In the first scene of “Hitchcock Loves Bikinis”, a young mum is playing happily with her baby. Next comes a close-up shot of Alfred Hitchcock, the late movie director, smiling. Clearly, he is a man whose heart is warmed by this sweet glimpse of maternal love. In the next scene, we see a bikini-clad woman sunbathing followed by exactly the same shot of Hitchcock smiling. Instead of a benign grandfatherly figure, this time we see a lecherous old man. The moral of the story is simple: context is everything.
Mr. Kagan’s effort, “Psychology’s Ghosts,” consists of his assessment of four problems in psychological theory and clinical practice. The first problem is laid out in the chapter “Missing Contexts”: the fact that many researchers fail to consider that their measurements of brains, behaviour and self-reported experience are profoundly influenced by their subjects’ culture, time and experience, as well as by the situation in which the research is conducted. In his second essay, “Happiness Ascendant”, Mr. Kagan virtually demolishes the popular academic effort to measure “subjective well-being”, let alone to measure and compare the level of happiness of entire nations. No psychologist, he observes, would accept as reliable your own answer to the question: “How good is your memory?” Whether your answer is “great” or “terrible”, you have no way of knowing whether your memory of good or bad memories is accurate. But psychologists, Mr. Kagan argues, are willing to accept people’s answers to how happy they are as if “it is an accurate measure of a psychological state whose definition remains fuzzy.”
In the third and fourth essays, “Who Is Mentally Ill?” and “Helping the Mentally Ill”, Mr. Kagan turns to the intransigent problems of psychiatric diagnosis and treatment. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) “regards every intense bout of sadness or worry, no matter what their origin, as a possible sign of mental disorder.” Mr. Kagan laments. But “most of these illness categories are analogous to complaints of headaches or cramps. Physicians can decide on the best treatment for a headache only after they have determined its cause. The symptom alone is an insufficient guide.”
Nonetheless, the DSM is primarily a collection of symptoms, overlooking the context in which a symptom such as anxiety or low sexual desire occurs and what it means to an individual. It might mean nothing at all. What it means to an American might mean nothing to a Japanese. The same one-size-fits-all approach plagues treatment: “Most drugs can be likened to a blow on the head,” Mr. Kagan observes, they are blunt instruments, not precisely-tailored remedies. Psychotherapy depends largely on the clients’ belief that it will be helpful, which is why all therapies help some people and some people are not helped by any. No experience affects everyone equally — including natural disasters, abuse, having a cruel parent, losing a job or having an illicit affair — though many therapists wish us to believe the opposite
The comprehension passage discusses Mr. Kagan's critique of psychological practices and the DSM's approach to diagnosing mental disorders. He argues that the DSM reduces mental disorders to a collection of standard symptoms without considering the context or the individual differences of the patients. This is evident in the passage where it states, “Nonetheless, the DSM is primarily a collection of symptoms, overlooking the context in which a symptom such as anxiety or low sexual desire occurs and what it means to an individual.” This supports the correct answer choice: “It reduces mental disorders to standard symptoms.” Other options do not align with the main argument presented in the passage. This choice reflects the idea that DSM simplifies mental disorders to a list of symptoms, ignoring the complexities and varying contexts that can influence these symptoms.
Based on the passage, the author expresses skepticism about the current state of psychiatric treatment, particularly regarding the role of drugs. The passage critiques the standard approach to psychiatric diagnosis and treatment, emphasizing a lack of context in diagnoses and treatments like those outlined in the DSM. It suggests that drugs are used to treat symptoms rather than addressing underlying causes, which aligns with the correct answer: "Drugs treat symptoms and they may or may not work." The author underscores the inefficacy of a universal approach, highlighting how symptoms and treatments can vary in effectiveness depending on individual contexts. Hence, the critique is mainly directed at how psychiatric treatments, particularly drug-based ones, often apply a general solution to context-specific problems.
The passage opens with a scenario from “Hitchcock Loves Bikinis”, illustrating the importance of context in shaping perceptions. This example is strategically placed at the beginning to effectively illustrate the broader issue discussed throughout the passage: the neglect of context in psychological research and clinical practices. The example of how Hitchcock's smile changes its meaning based on the preceding scene underscores the broader argument that context is crucial in understanding behaviors and perceptions. This aligns with the correct answer: the first paragraph cites a case that exemplifies a problem discussed more broadly in the text, specifically the oversight of contextual influences in psychological evaluations and treatments.


When people who are talking don’t share the same culture, knowledge, values, and assumptions, mutual understanding can be especially difficult. Such understanding is possible through the negotiation of meaning. To negotiate meaning with someone, you have to become aware of and respect both the differences in your backgrounds and when these differences are important. You need enough diversity of cultural and personal experience to be aware that divergent world views exist and what they might be like. You also need the flexibility in world view, and a generous tolerance for mistakes, as well as a talent for finding the right metaphor to communicate the relevant parts of unshared experiences or to highlight the shared experiences while demphasizing the others. Metaphorical imagination is a crucial skill in creating rapport and in communicating the nature of unshared experience. This skill consists, in large measure, of the ability to bend your world view and adjust the way you categorize your experiences. Problems of mutual understanding are not exotic; they arise in all extended conversations where understanding is important.
When it really counts, meaning is almost never communicated according to the CONDUIT metaphor, that is, where one person transmits a fixed, clear proposition to another by means of expressions in a common language, where both parties have all the relevant common knowledge, assumptions, values, etc. When the chips are down, meaning is negotiated: you slowly figure out what you have in common, what it is safe to talk about, how you can communicate unshared experience or create a shared vision. With enough flexibility in bending your world view and with luck and charity, you may achieve some mutual understanding.
Communication theories based on the CONDUIT metaphor turn from the pathetic to the evil when they are applied indiscriminately on a large scale, say, in government surveillance or computerized files. There, what is most crucial for real understanding is almost never included, and it is assumed that the words in the file have meaning in themselves—disembodied, objective, understandable meaning. When a society lives by the CONDUITmetaphor on a large scale, misunderstanding, persecution, and much worse are the likely products.
Later, I realized that reviewing the history of nuclear physics served another purpose as well: It gave the lie to the naive belief that the physicists could have come together when nuclear fission was discovered (in Nazi Germany!) and agreed to keep the discovery a secret, thereby sparing humanity such a burden. No. Given the development of nuclear physics up to 1938, development that physicists throughout the world pursued in all innocence of any intention of finding the engine of a new weapon of mass destruction—only one of them, the remarkable Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, took that possibility seriously—the discovery of nuclear fission was inevitable. To stop it, you would have had to stop physics. If German scientists hadn’t made the discovery when they did, French, American, Russian, Italian, or Danish scientists would have done so, almost certainly within days or weeks. They were all working at the same cutting edge, trying to understand the strange results of a simple experiment bombarding uranium with neutrons. Here was no Faustian bargain, as movie directors and other naifs still find it intellectually challenging to imagine. Here was no evil machinery that the noble scientists might hide from the problems and the generals. To the contrary, there was a high insight into how the world works, an energetic reaction, older than the earth, that science had finally devised the instruments and arrangements to coart forth. “Make it seem inevitable,” Louis Pasteur used to advise his students when they prepared to write up their discoveries. But it was. To wish that it might have been ignored or suppressed is barbarous. “Knowledge,” Niels Bohr once noted, “is itself the basis for civilization.” You cannot have the one without the other; the one depends upon the other. Nor can you have only benevolent knowledge; the scientific method doesn’t filter for benevolence. Knowledge has consequences, not always intended, not always comfortable, but always welcome. The earth revolves around the sun, not the sun around the earth. “It is a profound and necessary truth,” Robert Oppenheimer would say, “that the deep things in science are not found because they are useful; they are found because it was possible to find them.”
...Bohr proposed once that the goal of science is not universal truth. Rather, he argued, the modest but relentless goal of science is “the gradual removal of prejudices.” The discovery that the earth revolves around the sun has gradually removed the prejudice that the earth is the center of the universe. The discovery of microbes is gradually removing the prejudice that disease is a punishment from God. The discovery of evolution is gradually removing the prejudice that Homo sapiens is a separate and special creation.
For any natural number $k$, let $a_k = 3^k$. The smallest natural number $m$ for which \[ (a_1)^1 \times (a_2)^2 \times \dots \times (a_{20})^{20} \;<\; a_{21} \times a_{22} \times \dots \times a_{20+m} \] is: