Comprehension
“The question can also be considered from another point of view. Supposing the police send a report viz. a charge-sheet, under Section 170 of the Code. As we have already pointed out, the Magistrate is not bound to accept that report, when he considers the matter judicially. But can he differ from the police and call upon them to submit a final report, under Section 169? In our opinion, the Magistrate has no such power. If he has no such power, in law, it also follows that the Magistrate has no power to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet, when the police have submitted a final report that no case is made out for sending the accused for trial. The functions of the Magistracy and the police, are entirely different, and though, in the circumstances mentioned earlier, the Magistrate may or may not accept the report, and take suitable action, according to law, he cannot certainly infringe upon the jurisdiction of the police, by compelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with his view. Therefore, to conclude, there is no power, expressly or impliedly conferred, under the Code, on a Magistrate to call upon the police to submit a charge-sheet, when they have sent a report under Section 169 of the Code, that there is no case made out for sending up an accused for trial.”
[Extracted from Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, (1967) 3 SCR 668, para 19-20].
[Extracted from Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra, (1967) 3 SCR 668, para 19-20].
Question: 1
The above-mentioned case deals with the power of magistrate to take cognizance on police report under which provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
The above-mentioned case deals with the power of magistrate to take cognizance on police report under which provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973?
Updated On: Nov 7, 2024
- Section 190(1)(b)
- Section 159
- Section 190(1)(a)
- Section 173(8)
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Section 190(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, empowers a Magistrate
to take cognizance of any offence based on a police report.
The correct option is (A): Section 190(1)(b)
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Question: 2
If the Court is not satisfied with the police report, does the Code of Criminal Procedure allow for direction of further investigation?
If the Court is not satisfied with the police report, does the Code of Criminal Procedure allow for direction of further investigation?
Updated On: Nov 7, 2024
- No, the role of court is limited to adjudication.
- Yes, court can direct further investigation with specific instruction for a desired result
- Yes, court can direct further investigation at pre-cognizance stage.
- None of the above.
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The court can direct further investigation at the pre-cognizance stage if it finds the
initial police report unsatisfactory.
The correct option is (C): Yes, court can direct further investigation at pre-cognizance stage.
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Question: 3
If police submit a final report, does the Code of Criminal Procedure, allow Magistrate to take cognizance on the final report?
If police submit a final report, does the Code of Criminal Procedure, allow Magistrate to take cognizance on the final report?
Updated On: Nov 7, 2024
- Yes, magistrate can take cognizance on final report despite no charges listed in it
- No, Magistrate cannot take cognizance till the time chargesheet is filed
- Magistrate can take cognizance provided an order under section 156 has been given for investigation
- None of the above.
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The Magistrate has the authority to take cognizance on a final report submitted by
the police, even if no charges are listed.
The correct option is (A): Yes, magistrate can take cognizance on final report despite no charges listed in it
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Question: 4
If after submission of police report, there is a requirement to add further report on the basis of a newly found evidence, is it permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure?
If after submission of police report, there is a requirement to add further report on the basis of a newly found evidence, is it permissible under the Code of Criminal Procedure?
Updated On: Nov 7, 2024
- No, it is permissible only at the first instance, once a report has been submitted there cannot be further reports to the same under section 173(6)
- It is permissible under section 160 with the permission of the court.
- Yes, it is permissible under section 173(8).
- None of the above
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
Section 173(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits the filing of supplemen-
tary reports based on new evidence after the initial report has been submitted.
The correct option is (C): Yes, it is permissible under section 173(8).
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Question: 5
In case one of the alleged offences is of cognizable nature and there are three additional alleged offences of a non-cognizable nature, what would be the nature of the case?
In case one of the alleged offences is of cognizable nature and there are three additional alleged offences of a non-cognizable nature, what would be the nature of the case?
Updated On: Nov 7, 2024
- There will be two separate cases depending on the nature of the offence as per section 155(1).
- It will be collectively considered as a non-cognizable case under section 155(4)
- The nature of the case would be cognizable as per section 155(4).
- None of the above.
Hide Solution
Verified By Collegedunia
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
According to Section 155(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if one of the
offences is cognizable, the entire case is treated as cognizable.
The correct option is (C): The nature of the case would be cognizable as per section 155(4).
Was this answer helpful?
0
0
Top Questions on Administrative Law
- Which of the following statement best captures the key difference between a Lok Adalat and Permanent Lok Adalat?
- AILET LLM - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Administrative Law
- Which of the following statement best describes a social media intermediary?
- AILET LLM - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Administrative Law
- Match the following offences with the corresponding Sections under BNS, 2023:Select the correct options:
Offenses Sections (A) Voyeurism (1) Section 77 (B) Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman (2) Section 79 (C) Stalking (3) Section 75 (D) Sexual Harassment (4) Section 78 - AILET LLM - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Administrative Law
- Which of the following rights did the Supreme Court recognise for non-minorities in the T.M.A. Pai Foundation case (2002) 8 SCC 481 regarding the establishment and administration of educational institutions?
- AILET LLM - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Administrative Law
- Which of the following means ‘Fact’ as per BSA, 2023?
- AILET LLM - 2025
- Legal Studies
- Administrative Law
View More Questions
Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam
- The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Nil Ratan Kundu and another v. Abhijit Kundu’ 2008(3) Apex Court Judgements 232 (SC), while granting the custody to the maternal grandparents observed: In our judgement, the law relating to custody of a child is fairly well settled and it is this. In deciding a difficult and complex question as to custody of minor, a Court of law should keep in mind relevant statutes and the rights flowing therefrom. But such cases cannot be decided solely by interpreting legal provisions. It is a humane problem in live in relationship and is required to be solved with human touch. A Court while dealing with custody cases, is neither bound by statutes nor by strict rules of evidence or procedure nor by precedents. In selecting proper guardian of a minor, the paramount consideration should be the welfare and well-being of the child. In selecting a guardian, the Court is exercising parens patriae jurisdiction and is expected, may bound, to give due weight to a child’s ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favorable surroundings. But over and above physical comforts, moral and ethical values cannot be ignored. They are equally, or we may say, even more important, essential and indispensable consideration. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent preference or judgement, the Court must consider such preference as well, though the final decision should rest with the Court as to what is conducive to the welfare of the minor.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ‘Gaurav Nagpal v. Semedha Nagpal’-(2009)1 SCC 42, while giving paramount importance to the welfare of the child, which should include moral and ethical values, besides ethical well-being, observed as under:
When the court is confronted with conflicting demands made by the parents, each time it has to justify the demands. The Court has not only to look at the issue on legalistic basis, in such matters human angles are relevant for deciding those issues. The Court then does not give emphasis on what the parties say, it has to exercise a jurisdiction which is aimed at the welfare of the minor. As observed recently in Mausami Moitra Ganguli case, the Court has to give due weightage to the child’s ordinary contentment, health, education, intellectual development and favorable surroundings, but over and above physical comforts, the moral and ethical values have also to be noted. They are equal if not more important than the others.
(Extracts from Jaswinder Singh and Another vs Surjit Singh, AIR 2010 (NOC) 425 (P. & H.))- CLAT PG - 2025
- Family Laws
- The Companies Act, 2013 does not deal with insolvency and bankruptcy when the companies are unable to pay their debts or the aspects relating to the revival and rehabilitation of the companies and their winding up if revival and rehabilitation is not possible. In principle, it cannot be doubted that the cases of revival or winding up of the company on the ground of insolvency and inability to pay debts are different from cases where companies are wound up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013. The two situations are not identical. Under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013, even a running and financially sound company can also be wound up for the reasons in clauses (a) to (e). The reasons and grounds for winding up under Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013 are vastly different from the reasons and grounds for the revival and rehabilitation scheme as envisaged under the IBC. The two enactments deal with two distinct situations and in our opinion, they cannot be equated when we examine whether there is discrimination or violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For the revival and rehabilitation of the companies, certain sacrifices are required from all quarters, including the workmen. In case of insolvent companies, for the sake of survival and regeneration, everyone, including the secured creditors and the Central and State Government, are required to make sacrifices. The workmen also have a stake and benefit from the revival of the company, and therefore unless it is found that the sacrifices envisaged for the workmen, which certainly form a separate class, are onerous and burdensome so as to be manifestly unjust and arbitrary, we will not set aside the legislation,solely on the ground that some or marginal sacrifice is to be made by the workers. We would also reject the argument that to find out whether there was a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India or whether the right to life under Article 21 Constitution of India was infringed, we must word by word examine the waterfall mechanism envisaged under the Companies Act, 2013, where the company is wound up in terms of grounds (a) to (e) of Section 271 of the Companies Act, 2013; and the rights of the workmen when the insolvent company is sought to be revived, rehabilitated or wound up under the Code. The grounds and situations in the context of the objective and purpose of the two enactments are entirely different.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Moser Baer Karamchari Union Thr. President Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Union of India and Ors, 2023 SCC Online SC 547)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Company Law
- Ahmadi, J. (as he then was) speaking for himself and Punchhi, J., endorsed the recommendations in the following words-The time is ripe for taking stock of the working of the various Tribunals set up in the country after the insertion of Articles 323-A and 323-B in the Constitution. After the incorporation of these two articles, Acts have been enacted where-under tribunals have been constituted for dispensation of justice. Sufficient time has passed, and experience gained in these last few years for taking stock of the situation with a view to finding out if they have served the purpose and objectives for which they were constituted. Complaints have been heard in regard to the functioning of other tribunals as well and it is time that a body like the Law Commission of India has a comprehensive look-in with a view to suggesting measures for their improved functioning. That body can also suggest changes in the different statutes and evolve a model on the basis whereof tribunals may be constituted or reconstituted with a view to ensuring greater independence. An intensive and extensive study needs to be undertaken by the Law Commission in regard to the Constitution of tribunals under various statutes with a view to ensuring their independence so that the public confidence in such tribunals may increase and the quality of their performance may improve.
Before parting with the case, it is necessary to express our anguish over the ineffectiveness of the alternative mechanism devised for judicial review. The judicial review and remedy are the fundamental rights of the citizens. The dispensation of justice by the tribunal is much to be desired.
(Extracted with Edits from R.K. Jain v. Union of India, 1993 (4) SCC 119)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Constitutional Laws
- The elements of tort of negligence consist in – (a) duty of care; (b) duty is owed to the plaintiff; (c) the duty has been carelessly breached. Negligence does not entail liability unless the exacts a duty in the given circumstances to observe care. Duty is an obligation recognised by law to avoid conduct fraught with unreasonable risk of damage to others. The question whether duty exists in a particular situation involves determination of law. Hence, three ingredients are necessary for the existence of a duty of care: (i) foreseeability of the damage, (ii) proximity of relationship between the parties; and (iii) whether it is “just, fair and reasonable” that the law should impose a duty of care. In Caparo Industries Plc. v. Dickman, 1990 2AC 605, the court held that breach of duty is concerned with the standard of care that ought to have been adopted in the circumstances and whether the defendant’s conduct fell below that standard i.e., whether he was careless.
The court while quoting Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulben Jayantilal Nakum, 1997 stated that as a tort, negligence consists of legal duty to take care and breach of that duty. Duty determines whether the type of loss suffered by the plaintiff in the particular way in which to occurred can ever be actionable. The division of negligence into duty, breach and consequent damage is convenient for the purpose of exposition but it can be confusing because the issues will often overlap. The process of determining a breach of duty involves three steps: First, it is necessary to ascertain the qualities of the reasonable person, given the qualities attributed to him, would have taken in the circumstances. The factors that are permissible to take into account in this regard are prescribed by law, but the amount of care that the reasonable person would have taken is a question of fact. Thirdly, it must be determined whether the defendant took less care than the reasonable person would have taken.
(Extracts from Managing Director, Kerala Tourism Development Corporation Limited v. Deepti Singh and Ors., 2019 SC)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Law of Torts
- Article 14 of the Constitution stipulates that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of laws within the territory of India. Article 15(1) states that the State should not discriminate against any citizen on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. Article 15(4) stipulates that nothing in Article 15 shall prevent the State from making any special provision for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. Article 16 deals with equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Clause (1) of Article 16 guarantees equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State. Clause (2) stipulates that no citizen shall be discriminated in or be ineligible for any employment or office under the State on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Clause (4) of the provision states that nothing in Article 16 shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens, which in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. The purpose of the equal opportunity principle in Article 16(1) and the reservation provision in Article 16(4) has emerged as a focal point of the jurisprudence on reservations in this Court. A discussion of the journey of the competing models of equality that the Court has espoused and their evolution over the course of the years is necessary to understand the constitutional vision on equality.
The impugned constitutional amendments by which Article 16 (4-A) and 16 (4-B) have been inserted, flow from Article 16 (4). They do not alter the structure of Article 16 (4). They retain the controlling factors or the compelling reasons which enables the State to provide for reservation keeping in mind the overall efficiency of the state administration under article 335. Sub-categorization within a class is a constitutional requirement to secure substantive equality in the event that there is a distinction between two sections of a class; Sub-classification must not lead to the exclusion of one of the categories in the class. A model that provides sufficient opportunities to all categories of the class must be adopted; and Sub-classification among a class must be on a reasonable basis.
Justice Bela Trivedi opined, in dissent, that presidential list of scheduled castes notified under Article 341 cannot be altered by the States. Any change to this list can only be made by a law enacted by Parliament. Sub-classification, according to her would amount to tampering with the Presidential List and undermine the object Article 341, which aims to eliminate political influence in the SC-ST List. Further, she emphasised the importance of adhering to the rule of plain and literal interpretation. She mentions that any preferential treatment for a sub-class within the presidential list would deprive other classes within the same category of their benefits. In the absence of executive or legislative power, state lack the competence to sub-classify castes and the benefit reserved for all SCs. Allowing states to do so would constitute a colourable exercise of power, which is impermissible under law. Justice Trivedi concluded by affirming that affirmative action by States must remain within constitutional boundaries and held that the law laid down in E.V. Chinnaiah case was correct and should be upheld.
(Extract from The State of Punjab & Ors. v. Davinder Singh & Ors. 2024 SC)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Constitutional Laws
View More Questions