“The power to pardon is a part of the constitutional scheme, and we have no doubt, in our mind, that it should be so treated also in the Indian Republic. It has been reposed by the people through the Constitution in the Head of the State, and enjoys high status. It is a constitutional responsibility of great significance, to be exercised when occasion arises in accordance with the discretion contemplated by the context. It is not denied, and indeed it has been repeatedly affirmed in the course of argument by learned counsels appearing for the Petitioner that the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Article 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice......”
We are of the view that it is open to the President in the exercise of the power vested in him by Article 72 of the Constitution to scrutinise the evidence on the record of the criminal case and come to a different conclusion from that recorded by the court in regard to the guilt of, and sentence imposed on the accused. In doing so, the President does not amend or modify or supersede the judicial record. The judicial record remains intact, and undisturbed. The President acts in a wholly different plane from that in which the Court acted. He acts under a constitutional power, the nature of which is entirely different from the judicial power and cannot be regarded as an extension of it. This is so, notwithstanding that the practical effect of the Presidential act is to remove the stigma of guilt from the accused or to remit the sentence imposed on him.
It is apparent that the power under Article 72 entitles the President to examine the record of evidence of the criminal case and to determine for himself whether the case is one deserving the grant of the relief falling within that power. We are of opinion that the President is entitled to go into the merits of the case notwithstanding that it has been judicially concluded by the consideration given to it by this Court. In Kehar Singh v. Union of India, 1989 SC, this court stated that the same obviously means that the affected party need not be given the reasons. The question whether reasons can or cannot be disclosed to the Court when the same is challenged was not the subject-matter of consideration. In any event, the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate or relevant reasons for passing the order.
Extract from the judgment of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India 2014 (3) SCC 1
Which one of the following statements is correct with respect to the granting of pardon by the President?
Show Hint
- The power to grant pardon is a constitutional duty. Hence, judicial review is available, just as any executive action is.
- Granting pardon being the privilege of the President, no judicial review is available against the decision of the President in granting or refusing to grant a pardon.
- The constitution expressly conferred the power to grant to the President hence, the President is not bound to rely on the aid and advice of the executive.
- The President's power to grant pardon can be reviewed on the grounds of non-application of mind.
The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The question asks to identify the correct statement regarding the President's power to grant pardon based on the provided text and established constitutional law.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
Let's analyze each option in light of the passage and legal principles:
(A) This option is incorrect. While the power is a "constitutional responsibility," calling it a "duty" can be misleading. More importantly, judicial review is not available "just as any executive action is"; it is available on very limited grounds. The scope is narrower.
(B) This option is incorrect. The Supreme Court, in cases like Epuru Sudhakar v. Govt. of A.P., has clearly established that the President's decision on a mercy petition is subject to limited judicial review. It is not an absolute privilege beyond scrutiny.
(C) This option is incorrect and directly contradicts the passage. The text explicitly states, "...the power to pardon rests on the advice tendered by the Executive to the President, who subject to the provisions of Article 74(1) of the Constitution, must act in accordance with such advice." The President is bound by the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.
(D) This option is correct. The passage concludes by saying, "the absence of any obligation to convey the reasons does not mean that there should not be legitimate or relevant reasons for passing the order." This implies that the decision must be based on reason. It is a well-settled principle that the pardoning power under Article 72 is subject to judicial review on grounds such as the order being passed without application of mind, mala fide, based on extraneous considerations, or being arbitrary.
Step 3: Final Answer:
Based on the analysis, the statement that the President's power to grant pardon can be reviewed on the grounds of non-application of mind is correct.
In the above case the Supreme Court held that a minimum period of _________ days be stipulated between the receipt of communication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the scheduled date of execution.
Show Hint
- 60
- 30
- 14
- No such timeline was fixed
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The question asks for the specific minimum time period mandated by the Supreme Court in the case of Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India between the communication of the rejection of a mercy petition and the date of execution.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The judgment in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014) laid down several guidelines to protect the rights of death row convicts, flowing from Article 21 of the Constitution (Right to Life and Personal Liberty). One of the key procedural safeguards introduced was to ensure that the convict has a reasonable amount of time after the final rejection of his/her mercy petition. This period allows the convict to prepare mentally, settle worldly affairs, and meet with family members one last time. The Supreme Court held that a minimum period of 14 days must elapse between the receipt of the communication of the rejection of the mercy petition and the scheduled date of execution.
Step 3: Final Answer:
Therefore, the Supreme Court stipulated a minimum period of 14 days.
What is not true about the pardoning power vis a vis Article 21 of Constitution of India?
Show Hint
- Insanity is not a relevant supervening factor for commutation of death sentence.
- Right to life of a person continues till his last breath and that Court will protect that right even if the noose is being tied on the condemned person's neck.
- The anguish of alternating hope and despair, the agony of uncertainty and the consequence of such suffering on the mental, emotional and physical integrity and health violates Art. 21 of the prisoners.
- Article 21 is a substantive right and not merely procedural.
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The question asks to identify the incorrect statement regarding the interplay between the pardoning power and Article 21 of the Constitution.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
Let's evaluate each statement:
(A) This statement is false. The Supreme Court in Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India explicitly held that post-conviction insanity or mental illness is a supervening circumstance that renders the execution of a death sentence unconstitutional under Article 21. Therefore, insanity is a very relevant factor for the commutation of a death sentence. Since the statement claims it is "not a relevant factor," it is "not true".
(B) This statement is true. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the right to life under Article 21 includes the right to a dignified life until the very end, and this protection does not cease until the person is legally pronounced dead.
(C) This statement is true. This describes the "death row phenomenon." The Supreme Court has held that inordinate and unexplained delay in deciding a mercy petition causes immense mental anguish, which violates the prisoner's right to life under Article 21, and can be a ground for commutation.
(D) This statement is true. Article 21 is the bedrock of fundamental rights, guaranteeing the substantive right to life and personal liberty, not just a set of procedures. The procedures established by law must also be fair, just, and reasonable.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The statement that is not true is (A), as insanity is a crucial supervening factor for the commutation of a death sentence.
In which case, the Supreme Court held that if the crime is brutal and heinous and involves the killing of a large number of innocent people without any reason, delay cannot be the sole factor for the commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment?
Show Hint
- Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi.
- V. Sriharan @ Murugan v. Union of India
- Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra
- Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The question asks to identify the specific Supreme Court case that created an exception to the 'delay' rule for commutation of the death penalty, particularly in cases of terrorism or brutal mass killings.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
(A) Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi (2013): In this case, the Supreme Court held that in cases where the crime is related to terrorism and poses a threat to the sovereignty and integrity of the nation, the ground of inordinate delay in deciding a mercy petition may not be sufficient for commuting the death sentence. This judgment carved out an exception to the general rule.
(B) V. Sriharan @ Murugan v. Union of India: This case primarily dealt with the scope of the power of remission under the CrPC and the primacy of the Union Government's opinion in certain cases, particularly in the context of the Rajiv Gandhi assassination convicts.
(C) Yakub Abdul Razak Memon v. State of Maharashtra: While the gravity of the crime (1993 Mumbai blasts) was a central factor in the rejection of his final pleas, the primary legal precedent for the principle in question was set in the Bhullar case.
(D) Shatrughan Chauhan v. Union of India (2014): This case did the opposite. A larger bench of the Supreme Court in this case overruled the exception created in the Devender Pal Singh Bhullar case. It held that inordinate delay in disposal of mercy petitions is a ground for commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment, irrespective of the nature of the crime.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The case that held that delay cannot be the sole factor for commutation in heinous crimes like terrorism was Devender Pal Singh Bhullar v. State (NCT) of Delhi.
The President's power to grant a pardon
Show Hint
- Can be delegated to the Prime Minister and his Council of Ministers
- Cannot be delegated as it is an essential executive function
- Cannot be delegated as it is expressly conferred on the President
- Can be delegated to the Vice-president.
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The question asks about the delegability of the President's power to grant pardons under Article 72 of the Constitution.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The principle of delegatus non potest delegare (a delegate cannot further delegate) applies to powers conferred by the Constitution on specific authorities. Article 72 of the Constitution of India explicitly vests the power to grant pardons, reprieves, respites, or remissions of punishment in the President.
(A) This is incorrect. While the President acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, the power is formally vested in the President and cannot be delegated to the Prime Minister or the Council. They advise, but the constitutional authority to act remains with the President.
(B) This is plausible, but not the most precise reason. While it is an executive function, the primary reason for its non-delegability is its specific constitutional conferment.
(C) This is the most accurate and fundamental reason. The Constitution itself has chosen to confer this high power specifically on the Head of the State, the President. Such an express and specific grant of power to a designated constitutional authority implies that it cannot be delegated to any other person or body unless the Constitution itself allows for it, which it does not.
(D) This is incorrect. There is no constitutional provision that allows the President to delegate this power to the Vice-President.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The President's power to grant a pardon cannot be delegated because it is a power expressly conferred on the President by the Constitution.
Top Questions on Constitutional Laws
- “The law is well settled that a constitutional court can award monetary compen sation against the State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining dam ages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining the compensation payable in private tort claims are not as such applicable when a constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is a viola tion of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.
... In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416], a Constitution Bench of this Court held that there is no straitjacket formula for computation of damages and we find that there is no uniformity or yardstick followed in awarding damages for violation of fundamental rights. In Rudul Sah case [Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141] this Court used the terminology ’palliative’ for measuring the damages and the formula of ’adhoc’ was applied. In Sebastian Hongray case [Se bastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 82] the expression used by this Court for determining the monetary compensation was ’exemplary’ costs and the formula adopted was ’punitive’. In Bhim Singh case [Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, (1985) 4 SCC 677], the expression used by the Court was ’compensation’ and the method adopted was ’tortious formula’. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416] the expression used by this Court for determining the compensation was ’monetary compensation’. The formula adopted was ’cost to cost’ method. Courts have not, therefore, adopted a uniform criterion since no statutory formula has been laid down.”
tracted from: Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association (2011) 14 SCC 481- CLAT PG - 2026
- Legal Studies
- Constitutional Laws
SEBI was established as India’s principal capital markets regulator with the aim to pro tect the interest of investors in securities and promote the development and regulation of the securities market in India. SEBI is empowered to regulate the securities market in India by the SEBI Act 1992, the SCRA and the Depositories Act 1996. SEBI’s powers to regulate the securities market are wide and include delegated legislative, administrative, and adjudicatory powers to enforce SEBI’s regulations. SEBI exercises its delegated legislative power by inter alia framing regulations and appropriately amending them to keep up with the dynamic nature of the securities’ market. SEBI has issued a number of regulations on various areas of security regulation which form the backbone of the framework governing the securities market in India. Section 11 of the SEBI Act lays down the functions of SEBI and expressly states that it ”shall be the duty of the Board to protect the interests of investors in securities and to promote the development of, and to regulate the securities market, by such measures as it thinks fit”. Fur ther, Section 30 of the SEBI Act empowers SEBI to make regulations consistent with the Act. Significantly, while framing these regulations, SEBI consults its advisory committees consisting of domain experts, including market experts, leading market players, legal experts, technol ogy experts, retired Judges of this Court or the High Courts, academicians, representatives of industry associations and investor associations. During the consultative process, SEBI also in vites and duly considers comments from the public on their proposed regulations. SEBI follows similar consultative processes while reviewing and amending its regulations.
(Extracted, with edits and revision, from the judgement in Vishal Tiwari v. Union Of India, [2024] 1 S.C.R. 171)- CLAT PG - 2026
- Legal Studies
- Constitutional Laws
To recall, the petitioners while challenging the 1951 and 1965 amendments to the AMU Act in Azeez Basha argued that the amendments were violative of the right to administration guaran teed by Article 30(1). The Union of India responded to the argument with the submission that the Muslim minority cannot claim the right to administration since it did not ’establish’ the institution. Opposing this argument, the petitioners in Azeez Basha, submitted that Article 30(1) guarantees the ’right to administer’ an educational institution to minorities even if it was not established by them, if by ”some process, it had been administering the same before the Constitution came into force.” The argument of the petitioners was rejected. This Court held that the words ”establish” and ”administer” must be read conjunctively, that is, the guarantee of the right to administration is contingent on the establishment of the institution by religious or linguistic minorities...
The issue before this Bench is the indicia for an educational institution to be a minority educa tional institution. Should it be proved that the institution was established by the minority, or it was administered by the minority, or both? The petitioners and the respondents agree that the words ’establish’ and ’administer’ must be read conjunctively. They argue that administration is a sequitur to establishment. However, they disagree on the test to be applied to identify a minority education institution. The petitioners argue that the only indicia for a minority ed ucational institution is that it must be established by a minority, while the respondents argue that the dual test of establishment and administration must be satisfied.
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Aligarh Muslim University v. Naresh Agarwal & Ors, 2024 SC 8)- CLAT PG - 2026
- Legal Studies
- Constitutional Laws
- If the State Waqf Board composition requires non-Muslim members exceeding the limit set by the Amendment, can it be challenged under Articles 25, 26, and 14?
- CLAT PG - 2026
- Legal Studies
- Constitutional Laws
- Which Article permits reasonable restrictions for decency/obscenity?
- CLAT PG - 2026
- Legal Studies
- Constitutional Laws
Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
1. Conservative Approach:
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
- US Position: Prioritizes its own interests, supports better management and the creation of an Inspector General, favours enlarging the Security Council (to include Germany and Japan, mainly for financing peace-keeping), and associates the UN with regional organizations like NATO for peace enforcement. The US remains reluctant to allow full application of Chapter VII and views collective security restrictively.
- Secretary-General’s Position (Boutros Ghali): Advocated for the full implementation of ’collective security’ as envisaged in 1945, including the use of the Military Staff Committee (Article 47) and the conclusion of special agreements (Article 43) for providing armed forces. He also proposed ’peace enforcement units’ under the command of the Secretary-General and wider use of ’preventive diplomacy’. The report candidly recognized the Security Council’s incapacity to deal with threats from a major power.
2. Radical Approach:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
- Establishing an Economic Security Council.
- Modifying the Charter with less reluctance.
- Reforming the IMF and World Bank.
- Developing a new global security system .
- The creation of a consultative parliamentary assembly at the world level.
Future Outlook:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
- CLAT PG - 2026
- International Law
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
- It is well recognized that actionable negligence in context of medical profession involves three constituents (i) duty to exercise due care; (ii) breach of duty and (iii) consequential damage. However, a simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident is not sufficient proof of negligence on part of the medical professional so long as the doctor follows the acceptable practice of the medical profession in discharge of his duties. He cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative treatment or course of treatment was available or that more skilled doctors were there who could have administered better treatment.
A medical professional may be held liable for negligence only when he is not pos sessed with the requisite qualification or skill or when he fails to exercise reasonable skill which he possesses in giving the treatment. None of the above two essential conditions for establishing negligence stand satisfied in the case at hand as no ev idence was brought on record to prove that Dr. Neeraj Sud had not exercised due diligence, care or skill which he possessed in operating the patient and giving treatment to him. When reasonable care, expected of the medical professional, is extended or rendered to the patient unless contrary is proved, it would not be a case for actionable negligence.
tracted with edits and revisions from Neeraj Sud v Jaswinder Singh 2024 INSC 825- CLAT PG - 2026
- Law of Torts
Today, in the year 2025, we have been experiencing the drastic consequences of large scale destruction of environment on human lives in the capital city of our country and in many other cities. At least for a span of two months every year, the residents of Delhi suffocate due to air pollution. The AQI level is either dangerous or very dangerous. They suffer in their health. The other leading cities are not far behind. The air and water pollution in the cities is ever increasing. Therefore, coming out with measures such as the 2021 Official Memorandum is violative of fundamental rights of all persons guaranteed under Article 21 to live in a pollution free environment. It also infringes the right to health guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
The 2021 OM talks about the concept of development. Can there be development at the cost of environment? Conservation of environment and its improvement is an essential part of the concept of development. Therefore, going out of the way by issuing such OMs to protect those who have caused harm to the environment has to be deprecated by the Courts which are under a constitutional and statutory mandate to uphold the fundamental right under Article 21 and to protect the environment. In fact, the Courts should comedown heavily on such attempts. As stated earlier, the 2021 OM deals with project proponents who were fully aware of the EIA notification and who have taken conscious risk to flout the EIA notification and go ahead with the construction/continuation/expansion of projects. They have shown scant respect to the law and their duty to protect the environment. Apart from violation of Article 21, such action is completely arbitrary which is violative article 14 of the Constitution of India, besides being violative of the 1986 Act and the EIA notification.
(Extracted with edits from Vanashakti v. Union of India, 2025 INSC 718)- CLAT PG - 2026
- Environmental Law