet the hazards of service owing to their prolonged absence during pregnancy, motherhood and domestic obligations towards their children and families, as the notion assumes that domestic obligations rest solely on women. Reliance on the ‘inherent physiological differences between men and women’ rests in a deeply entrenched stereotypical and constitutionally flawed notion that women are the ‘weaker’ sex and may not undertake tasks that are ‘too arduous’ for them. Arguments founded on the physical strengths and weaknesses of men and women and on assumptions about women in the social context of marriage and family do not constitute a constitutionally valid basis for denying equal opportunity to women officers. To deny the grant of permanent commission to women officers on the ground that this would upset the ‘peculiar dynamics’ in a unit casts an undue burden on women officers which has been claimed as a ground for excluding women. If society holds strong beliefs about gender roles, that men are socially dominant, physically powerful and the breadwinners of the family and that women are weak and physically submissive, and primarily caretakers confined to a domestic atmosphere, it is unlikely that there would be a change in mindsets

Human liberty is a precious constitutional value; it is as tenuous as tenuous can be. Liberty survives by the vigilance of her citizens, on the cacophony of the media and in the dusty corridors of courts alive to the rule of (and not by) law. The doors of the court cannot be closed to a citizen who is able to establish prima facie that the instrumentality of the State is being weaponized for using the force of criminal law to the detriment of human liberty. The basic entitlement of every citizen who is faced with allegations of criminal wrongdoing, is that the investigative process should be fair. This is an integral component of the guarantee against arbitrariness under Article 14 and of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21. The Supreme Court considered the given principle in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, [AIR 2021 SC 1], which binds that the courts must be alive to the need to safeguard the public interest while ensuring that the due enforcement of criminal law is not obstructed. The fair investigation of crime is an aid to it. Equally it is the duty of courts across the spectrum-the district judiciary, the High Courts and the Supreme Court to ensure that the criminal law does not become a weapon for the selective harassment of citizens. The inherent power of the High Court must be construed as an aid to preserve the constitutional value of liberty. The writ of liberty runs through the fabric of the Constitution. The need to ensure fair investigation of crime is undoubtedly important in itself, because it protects at one level, the rights of the victim and, at a more fundamental level, the societal interest in ensuring that crime is investigated and dealt in accordance with law. On the other hand, the misuse of the criminal law is a matter of which the courts in this country must be alive

In jurisprudence, distinction between theoretical and practical aspects of law is the basis of an independent science of law, the purpose of which is not to subserve practical ends but to serve pure knowledge, which is concerned with facts but not with words. At the present time, the juristic science is an exclusively a practical science of law and adequate methods have been evolved for the application of law by the judges. The result of this situation is that its teaching on the subject of law and legal relations, subject matter and method, can be given only by the practical science of law. It aims to supply the judge with legal propositions, formulated in the most general terms possible, in order that the greatest possible number of decisions might be derived from them. It teaches the judge how to apply the general propositions to the specific cases. However, the human thinking is necessarily dominated by the underlying purpose and the thinking of the jurist is conditioned by the practical purposes pursued by juristic science. The jurist does not mean by law that which lives and is operative in human society as law, but law exclusively important in the administration of justice as a rule according to which the judges must decide the legal disputes. However, juristic science as a whole proceeds by abstractions and deductions but sometimes loses contact with reality. The rule of human conduct and the rule according to which the judges decide legal disputes may be distinct; a layman does not always act according to the rules which the judges apply for the judicial decisions as the rules to guide human conduct. However, the scientific view has given way to the practical view, adapted to the requirements of the judicial officials according to which they must proceed, but they arrive at this view by a jump in their personal thinking. They mean that the rules according to which courts decide are the rules according to which men ought to regulate their conduct. In this respect it is altogether different from true science. It is true that that judicial decisions influence the conduct of men, but we must first of all inquire to what extent this is true and upon what circumstances it depends

Harm suffered voluntarily does not constitute a legal injury and is not actionable. This principle is embodied in the maxim volenti non fit injuria. A person cannot complain of harm to the chances of which he has exposed himself with his free consent and free will. The maxim volenti non fit injuria is founded on good sense and justice. A person who has invited or assented to an act being done towards him cannot, when he suffers from it, complain of it as a wrong. The maxim presupposes a tortious act by the defendant. The maxim applies, in the first place, to intentional acts which would otherwise be tortious. There are certain limitations to the application of this maxim:
(i) It is no answer to a claim made by a workman against his employer for injury caused through a breach by the employer of a duty imposed upon him by a statute. But where the negligence or breach of statutory duty is on the part of an employee of the plaintiff who knowingly accepts the risk flowing from such breach and the employer-defendant is not guilty of negligence or breach of statutory duty, the defence of volenti non fit injuria is available to the defendant. 
(ii) Under an exigency caused by the defendant’s wrongful misconduct, consciously and deliberately faced a risk, even of death, whether the person endangered is one to whom he owes a duty of protection, as a member of his family, or is a mere stranger to whom he owes no such special duty. The rescuer will not be deprived of his remedy merely because the risk which he runs is not the same as that run by the person whom he rescues. But where there is no need to take any risk, the person suffering harm in doing so cannot recover. 
(iii) To cover a case of negligence the defence on the basis of the maxim must be based on implied agreement whether amounting to contract or not. The defence is available only when the plaintiff freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk impliedly agreed to incur it and to waive any claim for injury. But when the plaintiff has no choice or when the notice is given at a stage when it is beyond the ability of the plaintiff to make a choice there can be no implied agreement and the defence on the basis of the maxim must fail. 
(iv) The maxim will also not apply when the act relied upon is done because of the psychological condition which the defendant’s breach of duty had induced