Step 1: Principle in D.C. Wadhwa.
The Supreme Court criticised the practice of repeatedly re-promulgating ordinances without placing them before the legislature. This undermined the role of the legislature as the primary law-making body.
Step 2: Core reasoning.
Re-promulgation amounts to the Executive bypassing the Legislature, thereby usurping legislative functions. Since legislative power is constitutionally vested in legislatures (Arts. 168–212 for states), this practice was labelled a “fraud on the Constitution.”
Step 3: Eliminate distractors.
(B) “Colourable exercise of power” is a possible characterisation but the primary doctrinal basis used was that legislative power rests with legislatures.
(C) is correct in spirit but not the direct holding cited in the case.
\[ \boxed{\text{Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India}} \]
Step 1: Condition under Article 213.
An ordinance can be issued only when the legislature is not in session. In a bicameral state, this means both Houses must not be in session.
Step 2: Why?
The ordinance power is an emergency law-making mechanism meant to deal with situations when immediate action is required, and the normal legislative process is unavailable.
Step 3: Eliminate wrong options.
(B) Emergency is irrelevant; ordinance power is independent of emergency provisions.
(C) President’s Rule shifts law-making to Parliament under Art. 356; the Governor doesn’t exercise ordinance power in that context.
\[ \boxed{\text{Both Houses are not in session}} \]
Step 1: Maximum duration calculation.
An ordinance can be promulgated at any time when the legislature is not in session. It must be laid before the legislature upon reassembly and will cease to operate six weeks after the legislature reconvenes, unless approved.
Step 2: Derivation of 6.5 months.
If the Governor issues an ordinance on the first day after the legislature adjourns for 6 months, that ordinance lasts the adjournment period (6 months) + 6 weeks (1.5 months) after reassembly. Hence, maximum possible life = 6 months + 6 weeks = 6.5 months.
Step 3: Judicial reference.
The Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar case confirms that laying before the legislature is mandatory, and the “cease to operate” clause in Art. 213(2)(a) is strict. \[ \boxed{\text{Six-and-a-half months}} \]
Step 1: Understanding the KK Singh ruling.
The Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) held that the requirement to lay an ordinance before the legislature under Article 213(2) is mandatory. Failure to do so results in the ordinance having no legal effect.
Step 2: Overruling earlier decisions.
Earlier 5-Judge bench rulings had taken a more lenient view, treating such non-laid ordinances as valid until expiration. KK Singh explicitly overruled this.
Step 3: Why Option (A) is correct.
The judgment clarified that non-compliance renders the ordinance void ab initio in terms of enforceability — it cannot produce legal consequences. \[ \boxed{\text{No legal effect if not laid before Legislature as per Art. 213}} \]
Step 1: Ordinance as ‘law’ under Article 13.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held (e.g., in A.K. Roy v. Union of India) that ordinances are “law” within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a). Hence, they are subject to Fundamental Rights review.
Step 2: On prior approval.
(ii) is incorrect: Prior approval of the President is not required in all cases — only in specific circumstances under the provisos to Art. 213(1).
Step 3: On legislative competence.
(iii) is incorrect: Ordinances must conform to the same subject-matter restrictions as any State law under Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule. \[ \boxed{\text{i alone is correct}} \]
Step 1: Governor’s satisfaction under Art. 213(1).
The Constitution requires “satisfaction” of the Governor as a precondition to promulgating an ordinance. This is a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary ordinance-making.
Step 2: Judicial review scope as per KK Singh.
The Court clarified that while the adequacy of material (how much or how strong the evidence is) is not reviewable, the relevancy of the material (whether it has any rational nexus to the urgency requirement) is open to judicial review.
Step 3: Elimination of options.
(A) is incorrect — satisfaction is justiciable. (C) is incorrect — adequacy is non-justiciable. (D) is incorrect — (B) matches the Court’s holding. \[ \boxed{\text{Judicial review limited to relevancy of material — not adequacy.}} \]
Step 1: Understanding “ceases to operate”.
Art. 213(2) uses “ceases to operate” for ordinances post six weeks from reassembly or upon disapproval. The Court explained this phrase does not mean repeal, voidness, or temporary nature — it has its own constitutional connotation.
Step 2: Role of Section 6, General Clauses Act.
Section 6 generally applies on repeal unless excluded. In KK Singh, the Court held that in absence of a savings clause in Art. 213, Section 6 does not automatically preserve rights from a lapsed ordinance.
Step 3: Why all four statements are correct.
All four reflect the majority’s nuanced distinctions: i — Correct: Ceasing is different from voidness. ii — Correct: Different from temporary statutes enacted with fixed expiry. iii — Correct: Different from repeal of permanent law. iv — Correct: No saving without explicit provision. \[ \boxed{\text{All four statements correct as per KK Singh.}} \]