Imagine a world in which artificial intelligence is entrusted with the highest moral responsibilities: sentencing criminals, allocating medical resources, and even mediating conflicts between nations. This might seem like the pinnacle of human progress: an entity unburdened by emotion, prejudice or inconsistency, making ethical decisions with impeccable precision. . . .
Yet beneath this vision of an idealised moral arbiter lies a fundamental question: can a machine understand morality as humans do, or is it confined to a simulacrum of ethical reasoning? AI might replicate human decisions without improving on them, carrying forward the same biases, blind spots and cultural distortions from human moral judgment. In trying to emulate us, it might only reproduce our limitations, not transcend them. But there is a deeper concern. Moral judgment draws on intuition, historical awareness and context qualities that resist formalisation. Ethics may be so embedded in lived experience that any attempt to encode it into formal structures risks flattening its most essential features. If so, AI would merely reflect human shortcomings; it would strip morality of the very depth that makes ethical reflection possible in the first place.
Still, many have tried to formalise ethics, by treating certain moral claims not as conclusions, but as starting points. A classic example comes from utilitarianism, which often takes as a foundational axiom the principle that one should act to maximise overall wellbeing. From this, more specific principles can be derived, for example, that it is right to benefit the greatest number, or that actions should be judged by their consequences for total happiness. As computational resources increase, AI becomes increasingly well-suited to the task of starting from fixed ethical assumptions and reasoning through their implications in complex situations.
But, what exactly, does it mean to formalise something like ethics? The question is easier to grasp by looking at fields in which formal systems have long played a central role. Physics, for instance, has relied on formalisation for centuries. There is no single physical theory that explains everything. Instead, we have many physical theories, each designed to describe specific aspects of the Universe: from the behaviour of quarks and electrons to the motion of galaxies. These theories often diverge. Aristotelian physics, for instance, explained falling objects in terms of natural motion toward Earth’s centre; Newtonian mechanics replaced this with a universal force of gravity. These explanations are not just different; they are incompatible. Yet both share a common structure: they begin with basic postulates assumptions about motion, force or mass– and derive increasingly complex consequences. . . .
Ethical theories have a similar structure. Like physical theories, they attempt to describe a domain– in this case, the moral landscape. They aim to answer questions about which actions are right or wrong, and why. These theories also diverge, and even when they recommend similar actions, such as giving to charity, they justify them in different ways. Ethical theories also often begin with a small set of foundational principles or claims, from which they reason about more complex moral problems.
To solve this question, we need to identify which option cannot be reasonably inferred from the passage. The passage explores the potential of AI in moral decision-making and the limitations and concerns associated with formalizing ethics into AI systems.
The appeal of an AI judge rests on immunity to bribery, partiality, and fatigue; yet the text questions whether procedural cleanliness amounts to moral understanding without lived context and interpretive depth.
By analogy with physics, compact postulates can yield broad predictions across incompatible theories, and ethics can likewise share structure while continuing to diverge rather than close on a single comprehensive framework.
Encoding ethics into fixed structures risks stripping away intuition, history, and context, and if that occurs, the depth that enables reflective judgment disappears. So, machines would mirror our limits rather than exceed them.
With fixed moral starting points and expanding computational resources, the argument forecasts convergence on one ethical system and treats contextual judgment as unnecessary once formal reasoning scales across domains and cultures.
With fixed moral starting points and expanding computational resources, the argument forecasts convergence on one ethical system and treats contextual judgment as unnecessary once formal reasoning scales across domains and cultures.
To determine the option that cannot be reasonably inferred from the passage, we need to analyze each provided option against the content and implications of the passage.
The first option states, "The appeal of an AI judge rests on immunity to bribery, partiality, and fatigue; yet the text questions whether procedural cleanliness amounts to moral understanding without lived context and interpretive depth." The passage discusses AI making ethical decisions without human limitations but questions its ability to truly understand morality as humans do, emphasizing the importance of context and depth. This aligns with the option, making it a reasonable inference.
The second option mentions, "By analogy with physics, compact postulates can yield broad predictions across incompatible theories and ethics can likewise share structure while continuing to diverge rather than close on a single comprehensive framework." The passage compares ethical theories with physical theories, highlighting that despite having common structures, both can diverge into different theories. Thus, this statement aligns with the text.
The third option states, "Encoding ethics into fixed structures risks stripping away intuition, history, and context and, if that occurs, the depth that enables reflective judgment disappears. So, machines would mirror our limits rather than exceed them." The passage explicitly mentions the risk of encoding ethics into fixed structures, which could strip away essential qualities. Therefore, this inference is consistent with the passage.
The incorrect option claims, "With fixed moral starting points and expanding computational resources, the argument forecasts convergence on one ethical system and treats contextual judgment as unnecessary once formal reasoning scales across domains and cultures." This statement suggests that AI could lead to a convergence on one ethical system, downplaying the role of context, which contradicts the passage's argument about the importance of context and the risk of AI merely mirroring human limitations. Hence, it is the correct answer for the "EXCEPT" question.
In conclusion, the correct answer is the fourth option because it incorrectly infers that AI's formal reasoning would lead to a single ethical framework and remove the need for contextual judgment, which goes against the passage's emphasis on the nuances and context needed for true ethical understanding.
The given passage explores the concept of artificial intelligence (AI) being used for high-stakes moral reasoning, like sentencing and resource allocation, and the potential pitfalls in this application. Let's analyze the passage step-by-step and determine which option best summarizes it.
Based on this analysis, the correct option is:
This option effectively captures the essence of the passage by acknowledging both the potential appeal and concerns regarding AI in moral decision-making, the risk of losing nuanced judgment, and the analogy to physics in structuring ethical theories.
The question asks us to summarize the passage provided. The passage discusses the role of AI in making ethical decisions and the possible implications of formalizing ethics into structured AI systems. Let's examine the choices to find the one that best encapsulates the passage's main theme.
Analyzing each option:
Conclusion: Based on the above analysis, Option B is the correct choice as it best summarizes the passage by describing AI's appeal against its moral limitations and the risks of codifying ethics.
The passage compares the field of ethics to physics, suggesting that, like physics, different ethical theories can apply to different aspects of a domain. In this context, the correct assumption for artificial intelligence to utilize this analogy effectively in practice is: "There is a principled way to decide which ethical framework applies to which class of cases, so the system can select the relevant starting points before deriving a recommendation."
Let's break down the solution step-by-step:
Examining the other assumptions:
Thus, the most plausible assumption is that AI navigates through the complex ethical landscape by deciding which ethical framework is relevant to the given case, aligning with the correct answer option.
To determine the correct assumption that must hold for the given passage comparing ethics to physics, let us analyze the context and reasoning provided in the text.
The passage outlines the idea that AI can formalize ethical frameworks and reason from fixed starting points, much like physics theories describe different aspects of the universe. This leads us to explore the assumptions given in this context:
Given this analysis, the correct assumption is: There is a principled way to decide which ethical framework applies to which class of cases, so the system can select the relevant starting points before deriving a recommendation. This assumption enables the comparison to be practical, as it allows AI to use the most suitable ethical framework based on the nature of each case, akin to how different physical theories are applied in physics.
To determine the option that represents the opposite of "utilitarianism," we first need to understand what utilitarianism entails. The principle of utilitarianism is based on maximizing overall happiness or well-being. It prioritizes actions that result in the greatest good for the greatest number of people.
Now, let's evaluate each option to find which one contradicts this principle:
Therefore, the option that most closely represents the opposite of utilitarianism is:
The council followed a priorititarian approach, assigning greater moral weight to improvements for the worst-off rather than to maximizing total welfare across the affected population.
The question asks us to find the option that is the opposite of "utilitarianism". To answer this, we need to understand what utilitarianism is:
Utilitarianism: It is an ethical theory that suggests that the best action is the one that maximizes overall "utility" or "well-being". It emphasizes the outcomes or consequences of actions, and the greater good for the greatest number of people.
Now, let's look at each of the given options to determine which one is the opposite:
Given these considerations, the correct answer is the Prioritarian approach. It focuses on improving the condition of the worst-off, not on maximizing total welfare, which is distinctly different from utilitarianism. Therefore, it is the closest option to being opposite to utilitarianism.
Conclusion: The council followed a priorititarian approach, assigning greater moral weight to improvements for the worst-off rather than to maximising total welfare across the affected population.


When people who are talking don’t share the same culture, knowledge, values, and assumptions, mutual understanding can be especially difficult. Such understanding is possible through the negotiation of meaning. To negotiate meaning with someone, you have to become aware of and respect both the differences in your backgrounds and when these differences are important. You need enough diversity of cultural and personal experience to be aware that divergent world views exist and what they might be like. You also need the flexibility in world view, and a generous tolerance for mistakes, as well as a talent for finding the right metaphor to communicate the relevant parts of unshared experiences or to highlight the shared experiences while demphasizing the others. Metaphorical imagination is a crucial skill in creating rapport and in communicating the nature of unshared experience. This skill consists, in large measure, of the ability to bend your world view and adjust the way you categorize your experiences. Problems of mutual understanding are not exotic; they arise in all extended conversations where understanding is important.
When it really counts, meaning is almost never communicated according to the CONDUIT metaphor, that is, where one person transmits a fixed, clear proposition to another by means of expressions in a common language, where both parties have all the relevant common knowledge, assumptions, values, etc. When the chips are down, meaning is negotiated: you slowly figure out what you have in common, what it is safe to talk about, how you can communicate unshared experience or create a shared vision. With enough flexibility in bending your world view and with luck and charity, you may achieve some mutual understanding.
Communication theories based on the CONDUIT metaphor turn from the pathetic to the evil when they are applied indiscriminately on a large scale, say, in government surveillance or computerized files. There, what is most crucial for real understanding is almost never included, and it is assumed that the words in the file have meaning in themselves—disembodied, objective, understandable meaning. When a society lives by the CONDUITmetaphor on a large scale, misunderstanding, persecution, and much worse are the likely products.
Later, I realized that reviewing the history of nuclear physics served another purpose as well: It gave the lie to the naive belief that the physicists could have come together when nuclear fission was discovered (in Nazi Germany!) and agreed to keep the discovery a secret, thereby sparing humanity such a burden. No. Given the development of nuclear physics up to 1938, development that physicists throughout the world pursued in all innocence of any intention of finding the engine of a new weapon of mass destruction—only one of them, the remarkable Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, took that possibility seriously—the discovery of nuclear fission was inevitable. To stop it, you would have had to stop physics. If German scientists hadn’t made the discovery when they did, French, American, Russian, Italian, or Danish scientists would have done so, almost certainly within days or weeks. They were all working at the same cutting edge, trying to understand the strange results of a simple experiment bombarding uranium with neutrons. Here was no Faustian bargain, as movie directors and other naifs still find it intellectually challenging to imagine. Here was no evil machinery that the noble scientists might hide from the problems and the generals. To the contrary, there was a high insight into how the world works, an energetic reaction, older than the earth, that science had finally devised the instruments and arrangements to coart forth. “Make it seem inevitable,” Louis Pasteur used to advise his students when they prepared to write up their discoveries. But it was. To wish that it might have been ignored or suppressed is barbarous. “Knowledge,” Niels Bohr once noted, “is itself the basis for civilization.” You cannot have the one without the other; the one depends upon the other. Nor can you have only benevolent knowledge; the scientific method doesn’t filter for benevolence. Knowledge has consequences, not always intended, not always comfortable, but always welcome. The earth revolves around the sun, not the sun around the earth. “It is a profound and necessary truth,” Robert Oppenheimer would say, “that the deep things in science are not found because they are useful; they are found because it was possible to find them.”
...Bohr proposed once that the goal of science is not universal truth. Rather, he argued, the modest but relentless goal of science is “the gradual removal of prejudices.” The discovery that the earth revolves around the sun has gradually removed the prejudice that the earth is the center of the universe. The discovery of microbes is gradually removing the prejudice that disease is a punishment from God. The discovery of evolution is gradually removing the prejudice that Homo sapiens is a separate and special creation.
For any natural number $k$, let $a_k = 3^k$. The smallest natural number $m$ for which \[ (a_1)^1 \times (a_2)^2 \times \dots \times (a_{20})^{20} \;<\; a_{21} \times a_{22} \times \dots \times a_{20+m} \] is: