
Two players \( A \) and \( B \) are playing a game. Player \( A \) has two available actions \( a_1 \) and \( a_2 \). Player \( B \) has two available actions \( b_1 \) and \( b_2 \). The payoff matrix arising from their actions is presented below:

Let \( p \) be the probability that player \( A \) plays action \( a_1 \) in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game.
Then the value of p is (round off to one decimal place).
Three friends, P, Q, and R, are solving a puzzle with statements:
(i) If P is a knight, Q is a knave.
(ii) If Q is a knight, R is a spy.
(iii) If R is a knight, P is a knave. Knights always tell the truth, knaves always lie, and spies sometimes tell the truth. If each friend is either a knight, knave, or spy, who is the knight?
The figures I, II, and III are parts of a sequence. Which one of the following options comes next in the sequence at IV?

A color model is shown in the figure with color codes: Yellow (Y), Magenta (M), Cyan (Cy), Red (R), Blue (Bl), Green (G), and Black (K). Which one of the following options displays the color codes that are consistent with the color model?
