Comprehension
We may note that even though rights in land are no more a fundamental right, still it remains a constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution of India, and the provisions of any Act seeking to divest any person from the rights in property have to be strictly followed. The right to property ceased to be a fundamental right; however, it continued to be a human right in a welfare State, and a Constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution. Article 300A provides that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. The State cannot dispossess a citizen of his property except in accordance with the procedure established by law. The obligation to pay compensation, though not expressly included in Article 300A, can be inferred in that Article. The State in exercise of its power of eminent domain may interfere with the right of property of a person by acquiring the same but the same must be for a public purpose and reasonable compensation therefor must be paid. The right to property is recognised as a basic human right. It is accepted in every jurisprudence and by different political thinkers that some amount of property right is an indispensable safeguard against tyranny and economic oppression of the Government. Jefferson was of the view that liberty cannot long subsist without the support of property. “Property must be secured; else liberty cannot subsist” was the opinion of John Adams. Indeed, the view that property itself is the seed bed which must be conserved if other constitutional values are to flourish is the consensus among political thinkers and jurists.
Question: 1
Right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the
Right to property ceased to be a fundamental right by the
Updated On: Jul 11, 2024
- Constitution (Sixty Ninth Amendment) Act, 1991.
- Constitution (Forty Second Amendment) Act, 1976
- Constitution (Seventy First Amendment) Act, 1992
- Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
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The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The correct option is (D) : Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978.
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Question: 2
In which of the following cases the Supreme Court of India held that provisions of law seeking to divest the right provided under Article 300A of the Constitution of India must be strictly construed?
In which of the following cases the Supreme Court of India held that provisions of law seeking to divest the right provided under Article 300A of the Constitution of India must be strictly construed?
Updated On: Jul 11, 2024
- N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517
- Tukaram Kana Joshi v. M.I.D.C., (2013) 1 SCC 353.
- P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152
- Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, (1995) Supp. 1 SCC 596.
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The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The correct option is (A) : N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, (2008) 15 SCC 517
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Question: 3
Right to property is a basic human right. Which of the following statements is true regarding human rights?
Right to property is a basic human right. Which of the following statements is true regarding human rights?
Updated On: Jul 11, 2024
- Human rights have been considered in the realm of individual rights such as right to shelter, livelihood, health, employment, etc
- Human rights have gained a multifaceted dimension.
- Human rights are statutory rights.
- Both (A) and (B).
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The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The correct option is (D) : Both (A) and (B).
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Question: 4
‘Eminent Domain’ is defined as
‘Eminent Domain’ is defined as
Updated On: Aug 22, 2024
- The power of sovereign to take public property for public use with the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation
- The power of sovereign to take public property for private use without the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation.
- The power of sovereign to take property for public use without the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation
- The power of sovereign to take property for public use with the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation.
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The correct option is (C) : The power of sovereign to take property for public use without the owner’s consent upon the payment of just compensation
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Question: 5
According to which of the following jurists, property is the objective manifestation of the personality of an individual?
According to which of the following jurists, property is the objective manifestation of the personality of an individual?
Updated On: Jul 11, 2024
- John Austin
- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
- Jeremy Bentham
- Roscoe Pound
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
The correct option is (B) : Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel
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Question: 6
Which of the following statements is true regarding right to property?
Which of the following statements is true regarding right to property?
Updated On: Jul 19, 2024
- Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to life and personal liberty.
- Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to carry on any occupation, trade or business.
- Right to property is not a basic feature of the Constitution of India.
- Right to property is an inalienable right.
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The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The correct option is (A) : Right to property is recognised as part and parcel of the right to life and personal liberty.
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