”Mortgage inter alia means transfer of interest in the specific immovable prop erty for the purpose of securing the money advanced by way of loan. Section 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act provides that a non-testamentary instrument which acknowledges the receipt or payment of any consideration on account of the creation, declaration, assignment, limitation or extension of any such right, ti tle or interest, requires compulsory registration. Mortgage by deposit of title-deeds in terms of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act surely acknowledges the receipt and transfer of interest and, therefore, one may contend that its registration is compulsory.
However, Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act mandates that every mortgage other than a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds can be effected only by a registered instrument. In the face of it, in our opinion, when the debtor deposits with the creditor title-deeds of the property for the purpose of security, it becomes mort gage in terms of Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act and no registered instrument is required under Section 59 thereof as in other classes of mortgage. The essence of mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is handing over by a borrower to the creditor title-deeds of immovable property with the intention that those doc uments shall constitute security, enabling the creditor to recover the money lent. After the deposit of the title-deeds the creditor and borrower may record the trans action in a memorandum but such a memorandum would not be an instrument of mortgage. A memorandum reducing other terms and conditions with regard to the deposit in the form of a document, however, shall require registration under Section 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act, but in a case in which such a document does not incorporate any term and condition, it is merely evidential and does not require registration.”
tracted from: State of Haryana v Narvir Singh (2014) 1 SCC 105
Which of the following is NOT an essential of a mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882:
Show Hint
- It is a transfer of an interest in specific immovable property.
- It is for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan.
- It is always in respect of an existing debt.
- It is in respect of an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability.
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The question asks to identify which of the given options is not an essential element of a mortgage as defined under the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Step 2: Key Formula or Approach:
The definition and essentials of a mortgage are provided in Section 58(a) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Step 3: Detailed Explanation:
Section 58(a) defines a mortgage as "the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary liability."
Let's analyze the options based on this definition:
(A) This is a core essential of a mortgage.
(B) This is also a core essential, describing the purpose of the mortgage.
(D) This correctly states that a mortgage can secure an existing debt, a future debt, or the performance of an engagement leading to a pecuniary liability.
(C) This statement claims that a mortgage is "always" for an existing debt. This is incorrect, as the definition explicitly includes "future debt." Therefore, this is NOT an essential of a mortgage.
Step 4: Final Answer:
The statement that a mortgage is always in respect of an existing debt is incorrect because a mortgage can also be created to secure a future debt.
A mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is a form of mortgage recognised by section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which provides that:
Show Hint
- When the debtor deposits with the creditor the title-deeds of his property with an intent to create a security, the law implies a contract between the parties to create a mortgage, and no registered instrument is required under section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act, as in other forms of mortgage.
- When the debtor deposits with the creditor the title-deeds of his property with an intent to create a security, the implication of law (that there exists a contract between the parties to create a mortgage) is excluded, and a registered instrument is required under section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act.
- When the debtor deposits with the creditor the title-deeds of his property with an intent to create a security, the implication of law (that there exists a contract between the parties to create a mortgage) is excluded, and a registered instrument is required under section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act.
- When the debtor deposits with the creditor the title-deeds of his property with an intent to create a security, the implication of law (that there exists a contract between the parties to create a mortgage) is excluded, and a registered instrument is required under section 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act.
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The question asks to identify the correct legal position regarding a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds as per the Transfer of Property Act.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The provided passage from {State of Haryana v Narvir Singh} clearly explains the legal framework for this type of mortgage, also known as an equitable mortgage.
The passage states: "The essence of mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is handing over by a borrower to the creditor title-deeds of immovable property with the intention that those documents shall constitute security..."
It further clarifies the registration requirement by referencing Section 59: "...Section 59 of the Transfer of Property Act mandates that every mortgage other than a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds can be effected only by a registered instrument... no registered instrument is required under Section 59 thereof as in other classes of mortgage."
This means that the act of depositing title deeds with the intent to create security is sufficient to create the mortgage, and it is a specific exception to the general rule requiring a registered instrument. The law implies a contract of mortgage from this act. Option (A) perfectly encapsulates this legal position. The other options incorrectly state that a registered instrument is required or that the implication of law is excluded.
Step 3: Final Answer:
A mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is created by the act of depositing the deeds with intent to secure a debt, and unlike other mortgages, it does not require a registered instrument.
As per section 96 of the Transfer of Property Act, the provisions which apply to __________ shall, so far as may be, apply to a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds.
Show Hint
- A simple mortgage.
- A mortgage by conditional sale.
- A usufructuary mortgage.
- An English mortgage.
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
This is a direct question asking which type of mortgage's legal provisions are applied to a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, according to Section 96 of the Transfer of Property Act.
Step 2: Key Formula or Approach:
The answer is found by directly referencing the text of Section 96 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
Step 3: Detailed Explanation:
Section 96 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, is titled "Mortgage by deposit of title-deeds". The section states:
"The provisions hereinbefore contained which apply to a simple mortgage shall, so far as may be, apply to a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds."
This means that for matters like the rights and liabilities of the parties, the procedure for foreclosure or sale, etc., a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is treated similarly to a simple mortgage. In a simple mortgage, the mortgagee has the right to cause the mortgaged property to be sold in the event of non-payment, which is the primary remedy available in a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds as well.
Step 4: Final Answer:
The provisions applicable to a simple mortgage also apply to a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds.
The period of limitation for a suit to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property is:
Show Hint
- 30 years.
- 12 years.
- 20 years.
- 3 years.
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
The question asks for the statutory time limit (period of limitation) for filing a lawsuit to recover money that is secured by a mortgage on immovable property.
Step 2: Key Formula or Approach:
The answer is found in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. Specifically, we need to refer to the article governing suits related to mortgages.
Step 3: Detailed Explanation:
Article 62 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, provides the limitation period for such suits.
Description of suit: To enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage or otherwise charged upon immovable property.
Period of limitation: Twelve years.
Time from which period begins to run: When the money sued for becomes due.
The 30-year period mentioned in option (A) typically relates to a suit for foreclosure by a mortgagee (Article 63(a)) or for redemption of a mortgage by a mortgagor. The 3-year period is generally for simple money suits not based on a mortgage.
Step 4: Final Answer:
The period of limitation for a suit to enforce payment of money secured by a mortgage is 12 years.
In a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds, after the deposit of the title-deeds, if the creditor and the borrower choose to record their transaction in a memorandum reducing other terms and conditions (in addition to what flow from the mortgage by deposit of title-deeds) with regard to the deposit in the form of a memorandum/document, then the memorandum/document requires registration under section 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act. In this context which among the following propositions is not correct?
Show Hint
- The deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage.
- The deposit alone is not intended to create the charge and the document, which constitutes the bargain regarding the security, is also necessary and operates to create the charge in conjunction with the deposit.
- The implication of law (that there exists a contract between the parties to create a mortgage) is excluded by their express bargain, and the document becomes the sole evidence of its terms.
- The deposit and the documents do not form integral parts of the transaction and hence they are not essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage.
The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
The question sets up a specific scenario: a mortgage by deposit of title-deeds is followed by a written memorandum that contains the terms and conditions of the bargain. This memorandum, as per the passage and the question, requires registration. The question asks which statement is INCORRECT in this specific scenario.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The passage distinguishes between a simple memorandum that merely records the deposit (which doesn't need registration) and a memorandum that contains the terms and conditions of the loan (which does need registration). The question deals with the second type. When the parties reduce their bargain to writing in a document that requires registration, that document becomes the constitutive instrument of the mortgage, not just an evidence of it.
(A), (B), and (C): These statements correctly describe the legal effect when the bargain is reduced to writing. The written document becomes an integral part of the transaction (A), the charge is created by both the deposit and the document (B), and this express written contract overrides the simple contract implied by law (C). The document becomes the primary evidence of the mortgage.
(D): This statement claims that the deposit and the document are NOT integral parts and NOT essential ingredients. This is the direct opposite of the legal position described in (A), (B), and (C). In the scenario where the memorandum contains the bargain and requires registration, it becomes an essential and integral part of creating the mortgage. Therefore, this statement is incorrect.
Step 3: Final Answer:
Since the memorandum contains the actual terms of the mortgage and requires registration, it is an essential ingredient. The proposition that it is not an essential ingredient is therefore incorrect.
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The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
1. Conservative Approach:
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
- US Position: Prioritizes its own interests, supports better management and the creation of an Inspector General, favours enlarging the Security Council (to include Germany and Japan, mainly for financing peace-keeping), and associates the UN with regional organizations like NATO for peace enforcement. The US remains reluctant to allow full application of Chapter VII and views collective security restrictively.
- Secretary-General’s Position (Boutros Ghali): Advocated for the full implementation of ’collective security’ as envisaged in 1945, including the use of the Military Staff Committee (Article 47) and the conclusion of special agreements (Article 43) for providing armed forces. He also proposed ’peace enforcement units’ under the command of the Secretary-General and wider use of ’preventive diplomacy’. The report candidly recognized the Security Council’s incapacity to deal with threats from a major power.
2. Radical Approach:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
- Establishing an Economic Security Council.
- Modifying the Charter with less reluctance.
- Reforming the IMF and World Bank.
- Developing a new global security system .
- The creation of a consultative parliamentary assembly at the world level.
Future Outlook:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
- CLAT PG - 2026
- International Law
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
- “The law is well settled that a constitutional court can award monetary compen sation against the State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining dam ages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining the compensation payable in private tort claims are not as such applicable when a constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is a viola tion of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.
... In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416], a Constitution Bench of this Court held that there is no straitjacket formula for computation of damages and we find that there is no uniformity or yardstick followed in awarding damages for violation of fundamental rights. In Rudul Sah case [Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141] this Court used the terminology ’palliative’ for measuring the damages and the formula of ’adhoc’ was applied. In Sebastian Hongray case [Se bastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 82] the expression used by this Court for determining the monetary compensation was ’exemplary’ costs and the formula adopted was ’punitive’. In Bhim Singh case [Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, (1985) 4 SCC 677], the expression used by the Court was ’compensation’ and the method adopted was ’tortious formula’. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416] the expression used by this Court for determining the compensation was ’monetary compensation’. The formula adopted was ’cost to cost’ method. Courts have not, therefore, adopted a uniform criterion since no statutory formula has been laid down.”
tracted from: Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association (2011) 14 SCC 481- CLAT PG - 2026
- Constitutional Laws
- It is well recognized that actionable negligence in context of medical profession involves three constituents (i) duty to exercise due care; (ii) breach of duty and (iii) consequential damage. However, a simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident is not sufficient proof of negligence on part of the medical professional so long as the doctor follows the acceptable practice of the medical profession in discharge of his duties. He cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative treatment or course of treatment was available or that more skilled doctors were there who could have administered better treatment.
A medical professional may be held liable for negligence only when he is not pos sessed with the requisite qualification or skill or when he fails to exercise reasonable skill which he possesses in giving the treatment. None of the above two essential conditions for establishing negligence stand satisfied in the case at hand as no ev idence was brought on record to prove that Dr. Neeraj Sud had not exercised due diligence, care or skill which he possessed in operating the patient and giving treatment to him. When reasonable care, expected of the medical professional, is extended or rendered to the patient unless contrary is proved, it would not be a case for actionable negligence.
tracted with edits and revisions from Neeraj Sud v Jaswinder Singh 2024 INSC 825- CLAT PG - 2026
- Law of Torts