Comprehension
Our society is governed by the Constitution. The values of constitutional morality are a non-derogable entitlement. Notions of “purity and pollution”, which stigmatise individuals, can have no place in a constitutional regime. Regarding menstruation as polluting or impure, and worse still, imposing exclusionary disabilities on the basis of menstrual status, is against the dignity of women which is guaranteed by the Constitution. Practices which legitimise menstrual taboos, due to notions of “purity and pollution”, limit the ability of menstruating women to attain the freedom of movement, the right to education and the right of entry to places of worship and, eventually, their access to the public sphere. Women have a right to control their own bodies. The menstrual status of a woman is an attribute of her privacy and person. Women have a constitutional entitlement that their biological processes must be free from social and religious practices, which enforce segregation and exclusion. These practices result in humiliation and a violation of dignity.
Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner.
But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1]
Article 17 prohibits the practice of “untouchability”, which is based on notions of purity and impurity, “in any form”. Article 17 certainly applies to untouchability practices in relation to lower castes, but it will also apply to the systemic humiliation, exclusion and subjugation faced by women. Prejudice against women based on notions of impurity and pollution associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women, based on menstrual status, is but a form of untouchability which is an anathema to constitutional values. As an expression of the anti-exclusion principle, Article 17 cannot be read to exclude women against whom social exclusion of the worst kind has been practised and legitimised on notions of purity and pollution. Article 17 cannot be read in a restricted manner.
But even if Article 17 were to be read to reflect a particular form of untouchability, that Article will not exhaust the guarantee against other forms of social exclusion. The guarantee against social exclusion would emanate from other provisions of Part III, including Articles 15(2) and 21. Exclusion of women between the age group of ten and fifty, based on their menstrual status, from entering the temple in Sabarimala can have no place in a constitutional order founded on liberty and dignity.
[Extracted from Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, (2019) 11 SCC 1]
Question: 1
In IYLA, the Supreme Court held that the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa:
In IYLA, the Supreme Court held that the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa:
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For Article 26 protection, a religious denomination must have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure. Mere shared faith or social recognition does not suffice.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- are not a religious denomination because they have not registered themselves as such
- are not a religious denomination because they do not have a distinct name, a common set of beliefs, and a common organisational structure
- are a religious denomination because they have been recognised as such by the state
- are a religious denomination because they have consistently been treated as such by themselves as well as by society in general
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Understanding the legal context.
The question is based on the case Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2019), in which the Supreme Court examined whether the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala qualified as a “religious denomination” under Article 26 of the Indian Constitution. Step 2: Criteria for a religious denomination.
The Supreme Court, relying on prior jurisprudence, has clarified that to qualify as a religious denomination, a group must have: A distinct name,
A common set of beliefs, and
A common organisational structure.
Step 3: Application to the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa.
While Lord Ayyappa’s devotees share the Hindu faith and follow certain traditions, they do not form an entirely separate sect or denomination with an independent organisational structure or a distinctly recognised name. Their practices are part of a larger Hindu tradition and not a distinct, self-contained religious denomination. Step 4: Elimination of incorrect options.
(A) Incorrect — Registration is not a constitutional requirement for being a denomination.
(C) Incorrect — Recognition by the state is not the sole criterion; the group must independently satisfy the three essential features.
(D) Incorrect — Being treated as such by society is insufficient without meeting the definitional requirements.
Thus, option (B) is correct. \[ \boxed{\text{Not a religious denomination — no distinct name, beliefs, organisation}} \]
The question is based on the case Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala (2019), in which the Supreme Court examined whether the devotees of Lord Ayyappa at Sabarimala qualified as a “religious denomination” under Article 26 of the Indian Constitution. Step 2: Criteria for a religious denomination.
The Supreme Court, relying on prior jurisprudence, has clarified that to qualify as a religious denomination, a group must have: A distinct name,
A common set of beliefs, and
A common organisational structure.
Step 3: Application to the worshippers of Lord Ayyappa.
While Lord Ayyappa’s devotees share the Hindu faith and follow certain traditions, they do not form an entirely separate sect or denomination with an independent organisational structure or a distinctly recognised name. Their practices are part of a larger Hindu tradition and not a distinct, self-contained religious denomination. Step 4: Elimination of incorrect options.
(A) Incorrect — Registration is not a constitutional requirement for being a denomination.
(C) Incorrect — Recognition by the state is not the sole criterion; the group must independently satisfy the three essential features.
(D) Incorrect — Being treated as such by society is insufficient without meeting the definitional requirements.
Thus, option (B) is correct. \[ \boxed{\text{Not a religious denomination — no distinct name, beliefs, organisation}} \]
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Question: 2
The Supreme Court determined whether a religious practice falls within Article 25 using the:
The Supreme Court determined whether a religious practice falls within Article 25 using the:
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In Indian constitutional law, ERP is central for Article 25 cases — it examines necessity to the religion, not just popularity or tradition.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Essential Religious Practice Test
- Sincerity of Belief Test
- Proportionality Test
- Constitutional Morality Test
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The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Context of Article 25.
Article 25 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality, health, and other provisions of Part III. Step 2: The test used by courts.
To decide whether a practice is constitutionally protected as part of a religion, the judiciary applies the Essential Religious Practice (ERP) Test. This test asks: “Is the practice in question fundamental to the religion itself, without which the religion’s identity would be altered?”
Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(B) Sincerity of Belief Test — This is used in some jurisdictions like the USA to examine if an individual genuinely holds a belief, but in India, ERP is the established test for Article 25 scope.
(C) Proportionality Test — Applied in balancing rights against restrictions (e.g., privacy cases), not specifically for identifying essential religious practices.
(D) Constitutional Morality Test — Used for judging the constitutional validity of practices vis-à-vis principles like equality, not for determining if a practice qualifies under Article 25.
\[ \boxed{\text{Essential Religious Practice Test}} \]
Article 25 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practice, and propagate religion — subject to public order, morality, health, and other provisions of Part III. Step 2: The test used by courts.
To decide whether a practice is constitutionally protected as part of a religion, the judiciary applies the Essential Religious Practice (ERP) Test. This test asks: “Is the practice in question fundamental to the religion itself, without which the religion’s identity would be altered?”
Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(B) Sincerity of Belief Test — This is used in some jurisdictions like the USA to examine if an individual genuinely holds a belief, but in India, ERP is the established test for Article 25 scope.
(C) Proportionality Test — Applied in balancing rights against restrictions (e.g., privacy cases), not specifically for identifying essential religious practices.
(D) Constitutional Morality Test — Used for judging the constitutional validity of practices vis-à-vis principles like equality, not for determining if a practice qualifies under Article 25.
\[ \boxed{\text{Essential Religious Practice Test}} \]
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Question: 3
Parliament gave effect to Article 17 by enacting:
Parliament gave effect to Article 17 by enacting:
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Always connect an Article with its enforcing statute — Article 17’s enforcement law is the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- The Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951
- The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955
- The Constitutional Offences Act, 1951
- The Untouchability Offences (Prohibition, Protection, and Remedies) Act, 1950
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Understanding Article 17.
Article 17 abolishes “untouchability” and forbids its practice in any form. Parliament is empowered to enact a law to give effect to this abolition. Step 2: Legislative implementation.
Initially, the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 was passed to penalise acts of untouchability. In 1976, it was renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 with amendments to make it more effective. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) — There is no legislation called “Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951.”
(C) — “Constitutional Offences Act, 1951” does not exist.
(D) — “Untouchability Offences…” is a misstatement of the 1955 Act’s old name.
\[ \boxed{\text{The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955}} \]
Article 17 abolishes “untouchability” and forbids its practice in any form. Parliament is empowered to enact a law to give effect to this abolition. Step 2: Legislative implementation.
Initially, the Untouchability (Offences) Act, 1955 was passed to penalise acts of untouchability. In 1976, it was renamed the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 with amendments to make it more effective. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) — There is no legislation called “Abolition of Untouchability Act, 1951.”
(C) — “Constitutional Offences Act, 1951” does not exist.
(D) — “Untouchability Offences…” is a misstatement of the 1955 Act’s old name.
\[ \boxed{\text{The Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955}} \]
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Question: 4
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s reliance on Constituent Assembly Debates to determine the scope of Article 17 is best explained by this method of constitutional interpretation:
Justice D.Y. Chandrachud’s reliance on Constituent Assembly Debates to determine the scope of Article 17 is best explained by this method of constitutional interpretation:
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When judgments cite Constituent Assembly Debates to explain meaning, they are usually applying Originalist interpretation.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Living Constitutionalism
- Originalism
- Structuralism
- Textualism
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: What is Originalism?
Originalism interprets constitutional provisions in light of the original intent or understanding of the framers at the time the Constitution was adopted. Step 2: Why it applies here.
Justice Chandrachud examined the Constituent Assembly Debates to determine what the framers intended for Article 17’s scope — a hallmark of Originalism. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) Living Constitutionalism — Interprets provisions as evolving with time, not primarily based on framers’ original intent.
(C) Structuralism — Deduces meaning from the structure of the Constitution as a whole, not specific historical debates.
(D) Textualism — Focuses strictly on the text’s plain meaning without delving into historical intent.
\[ \boxed{\text{Originalism}} \]
Originalism interprets constitutional provisions in light of the original intent or understanding of the framers at the time the Constitution was adopted. Step 2: Why it applies here.
Justice Chandrachud examined the Constituent Assembly Debates to determine what the framers intended for Article 17’s scope — a hallmark of Originalism. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) Living Constitutionalism — Interprets provisions as evolving with time, not primarily based on framers’ original intent.
(C) Structuralism — Deduces meaning from the structure of the Constitution as a whole, not specific historical debates.
(D) Textualism — Focuses strictly on the text’s plain meaning without delving into historical intent.
\[ \boxed{\text{Originalism}} \]
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Question: 5
In IYLA, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud held that Article 17 has:
In IYLA, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud held that Article 17 has:
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Some fundamental rights (like Art. 17, 23) apply horizontally, protecting individuals against other individuals, not just the state.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Vertical application
- Horizontal application
- Indirect horizontal application
- None of the above
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Meaning of horizontal vs vertical application.
Vertical application — applies only between individuals and the state. Horizontal application — applies between private parties as well. Step 2: Justice Chandrachud’s interpretation.
He held that Article 17’s guarantee against untouchability applies horizontally, meaning it binds not just the state but also private individuals, social groups, and institutions. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) — This would limit Article 17 to state action, contrary to the judgment.
(C) — Indirect horizontal application is not what Chandrachud J. stated; it was a direct horizontal effect.
(D) — Not correct since a specific answer exists.
\[ \boxed{\text{Horizontal application}} \]
Vertical application — applies only between individuals and the state. Horizontal application — applies between private parties as well. Step 2: Justice Chandrachud’s interpretation.
He held that Article 17’s guarantee against untouchability applies horizontally, meaning it binds not just the state but also private individuals, social groups, and institutions. Step 3: Elimination of wrong options.
(A) — This would limit Article 17 to state action, contrary to the judgment.
(C) — Indirect horizontal application is not what Chandrachud J. stated; it was a direct horizontal effect.
(D) — Not correct since a specific answer exists.
\[ \boxed{\text{Horizontal application}} \]
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Question: 6
In the review petition against this judgment, the Supreme Court has framed which of the following questions for determination by a 9-judge bench?
In the review petition against this judgment, the Supreme Court has framed which of the following questions for determination by a 9-judge bench?
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When multiple listed issues are part of the same reference, “All the above” is correct if each statement is factually true.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Scope of “public order, morality and health” in Article 25(1)
- Scope of expression “section of Hindus” in Article 25(2)(b)
- Scope of “judicial recognition” to PILs filed by people not belonging to a religious denomination to contest a religious practice
- All the above
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The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The 9-judge bench in the Sabarimala review framed broad questions touching multiple constitutional issues, including:
The meaning of “public order, morality and health” in Art. 25(1).
Who qualifies as a “section of Hindus” under Art. 25(2)(b).
Whether non-members of a religious denomination can maintain PILs challenging religious practices.
Since all three were included, the correct answer is (D). \[ \boxed{\text{All the above}} \]
Who qualifies as a “section of Hindus” under Art. 25(2)(b).
Whether non-members of a religious denomination can maintain PILs challenging religious practices.
Since all three were included, the correct answer is (D). \[ \boxed{\text{All the above}} \]
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Question: 7
Which judge on the bench in IYLA disagreed with Justice Chandrachud on the application of Article 17?
Which judge on the bench in IYLA disagreed with Justice Chandrachud on the application of Article 17?
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Remember the lone dissent in Sabarimala (IYLA) — Justice Indu Malhotra — as a key point for both constitutional law and judicial opinions.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Justice R.F. Nariman
- Justice Dipak Misra
- Justice Indu Malhotra
- None of the above
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
In the Indian Young Lawyers Association (IYLA) case, the constitutional bench deliberated on the application of Article 17 regarding untouchability and its possibly broader implications beyond caste discrimination, incorporating menstrual discrimination as well. Justice Chandrachud propounded that Article 17 should encompass practices excluding women based on menstruation, equating these actions with untouchability. Justice Indu Malhotra, however, disagreed with this proposition, becoming the dissenting voice on the bench. She argued for a more restricted interpretation of Article 17, contending that it traditionally related to caste-based discrimination and should not be extended to encompass menstrual discrimination. Therefore, the judge who disagreed with Justice Chandrachud on the application of Article 17 was Justice Indu Malhotra.
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Question: 8
In reaching his conclusion on the scope of Article 17, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud cited which of the following works of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar?
In reaching his conclusion on the scope of Article 17, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud cited which of the following works of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar?
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When a question asks “which work of Ambedkar…”, first verify authorship. Ambedkar’s key texts often cited by courts include Annihilation of Caste and Who Were the Shudras?
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Coming out as Dalit
- Goolami
- Annihilation of Caste
- All the above
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
In reaching his conclusion on the scope of Article 17, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud cited "Annihilation of Caste" by Dr. B.R. Ambedkar.
Article 17 of the Indian Constitution explicitly prohibits the practice of "untouchability" in any form. This article has been interpreted to extend not only to caste-based discrimination but also to systemic forms of social exclusion, such as those faced by women. In the judgement of the Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, it was emphasized that practices stigmatizing individuals on notions of "purity and pollution" are unconstitutional, as they violate the dignity and liberty protected by the Constitution.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar's "Annihilation of Caste" is a seminal work that critiques the caste system and advocates for the eradication of caste-based discrimination. This work is relevant in understanding the broad intent behind Article 17, as it aligns with the principles of equality and non-discrimination enshrined in the Constitution.
The judgement further states that even if Article 17 were interpreted narrowly, other constitutional provisions such as Articles 15(2) and 21 would provide protection against social exclusion. Therefore, practices based on menstrual status that exclude women are a form of untouchability, which contradicts constitutional values.
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Question: 9
In the passage above, what does the term “non-derogable” mean?
In the passage above, what does the term “non-derogable” mean?
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Remember: non-derogable $\equiv$ non-suspendable. Even emergency powers cannot lawfully curtail such rights.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Cannot be extracted under any circumstances
- Cannot be precisely determined
- Cannot be infringed under any circumstances
- None of the above
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The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
In the passage, the term "non-derogable" refers to rights or values that cannot be overridden or dismissed under any circumstances. These are fundamental entitlements guaranteed by the Constitution that must always be upheld. The passage emphasizes the non-derogable nature of constitutional morality, which prohibits discrimination based on concepts of purity and pollution, ensuring dignity and equality for all individuals. The correct definition of "non-derogable" in this context is "Cannot be infringed under any circumstances." This aligns with the explanation given in the passage, where certain rights related to dignity and freedom are described as inviolable and protected by constitutional provisions such as Article 17. Therefore, the correct answer is: "Cannot be infringed under any circumstances."
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Question: 10
The petition filed by the Indian Young Lawyers Association in this case was a:
The petition filed by the Indian Young Lawyers Association in this case was a:
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When a case originates in the Supreme Court to enforce fundamental rights for a class of persons (not a private dispute or an appeal), it is typically a PIL under Article 32.
Updated On: Aug 17, 2025
- Special Leave Petition from the decision of the Kerala High Court
- Public Interest Litigation
- Writ Appeal from a petition filed under Article 226
- None of the above
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The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Identify the procedural posture.
Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala was initiated directly before the Supreme Court as a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) under Article 32, seeking enforcement of fundamental rights (women’s entry into Sabarimala temple).
Step 2: Distinguish each option.
SLP (Option A): A Special Leave Petition (Art. 136) challenges a decision of a lower court/tribunal. Here, the matter was not an appeal from the Kerala High Court; it was a direct petition.
Writ Appeal (Option C): This is an intra-court appeal in High Courts against a Single Judge’s writ order under Art. 226. Not applicable because proceedings began in the Supreme Court.
PIL (Option B): Suits filed for broader public interest, especially to vindicate fundamental rights under Arts. 32/226. IYLA fits this description.
Step 3: Conclude.
Therefore, the correct characterisation is PIL. \[ \boxed{\text{Public Interest Litigation (filed under Article 32)}} \]
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(Extracts from Managing Director, Kerala Tourism Development Corporation Limited v. Deepti Singh and Ors., 2019 SC)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Law of Torts
- Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 475: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 478] it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc. We have few other legislations also where reliefs have been provided to woman placed in certain vulnerable situations. Section 125 Cr.P.C. of course, provides for maintenance of a destitute wife and Section 498-A IPC is related to mental cruelty inflicted on women by her husband and in-laws. Section 304-B IPC deals with the cases relating to dowry death. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was enacted to deal with the cases of dowry demands by the husband and family members. The Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 provides for grant of maintenance to a legally wedded Hindu wife, and also deals with rules for adoption. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 refers to the provisions dealing with solemnisation of marriage also deals with the provisions for divorce. For the first time, though, the DV Act, Parliament has recognised a “relationship in the nature of marriage” and not a live-in relationship simpliciter. We have already stated, when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f ) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship invariably, it may be a question of fact and degree, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the tests judicially evolved.
(This extract is taken from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755)- CLAT PG - 2025
- Family Laws
- The environmental rule of law, at a certain level, is a facet of the concept of the rule of law. But it includes specific features that are unique to environmental governance, features which are sui generis. The environmental rule of law seeks to create essential tools such as conceptual, procedural and institutional, to bring structure to the discourse on environmental protection. It does so to enhance our understanding of environmental challenges of how they have been shaped by humanity’s interface with nature in the past, how they continue to be affected by its engagement with nature in the present and the prospects for the future, if we were not to radically alter the course of destruction which humanity’s actions have charted.
The environmental rule of law seeks to facilitate a multi-disciplinary analysis of the nature and consequences of carbon footprints and in doing so it brings a shared understanding between science, regulatory decisions and policy perspectives in the field of environmental protection. It recognises that the “law” element in the environmental rule of law does not make the concept peculiarly the preserve of Lawyers and Judges. On the contrary, it seeks to draw within the fold all stakeholders in formulating strategies to deal with current challenges posed by environmental degradation, climate change and the destruction of habitats. The environmental rule of law seeks a unified understanding of these concepts. There are significant linkages between concepts such as sustainable development, the polluter pays principle etc. The universe of nature is indivisible and integrated. The state of the environment in one part of the earth affects and is fundamentally affected by what occurs in another part. Every element of the environment shares a symbiotic relationship with the others. It is this inseparable bond and connect which the environmental rule of law seeks to explore and understand in order to find solutions to the pressing problems which threaten the existence of humanity. The environmental rule of law is founded on the need to understand the consequences of our actions going beyond local, State and national boundaries. The rise in the oceans threatens not just maritime communities. The rise in temperatures, dilution of glaciers and growing desertification have consequences which go beyond the communities and creatures whose habitats are threatened. They affect the future survival of the entire eco-system. The environmental rule of law attempts to weave an understanding of the connections in the natural environment which make the issue of survival a unified challenge which confronts human societies everywhere.
(Extract from Pragnesh Shah v. Arunkumar Sharma (2022) 11 SCC 493 )- CLAT PG - 2025
- Environmental Law
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