Article 213(2)(a) postulates that an ordinance would cease to operate upon the expiry of a period of six weeks of the reassembly of the legislature. The Oxford English dictionary defines the expression “cease” as : “to stop, give over, discontinue, desist; to come to the end.” P Ramanatha Aiyar’s, The Major Law Lexicon defines the expression “cease” to mean “discontinue or put an end to”. Justice C K Thakker’s Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon defines the word “cease” as meaning: “to put an end to; to stop, to terminate or to discontinue”. The expression has been defined in similar terms in Black’s Law Dictionary.
The expression “cease to operate” in Article 213(2)(a) is attracted in two situations. The first is where a period of six weeks has expired since the reassembling of the legislature. The second situation is where a resolution has been passed by the legislature disapproving of an ordinance. Apart from these two situations that are contemplated by sub-clause (a), sub-clause (b) contemplates that an ordinance may be withdrawn at any time by the Governor. Upon its withdrawal the ordinance would cease to operate as well.
[Extracts from the judgment of majority judgment in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar, Civil Appeal No. 5875 of 1994, decided on January 2, 2017 hereafter ‘KK Singh’]
The power to promulgate an ordinance is an instance of the:
Show Hint
- Executive power of the Governor
- Delegated power of the Governor
- Sovereign prerogative power of the Governor
- None of the above
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The Governor’s ordinance-making power is derived from Article 213 of the Constitution of India. It allows the Governor to promulgate ordinances when the Legislative Assembly (or both Houses in a bicameral state) is not in session.
Step 2: Nature of the power.
Although ordinance-making is a law-making function, it is exercised by the Executive (Governor) on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. Therefore, it is categorised under the Governor’s executive power, not as a delegated legislative power in the usual sense.
Step 3: Elimination of other options.
(B) Delegated power — not correct; this is a constitutional power, not delegated by legislature.
(C) Sovereign prerogative — India does not recognise absolute “Crown-like” prerogatives; all powers stem from the Constitution.
\[ \boxed{\text{Executive power of the Governor}} \]
The Constitution Bench in D.C. Wadhwa v. State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 378 held that re-promulgation of an Ordinance was a ‘fraud on the Constitution’ because:
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- Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India
- It is a colourable exercise of power under the Constitution of India
- The role of the Executive is to implement a law, not make it
- None of the above
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Principle in D.C. Wadhwa.
The Supreme Court criticised the practice of repeatedly re-promulgating ordinances without placing them before the legislature. This undermined the role of the legislature as the primary law-making body.
Step 2: Core reasoning.
Re-promulgation amounts to the Executive bypassing the Legislature, thereby usurping legislative functions. Since legislative power is constitutionally vested in legislatures (Arts. 168–212 for states), this practice was labelled a “fraud on the Constitution.”
Step 3: Eliminate distractors.
(B) “Colourable exercise of power” is a possible characterisation but the primary doctrinal basis used was that legislative power rests with legislatures.
(C) is correct in spirit but not the direct holding cited in the case.
\[ \boxed{\text{Legislative power is vested in the legislatures by the Constitution of India}} \]
In States which are bicameral, the Governor can promulgate an Ordinance only when:
Show Hint
- Both Houses are not in session
- When a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation
- When the state has been placed under President’s rule
- None of the above
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Condition under Article 213.
An ordinance can be issued only when the legislature is not in session. In a bicameral state, this means both Houses must not be in session.
Step 2: Why?
The ordinance power is an emergency law-making mechanism meant to deal with situations when immediate action is required, and the normal legislative process is unavailable.
Step 3: Eliminate wrong options.
(B) Emergency is irrelevant; ordinance power is independent of emergency provisions.
(C) President’s Rule shifts law-making to Parliament under Art. 356; the Governor doesn’t exercise ordinance power in that context.
\[ \boxed{\text{Both Houses are not in session}} \]
Under Article 213, an Ordinance once promulgated by the Governor can remain effective for a maximum period of:
Show Hint
- Six weeks
- Six months
- Six-and-a-half months
- One year
The Correct Option is C
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Maximum duration calculation.
An ordinance can be promulgated at any time when the legislature is not in session. It must be laid before the legislature upon reassembly and will cease to operate six weeks after the legislature reconvenes, unless approved.
Step 2: Derivation of 6.5 months.
If the Governor issues an ordinance on the first day after the legislature adjourns for 6 months, that ordinance lasts the adjournment period (6 months) + 6 weeks (1.5 months) after reassembly. Hence, maximum possible life = 6 months + 6 weeks = 6.5 months.
Step 3: Judicial reference.
The Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar case confirms that laying before the legislature is mandatory, and the “cease to operate” clause in Art. 213(2)(a) is strict. \[ \boxed{\text{Six-and-a-half months}} \]
KK Singh overruled two 5-Judge decisions of the Supreme Court, to hold:
Show Hint
- An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall not have any legal effect and consequences.
- An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be void from the date that it should have obtained approval.
- An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be void from the date the ordinance is replaced by a law made by the Legislature to replace the Ordinance.
- An Ordinance which is not laid before the Legislature in the manner prescribed by Article 213 shall be considered as a temporary statute.
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Understanding the KK Singh ruling.
The Supreme Court in Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar (2017) held that the requirement to lay an ordinance before the legislature under Article 213(2) is mandatory. Failure to do so results in the ordinance having no legal effect.
Step 2: Overruling earlier decisions.
Earlier 5-Judge bench rulings had taken a more lenient view, treating such non-laid ordinances as valid until expiration. KK Singh explicitly overruled this.
Step 3: Why Option (A) is correct.
The judgment clarified that non-compliance renders the ordinance void ab initio in terms of enforceability — it cannot produce legal consequences. \[ \boxed{\text{No legal effect if not laid before Legislature as per Art. 213}} \]
An Ordinance promulgated by the Governor:
i. Shall be treated to be ‘law’ for the purposes of Article 13 of the Constitution of India.
ii. Shall in all cases require the prior approval of the President.
iii. Shall not be constrained by the subject-matter requirements of Article 246 read with the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.
ii. Shall in all cases require the prior approval of the President.
iii. Shall not be constrained by the subject-matter requirements of Article 246 read with the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.
Show Hint
- i alone is correct
- i and ii are correct
- i, ii and iii are correct
- None of the above
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Ordinance as ‘law’ under Article 13.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held (e.g., in A.K. Roy v. Union of India) that ordinances are “law” within the meaning of Article 13(3)(a). Hence, they are subject to Fundamental Rights review.
Step 2: On prior approval.
(ii) is incorrect: Prior approval of the President is not required in all cases — only in specific circumstances under the provisos to Art. 213(1).
Step 3: On legislative competence.
(iii) is incorrect: Ordinances must conform to the same subject-matter restrictions as any State law under Article 246 and the Seventh Schedule. \[ \boxed{\text{i alone is correct}} \]
Article 213 requires the Governor to reserve an Ordinance for the consideration of the President:
i. In all cases when the state is placed under President’s Rule under Article 356.
ii. When the Ordinance pertains to the proviso to Article 304(b) and seeks to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that state.
iii. When the Ordinance is on a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List (of the Seventh Schedule) and which is repugnant to a law made by Parliament.
ii. When the Ordinance pertains to the proviso to Article 304(b) and seeks to impose reasonable restrictions in the public interest on the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse with or within that state.
iii. When the Ordinance is on a matter enumerated in the Concurrent List (of the Seventh Schedule) and which is repugnant to a law made by Parliament.
Show Hint
- i, ii and iii are correct
- i and iii are correct
- i and ii are correct
- None is correct
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
The Governor must reserve an ordinance for President’s consideration in three situations: 1. When a state is under President’s Rule (Art. 356) — i.e., Governor acts under Union’s directions.
2. When ordinance relates to restrictions under Art. 304(b) — this requires President’s sanction.
3. When ordinance is repugnant to an existing Parliamentary law in the Concurrent List — requires President’s assent to be valid.
Step 2: Matching to statements.
All three given statements match the constitutional text exactly, hence all are correct. \[ \boxed{\text{i, ii and iii are correct}} \]
The power of the Governor to promulgate an Ordinance is subject to the Governor being satisfied that “circumstances exist which render it necessary for him to take immediate action.” The 7-judge bench in KK Singh held that the satisfaction of the Governor:
Show Hint
- Is not subject to judicial review since it is a political question
- Is subject to judicial review with regard to the relevancy of the material on which such satisfaction is based
- Is subject to judicial review with regard to the adequacy of materials on which such satisfaction is based
- None of the above
The Correct Option is B
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Governor’s satisfaction under Art. 213(1).
The Constitution requires “satisfaction” of the Governor as a precondition to promulgating an ordinance. This is a constitutional safeguard against arbitrary ordinance-making.
Step 2: Judicial review scope as per KK Singh.
The Court clarified that while the adequacy of material (how much or how strong the evidence is) is not reviewable, the relevancy of the material (whether it has any rational nexus to the urgency requirement) is open to judicial review.
Step 3: Elimination of options.
(A) is incorrect — satisfaction is justiciable. (C) is incorrect — adequacy is non-justiciable. (D) is incorrect — (B) matches the Court’s holding. \[ \boxed{\text{Judicial review limited to relevancy of material — not adequacy.}} \]
Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 protects rights, privileges, obligations and liabilities in cases of repeal of an enactment. The majority in KK Singh held that:
i. An Ordinance that ‘ceases to operate’ is distinct from a law that is void.
ii. An Ordinance that ‘ceases to operate’ is distinct from a temporary statute.
iii. An Ordinance that ‘ceases to operate’ is distinct from a repealed statute.
iv. An Ordinance that ‘ceases to operate’ is not ‘saved’ in the absence of any ‘savings clause’ in Article 213.
ii. An Ordinance that ‘ceases to operate’ is distinct from a temporary statute.
iii. An Ordinance that ‘ceases to operate’ is distinct from a repealed statute.
iv. An Ordinance that ‘ceases to operate’ is not ‘saved’ in the absence of any ‘savings clause’ in Article 213.
Show Hint
- i, ii, and iii are correct
- ii and iii are correct
- i and iii are correct
- All the above are correct
The Correct Option is D
Solution and Explanation
Step 1: Understanding “ceases to operate”.
Art. 213(2) uses “ceases to operate” for ordinances post six weeks from reassembly or upon disapproval. The Court explained this phrase does not mean repeal, voidness, or temporary nature — it has its own constitutional connotation.
Step 2: Role of Section 6, General Clauses Act.
Section 6 generally applies on repeal unless excluded. In KK Singh, the Court held that in absence of a savings clause in Art. 213, Section 6 does not automatically preserve rights from a lapsed ordinance.
Step 3: Why all four statements are correct.
All four reflect the majority’s nuanced distinctions: i — Correct: Ceasing is different from voidness. ii — Correct: Different from temporary statutes enacted with fixed expiry. iii — Correct: Different from repeal of permanent law. iv — Correct: No saving without explicit provision. \[ \boxed{\text{All four statements correct as per KK Singh.}} \]
A resolution by the Legislature disapproving an Ordinance promulgated under Article 213 by the Governor is:
Show Hint
- Statutory in nature and has binding effect upon the Government
- A mere expression of the opinion of the House
- A decision of the House relating to the control of its proceedings
- An exercise of delegated legislation
The Correct Option is A
Solution and Explanation
Under Art. 213(2)(a), if the Legislature passes a resolution disapproving an ordinance, it shall cease to operate from the date of such resolution. Step 2: Nature of the resolution.
Since this outcome is mandated by the Constitution, the resolution is not merely an advisory opinion — it is binding and has statutory force. Step 3: Eliminating other options.
(B) is incorrect — it’s more than an opinion. (C) is incorrect — control of proceedings is irrelevant; effect is constitutional. (D) is incorrect — this is not delegated legislation but a constitutional check. \[ \boxed{\text{Statutory in nature, binding on Government.}} \]
Questions Asked in CLAT PG exam
The document presents a critique of the United Nations (UN) organization, arguing that it has failed to carry out its charter-mandated tasks, specifically to ”maintain international peace and security” and ”to achieve international cooperation” in solving global problems. The author notes growing public frustration with catastrophic humanitarian situations and the failure of peace-keeping operations, leading to widespread scepticism about the possibility of ”revitalization”.
UN Reform Approaches
Discussions on UN reform are divided into two main categories: the conservative approach and the radical approach.
1. Conservative Approach:
The conservative view considers the existing Charter ”practically untouchable” and believes in improving ”collective security” as defined in Chapter VII. Key positions include:
- US Position: Prioritizes its own interests, supports better management and the creation of an Inspector General, favours enlarging the Security Council (to include Germany and Japan, mainly for financing peace-keeping), and associates the UN with regional organizations like NATO for peace enforcement. The US remains reluctant to allow full application of Chapter VII and views collective security restrictively.
- Secretary-General’s Position (Boutros Ghali): Advocated for the full implementation of ’collective security’ as envisaged in 1945, including the use of the Military Staff Committee (Article 47) and the conclusion of special agreements (Article 43) for providing armed forces. He also proposed ’peace enforcement units’ under the command of the Secretary-General and wider use of ’preventive diplomacy’. The report candidly recognized the Security Council’s incapacity to deal with threats from a major power.
2. Radical Approach:
The radical approach criticizes the principles of the present system and proposes an overhaul. It reflects increasing doubts about the value of the Charter’s collective security system, especially in intra-State conflicts. Radical proposals include:
- Establishing an Economic Security Council.
- Modifying the Charter with less reluctance.
- Reforming the IMF and World Bank.
- Developing a new global security system .
- The creation of a consultative parliamentary assembly at the world level.
Future Outlook:
The author asserts that no major or minor reform has any chance of being implemented now, primarily because the Charter’s amendment procedures (requiring a two-thirds majority including all five permanent Security Council members) preclude agreement. However, he concludes that the continuing deterioration of the global situation, driven by economic integration, rising inequality, and intra-State conflicts, will inevitably lead the political establishment to define a new global institutional structure. This future debate will become highly political.
- CLAT PG - 2026
- International Law
“Section 55 of the Indian Contract Act says that when a party to a contract promises to do a certain thing within a specified time but fails to do so, the contract or so much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the promisee if the intention of the parties was, that time should be of the essence of the contract. If time is not the essence of the contract, the contract does not become voidable by the failure to do such thing on or before the specified time but the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned to him by such failure. Further, if in case of a contract voidable on account of the promisor’s failure to perform his promise within the time agreed and the promisee accepts performance of such promise at any time other than that agreed, the promisee cannot claim compensation for any loss occasioned by the non-performance of the promise at the time agreed, unless, at the time of such acceptance he gives notice to the promisor of his intention to do so.
Sections 73 and 74 deal with consequences of breach of contract. Heading of Sec tion 73 is compensation for loss or damage caused by breach of contract. When a contract is broken, the party who suffers by such breach is entitled to receive from the party who has broken the contract compensation for any loss or damage caused to him thereby which naturally arose in the usual course of things from such breach or which the parties knew when they made the contract to be likely to result from the breach of it. On the other hand, Section 74 deals with compen sation for breach of contract where penalty is stipulated for. When a contract is broken, if a sum is mentioned in the contract as the amount to be paid in case of such breach or if the contract contains any other stipulation by way of penalty, the party complaining of the breach is entitled whether or not actually damage or loss is proved to have been caused thereby, to receive from the party who has broken the contract reasonable compensation not exceeding the amount so named or the penalty stipulated for.”
tracted from: Consolidated Construction Consortium Limited v Software Technol ogy Parks of India 2025 INSC 574- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
“Law treats all contracts with equal respect and unless a contract is proved to suffer from any of the vitiating factors, the terms and conditions have to be enforced regardless of the relative strengths and weakness of the parties.
Section 28 of the Contract Act does not bar exclusive jurisdiction clauses. What has been barred is the absolute restriction of any party from approaching a legal forum. The right to legal adjudication cannot be taken away from any party through contract but can be relegated to a set of Courts for the ease of the parties. In the present dispute, the clause does not take away the right of the employee to pursue a legal claim but only restricts the employee to pursue those claims before the courts in Mumbai alone.
... the Court must already have jurisdiction to entertain such a legal claim. This limb pertains to the fact that a contract cannot confer jurisdiction on a court that did not have such a jurisdiction in the first place.”
Extracted from: Rakesh Kumar Verma v HDFC Bank Ltd 2025 INSC 473- CLAT PG - 2026
- Contract Law
- “The law is well settled that a constitutional court can award monetary compen sation against the State and its officials for its failure to safeguard fundamental rights of citizens but there is no system or method to measure the damages caused in such situations. Quite often the courts have a difficult task in determining dam ages in various fact situations. The yardsticks normally adopted for determining the compensation payable in private tort claims are not as such applicable when a constitutional court determines the compensation in cases where there is a viola tion of fundamental rights guaranteed to its citizens.
... In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416], a Constitution Bench of this Court held that there is no straitjacket formula for computation of damages and we find that there is no uniformity or yardstick followed in awarding damages for violation of fundamental rights. In Rudul Sah case [Rudul Sah v. State of Bihar, (1983) 4 SCC 141] this Court used the terminology ’palliative’ for measuring the damages and the formula of ’adhoc’ was applied. In Sebastian Hongray case [Se bastian M. Hongray v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 82] the expression used by this Court for determining the monetary compensation was ’exemplary’ costs and the formula adopted was ’punitive’. In Bhim Singh case [Bhim Singh v. State of J & K, (1985) 4 SCC 677], the expression used by the Court was ’compensation’ and the method adopted was ’tortious formula’. In D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. [(1997) SCC 1 416] the expression used by this Court for determining the compensation was ’monetary compensation’. The formula adopted was ’cost to cost’ method. Courts have not, therefore, adopted a uniform criterion since no statutory formula has been laid down.”
tracted from: Municipal Corporation of Delhi, Delhi v Uphaar Tragedy Victims Association (2011) 14 SCC 481- CLAT PG - 2026
- Constitutional Laws
- It is well recognized that actionable negligence in context of medical profession involves three constituents (i) duty to exercise due care; (ii) breach of duty and (iii) consequential damage. However, a simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident is not sufficient proof of negligence on part of the medical professional so long as the doctor follows the acceptable practice of the medical profession in discharge of his duties. He cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative treatment or course of treatment was available or that more skilled doctors were there who could have administered better treatment.
A medical professional may be held liable for negligence only when he is not pos sessed with the requisite qualification or skill or when he fails to exercise reasonable skill which he possesses in giving the treatment. None of the above two essential conditions for establishing negligence stand satisfied in the case at hand as no ev idence was brought on record to prove that Dr. Neeraj Sud had not exercised due diligence, care or skill which he possessed in operating the patient and giving treatment to him. When reasonable care, expected of the medical professional, is extended or rendered to the patient unless contrary is proved, it would not be a case for actionable negligence.
tracted with edits and revisions from Neeraj Sud v Jaswinder Singh 2024 INSC 825- CLAT PG - 2026
- Law of Torts