The opinion polls had been wrong. Although they were signalling a weakening in Labour’s lead in the days before the general election — which pointed to a hung parliament — many working-class voters had been embarrassed to tell middle-class pollsters that they were intending to vote Labour. The final result on April 9, 1992, which gave Neil Kinnock a working majority of 30, was a turnaround of the century.
As John Major cleared his desk in Downing Street, pundit after pundit lined up to criticise his lacklustre campaign. The trouble was, they all agreed, that the Conservative Party no longer had a message or political purpose. Its representation in the north of England was decimated; its future as a national party doubtful.
For Kinnock the victory was a sweet reward for nine years of Herculean labour in making his party electable. Not only had he a working majority, but the divisions in Conservative ranks —between anti-Europeans, free marketers and moderates — threatened to split the party. Having set himself the objective of heading a two or three term government, Kinnock made his cabinet appointments with the long haul in min(d) There were few surprises. John Smith, with whom he coexisted uneasily, was made chancellor; Roy Hattersley became home secretary; Gerald Kaufmann went to the foreign office; inveterate Euro-sceptic Bryan Gould took over environment; and Gordon Brown went to trade. It was, as many commentators conceded, a much more heavyweight cabinet than any of the Conservatives could have mustere(d)
But the new cabinet was to have its first trial of strength very soon. The problem was the foreign exchange markets. Although both Kinnock and Smith had, throughout, the election campaign, reaffirmed their commitment to hold the pound’s parity at 2.95DM inside the ERM, the foreign exchange markets simply did not believe them. Every previous Labour government had devalued; what reason was there to suppose this one would be different? The pressure built up immediately. On Friday, April 10, the Bank of England managed to hold the line only by spending £4 billion — around a sixth of its total reserves — to support the exchange rate. But late that night, as the New York markets closed, the Governor of the Bank of England felt the devaluation to a meeting at 11, Downing Street with Smith and the permanent secretary to the Treasury, Sir Terence Burns. If, said the governor, the pound was to survive the coming week inside the ERM, then Smith would have to demonstrate his resolve by raising interest rates — by at least 2 per cent. It would also help, added the officials, if the government were to commit Britain to full monetary union and to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency. This would mean that both the taxation from Smith’s first budget would have to be used to reduce government borrowing and the manifesto promises to raise child benefit and pensions be postpone(d)
Smith listened to Eddie George — number two at the Bank of England and the arbiter of British exchange rate policy — explain that, at the current rate of reserve loss, Britain’s reserves would have run out by the following weeken(d) The markets needed decisive action.
And they needed to know, by the night of Sunday, April 12, at the very latest, what the government would do when the far-eastern markets opened after the weeken(d) Sir Terence advised that once the markets recognised the government was resolved to hold the exchange rate, pressure would quickly subside and the interest rate increases could be reverse(d) The name of the game was earning credibility.
Although Smith had been warned to expect a Treasury/Bank of England move to assert the cannons of economic orthodoxy, he had hoped to have been more than a few hours into his chancellorship before the pressures started to mount. As it stood, he felt like the victim of a coup and wondered to what extent the foreign exchange market selling had been prompted by the Bank of England’s ham fisted intervention — almost designed to manufacture a run on the poun(d) In any case, he could do nothing without conferring with the prime minister. In fact Kinnock had asked Smith to have the preliminary Bank of England meeting without him. Although he was not at one with his chancellor over economic policy and distrusted his judgement, he wanted to complete his cabinet appointments — and confer with his own advisers about how to react to what he knew the bank and treasury recommendations would be. He was determined to avoid being bounced into decisions before he had decided his line. The alternative was to apply to the EC for a realignment conference, in which many more currencies would be devalue(d) But that could hardly be done then; it would have to wait until the following weeken(d) And it was not clear if the pound could be devalued sufficiently, or if other countries would follow the British lea(d) Not only would such a move be regarded in the EC as a failure of the British government to make a difference; and be accompanied by devaluation.


When people who are talking don’t share the same culture, knowledge, values, and assumptions, mutual understanding can be especially difficult. Such understanding is possible through the negotiation of meaning. To negotiate meaning with someone, you have to become aware of and respect both the differences in your backgrounds and when these differences are important. You need enough diversity of cultural and personal experience to be aware that divergent world views exist and what they might be like. You also need the flexibility in world view, and a generous tolerance for mistakes, as well as a talent for finding the right metaphor to communicate the relevant parts of unshared experiences or to highlight the shared experiences while demphasizing the others. Metaphorical imagination is a crucial skill in creating rapport and in communicating the nature of unshared experience. This skill consists, in large measure, of the ability to bend your world view and adjust the way you categorize your experiences. Problems of mutual understanding are not exotic; they arise in all extended conversations where understanding is important.
When it really counts, meaning is almost never communicated according to the CONDUIT metaphor, that is, where one person transmits a fixed, clear proposition to another by means of expressions in a common language, where both parties have all the relevant common knowledge, assumptions, values, etc. When the chips are down, meaning is negotiated: you slowly figure out what you have in common, what it is safe to talk about, how you can communicate unshared experience or create a shared vision. With enough flexibility in bending your world view and with luck and charity, you may achieve some mutual understanding.
Communication theories based on the CONDUIT metaphor turn from the pathetic to the evil when they are applied indiscriminately on a large scale, say, in government surveillance or computerized files. There, what is most crucial for real understanding is almost never included, and it is assumed that the words in the file have meaning in themselves—disembodied, objective, understandable meaning. When a society lives by the CONDUITmetaphor on a large scale, misunderstanding, persecution, and much worse are the likely products.
Later, I realized that reviewing the history of nuclear physics served another purpose as well: It gave the lie to the naive belief that the physicists could have come together when nuclear fission was discovered (in Nazi Germany!) and agreed to keep the discovery a secret, thereby sparing humanity such a burden. No. Given the development of nuclear physics up to 1938, development that physicists throughout the world pursued in all innocence of any intention of finding the engine of a new weapon of mass destruction—only one of them, the remarkable Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, took that possibility seriously—the discovery of nuclear fission was inevitable. To stop it, you would have had to stop physics. If German scientists hadn’t made the discovery when they did, French, American, Russian, Italian, or Danish scientists would have done so, almost certainly within days or weeks. They were all working at the same cutting edge, trying to understand the strange results of a simple experiment bombarding uranium with neutrons. Here was no Faustian bargain, as movie directors and other naifs still find it intellectually challenging to imagine. Here was no evil machinery that the noble scientists might hide from the problems and the generals. To the contrary, there was a high insight into how the world works, an energetic reaction, older than the earth, that science had finally devised the instruments and arrangements to coart forth. “Make it seem inevitable,” Louis Pasteur used to advise his students when they prepared to write up their discoveries. But it was. To wish that it might have been ignored or suppressed is barbarous. “Knowledge,” Niels Bohr once noted, “is itself the basis for civilization.” You cannot have the one without the other; the one depends upon the other. Nor can you have only benevolent knowledge; the scientific method doesn’t filter for benevolence. Knowledge has consequences, not always intended, not always comfortable, but always welcome. The earth revolves around the sun, not the sun around the earth. “It is a profound and necessary truth,” Robert Oppenheimer would say, “that the deep things in science are not found because they are useful; they are found because it was possible to find them.”
...Bohr proposed once that the goal of science is not universal truth. Rather, he argued, the modest but relentless goal of science is “the gradual removal of prejudices.” The discovery that the earth revolves around the sun has gradually removed the prejudice that the earth is the center of the universe. The discovery of microbes is gradually removing the prejudice that disease is a punishment from God. The discovery of evolution is gradually removing the prejudice that Homo sapiens is a separate and special creation.
For any natural number $k$, let $a_k = 3^k$. The smallest natural number $m$ for which \[ (a_1)^1 \times (a_2)^2 \times \dots \times (a_{20})^{20} \;<\; a_{21} \times a_{22} \times \dots \times a_{20+m} \] is: