Step 1: Market Demand Function and Firm 1's Profit.
The market price \( P \) is given by the demand function: \[ P = 1 - (q_1 + q_2) \] Firm 1's profit, \( \pi_1 \), is given by: \[ \pi_1 = P \cdot q_1 = (1 - (q_1 + q_2)) \cdot q_1 = q_1 - q_1^2 - q_1q_2 \] Since Firm 1 believes there is a 50% chance that Firm 2’s cost function is \( 0.5q_2 \) and a 50% chance it is \( 0.25q_2 \), the expected profit of Firm 1 is the weighted average of the profits under these two scenarios.
Step 2: Firm 2’s Reaction Functions.
For the case when Firm 2’s cost is \( 0.5q_2 \), Firm 2’s profit is: \[ \pi_2 = P \cdot q_2 - 0.5q_2^2 = (1 - (q_1 + q_2)) \cdot q_2 - 0.5q_2^2 \] \[ \pi_2 = q_2 - q_1q_2 - q_2^2 - 0.5q_2^2 = q_2 - q_1q_2 - 1.5q_2^2 \] Maximizing \( \pi_2 \) with respect to \( q_2 \), we get the reaction function: \[ \frac{d\pi_2}{dq_2} = 1 - q_1 - 3q_2 = 0 \] \[ q_2 = \frac{1 - q_1}{3} \] For the case when Firm 2’s cost is \( 0.25q_2 \), Firm 2’s profit is: \[ \pi_2 = (1 - (q_1 + q_2)) \cdot q_2 - 0.25q_2^2 \] \[ \pi_2 = q_2 - q_1q_2 - q_2^2 - 0.25q_2^2 = q_2 - q_1q_2 - 1.25q_2^2 \] Maximizing \( \pi_2 \) with respect to \( q_2 \), we get the reaction function: \[ \frac{d\pi_2}{dq_2} = 1 - q_1 - 2.5q_2 = 0 \] \[ q_2 = \frac{1 - q_1}{2.5} \] Step 3: Solving for Firm 1’s Optimal Quantity.
Firm 1’s expected profit is the average of the profits in both scenarios, which requires solving for \( q_1 \) by substituting the reaction functions of Firm 2 into Firm 1’s profit function and maximizing. After solving, we find that \( q_1^* = 0.4375 \).
Step 4: Final Answer.
The value of \( 24q_1^* \) is: \[ 24 \times 0.4375 = 10.5 \]
Consider the following statements:
Statement 1: The new classical policy ineffectiveness proposition asserts that, systematic monetary policy and fiscal policy actions that change aggregate demand will not affect output and employment even in short run.
Statement 2: According to Real Business Cycle (RBC) model, the aggregate economic variables are the outcomes of the decisions made by many individual agents acting to maximize their utility subject to production possibilities and resource constraints.
For a closed economy with no government expenditure and taxes, the aggregate consumption function (\(C\)) is given by: \[ C = 100 + 0.75 \, Y_d \] where \( Y_d \) is the disposable income. If the total investment is 80, the equilibrium output is ____________ (in integer).
Two players \( A \) and \( B \) are playing a game. Player \( A \) has two available actions \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \). Player \( B \) has two available actions \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \). The payoff matrix arising from their actions is presented below:
Let \( p \) be the probability that player \( A \) plays action \( a_1 \) in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
Then the value of p is (round off to one decimal place).
The installation cost (IC) of a solar power plant is INR 89,000. The plant shall be operational for 5 years. The recurring costs for maintenance of the solar plant per year is INR 5,000 but the benefits it creates including reduction in emissions amounts to INR 25,000 per year. These are the only costs and benefits associated with this project. The social discount rate (r) considered is 4% per year. The yearwise information is presented below.
A coin has a true probability \( \mu \) of turning up Heads. This coin is tossed 100 times and shows up Heads 60 times. The following hypothesis is tested:
\[ H_0: \mu = 0.5 \quad ({Null Hypothesis}), \quad H_1: \mu>0.5 \quad ({Alternative Hypothesis}) \]
Using the Central Limit Theorem, the \( p \)-value of the above test is ________ (round off to three decimal places).
Hint: If Z is a random variable that follows a standard normal distribution, then P (Z ≤ 2) = 0.977.