To find the equilibrium quantity under perfect competition, we first equate marginal cost (MC) to the market price (P) derived from the inverse demand function. The cost function given for each firm is \(C_i = 0.25q_i^2 + 2q_i + 5\). The marginal cost is the derivative of the cost function with respect to output \(q_i\):
MC = \(\frac{dC_i}{dq_i}\) = \(0.5q_i + 2\).
In perfect competition, MC = P. Thus, \(0.5q_i + 2 = 10 - 0.01Q\).
Since each firm is small and acts independently, assume \(Q = nq\), where \(n = 150\) (number of firms) and \(q_i = q\), the firm's output.
Substituting \(Q = 150q\), we get:
\(0.5q + 2 = 10 - 0.01(150q)\).
Simplifying the equation gives:
\(0.5q + 2 = 10 - 1.5q\).
Rearranging terms:
\(0.5q + 1.5q = 8\).
\(2q = 8\).
\(q = 4\).
Hence, for each firm, the equilibrium output is 4. Consequently, \(Q = 150 \times 4 = 600\).
The sum of the payoffs to the players in the Nash equilibrium of the following simultaneous game is ............
| Player Y | ||
|---|---|---|
| C | NC | |
| Player X | X: 50, Y: 50 | X: 40, Y: 30 |
| X: 30, Y: 40 | X: 20, Y: 20 | |