The only other submission which we are required to deal with before we part with this matter is the argument of the learned counsel for the State that in view of the scheme of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereafter ‘MMDRA’) which prohibits under Section 4 the carrying on of any mining activity in this country except in accordance with the permit, licence or mining lease as the case may be, granted under the Act, the appellants cannot claim any proprietary right in the sub-soil.
[Extract from the judgment in Thressiamma Jacob v. Dept. of Mining & Geology, (2013) 9 SCC 725] (hereafter ‘T Jacob’)
The MMDRA enacted by Parliament grants the Union Government the:
Show Hint
- Right to obtain ownership of land containing mineral wealth
- Power to exclude the State Government from ownership rights of land containing mineral wealth
- Right to regulate the grant of mining rights
- Right to impose taxes on all mining activities
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Place MMDRA in the constitutional scheme.
Parliament legislates on “regulation of mines and mineral development” under List I Entry 54 when it declares such regulation to be expedient in public interest. The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDRA) is that central law.
Step 2: What the Act actually does.
MMDRA creates a regulatory framework for prospecting licences, mining leases and permits (who may mine, on what terms, central–state coordination, etc.). It is about grant/conditions of mining rights, not automatic transfer of ownership in land/minerals.
Step 3: Eliminate distractors using T Jacob.
(A) No provision in MMDRA vests ownership of land/minerals in the Union.
(B) The Act does not oust States from proprietary rights; it only regulates.
(D) Taxing power is a different constitutional head (e.g., List II Entry 50; List I Entry 84 for duties). MMDRA is not a taxation statute. \[ \boxed{ \text{Right to regulate the grant of mining rights (C)} } \]
T Jacob dealt with traditional proprietary rights in subsoil/minerals and held that:
i. Sub-soil rights are treated as ‘commons’ and are held by the State in public trust.
ii. There is nothing in the law which declares that all mineral wealth/subsoil rights vest in the State.
iii. The owner of the land can be deprived of sub-soil rights by law.
i. Sub-soil rights are treated as ‘commons’ and are held by the State in public trust.
ii. There is nothing in the law which declares that all mineral wealth/subsoil rights vest in the State.
iii. The owner of the land can be deprived of sub-soil rights by law.
Show Hint
- i is correct
- ii and iii are correct
- i and iii are correct
- None of the above is correct
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Core holding in Thressiamma Jacob.
The Court rejected the High Court’s view that payment of seigniorage/extra tax proved State ownership. It drew the imperium (tax power) vs dominium (proprietary right) distinction: taxing minerals does not make the State their owner.
Step 2: Examine each statement.
(i) Incorrect. The Court did not say all subsoil rights are public commons in State trust. Private ownership of subsoil is recognised unless law transfers it.
(ii) Correct. The Court expressly noted there is no blanket rule vesting all minerals/subsoil in the State.
(iii) Correct. The legislature can by law divest/limit private subsoil rights (subject to the Constitution) — e.g., specific vesting/statutory reservation. \[ \boxed{ \text{ii and iii are correct (B)} } \]
The power to impose a tax on the produce of some land should be treated as:
Show Hint
- Assertion that land is partly owned by government
- Power of eminent domain
- Assertion of a proprietary right
- Assertion of a sovereign right
The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Apply the imperium–dominium distinction from T Jacob.
Imperium = sovereign authority to govern (includes taxation).
Dominium = ownership/proprietary title.
Step 2: Classify “seigniorage/extra tax on minerals”.
A levy that arises upon extraction is an excise/tax — an exercise of imperium, not proof of dominium. Therefore it does not imply State ownership (eliminates A and C).
Step 3: Distinguish eminent domain.
(B) is about compulsory acquisition with compensation — not mere taxation. \[ \boxed{ \text{Sovereign right (D)} } \]
In common law, the owner of a piece of land is entitled to:
i. Work on the surface of the land.
ii. Everything beneath the surface down to the centre of the earth.
iii. Everything below the surface except those minerals included under the MMDRA.
i. Work on the surface of the land.
ii. Everything beneath the surface down to the centre of the earth.
iii. Everything below the surface except those minerals included under the MMDRA.
Show Hint
- All are correct
- Only i is correct
- Only i and ii are correct
- Only i and iii are correct
The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Start with the traditional maxim.
Common law once stated ownership “usque ad coelum et ad inferos” (up to the heavens and down to the depths). Statement (ii) reflects that old absolute claim.
Step 2: Modern limitation in India.
Statutes like MMDRA regulate/limit subsoil rights; certain minerals or the entire activity of mining require licences/leases, and laws may reserve/vest particular minerals to the State. Thus, an owner retains subsoil rights subject to such statutory carve-outs.
Step 3: Decide each statement.
(i) Correct — one may work on the surface (subject to other laws).
(ii) Not fully correct today — the “centre of the earth” claim is curtailed by statute and public law limits.
(iii) Correct in substance — entitlement below the surface stands except to the extent excluded/regulated by MMDRA and other laws. \[ \boxed{ \text{Only i and iii (D)} } \]
Under the Constitution of India, all property and assets which vested in the British Crown for the purposes of the Government of the Dominion of India and Governor’s Provinces, stood:
Show Hint
- Confiscated without payment
- Repatriated back to the Crown
- Vested in the Union of India
- Vested in the Union of India and the States
The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Cite the constitutional provision.
Article 294 provides for succession to property, assets, rights and liabilities of the Government of India and the Provinces. Upon commencement of the Constitution:
Property used for Union purposes vested in the Union of India; and
Property used for provincial purposes vested in the respective States.
Step 2: Eliminate wrong answers.
(A) No confiscation provision. (B) No “repatriation” to the Crown. (C) is incomplete — ignores vesting in States.
Correct Option - D
The Constitution of India vests all lands, minerals, and other things of value under the ocean floor within the territorial waters:
Show Hint
- In the Union of India
- In the respective States having a shoreline
- In the Union and all States in the Union
- Are treated as ‘res commune’
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Article 297 of the Constitution declares that all lands, minerals and other things of value underlying the ocean within the territorial waters, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone vest in the Union of India.
Step 2: Scope of Article 297.
It covers: Territorial waters (12 nautical miles from baseline),
Continental shelf,
Exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles for resource rights).
Step 3: Eliminate incorrect options.
(B) Incorrect — States do not own offshore minerals.
(C) Incorrect — vesting is exclusively in Union, not concurrent.
(D) Incorrect — res commune means common to all mankind (international waters), not within Indian territorial waters. \[ \boxed{\text{In the Union of India (A)}} \]
The Supreme Court in State of Meghalaya v. All Dimasa Students Union Hasao (2019) held that in the Sixth Schedule State of Meghalaya, where most lands are either privately or community-owned:
[i.]
Landowners of privately owned/community-owned lands can lease their lands for mining.
The State Government alone can grant a lease for mining in privately/community-owned lands.
Landowners of privately owned/community-owned lands can lease their lands for mining after obtaining previous approval of the Central Government through the State Government.
Show Hint
- iv is correct
- ii and iii are correct
- i and iii are correct
- None of the above is correct
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Special land ownership in Meghalaya.
In Meghalaya, unlike most States, a large part of land is not owned by the State Government — it is privately or community owned, protected under the Sixth Schedule.
Step 2: Supreme Court’s interpretation.
The Court held: Landowners (private or community) retain ownership of land and subsoil minerals, unless law says otherwise.
They can lease land for mining operations — BUT mining is a regulated activity under MMDRA.
Any such lease must comply with MMDRA — requiring prior approval of the Central Government through the State Government.
Step 3: Assess each statement.
(i) Correct — Owners can lease their land for mining.
(ii) Incorrect — The State Government is not the sole grantor of leases in private/community lands; owners have rights.
(iii) Correct — Prior central approval via State Government is needed under MMDRA for mining leases. \[ \boxed{\text{i and iii are correct (C)}} \]
Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 states that a lease of immovable property is a transfer of a right to enjoy such property under certain conditions.
The right to ‘enjoy such property’:
Show Hint
- Includes the right to carry on mining operation in the surface of the land
- Includes the right to carry on mining operation in the sub-soil of the land
- Includes the right to extract the specified quantity of the minerals found therein, to remove and appropriate that mineral
- All the above
The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Understanding Section 105.
A lease is a transfer of a right to enjoy the property, which may include surface rights, sub-soil rights, and rights to extract resources, if expressly included in the lease terms.
Step 2: Mining and subsoil.
If the lease is for mining, it includes:
Surface mining rights.
Sub-soil mineral extraction rights.
Rights to remove and appropriate extracted minerals.
Step 3: Elimination.
Since each of (A), (B), and (C) is correct, the comprehensive answer is (D) — All the above. \[ \boxed{\text{All the above (D)}} \]
The need for environmental clearance under the Environment Protection Act, 1986 is required for a project of coal mining:
Show Hint
- In all lands whether privately, community, or publicly owned
- Only in lands owned by the Union Government
- Only in lands owned by the State Government
- Only where sustainability is threatened
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Under the Environment (Protection) Act and the EIA Notification, 2006, certain activities — including coal mining beyond a specified capacity — require prior Environmental Clearance (EC) from MoEF&CC.
Step 2: Ownership is irrelevant.
The law applies irrespective of whether the land is private, community-owned, or state-owned — the clearance is based on environmental impact, not ownership.
Step 3: Eliminate options.
(B) and (C) are wrong because they limit EC only to government-owned lands.
(D) is wrong because sustainability assessment is inherent in EC, not an optional trigger.
\[ \boxed{\text{In all lands whether privately, community, or publicly owned (A)}} \]
The Constitution of India provides that all properties within the territory of India that do not have a lawful heir, successor or rightful owner, accrue to the Union or State where it is situate through:
Show Hint
- Escheat
- Lapse
- Bona vacantia
- All the above
The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Definitions.
Escheat — Property reverts to the State in absence of legal heirs.
Lapse — End of rights due to expiry of the grant or failure of conditions.
Bona vacantia — Ownerless property that passes to the State.
Step 2: Constitutional basis.
Article 296 of the Constitution provides that such property shall vest in the Union or State where it is located.
Step 3: Comprehensive coverage.
Since the question covers all three scenarios, the answer is (D) — All the above. \[ \boxed{\text{All the above (D)}} \]
Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
1. Conservative Approach:
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
- US Position: Prioritizes its own interests, supports better management and the creation of an Inspector General, favours enlarging the Security Council (to include Germany and Japan, mainly for financing peace-keeping), and associates the UN with regional organizations like NATO for peace enforcement. The US remains reluctant to allow full application of Chapter VII and views collective security restrictively.
- Secretary-General’s Position (Boutros Ghali): Advocated for the full implementation of ’collective security’ as envisaged in 1945, including the use of the Military Staff Committee (Article 47) and the conclusion of special agreements (Article 43) for providing armed forces. He also proposed ’peace enforcement units’ under the command of the Secretary-General and wider use of ’preventive diplomacy’. The report candidly recognized the Security Council’s incapacity to deal with threats from a major power.
2. Radical Approach:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
- Establishing an Economic Security Council.
- Modifying the Charter with less reluctance.
- Reforming the IMF and World Bank.
- Developing a new global security system .
- The creation of a consultative parliamentary assembly at the world level.
Future Outlook:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
- CLAT PG - 2026
- International Law
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
- “The law is well settled that a constitutional court can award monetary compen sation against the State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining dam ages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining the compensation payable in private tort claims are not as such applicable when a constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is a viola tion of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.
... In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416], a Constitution Bench of this Court held that there is no straitjacket formula for computation of damages and we find that there is no uniformity or yardstick followed in awarding damages for violation of fundamental rights. In Rudul Sah case [Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141] this Court used the terminology ’palliative’ for measuring the damages and the formula of ’adhoc’ was applied. In Sebastian Hongray case [Se bastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 82] the expression used by this Court for determining the monetary compensation was ’exemplary’ costs and the formula adopted was ’punitive’. In Bhim Singh case [Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, (1985) 4 SCC 677], the expression used by the Court was ’compensation’ and the method adopted was ’tortious formula’. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416] the expression used by this Court for determining the compensation was ’monetary compensation’. The formula adopted was ’cost to cost’ method. Courts have not, therefore, adopted a uniform criterion since no statutory formula has been laid down.”
tracted from: Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association (2011) 14 SCC 481- CLAT PG - 2026
- Constitutional Laws
- It is well recognized that actionable negligence in context of medical profession involves three constituents (i) duty to exercise due care; (ii) breach of duty and (iii) consequential damage. However, a simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident is not sufficient proof of negligence on part of the medical professional so long as the doctor follows the acceptable practice of the medical profession in discharge of his duties. He cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative treatment or course of treatment was available or that more skilled doctors were there who could have administered better treatment.
A medical professional may be held liable for negligence only when he is not pos sessed with the requisite qualification or skill or when he fails to exercise reasonable skill which he possesses in giving the treatment. None of the above two essential conditions for establishing negligence stand satisfied in the case at hand as no ev idence was brought on record to prove that Dr. Neeraj Sud had not exercised due diligence, care or skill which he possessed in operating the patient and giving treatment to him. When reasonable care, expected of the medical professional, is extended or rendered to the patient unless contrary is proved, it would not be a case for actionable negligence.
tracted with edits and revisions from Neeraj Sud v Jaswinder Singh 2024 INSC 825- CLAT PG - 2026
- Law of Torts