Live-in relationship, as such, as already indicated, is a relationship which has not been socially accepted in India, unlike many other countries. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P. [(2006) 5 SCC 475: (2006) 2 SCC (Cri) 478] it was observed that a live-in relationship between two consenting adults of heterosexual sex does not amount to any offence even though it may be perceived as immoral. However, in order to provide a remedy in civil law for protection of women, from being victims of such relationship, and to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the so ciety, first time in India, the DV Act has been enacted to cover the couple having relationship in the nature of marriage, persons related by consanguinity, marriages, etc. ... For the first time, though, the DV Act, Parliament has recognised a “rela tionship in the nature of marriage” and not a live- in relationship simpliciter. We have already stated, when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” within the meaning of Section 2(f) of the DV Act, we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship In variably, it may be a question of fact and degree, whether a relationship between two unrelated persons of the opposite sex meets the tests judicially evolved.
(Extracted with edits and revisions from Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755)
What is the scope of analysis required to determine if a relationship falls within the expression “relationship in the nature of marriage” under Section 2(f) of the DV Act?
Show Hint
- Considering the number of children born in a live in relationship.
- Considering only the cohabitation period of the relationship and their emotional connectivity.
- Conducting a close analysis of the entire interpersonal relationship, taking into account all facets.
- Evaluating only the financial aspects and mutual agreements of the relationship, and if there is any written agreement between the partner.
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
The question asks what kind of examination a court must undertake to decide if a live-in relationship qualifies as a "relationship in the nature of marriage" under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (DV Act).
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The provided passage from {Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma} gives a direct answer. The Supreme Court states: "...when we examine whether a relationship will fall within the expression 'relationship in the nature of marriage' ... we should have a close analysis of the entire relationship Invariably, it may be a question of fact and degree...".
This means the court cannot look at isolated factors. It must conduct a holistic review of the relationship. Option (C) perfectly captures this requirement. Options (A), (B), and (D) are too narrow as they focus on specific aspects (children, cohabitation period, finances) rather than the "entire interpersonal relationship" with "all facets."
Step 3: Final Answer:
The court must conduct a close and holistic analysis of the entire relationship, considering all its facets, to determine if it is 'in the nature of marriage'.
In which of the following cases, the Supreme Court read down the word “adult male" in Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005?
Show Hint
- Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013) 15 SCC 755)
- Hiral P Harsora v. Kusum Harsora, (Manu/SC/1269/2016)
- Uma Narayanan v. Priya Krishna Prasad, (Laws (Mad) 2008-8-28)
- D Velusamy v. D Patchaiammal (AIR 2011 SC 479)
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
This is a direct, knowledge-based question asking to identify the landmark Supreme Court case that struck down the words "adult male" from the definition of "respondent" in the DV Act.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
Section 2(q) of the DV Act originally defined a "respondent" as any "adult male person" who is in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. This meant that a woman could not file a complaint against another woman (e.g., her mother-in-law or sister-in-law) or against a male who was not an adult.
In the case of Hiral P Harsora v. Kusum Harsora (2016), the Supreme Court found this definition to be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The court held that domestic violence is not gender-specific and can be perpetrated by any member of the family, regardless of their gender or age. Consequently, the court struck down the words "adult male" from Section 2(q), making the provision gender-neutral. This means a complaint can now be filed against any person, male or female, adult or minor, who is in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved woman.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The correct case is {Hiral P Harsora v. Kusum Harsora}.
As per section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, while disposing of an application under Section 12(1), the Magistrate may direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to the aggrieved person so that the aggrieved person can:
Show Hint
- Live a life that meets at least the bare minimum needs for survival and basic well. being.
- Live a life that is consistent with her standard of living which she is accustomed.
- Live a life that is consistent with her parent's standard of living.
- Live a life which can cover her medical expenses and expenses incurred due to litigation of domestic violence.
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
The question asks about the standard or purpose of monetary relief that can be granted under Section 20 of the DV Act.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
Section 20 of the DV Act allows the Magistrate to direct the respondent to pay monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered by the aggrieved person. The objective of such relief, particularly the maintenance component, is not just for bare subsistence but to enable the aggrieved person to maintain a lifestyle commensurate with the one she was used to in the shared household.
(A) This describes the standard of "bare subsistence," which is often associated with Section 125 CrPC, but the DV Act aims for a higher standard.
(B) This correctly states the established legal principle. The courts have consistently held that maintenance should befit the standard of living the person was accustomed to. Section 20(2) also states the relief must be "adequate, fair and reasonable and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved person is accustomed."
(C) The parent's standard of living is irrelevant.
(D) While medical and litigation expenses can be covered under Section 20, this option is incomplete. It only lists some components of the relief, whereas option (B) describes the overall guiding principle or standard for the maintenance part of the relief.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The monetary relief under the DV Act is intended to allow the aggrieved person to maintain a standard of living she was accustomed to.
In which case, the three judge bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has recently interpreted the term “shared household” and has held that “...lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship...” have to be given its normal and purposeful meaning. The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household.
Show Hint
- Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, AIR 2020 SC 2483
- Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra AIR 2002 SC 177
- S.R. Batra v. Tarun Batra (2007) 3 SCC 169
- B.R. Mehta Vs. Atma Devi (1987) 4 SCC 183
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The question asks to identify a recent, landmark three-judge bench Supreme Court decision that gave a broad and purposeful interpretation to the term "shared household" under the DV Act.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
The interpretation of "shared household" under Section 2(s) of the DV Act has been a contentious issue.
In the earlier case of S.R. Batra v. Tarun Batra (2007), a two-judge bench had given a very restrictive interpretation, holding that a "shared household" would only mean a house owned or tenanted by the husband, or a house belonging to the joint family of which the husband is a member.
This restrictive view caused significant hardship to women, particularly those living in houses owned by their in-laws.
The issue was reconsidered by a larger three-judge bench in the case of Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja (2020). This bench overruled the decision in *S.R. Batra*. It held that the term "shared household" should be interpreted literally and purposefully. A shared household is where the aggrieved person "lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship," irrespective of whether she has any right, title, or interest in the said household. The court emphasized that the living must have some degree of permanency, not be merely fleeting or casual. The text in the question is a direct reflection of the ratio in this case.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The case that provided this expansive interpretation and overruled *S.R. Batra* is {Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja}.
Under Indian Law, can a woman in a live in relationship claim maintenance under S. 125, CrPC despite not being a legally wedded wife?
Show Hint
- No, as per the interpretation of statute 'wife' means legally wedded wife and includes who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband.
- Yes, a woman in a live in relationship can claim maintenance u/s 125, CrPC as strict proof of marriage is not necessary and maintenance cannot be denied if evidence suggests cohabitation.
- A woman in live in relationship can only claim maintenance if she has been cohabiting for more than five years and dependent children from the relationship.
- A woman in live in relationship can claim maintenance only through a civil suit as the protection of women from domestic violence act 2005 (PWDVA) does not apply to live in relationships.
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
The question asks about the eligibility of a woman in a long-term live-in relationship to claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
Step 2: Detailed Explanation:
Section 125 of the CrPC is a social welfare provision designed to prevent vagrancy and destitution. While the section uses the word "wife," the Supreme Court has interpreted it broadly to achieve the object of the law.
In a series of judgments, including {Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha} and {D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal}, the Supreme Court has held that for the purpose of Section 125 CrPC, a woman who has been in a long-term live-in relationship, which is in the nature of marriage, is entitled to maintenance.
The reasoning is that strict proof of a formal wedding is not required in proceedings under Section 125. If a man and woman have cohabited for a long period as husband and wife, the law will presume them to be married, and the man will be estopped from denying the marriage solely to evade his duty to maintain her.
This makes option (B) the correct statement of the law. Option (A) reflects a very old and outdated literal interpretation. Option (C) imposes arbitrary conditions (like a five-year minimum) that are not required by law. Option (D) is incorrect as Section 125 CrPC provides a direct and speedy remedy.
Step 3: Final Answer:
The law has evolved to allow women in long-term live-in relationships to claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, based on the presumption of marriage arising from prolonged cohabitation.
Top Questions on Family Laws
- Mother’s right to care and custody of a child under Muslim law is known as
- AILET LLM - 2026
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- Consider the given statements:
(i) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the court shall not recognise any pious obligation of a son under the Hindu law to discharge any debt due from his father.
(ii) Right of creditor to proceed against a son to recover any debt due from his father solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law shall not be affected if the debt was contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005.
Choose the correct answer from the options given below.
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Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
1. Conservative Approach:
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
- US Position: Prioritizes its own interests, supports better management and the creation of an Inspector General, favours enlarging the Security Council (to include Germany and Japan, mainly for financing peace-keeping), and associates the UN with regional organizations like NATO for peace enforcement. The US remains reluctant to allow full application of Chapter VII and views collective security restrictively.
- Secretary-General’s Position (Boutros Ghali): Advocated for the full implementation of ’collective security’ as envisaged in 1945, including the use of the Military Staff Committee (Article 47) and the conclusion of special agreements (Article 43) for providing armed forces. He also proposed ’peace enforcement units’ under the command of the Secretary-General and wider use of ’preventive diplomacy’. The report candidly recognized the Security Council’s incapacity to deal with threats from a major power.
2. Radical Approach:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
- Establishing an Economic Security Council.
- Modifying the Charter with less reluctance.
- Reforming the IMF and World Bank.
- Developing a new global security system .
- The creation of a consultative parliamentary assembly at the world level.
Future Outlook:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
- CLAT PG - 2026
- International Law
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
- “The law is well settled that a constitutional court can award monetary compen sation against the State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining dam ages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining the compensation payable in private tort claims are not as such applicable when a constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is a viola tion of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.
... In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416], a Constitution Bench of this Court held that there is no straitjacket formula for computation of damages and we find that there is no uniformity or yardstick followed in awarding damages for violation of fundamental rights. In Rudul Sah case [Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141] this Court used the terminology ’palliative’ for measuring the damages and the formula of ’adhoc’ was applied. In Sebastian Hongray case [Se bastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 82] the expression used by this Court for determining the monetary compensation was ’exemplary’ costs and the formula adopted was ’punitive’. In Bhim Singh case [Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, (1985) 4 SCC 677], the expression used by the Court was ’compensation’ and the method adopted was ’tortious formula’. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416] the expression used by this Court for determining the compensation was ’monetary compensation’. The formula adopted was ’cost to cost’ method. Courts have not, therefore, adopted a uniform criterion since no statutory formula has been laid down.”
tracted from: Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association (2011) 14 SCC 481- CLAT PG - 2026
- Constitutional Laws
- It is well recognized that actionable negligence in context of medical profession involves three constituents (i) duty to exercise due care; (ii) breach of duty and (iii) consequential damage. However, a simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident is not sufficient proof of negligence on part of the medical professional so long as the doctor follows the acceptable practice of the medical profession in discharge of his duties. He cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative treatment or course of treatment was available or that more skilled doctors were there who could have administered better treatment.
A medical professional may be held liable for negligence only when he is not pos sessed with the requisite qualification or skill or when he fails to exercise reasonable skill which he possesses in giving the treatment. None of the above two essential conditions for establishing negligence stand satisfied in the case at hand as no ev idence was brought on record to prove that Dr. Neeraj Sud had not exercised due diligence, care or skill which he possessed in operating the patient and giving treatment to him. When reasonable care, expected of the medical professional, is extended or rendered to the patient unless contrary is proved, it would not be a case for actionable negligence.
tracted with edits and revisions from Neeraj Sud v Jaswinder Singh 2024 INSC 825- CLAT PG - 2026
- Law of Torts