The solution to the problem "the author of the passage is likely to disagree with all of the following statements, EXCEPT" involves understanding the author's stance on liberalism based on the passage provided. Let's analyze the information:
1. If we accept that liberalism is a dying ideal, we must work to find a viable substitute. The passage argues against liberalism's demise, implying the author disagrees with the notion of liberalism as a dying ideal, thus likely opposing this statement.
2. Liberalism was the dominant ideal in the past century, but it had to reform itself to remain so. The passage mentions liberalism's ability to reform, indicating the author agrees with this point, making it the exception.
3. Claims about liberalism’s disintegration are exaggerated and misunderstand its core features. The passage critiques liberalism’s disintegration but highlights its adaptability, which the author might challenge, suggesting disagreement with this statement.
4. The essence of liberalism lies in greater individual self-expression and freedoms. The author challenges the oversimplified essence of liberalism, suggesting disagreement with this statement as well.
Considering the passage and the author's perspective, option 2 is the exception the author is likely to agree with: "Liberalism was the dominant ideal in the past century, but it had to reform itself to remain so."
To determine which statement does not serve as evidence of the decline of liberalism, we need to identify if each provided option aligns with the stated decline in the passage. Let's analyze each statement:
1. "‘The gap between liberalism’s claims about itself and the lived reality of the citizenry’ is now so wide that ‘the lie can no longer be accepted,’ . . .” This statement highlights the disparity between liberalism's promises and actual societal experiences, indicating a negative perception and thus suggesting evidence of decline.
2. “And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery.” This statement refers to technological changes leading to monotonous jobs. While it discusses a societal issue, it doesn't directly critique liberalism itself as failing; instead, it identifies a byproduct of technological progress, which can occur in any political or economic system.
3. “. . . the creation of a business aristocracy, the rise of vast companies . . .” This reflects concerns about an elite class dominating economic structures, indicative of liberalism failing to provide equality, hence supporting its decline.
4. “Democracy has degenerated into a theatre of the absurd.” This depicts democracy, a core tenet of liberalism, as a farce, clearly underscoring liberalism's perceived decline.
Among these, statement 2 is the exception, as it merely mentions a side effect of technological advancement without attributing this issue to a failure of liberalism. Therefore, the correct answer is:
“And technological advances are reducing ever more areas of work into meaningless drudgery.”
Take note of the context in which the author discusses the "Davos elite": "As members of the Davos elite pile their plates ever higher with perks and share options, the biggest enemy of liberalism is not so much atomization but old-fashioned greed." Option B is the only one that mentions the Davos elite's avarice. This is the right response option.
Option A is wrong because the passage calls out the hypocrisy of the Davos elite's actions rather than implying that the advent of liberalism has increased interest in shared futures among improbable socioeconomic classes.
Option C is inaccurate because the paragraph refers to internal inconsistencies and arrogance rather than directly linking the fall in liberal values to the rich profiting.
Option D is wrong since the passage criticizes the Davos elite's activities rather than focusing on how the rich and powerful control the liberal language.
The correct option is (B): the hypocrisy of the liberal rich, who profess to subscribe to liberal values while cornering most of the wealth.
When people who are talking don’t share the same culture, knowledge, values, and assumptions, mutual understanding can be especially difficult. Such understanding is possible through the negotiation of meaning. To negotiate meaning with someone, you have to become aware of and respect both the differences in your backgrounds and when these differences are important. You need enough diversity of cultural and personal experience to be aware that divergent world views exist and what they might be like. You also need the flexibility in world view, and a generous tolerance for mistakes, as well as a talent for finding the right metaphor to communicate the relevant parts of unshared experiences or to highlight the shared experiences while demphasizing the others. Metaphorical imagination is a crucial skill in creating rapport and in communicating the nature of unshared experience. This skill consists, in large measure, of the ability to bend your world view and adjust the way you categorize your experiences. Problems of mutual understanding are not exotic; they arise in all extended conversations where understanding is important.
When it really counts, meaning is almost never communicated according to the CONDUIT metaphor, that is, where one person transmits a fixed, clear proposition to another by means of expressions in a common language, where both parties have all the relevant common knowledge, assumptions, values, etc. When the chips are down, meaning is negotiated: you slowly figure out what you have in common, what it is safe to talk about, how you can communicate unshared experience or create a shared vision. With enough flexibility in bending your world view and with luck and charity, you may achieve some mutual understanding.
Communication theories based on the CONDUIT metaphor turn from the pathetic to the evil when they are applied indiscriminately on a large scale, say, in government surveillance or computerized files. There, what is most crucial for real understanding is almost never included, and it is assumed that the words in the file have meaning in themselves—disembodied, objective, understandable meaning. When a society lives by the CONDUITmetaphor on a large scale, misunderstanding, persecution, and much worse are the likely products.
Later, I realized that reviewing the history of nuclear physics served another purpose as well: It gave the lie to the naive belief that the physicists could have come together when nuclear fission was discovered (in Nazi Germany!) and agreed to keep the discovery a secret, thereby sparing humanity such a burden. No. Given the development of nuclear physics up to 1938, development that physicists throughout the world pursued in all innocence of any intention of finding the engine of a new weapon of mass destruction—only one of them, the remarkable Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, took that possibility seriously—the discovery of nuclear fission was inevitable. To stop it, you would have had to stop physics. If German scientists hadn’t made the discovery when they did, French, American, Russian, Italian, or Danish scientists would have done so, almost certainly within days or weeks. They were all working at the same cutting edge, trying to understand the strange results of a simple experiment bombarding uranium with neutrons. Here was no Faustian bargain, as movie directors and other naifs still find it intellectually challenging to imagine. Here was no evil machinery that the noble scientists might hide from the problems and the generals. To the contrary, there was a high insight into how the world works, an energetic reaction, older than the earth, that science had finally devised the instruments and arrangements to coart forth. “Make it seem inevitable,” Louis Pasteur used to advise his students when they prepared to write up their discoveries. But it was. To wish that it might have been ignored or suppressed is barbarous. “Knowledge,” Niels Bohr once noted, “is itself the basis for civilization.” You cannot have the one without the other; the one depends upon the other. Nor can you have only benevolent knowledge; the scientific method doesn’t filter for benevolence. Knowledge has consequences, not always intended, not always comfortable, but always welcome. The earth revolves around the sun, not the sun around the earth. “It is a profound and necessary truth,” Robert Oppenheimer would say, “that the deep things in science are not found because they are useful; they are found because it was possible to find them.”
...Bohr proposed once that the goal of science is not universal truth. Rather, he argued, the modest but relentless goal of science is “the gradual removal of prejudices.” The discovery that the earth revolves around the sun has gradually removed the prejudice that the earth is the center of the universe. The discovery of microbes is gradually removing the prejudice that disease is a punishment from God. The discovery of evolution is gradually removing the prejudice that Homo sapiens is a separate and special creation.
As the post–World War II generation of liberal democratic leaders forged new, highly successful domestic and international institutions and policies throughout the West, the weaknesses of liberal democracy that dominated the two decades after World War II faded from view. But they did not go away.
First, because liberal democracy restrains majorities, it slows the achievement of goals that majorities support. This generates frustration with institutional restraints, and an unacknowledged envy of authoritarian systems that can act quickly and decisively. China can build huge cities in the time it takes the United States to review the environmental impact of small highway projects. Liberal democracy requires more patience than many possess. Second, liberal democracy requires tolerance for minority views and ways of life to which many citizens are deeply opposed. It is natural to feel that if we consider certain views or ways of life to be odious, we should use public power to suppress them. In many such cases, liberal democracy restrains this impulse, a psychological burden that some will find unbearable.
This leads directly to the third inherent problem of liberal democracy—the distinction it requires us to make between civic identity and personal or group identity. For example, although we may consider certain religious views false and even dangerous, we must, for civic purposes, accept those who hold these views as our equals. They may freely express these views; they may organize to promote them; they may vote, and their votes are given the same weight as ours. The same goes for race, ethnicity, gender, and all the particularities that distinguish us from one another.
This requirement often goes against the grain of natural sentiments. We want the public sphere to reflect what we find most valuable about our private commitments. Liberal democracy prevents us from fully translating our personal identities into our public lives as citizens. This too is not always easy to bear. The quest for wholeness—for a political community, or even a world, that reflects our most important commitments—is a deep yearning to which liberal leaders can always appeal.
Nor is the fourth inherent difficulty of liberal democracy—the necessity of compromise—easy to bear. If what I want is good and true, why should I agree that public decisions must incorporate competing views? James Madison gives us the answer: in circumstances of liberty, diversity of views is inevitable, and unless those who agree with us form a majority so large as to be irresistible, the alternative to compromise is inaction, which is often more damaging, or oppression, which always is.
Beware of the old newspapers
stacked
on that little three legged stool over there.
Don’t disturb them.
I know it for a fact
that snakes have spawned in between these sheets.
Don’t even look in that direction.
It’s not because of breeze
that their corners are fluttering.
It’s alive, that nest of newspapers.
new born snakes, coiling and uncurling,
are turning their heads to look at you.
That white corner has spread its hood.
A forked tongue
shoots out of its mouth.
Keep your eyes closed.
Get rid of the whole goddamn pile if you
want to
in the morning.
For any natural number $k$, let $a_k = 3^k$. The smallest natural number $m$ for which \[ (a_1)^1 \times (a_2)^2 \times \dots \times (a_{20})^{20} \;<\; a_{21} \times a_{22} \times \dots \times a_{20+m} \] is: