Bregman opposes Hobbes' belief in humans' inherent selfishness or savagery and aligns himself with Rousseau instead. He argues that negative or undesirable circumstances are the result of civilizational progress stemming from the post-agricultural era. In support of this argument, he contrasts pre-agricultural and post-agricultural societies, portraying the nomadic lifestyle as an "unspoiled paradise" while depicting the discovery of agriculture as a regrettable event. This portrayal enhances his assertion that humans are fundamentally good, but societal progress can lead them to selfishness. Option A is the correct choice.
Option B: The environment is not the primary focus of the discussion, so this option can also be discarded.
Option C: This option veers off into discussing the impact of settled farming on population growth, which is not directly relevant to the main argument. Therefore, it can be eliminated.
Option D: Complexity is not the central focus of the discussion, so this option can be dismissed.
So, the correct answer is (A): bolster his argument that people are basically decent, but progress as we know it can make them selfish.
Option A: The author characterizes the perspectives of Hobbes and Rousseau as diametrically opposed ("Hobbes and Rousseau are seen as the two poles of the human nature argument") and does not present a similarity, especially any comment suggesting "both believed in the need for a strong state." Hence, we can discard this option.
Option B: No such viewpoint is presented in the passage.
Option C: The author's assessment of Frans de Waal's "veneer theory" is not explicitly highlighted. Therefore, we can eliminate this option.
Option D: The opening lines of the passage help us infer this viewpoint: "....Although one of the most contested concepts in political philosophy, human nature is something on which most people seem to agree. By and large, according to Rutger Bregman in his new book Humankind, we have a rather pessimistic view - not of ourselves exactly, but of everyone else. We see other people as selfish, untrustworthy and dangerous and therefore we behave towards them with defensiveness and suspicion..."
So, the correct answer is (D): most people agree with Hobbes’ pessimistic view of human nature as being intrinsically untrustworthy and selfish.
In the passage, the author discusses the views of Rutger Bregman, who takes a positive approach towards human nature, aligning with the ideas of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Rousseau believed that humans were naturally harmonious and that civilization, with its coercive powers and social structures, corrupted this natural state. Bregman argues against the notion that civilization is inherently necessary to prevent chaos, suggesting instead that primitive, pre-agricultural societies were more egalitarian and less repressive.
The author differentiates their perspective from Bregman's on the notion of civilization. Bregman sees civilization as coercive and unjust, a theme echoed in the provided options as he suggests civilized society introduces inequities and oppressions. The correct answer, a civilised society being coercive and unjust, captures the key point of differentiation between Bregman's belief that civilization brings coercion and the author's implied skepticism about this narrative by stating that the truth likely lies between Rousseau's and Hobbes' positions.


When people who are talking don’t share the same culture, knowledge, values, and assumptions, mutual understanding can be especially difficult. Such understanding is possible through the negotiation of meaning. To negotiate meaning with someone, you have to become aware of and respect both the differences in your backgrounds and when these differences are important. You need enough diversity of cultural and personal experience to be aware that divergent world views exist and what they might be like. You also need the flexibility in world view, and a generous tolerance for mistakes, as well as a talent for finding the right metaphor to communicate the relevant parts of unshared experiences or to highlight the shared experiences while demphasizing the others. Metaphorical imagination is a crucial skill in creating rapport and in communicating the nature of unshared experience. This skill consists, in large measure, of the ability to bend your world view and adjust the way you categorize your experiences. Problems of mutual understanding are not exotic; they arise in all extended conversations where understanding is important.
When it really counts, meaning is almost never communicated according to the CONDUIT metaphor, that is, where one person transmits a fixed, clear proposition to another by means of expressions in a common language, where both parties have all the relevant common knowledge, assumptions, values, etc. When the chips are down, meaning is negotiated: you slowly figure out what you have in common, what it is safe to talk about, how you can communicate unshared experience or create a shared vision. With enough flexibility in bending your world view and with luck and charity, you may achieve some mutual understanding.
Communication theories based on the CONDUIT metaphor turn from the pathetic to the evil when they are applied indiscriminately on a large scale, say, in government surveillance or computerized files. There, what is most crucial for real understanding is almost never included, and it is assumed that the words in the file have meaning in themselves—disembodied, objective, understandable meaning. When a society lives by the CONDUITmetaphor on a large scale, misunderstanding, persecution, and much worse are the likely products.
Later, I realized that reviewing the history of nuclear physics served another purpose as well: It gave the lie to the naive belief that the physicists could have come together when nuclear fission was discovered (in Nazi Germany!) and agreed to keep the discovery a secret, thereby sparing humanity such a burden. No. Given the development of nuclear physics up to 1938, development that physicists throughout the world pursued in all innocence of any intention of finding the engine of a new weapon of mass destruction—only one of them, the remarkable Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard, took that possibility seriously—the discovery of nuclear fission was inevitable. To stop it, you would have had to stop physics. If German scientists hadn’t made the discovery when they did, French, American, Russian, Italian, or Danish scientists would have done so, almost certainly within days or weeks. They were all working at the same cutting edge, trying to understand the strange results of a simple experiment bombarding uranium with neutrons. Here was no Faustian bargain, as movie directors and other naifs still find it intellectually challenging to imagine. Here was no evil machinery that the noble scientists might hide from the problems and the generals. To the contrary, there was a high insight into how the world works, an energetic reaction, older than the earth, that science had finally devised the instruments and arrangements to coart forth. “Make it seem inevitable,” Louis Pasteur used to advise his students when they prepared to write up their discoveries. But it was. To wish that it might have been ignored or suppressed is barbarous. “Knowledge,” Niels Bohr once noted, “is itself the basis for civilization.” You cannot have the one without the other; the one depends upon the other. Nor can you have only benevolent knowledge; the scientific method doesn’t filter for benevolence. Knowledge has consequences, not always intended, not always comfortable, but always welcome. The earth revolves around the sun, not the sun around the earth. “It is a profound and necessary truth,” Robert Oppenheimer would say, “that the deep things in science are not found because they are useful; they are found because it was possible to find them.”
...Bohr proposed once that the goal of science is not universal truth. Rather, he argued, the modest but relentless goal of science is “the gradual removal of prejudices.” The discovery that the earth revolves around the sun has gradually removed the prejudice that the earth is the center of the universe. The discovery of microbes is gradually removing the prejudice that disease is a punishment from God. The discovery of evolution is gradually removing the prejudice that Homo sapiens is a separate and special creation.
For any natural number $k$, let $a_k = 3^k$. The smallest natural number $m$ for which \[ (a_1)^1 \times (a_2)^2 \times \dots \times (a_{20})^{20} \;<\; a_{21} \times a_{22} \times \dots \times a_{20+m} \] is: