Given:
Market price for X's output: \(P=1600\) (INR per unit).
External effect per unit: benefit to Y = 700, cost to Z = 300 β net external effect = \(700-300=400\) (INR per unit).
Cost function of firm X: \(\;C(Q_X)=2Q_X^2+10.\)
Step 1 β Private profit maximization (price taker)
Marginal cost: \[ MC=\frac{dC}{dQ_X}=4Q_X. \] For a competitive firm \(MR=P\). Set \(MC=MR\): \[ 4Q_p = 1600 \quad\Rightarrow\quad Q_p = \frac{1600}{4}=400. \]
Step 2 β Socially optimal output (internalize externality)
Social marginal benefit (SMB) = private marginal benefit (price) + net external effect: \[ SMB = P + 400 = 1600 + 400 = 2000. \] Set \(SMB = MC\): \[ 4Q_s = 2000 \quad\Rightarrow\quad Q_s = \frac{2000}{4}=500. \]
Step 3 β Difference
Difference in output: \[ Q_s - Q_p = 500 - 400 = 100\ \text{units}. \] If you instead interpret the question as the monetary difference at the market price, that would be \[ 100\ \text{units}\times 1600\ \text{INR/unit} = 160000\ \text{INR}. \]
Final answer (units): \(\boxed{100}\). (If monetary difference asked: \(160000\) INR.)
The sum of the payoffs to the players in the Nash equilibrium of the following simultaneous game is ............
| Player Y | ||
|---|---|---|
| C | NC | |
| Player X | X: 50, Y: 50 | X: 40, Y: 30 |
| X: 30, Y: 40 | X: 20, Y: 20 | |