
Two players \( A \) and \( B \) are playing a game. Player \( A \) has two available actions \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \). Player \( B \) has two available actions \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \). The payoff matrix arising from their actions is presented below:

Let \( p \) be the probability that player \( A \) plays action \( a_1 \) in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
Then the value of p is (round off to one decimal place).
Three friends, P, Q, and R, are solving a puzzle with statements:
(i) If P is a knight, Q is a knave.
(ii) If Q is a knight, R is a spy.
(iii) If R is a knight, P is a knave. Knights always tell the truth, knaves always lie, and spies sometimes tell the truth. If each friend is either a knight, knave, or spy, who is the knight?