Question

According to the Supreme Court's interpretation of Section 2(k)(i) of the Factories Act, 1948, the business of a laundry service involving cleaning and washing of clothes is considered a "manufacturing process" primarily because it involves:

• A. Producing a new marketable commodity through transformation.
• B. Washing or cleaning any article or substance with a view to its delivery or use.
• C. Carrying on a service and not a manufacturing activity.
• D. Employing more than 50 workers, regardless of the activity.
• A. Rule of Literal Interpretation.
• B. Doctrine of Stare Decisis.
• C. Liberal and Beneficial Construction.
• D. Rule of Ejusdem Generis.
• A. The 1948 Act introduced the concept of "power" being used in the process.
• B. The 1948 Act included the words 'washing, cleaning', which were absent in the 1934 Act.
• C. The 1948 Act removed the exemption for mobile units of the armed forces.
• D. The 1948 Act lowered the minimum age of employment for children.
• A. Twenty or more workers are working without the aid of power.
• B. Ten or more workers are working, and a manufacturing process is carried on with the aid of power.
• C. Less than ten workers are working, but the process involves hazardous substances.
• D. It is a hotel, restaurant, or eating place.
• A. The Triplex Dry Cleaners case was decided under the Shops and Establishments Act, not the Factories Act.
• B. The Triplex Dry Cleaners case was decided before the definition of "manufacturing process" under the Factories Act, 1948, was incorporated into the Employees State Insurance Act (ESIC Act).
• C. The Triplex Dry Cleaners case dealt with washing, not dry cleaning.
• D. The ESIC Act was a penal statute, while the Factories Act, 1948, is a welfare statute.

Answer 1

The Correct Option is B

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks for the primary reason, based on the provided passage, why a laundry service is considered a "manufacturing process" under the Factories Act, 1948.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The passage explicitly addresses this point. It quotes the definition from the Act and applies it to the laundry business.
The key sentences are:


"The Act of 1948 defines 'manufacturing process' and we clearly find that 'washing, cleaning' and the activities carried out by the respondent with a view to its use, delivery or disposal are squarely attracted."

"'Manufacturing process' has been defined to mean any process for washing or cleaning with a view to its use, sale, transport, delivery or disposal."

This directly matches the wording of option (B). The court's reasoning is not that a new commodity is produced (A), but that the specific act of "washing or cleaning" for delivery or use is explicitly included in the statutory definition. Option (C) is what the respondent argued and the court rejected. Option (D) relates to the definition of a 'factory', not a 'manufacturing process'.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The Supreme Court's reasoning, as stated in the passage, is that the definition of "manufacturing process" in the Factories Act explicitly includes the act of washing or cleaning an article for its use or delivery.

Answer 2

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks about the specific rule of interpretation that courts apply to the Factories Act, 1948, due to its character as a piece of legislation.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The Factories Act, 1948, is a social welfare legislation. Its primary purpose is to protect the health, safety, and welfare of workers in factories. It is a well-established principle of statutory interpretation that social welfare and labour laws should be interpreted liberally to advance the object of the legislation and benefit the class of persons for whom the law was made (in this case, workers). This approach is known as the rule of Beneficial Construction or Liberal Construction.


(A) Rule of Literal Interpretation: This rule is applied when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. However, for welfare legislations, courts often depart from a strict literal meaning to achieve the statute's purpose.

(B) Doctrine of Stare Decisis: This means to stand by things decided; it is the principle of following precedent, not a rule of interpreting the text of a statute itself.

(C) Liberal and Beneficial Construction: This is the correct rule for interpreting welfare statutes like the Factories Act, to ensure the intended benefits reach the workers.

(D) Rule of Ejusdem Generis: This rule applies when general words follow specific words in a list, and it limits the general words to the same class as the specific ones. It is not the general rule for interpreting the entire Act.

Step 3: Final Answer:
The Factories Act, 1948, being a welfare legislation, must be interpreted using the rule of Liberal and Beneficial Construction.

Answer 3

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks to identify a key change in the definition of "manufacturing process" introduced by the Factories Act, 1948, when compared to the earlier 1934 Act. This change was identified by the Supreme Court using the Mischief Rule (which looks at the problem the new law was trying to solve).
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The Mischief Rule (or Heydon's case rule) requires the court to consider four things: 1) What was the common law before the Act? 2) What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? 3) What remedy the Parliament has resolved and appointed to cure the disease of the commonwealth? 4) The true reason of the remedy.
Applying this, the definition of "manufacturing process" in Section 2(g) of the 1934 Act was much narrower. The 1948 Act was enacted to remedy the defects and widen the scope of worker protection. One of the key changes in Section 2(k) of the 1948 Act was the explicit inclusion of processes that don't necessarily 'make' a new article but 'treat' or 'adapt' it. The inclusion of words like "washing, cleaning, repairing, ornamenting, finishing, packing..." significantly broadened the definition. The specific inclusion of "washing, cleaning" was a crucial expansion, which is the subject of the comprehension passage itself.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The critical difference was the expansion of the definition in the 1948 Act to include processes like 'washing, cleaning', which were not present in the 1934 Act's definition.

Answer 4

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks for the specific conditions that define a "factory" under Section 2(m)(i) of the Factories Act, 1948.
Step 2: Key Formula or Approach:
The definition of "factory" is given in Section 2(m) of the Act, which has two main clauses. We need to identify the contents of clause (i).
Step 3: Detailed Explanation:
Section 2(m) of the Factories Act, 1948 defines "factory" as any premises including the precincts thereof—


(i) whereon ten or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on with the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on, or

(ii) whereon twenty or more workers are working, or were working on any day of the preceding twelve months, and in any part of which a manufacturing process is being carried on without the aid of power, or is ordinarily so carried on.

The question specifically asks about Section 2(m)(i). This corresponds exactly to option (B). Option (A) corresponds to Section 2(m)(ii). Options (C) and (D) are incorrect; hotels and restaurants are explicitly excluded from the definition of a factory.
Step 4: Final Answer:
The correct definition of a factory under Section 2(m)(i) is a premises with ten or more workers where a manufacturing process is carried on with the aid of power.

Answer 5

Step 1: Understanding the Question:
The question asks for the reason why the Supreme Court distinguished the present case (under the Factories Act) from a previous High Court judgment in *Triplex Dry Cleaners* (which was under the ESIC Act).
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
This question requires an understanding of the principles of legal interpretation and the nature of different statutes. While both the Factories Act and the ESIC Act are welfare legislations, courts sometimes draw distinctions based on the specific context or perceived nature of the provisions being invoked. The case mentioned in the passage, *State of Goa v. Namita Tripathi*, involved a complaint and potential prosecution under the Factories Act for non-compliance. In this context, the provisions of the Factories Act could be seen as having a penal aspect (imposing penalties for violations).
In legal reasoning, a judgment rendered under one statute may not be a binding precedent for a case under another statute if the objects and purposes of the two acts are different. The court in the *Namita Tripathi* case likely distinguished the *Triplex Dry Cleaners* case by highlighting the difference in the statutory context. Option (D) points out a possible interpretive distinction made by the court: treating the ESIC Act in that specific context as a welfare statute (requiring liberal interpretation for coverage) and the provision of the Factories Act being invoked as having penal consequences (requiring a stricter interpretation). While both are broadly welfare laws, this distinction in their application (benefit-conferring vs. penalty-imposing) is a valid ground for distinguishing precedents. The other options are less likely to be correct. The definition of 'manufacturing process' from the Factories Act has long been relevant to the ESIC Act.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The most plausible legal reasoning for distinguishing a precedent from a different statute is the difference in the nature and purpose of the specific provisions of the statutes in question. Option (D) provides such a distinction.